A. Pascal's statement of his wager argument is couched in terms of the theory of probability and the theory of games, and the exposition is unclear and unnecessarily complicated. The following is a ‘creative’ reformulation of the argument designed to avoid some of the objections which have been or might be raised against the original.

James Cargile ABSTRACT: Many languages have a first person singular subject pronoun. Fewer also have a first person singular object pronoun. The term ‘I’ is commonly used to refer to the person using the term. It has a variety of other uses. A normal person is able to refer...

The ancient semantic paradoxes were thought to undermine the rationalist metaphysics of Plato, and their modern relatives have been used by Russell and others to administer some severe logical and epistemological shocks. These are not just tricks or puzzles, but are intimately connected with some of the liveliest and most basic philosophical disputes about logical form, universals, reference and predication. Dr Cargile offers here an original and sustained treatment of this range of issues, and in fact presents an unfashionable defence (...) of a platonistic ontology. He argues that the paradoxes arise not from mistakes in classical assumptions about truth or from an ontology that includes propositions and properties, but from mistakes in describing what propositions and properties are conveyed by particular linguistic expressions. The book should interest, and may well surprise, philosophers and others concerned with semantics and the foundations of logic. (shrink)

Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads to (...) a new universal of resemblance, and so on. It is argued here that this does not arise for a properly formulated resemblance theory, which only requires one complex relation among the many particulars we deal with, a complex relation which is not multiply instantiated and thus not a universal. (shrink)

In his paper ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, T. S. Kuhn asks: Ought we demand of our concepts, as we do of our laws and theories, that they be applicable to any and every situation that might conceivably arise in any possible world? Is it not sufficient to demand of a concept, as we do of a law or theory, that it be unequivocally applicable in every situation which we expect ever to encounter?

The phrase ‘burden of proof’ or ‘onus probandi’ originally referred to something determined by a judge in a legal proceeding. Some claims would be accepted as true by the court, and other relevant claims would require proving. The burden of doing this proving could be assigned to one or another party by the judge. Success or failure to meet this burden could be determined by the judge or the jury, as could consequences of success or failure.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

(1970). IV. Davidson's notion of logical form 1. Inquiry: Vol. 13, No. 1-4, pp. 129-139.

There are several styles of ontological argument. Here are examples of the first style. God has all perfections. Existence is a perfection. ∴God exists. All perfect beings exist. God is a perfect being. ∴God exists. God couldn't be improved. A being that doesn't exist could be improved . ∴God exists.

One skeptical strategy against A’s claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same “base” for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of (...) skepticism. Even if there are the odd logical possibilities, they do not suffice to warrant skeptical doubts. Rather, there has to be good reason to think that there is a genuine chance of the alleged possibility obtaining. This requirement cannot be satisfied generically, and that is what is wrong with generic skepticism. (shrink)

No one doubts that philosophers have discussed at length ‘the problem of induction’, but it would also be generally recognized that there would be disagreement as to precisely what that problem is. Rather than tackle the formulation problem, I will borrow from a popular text: Our existence as well as science itself is based on the principle of induction that tells us to reason from past frequencies to future likelihoods, from the limited known of the past and present to the (...) unknown of the past, present, and future ... But though inductive probability is psychologically inescapable, we have trouble providing a rational justification for it. We might say, then, that there is such a practice as induction, and a problem associated with it is that of justifying engaging in it. We engage in reasoning from things we know about the past and present to conclusions about the past, present and future. We can't resist doing this but we have trouble finding a rational justification for doing so. This problem suggests a generalization. We engage in reasoning, reaching new conclusions. It would be hard to resist engaging in this practice. How do we provide a rational justification for it? (shrink)

This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here.

