Audio features such as inharmonicity, noisiness, and spectral roll-off have been identified as correlates of “noisy” sounds. However, such features are likely involved in the experience of multiple semantic timbre categories of varied meaning and valence. This paper examines the relationships of stimulus properties and audio features with the semantic timbre categories raspy/grainy/rough, harsh/noisy, and airy/breathy. Participants rated a random subset of 52 stimuli from a set of 156 approximately 2-s orchestral instrument sounds representing varied instrument families, (...) registers, and both traditional and extended playing techniques. Stimuli were rated on the three semantic categories of interest, as well as on perceived playing exertion and emotional valence. Correlational analyses demonstrated a strong negative relationship between positive valence and perceived physical exertion. Exploratory linear mixed models revealed significant effects of extended technique and pitch register on valence, the perception of physical exertion, raspy/grainy/rough, and harsh/noisy. Instrument family was significantly related to ratings of airy/breathy. With an updated version of the Timbre Toolbox, we used 44 summary audio features, extracted from the stimuli using spectral and harmonic representations, as input for various models built to predict mean semantic ratings for each sound on the three semantic categories, on perceived exertion, and on valence. Random Forest models predicting semantic ratings from audio features outperformed Partial Least-Squares Regression models, consistent with previous results suggesting that non-linear methods are advantageous in timbre semantic predictions using audio features. Relative Variable Importance measures from the models among the three semantic categories demonstrate that although these related semantic categories are associated in part with overlapping features, they can be differentiated through individual patterns of audio feature relationships. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel way to understand trust in blockchain technology by analogy with trust placed in institutions. In support of the analysis, a detailed investigation of institutional trust is provided, which is then used as the basis for understanding the nature and ethical limits of blockchain trust. Two interrelated arguments are presented. First, given blockchains’ capacity for being institution-like entities by inviting expectations similar to those invited by traditional institutions, blockchain trust is argued to be (...) best conceptualized as a specialized form of trust in institutions. Keeping only the core functionality and certain normative ideas of institutions, this technology broadens our understanding of trust by removing the need for third parties while retaining the value of trust for the trustor. Second, the paper argues that blockchains’ decentralized nature and the implications and effects of this decentralization on trust issues are double-edged. With the erasure of central points, the systems simultaneously crowd out the pivotal role played by traditional institutions and a cadre of representatives in meeting their assigned obligations and securing the functional systems’ trustworthy performances. As such, blockchain is positioned as a technology containing both disruptive features that can be embedded with meaningful normative values and inherent ethical limits that pose a direct challenge to the actual trustworthiness of blockchain implementations. Such limits are proposed to be ameliorated by facilitating a shift of responsibility to the groups of people directly associated with the engendering of trust in the blockchain context. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Biomedical research based on big data offers immense benefits. Large multisite research that integrates large amounts of personal health data, especially genomic and genetic data, might contribute to a more personalized medicine. This type of research requires the transfer and storage of highly sensitive data, which raises the question of how to protect data subjects against data harm, such as privacy breach, disempowerment, disenfranchisement, and exploitation. As a result, there is a trade-off between reaping the benefits (...) of big-data-based biomedical research and protecting data subjects’ right to informational privacy. Arguments Blockchain technologies are often discussed as a technical fix for the abovementioned trade-off due to their specific features, namely data provenance, decentralization, immutability, and access and governance system. However, implementing blockchain technologies in biomedical research also raises questions regarding consent, legal frameworks, and workflow integration. Hence, accompanying measures, which I call enablers, are necessary to unleash the potential of blockchain technologies. These enablers are innovative models of consent, data ownership models, and regulatory models. Conclusion Blockchain technologies as a technical fix alone is insufficient to resolve the aforementioned trade-off. Combining this technical fix with the enablers outlined above might be the best way to perform biomedical research based on big data and at the same time protect the informational privacy of data subjects. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code and symbols. In what (...) follows, I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful for the future of law and innovation. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the matter on binary code language, rivalrous to legal alphabetic language. Lastly, the study aims at emphasizing the pivotal role of the jurist as an interpreter in a changing society accommodating diverging realms of reality. The study is structured as follows. Firstly, a quick exam of the traits of blockchain networks would provide the contextual link to establish the arguments in support of the need of a standard legal language. Secondly, a comparison between liberal legal institutions and theory of semiotics is set to perceive their functioning and ascertain their limits in the light of todays unprecedented changes. Thirdly, a summary on blockchain networks’ legal features would constitute the thrust behind the idea of a uniform legal language. Methodologically, the argument does also establish some relations with classical laws of physics and philosophy of media. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggested legal interpretation and semiotic-based approach can contribute to overcome existing stumbling blocks including, but not limited to, the lack of cooperation at the international level as well as the gap in State norms when it comes to innovation. In this sense, the proposed strategies do not intend to replace current advances in the legal thought. In contrast, it seeks to harmonise their results providing a methodical approach that can concur to inform a new technique to address new controversial issues. In practice, the proposed method regarding the adoption of a uniform legal language would lower transactive costs in terms of normative coordination in the matter of international cooperation and in the definition of applicable law among different legal systems. Alternatively, it might contribute to the convergence of legal systems and/or their underlying concepts. Differently put, article’s contribution can be envisaged in fostering juridical consistency with regards to different forms of languages’ coexistence. (shrink)

Since the introduction of Ethereum in 2015, blockchain technology (BT) has been evolving, and BT has been associated with the concept of the sharing economy by business academics. Despite the marketing research on the sharing economy that has been extensively conducted in the last decade, the linkage between BT and ethical marketing in the sharing economy remains unclear. Through a systematic literature review of 163 articles and a co-citation analysis, this study identifies the key elements of blockchain capabilities, (...) blockchain attributes, and the underlying economic theories of blockchain. It also synthesizes and proposes a shift of ethical marketing logic in the blockchain-based sharing economy that delineates the principles of stakeholder capitalism. The article concludes with a list of future research directions that underline three approaches of stakeholder theory (i.e., the descriptive, instrument, and normative approaches). These directions aim to guide marketing scholars concerning how BT enables an institutionally embedded view of ethical marketing activities and practices that enhance collaborative marketing and subsequently innovate value chains and create sustainable business models in the sharing economy, as well as to the metaverse. (shrink)

This paper investigates ontological dimensions of the blockchain by asking what kind of socio-technical object bitcoin is. It discusses both blockchain's political qualities and the political forms enabled by its emergence. It first observes recent approaches to the ontology of money and the political qualities of the ledgers used by the current fractional reserve banking model. It then directs the same questions at blockchain technology. The paper discusses an ontology proposed by Ole Bjerg and argues in favour (...) of a mixed-ontology approach to blockchains. It then questions the political qualities of the distributed ledger as a digital object and highlights the apparent absence of authority figures in the model. Finally, it argues that the political ontology of the blockchain can be framed as the displacement of authority from institutional actors into instrumental control of trust, in a dynamically distributed environment. (shrink)

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 is one of America’s most powerful statutes, not only in American domestic environmental law, but in American domestic law in general. The first part of the ESA gives us the ‘Findings, Purposes, and Policy’ that underlie the Act. In this prefratory language, it is explicit that the ESA is referring to instrumental aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific values. But J. Baird Callicott and Andrew Wetzler argued that the ESA is also implicitly (...) committed to endangered species having intrinsic value. I argue that the best explanation of the seeming tacit intrinsic value in the ESA is not that such value really is implicit in the ESA; rather, the best explanation is that the ESA is committed to instrumental value with a certain feature that has not been carefully considered in the environmental ethics/philosophy literature before, that of incalculable instrumental value, in this case held by endangered species. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the instrumental perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in practice and theory by relying on sociological analyses of a well known organization: the Italian Mafia. Legal businesses might share features of the Mafia, such as the propensity to exploit a governance vacuum in society, a strong organizational identity that demarcates the inside from the outside, and an extreme profit motive. Instrumental CSR practices have the power to accelerate a (...) firm's transition to Mafia status through its own pathologies. The boundaries of such instrumentalism are explored and lessons for future CSR research derived, with specific emphasis on a firm's social and normative embeddedness, taking into account the inherent challenge of regulating corporate behaviour in the global economy. (shrink)