In Principia Ethica Moore held that the meaning of the word ‘good’ is a simple, unanalysable, non-natural property. Several features of this claim might be questioned. It might be questioned whether there are properties at all, and whether, even if there are, they are ever the meanings of words. Again, it might be questioned whether the word ‘good’ expresses a property, even assuming that some other words do. Moore considers this latter question, but not the former . The two questions (...) may seem connected by the fact that a negative answer to the first trivially leads to a negative answer for the second. But this triviality should be a caution to us. Otherwise we may confuse nominalism with ethical non-cognitivism or ‘anti-realism’. (shrink)

This presents the Epimenides and some related paradoxes with a brief history. It is then argued that the paradoxes arise from mistaken assumptions about what the relevant problem sentences say. For example, one paradox has the sentence A: “The sentence A is not true” and two premises: (i) that a sentence is true iff what it says is true and (ii) what the sentence A says is that the sentence A is not true. Premise (ii) is false. A similar mistake (...) about what is said is involved in the Epimenides. Paradoxes involving other “propositional attitudes” such as belief, require different treatment, but the proper interpretation of the words involved is, again, the primary requirement for relief. (shrink)

A law saying that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones has been held to be refutable independently of empirical experiments, with a priori “thought experiments”. I argue that these thought experiments do not qualify as good arguments against the law.

… if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration—I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind. (G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 1958, p. 17).

Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When (...) I speak of ‘some reason’ I mean the contradictory of no reason at all (p. 85). (‘A Possible Extension of Logical Theory?’ Geoffrey Hunter, Philosophical Studies 1965, pp. 81–8.). (shrink)

Este artículo empieza con varias interpretaciones de un eslogan panteísta básico. La ambigüedad del eslogan es ilustrada por una critica a la interpretación que Jonathan Bennett hace del panteísmo de Spinoza, según la cualla frase de Spinoza "Todo lo que es, está en Dios" implica que todo lo que está en Dios, es Dios. Seguidamente se arguye que el panteísmo no ofrece solución alguna al problema que tienen los teístas con respecto a si hay cosas distintas de Dios pero no (...) creadas por Dios. Luego se arguye que laexistencia del tipo de totalidad requerida por el panteísmo no es menos problemática que la existencia del Dios teísta en tanto creador. Finalmente, se sostiene que este último es un objeto apropiado de adoración de una manera en que el primero no lo es. (shrink)

It is a common idea in philosophy that some false propositions such as (C) that Charlottesville is the largest city in Virginia, have the property of being possibly true. It is not a clear idea but an important one which has inspired considerable effort at clarification. One suggestion is that there exist (really, not just possibly) “possible worlds” in which C or some suitable facsimile is true. One further attempt at clarification on offer is that there exists (again, really) a (...) maximal consistent set of propositions containing C. It is argued here that these attempts at clarification are profoundly erroneous. There exist actual powers of imaginative construction which would yield a scenario sufficiently detailed to be recognized by competent reviewers as one in which C is true. (The depiction might be in film or narrative and would avoid analytic falsehoods.) This is a frail clarification, vulnerable to questions, but is the best possible direction for a clear idea of the possibility of the proposition. The notion of possible worlds is associated with very valuable work in mathematical logic. It can only improve our appreciation of this excellent work to separate it from cloudy metaphysics. (shrink)

Russell’s formal logic has been criticized by some formal logicians as not having fully precise syntax (form). However, he is guided by the principle of formal logic, (Form) that proof depends entirely on form, independently of content. This is a profoundly questionable view of proof. It conflicts with recognizing that (i) “The set of dogs is a non-self-member” and (ii) “The set of cats is a non-self-member” are attributing different properties in spite of having the same predicate. The predicate form (...) Rx: “x is a non-self-member” is common to (i) and (ii) but the content of the predicate, the property attributed, is different. This is the key to resolving Russell’s paradox and is unavailable to Russell due to his commitment to (Form). His “Vicious Circle Principle” is not well stated and its concern with content conflicts with (Form). But a proper understanding of the principle does provide an answer to the “Truthteller Paradox”. That allows me to close on a note of agreement with Russell. (shrink)