If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well – or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. (...) I reject actualism, provide an alternative explanation of its plausible features, and present an independent argument for the transmission principle. (shrink)

Scientific instruments are not neutral artefacts; the perception of their value is greatly determined not only by the objects themselves and the function they perform, but also by the context of their use. In the 16th and 17th centuries, scientific instruments – not only nautical ones – acquired a prominent place in European societies that greatly transcended the specific narrow professional circles that used them. This has already been noted as being an important feature in the development of science in (...) early modern Europe. But exactly how did this happen? Following other recent studies, I argue in this paper that in order to understand this phenomenon one has to look carefully at artisanal practices of the period. (shrink)

The standard view of rationality distinguishes between instrumental rationality and the rationality of ends. We discuss this conception briefly before introducing an alternative theory. According to it, means and ends are interconnected so that the means will produce the ends. In other words, the means are used to shape our ends. We describe and discuss this view, asking whether it can be called rationality. It is clear that this alternative view has many irrational features. But at the same (...) time it is clear that much of our technological culture is based on this view so that also it is hampered by the emerging irrationality. We conclude by discussing the case of genetic engineering as a technology we cannot possibly accept. Its characteristic ends may be of a wrong type. (shrink)

The role that trust plays in blockchain-based systems is understood and portrayed in various manners. The blockchain technology is said to enable and establish trust as well as to redirect it, to substitute for it, and to make it obsolete. Furthermore, there is disagreement on whom or what users have to trust when using the blockchain technology: code, math, algorithms, and machines, or still human actors. This paper hypothesizes that the divergences of the depictions largely rest on (...) implicitly adhering to different accounts of trust. Thus, the goal of this paper is to outline how the current lack of a shared understanding of the term “trust” leads to diverging interpretations of the blockchain technology’s core features. Furthermore, it shows how this lack of common understanding obstructs scholars from referring to one another meaningfully in the discourse on blockchain technology. To do so, this paper outlines the most prominent depictions of the setup of relevant trust relationships within blockchain-based systems and traces their roots to different underlying assumptions on the nature of trust. (shrink)

The invention of Bitcoin in 2008 as a new type of electronic cash has arguably been one of the most radical financial innovations in the last decade. Recently, developer communities of blockchain technologies have started to turn their attention towards the issue of governance. The features of blockchain governance raise questions as to tensions that might arise between a strictly “on-chain” governance system and possible applications of “off-chain” governance. In this paper, we approach these questions by reflecting (...) on a long-running debate in legal philosophy regarding the construction of a positivist legal order. First, we argue that on-chain governance shows striking similarities with Kelsen’s notion of a positivist legal order, characterised by Schmitt as the machine that runs itself. Second, we illustrate some of the problems that emerged from the application of on-chain governance, with particular reference to a calamity in a blockchain-based system called the DAO. Third, we reflect on Schmitt’s argument that the coalescence of private interests is a vulnerability of positivist legal systems, and accordingly posit this as an inherent vulnerability of on-chain governance of existing blockchain-based systems. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe torsion balance, an instrument that was first developed to demonstrate the high precision of physical science in the laboratory became a different sort of demonstration instrument in its brief vogue in the 1920s. This article considers intersecting stories of acquiring and testing the torsion balance as a field instrument in Canada, Britain and Australia. It examines the purchasing trip and fieldwork of A. H. Miller of the Dominion Observatory in 1928–1931, testing conducted by the British Geological Survey in 1926–1930, (...) and finally the Imperial Geophysical Experimental Survey of 1928–1930 in Australia. These different stories produce a kind of collective biography, illustrating well the variety of material and textual records that accrete around instruments, especially expensive ones. But the trials and travels of the torsion balance also point to large themes. By comparing the different ways an instrument becomes valuable, and to whom, these micro-histories reveal significant features of the developing identity of geophysics. They also show the interaction of different forms of scientific internationalism in the inter-war period. (shrink)

Might there be knowledge of non-instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non-instrumental value which are not commonly (...) found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima-facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. (shrink)

By a close examination of changes in analytical chemistry between the years 1920 and 1950, I document the case that natural science has undergone and continues to undergo a major revolution. The central feature of this transformation is the rise in importance of scientific instrumentation. Prior to 1920, analytical chemists determined the chemical constitution of some unknown by treating it with a series of known compounds and observing the kind of reactions it underwent. After 1950, analytical chemists determined the chemical (...) constitution of an unknown by using a variety of instruments which allow one to discriminate chemicals in terms of their physical properties. This transformation involved changes in the practice of analytical chemistry. It involved the development of a new family of scientific instrument-making companies, and a new level of capital expenditure necessary to do analytical chemistry. It involved the development of new means to disseminate information about scientific instruments. While I do not document the broader case, these changes have been widespread throughout the natural sciences. It is the rise in the importance of instrumentation which is the key conceptual change in what has been identified as the fourth big scientific revolution. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta una descripción del sistema fonológico del mapudungun hablado por escolares pehuenches de la VIII Región del Bío-Bío. Este sistema fonológico se compara con el que se presenta en las descripciones fonemáticas existentes del mapudungun en general y de la variante pehuenche en particular. Los colaboradores corresponden a un grupo de 20 escolares de entre 12 y 15 años que cursan 7° y 8° año básico en escuelas rurales adscritas al Programa de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (PEIB) (...) de la comuna de Alto Bío-Bío. Para la recolección del material fonético-fonológico, se elicitó una lista léxica de 64 ítemes y se solicitó a los niños relatar en mapudungun un cuento mapuche. El marco de referencia escogido para el análisis de los datos fue el método descriptivista norteamericano. Esta presentación finaliza con el resumen de los aspectos prominentes de la fonología descrita, una evaluación de los instrumentos utilizados y dos proyecciones a partir de la investigación realizada. This paper presents a description of the Mapudungun’s phonological system spoken by Pehuenche students from the 8th Bío-Bío region. This phonological system is compared to the one that is present in the phonemic descriptions that exist in Mapudungun in general and in the Pehuenche variant in particular. The participants correspond to a group of 20 seventh and eighth graders whose age ranges between 12 and 15, from rural schools that are part of the Programa de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (PEIB) in Alto Bío-Bío. For the phonetic and phonological data, a 64 lexical item list was gathered and participants were requested to tell a short story in Mapudungun. The reference framework selected for the data analysis was the North American descriptive method. This paper ends up with tprominent aspects of the described phonology, an evaluation of the utilized instruments and two projections based on the conducted research. (shrink)

Might there be knowledge of non‐instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing‐how with knowing‐that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non‐instrumental value which are not commonly (...) found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima‐facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. (shrink)

Resumen: Se sostiene que en la Ciencia de la Lógica Hegel distingue, mediante la categoría de “fin subjetivo”, una dimensión puramente instrumental de la actividad del concepto. Tras delinear una lectura de conjunto de la Doctrina del Concepto se reconstruyen sectores clave del capítulo dedicado a la Teleología con vistas a detectar tanto los rasgos fundamentales como las limitaciones de esta dimensión puramente instrumental del concepto. Se concluye que es posible verificar en el capítulo una “lógica de la (...) actividad instrumental” e interpretar en dicha clave la posición sistemática del capítulo. Además, se subrayan los rasgos críticos del tratamiento hegeliano en vista del problema general de una mecanización y desgaste del mundo y de la vida, lo que proyecta el problema al tránsito desde el capítulo Teleología a la sección Idea.: This paper seeks to show that, in the Science of Logic Hegel, through the category of “subjective end”, distinguishes a purely instrumental dimension of the activity of concept. After delineating a general interpretation of the Doctrine of Concept, key aspects of the chapter dedicated of Teleology are re-constructed with the aim of detecting both the fundamental features and the limitations of this purely instrumental dimension of the concept. It is concluded that, in the chapter, it is possible to verify a ‘logic of the instrumentally activity’ and from this standpoint, to interpret the systematic position of the chapter. In addition, critical features of the Hegelian analysis are emphasized in regard to the general problem of mechanization and wear of the world and life, which projects the problem to the transit from chapter on Teleology to the Idea section. (shrink)

This paper argues that Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussion of violence from his Notebooks for an ethics constitutes an attempt to go beyond an instrumental view of violence. An “instrumental view of violence” essentially assumes that violent behavior is a form of pragmatic behavior whose distinguishing feature consists in the kind of means one employs for reaching one’s goals (violent behavior resorting to means that are harmful for others, whereas non-violent behavior does not). For his part, Sartre attempts to provide (...) a stronger demarcation between violent and pragmatic behaviors. First, violent behavior is, for Sartre, not necessarily characterized by the use of particular means, but by a particular manner of using means, one that involves a certain “forcing” or “straining” of the means. Second, I argue that, according to Sartre, in contrast with pragmatic behavior, violent behavior involves a modification of one’s attitude towards one’s goals. Three such modified attitudes with respect to one’s goals are detailed here, namely the non-productive attitude (the assumption that the goal is not to be produced or that it is not to be produced by means that are under our control), the counter-productive attitude (the exacerbation of one’s proximate goal at the expense of more distant goals) and the anti-productive attitude (the active refusal of one’s previously set goal). Moreover, I show that Sartre’s view that violence involves the “straining” of one’s means is undergirded by his idea that violent behavior presupposes the modification of one’s attitude with respect to one’s goals. (shrink)

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific (...) practices; (2) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a “simple exemplar” of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. (shrink)

People often engage in “offline simulation”, considering what would happen if they performed certain actions in the future, or had performed different actions in the past. Prior research shows that these simulations are biased towards actions a person considers to be good—i.e., likely to pay off. We ask whether, and why, this bias might be adaptive. Through computational experiments we compare five agents who differ only in the way they engage in offline simulation, across a variety of different environment types. (...) Broadly speaking, our experiments reveal that simulating actions one already regards as good does in fact confer an advantage in downstream decision making, although this general pattern interacts with features of the environment in important ways. We contrast this bias with alternatives such as simulating actions whose outcomes are instead uncertain. (shrink)

Certain distinctively patristic and medieval features may be traced in Spanish-Renaissance thought, a tradition in which Aristotelianism played an otherwise dominant role. The study of these features may help to better understand the place of Hispanic thought in Renaissance intellectual history. I focus on one such a feature, providentialism, as it can be seen in two representative authors of sixteenth-century Spanish historiography. By discussing their differing providentialist views, and their motives for adopting them in each author’s historical and (...) political circumstances, it is argued that the zeal for justice constitutes a distinctive trait of Spanish-Renaissance thought. (shrink)

Building on Friedrich A. Hayek’s work in social philosophy, the paper gives an account of the central role of ignorance in institutional epistemology. The first part of the paper argues that if individuals involved in the search for knowledge are constitutionally ignorant and guided by norms, as Hayek saw them, they are more likely to attain knowledge if they follow different norms, including those that are redundant. The second part of the paper argues that the market as an institutional arrangement, (...) preferred by Hayek for its epistemic features, may lead to an epistemically detrimental reduction of agents following redundant norms. (shrink)

The paper deals with the topical issue of studying cyclic patterns in the economy and their practical application for the forecasts on the development of financial markets. The work aims to establish the features of the seasonal-cyclic patterns "The January barometer" and "The first five days of January" in the international financial markets in current conditions and to develop recommendations for the practical application of these patterns in the investment activities. The US stock market as an integral part of (...) the World financial market was chosen as a basis for research. The research was conducted by statistical processing of data on the values of the broad market index Standard & Poor's-500 for the period from 1950 to 2019. The study showed that the formation of forecasts about the annual growth or decline of the stock market index using the seasonal-cyclic patterns "The January barometer" and "The first five days of January" can show a high result in cases where the growth of the Standard & Poor's-500 index by the results of both the first five days of January and the results of the entire month of January of this year is a positive value. Otherwise, forecasting based on these instruments is not advisable. The best results (the forecast efficiency was 93.3%) were achieved with the joint application of both cyclic patterns. The practical application of the research results makes it possible to improve the efficiency of investment activities in international financial markets. (shrink)

This book presents fresh insights into analogue quantum simulation. It argues that these simulations are a new instrument of science. They require a bespoke philosophical analysis, sensitive to both the similarities to and the differences with conventional scientific practices such as analogical argument, experimentation, and classical simulation. -/- The analysis situates the various forms of analogue quantum simulation on the methodological map of modern science. In doing so, it clarifies the functions that analogue quantum simulation serves in scientific practice. To (...) this end, the authors introduce a number of important terminological distinctions. They establish that analogue quantum ‘computation' and ‘emulation' are distinct scientific practices and lead to distinct forms of scientific understanding. The authors also demonstrate the normative value of the computation vs. emulation distinction at both an epistemic and a pragmatic level. -/- The volume features a range of detailed case studies focusing on: i) cold atom computation of many-body localisation and the Higgs mode; ii) photonic emulation of quantum effects in biological systems; and iii) emulation of Hawking radiation in dispersive optical media. Overall, readers will discover a normative framework to isolate and support the goals of scientists undertaking analogue quantum simulation and emulation. This framework will prove useful to both working scientists and philosophers of science interested in cutting-edge scientific practice. (shrink)

Because much of the recent philosophical interest in functions has been motivated by their application in biology and other sciences, most of the ensuing discussions have focused on functional explanations to the neglect of the practical role of functional knowledge. This practical role is essential for understanding how users form plans involving artifacts. We introduce the concept of instrumental function which is intended to capture the features of functional claims that are relevant to practical—in particular, instrumental—reasoning. We (...) discuss the four primary features of an instrumental function ascription, the teleological component of such ascriptions and give a clear definition of malfunction in terms of incapability to perform as well as “normal” tokens of the same type. (shrink)

There are many instruments of knowledge. The primary feature of an instrument of knowledge is that it be a trustworthy source of information about the world. But what is the source of the trustworthiness of instruments? What does it mean to say that an instrument is a trustworthy source of information that p? Is there, for example, an implicit reference to the trustworthiness of a person who receives the information that p? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then (...) we should modify our first question to include the reference to a subject. Must we then allow that an instrument that is a trustworthy source of information that p for one person is not a trustworthy source of information that p for another? It seems that we must, for one person who understands an instrument may learn an important fact from it when another, who does not, learns nothing at all. But that consideration does not appear to reflect on the trustworthiness of the instrument but, rather, on the trustworthiness of the person who uses it. There are deep and more subtle questions pertaining to knowledge. A person who understands the instrument and a person who does not may both read the instrument and receive correct information that p from it, that is, they may both believe the information that p they receive, but only the person who understands the instrument knows that the information that p is correct. But how can a person receive correct information that p from a trustworthy instrument and not know that p? These are questions I shall attempt to answer. To answer them, we need some account of knowledge, and I proceed briefly with the necessary analysis. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the ongoing task of clarifying the relationships between reality, probability, and nonlocality in quantum physics. It is in part stimulated by Khrennikov’s argument, in several communications, for “eliminating the issue of quantum nonlocality” from the analysis of quantum entanglement. I argue, however, that the question may not be that of eliminating but instead that of further illuminating this issue, a task that can be pursued by relating quantum nonlocality to other key features of (...) quantum phenomena. I suggest that the following features of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, distinguishing them from classical phenomena and classical physics— the irreducible role of measuring instruments in defining quantum phenomena, discreteness, complementarity, entanglement, quantum nonlocality, and the irreducibly probabilistic nature of quantum predictions—are all interconnected, so that it is difficult to give an unconditional priority to any one of them. To argue this case, I shall consider quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics from a nonrealist or, in terms adopted here, “reality-without-realism” perspective. This perspective extends Bohr’s view, grounded in his analysis of the irreducible role of measuring instruments in the constitution of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting (...) the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic. (shrink)

Inducement prizes have been long used to stimulate individuals and groups to accomplish diverse goals. Lately, governments have become more and more interested in these prizes and sought to include this kind of incentives within the set of policy tools available to promote science, technology, and innovation. To date, however, there has been little empirically-based scientific knowledge on how to design, manage, and evaluate innovation prizes. This note discusses aspects of the prize phenomenon and the opportunities and challenges related with (...) the use of innovation prizes as a government policy instrument. Compared to other incentive mechanisms, prizes are likely to present advantages to, for example, accelerate the development and commercialization of technologies that are held back for diverse reasons and help to leverage public money with external ideas, collaborative efforts, and the participation of diverse individuals and organizations. Still, despite these advantages and other interesting features of prizes, there are key questions that policy-makers and scholars must address to better understand this kind of incentives and further improve prize designs and implementations before governments move forward to a more widespread use of innovation prizes in science and technology policies. (shrink)

The Architecture of Reason aims to develop a unified theory of theoretical and practical rationality along foundationalist lines. The structure of practical reason, Audi argues, is closely parallel to that of theoretical reason: just as the rationality of inferential beliefs ultimately rests on the rationality of basic beliefs, so too the rationality of instrumental desires and of the corresponding actions ultimately rests on the rationality of intrinsic desires. Intrinsic desires are rational if they are well-grounded in certain “objectively valuable” (...) features of experience, much as basic beliefs are justified, and thus rational, if they are well-grounded in certain perceptual or intuitive features of experience. Though Audi’s theory of practical rationality does not strictly require “axiological experientialism”, in point of fact it is “the experientially grounded rationality of intrinsic desire that chiefly concerns [him] in accounting for the foundations of practical reason”. This normative sort of foundationalism, Audi holds, is to be distinguished from merely motivational foundationalism; the latter is compatible with certain instrumental accounts of rationality which view intrinsic desires as ultimate motivational states capable, via appropriate beliefs, of conferring rationality on the actions they motivate without themselves being properly regarded as rational. The normative foundationalism that Audi proposes to defend in opposition to instrumentalism about practical reason holds not only that rational action must ultimately be well-grounded in rational intrinsic desires, but that “there are substantive criteria for the rationality of intrinsic desires”. My aim in this discussion note is to raise some concerns about Audi’s claim to have established a normatively and substantively foundational alternative to instrumentalism, and thus to have provided a unified foundational account of rationality. In closing, I shall also attempt to respond to certain objections Audi has raised against instrumentalism. Much in this wide-ranging book, however, remains untouched by my comments; many of its excellent features would doubtless have been highlighted in the context of a general review. (shrink)

The Architecture of Reason aims to develop a unified theory of theoretical and practical rationality along foundationalist lines. The structure of practical reason, Audi argues, is closely parallel to that of theoretical reason: just as the rationality of inferential beliefs ultimately rests on the rationality of basic beliefs, so too the rationality of instrumental desires and of the corresponding actions ultimately rests on the rationality of intrinsic desires. Intrinsic desires are rational if they are well-grounded in certain “objectively valuable” (...) features of experience, much as basic beliefs are justified, and thus rational, if they are well-grounded in certain perceptual or intuitive features of experience. Though Audi’s theory of practical rationality does not strictly require “axiological experientialism”, in point of fact it is “the experientially grounded rationality of intrinsic desire that chiefly concerns [him] in accounting for the foundations of practical reason”. This normative sort of foundationalism, Audi holds, is to be distinguished from merely motivational foundationalism; the latter is compatible with certain instrumental accounts of rationality which view intrinsic desires as ultimate motivational states capable, via appropriate beliefs, of conferring rationality on the actions they motivate without themselves being properly regarded as rational. The normative foundationalism that Audi proposes to defend in opposition to instrumentalism about practical reason holds not only that rational action must ultimately be well-grounded in rational intrinsic desires, but that “there are substantive criteria for the rationality of intrinsic desires”. My aim in this discussion note is to raise some concerns about Audi’s claim to have established a normatively and substantively foundational alternative to instrumentalism, and thus to have provided a unified foundational account of rationality. In closing, I shall also attempt to respond to certain objections Audi has raised against instrumentalism. Much in this wide-ranging book, however, remains untouched by my comments; many of its excellent features would doubtless have been highlighted in the context of a general review. (shrink)

Sustainable Development Goals, which serve as the primary feature of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and Nationally Determined Contributions, which serve as a vital instrumental of the UNFCCC’s Paris Agreement, have clear synergies. Both are focused, in part, on responding to challenges presented to human well-being. There are good practical reasons to integrate development efforts with a comprehensive response to climate change. However, at least in their current form, these two policy instruments are ill-suited to this task. Where (...) SDGs are focused on supporting considerations of human flourishing to which policy needs to respond, NDCs, in their current form, are dependent on the determinations of the nations that generate them. I conclude that the best means of integrating these two policy initiatives require moving past the subjective foundations of NDCs. (shrink)

The article is built around the analysis of The critique of instrumental reason by Horkheimer, applied to issues connected with the philosophy of economics. Positive economics is under-stood as an example of a discipline where the pragmatic paradigm has been implemented. Therefore, economics functions within the boundaries of what Horkheimer called instrumental rationality. The starting point is the intellectual source shared by economics and the Frankfurt School, namely Kant’s philosophy of rationality. In the first part of the article, (...) three of Kant’s ideas that are fundamental to economics are presented, and then the development of their application in philosophy of science, as seen by Horkheimer in 1947, is laid out. The second part of the article consists of enumerating various distinctive features of economics that set it apart from other social sciences and which constitute factors for which it can be considered a realm of the reign of ‘instrumental rationality’, with all the threats such an approach provokes. The above-mentioned features concentrate on treating humans in economics as a means, not as a goal. This aspect of the philosophy of science of the Frankfurt School (unlike its critique of capitalism as an economic system) has not been widely received. (shrink)

Acts of intimate partner violence and abuse of nonhuman animals are common, harmful, and co-occurring phenomena. The aim of the present study was to identify perpetrator subtypes based on variable paths hypothesized to influence physical violence toward both partners and nonhuman animals: callousness and instrumental representations of aggression and rejection-sensitivity and expressive representations of aggression. Strong associations emerged between callousness and instrumental representations and between rejection-sensitivity and expressive representations. For males, callousness directly predicted both IPV and animal abuse. (...) For females, rejection-sensitivity predicted IPV. Instrumental representations mediated the relationship between callousness and animal abuse for females but not for males. Results suggest that IPV and animal abuse functionally interconnect, that perpetration of animal abuse may differ in function across gender, and that identifying distinct pathways to violence may facilitate violence prediction and prevention. (shrink)

This paper presents an approach to managing knowledge specific to a particular location for complex instruments. The goal is to improve the knowledge communication between experts and end-users of scientific instruments. We propose a computational framework that integrates augmented reality and augmented virtuality as interface for manipulating knowledge. The augmented virtuality-based interface can be produced and distributed without extra costs. It allows knowledge dissemination at a larger scale. The prominent feature of our model is that the knowledge representation is independent (...) from those interfaces. A preliminary version of our framework has been implemented and deployed in customers’ environments. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to reveal the features of the application of event management as a PR tool in the activities of public and business spaces. In this study, the concept of "event management" has been clarified; the role of event management in the activities of public and business spaces has been determined; the use of this tool in the B2B and B2C markets has been studied; a content analysis of the reviews of visitors to the spaces (...) has been carried out in order to determine the problem field and search for ways to improve the effectiveness of event management as a PR tool; a series of expert interviews with the leaders of public and business spaces has been carried out. The scientific novelty lies in the proposed model of event management of the social and business space. As a result, the authors propose three main directions in planning and organizing the activities of public and business spaces: development and implementation of their own projects and events; management of partner projects; management of relations with partners. (shrink)

As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. Instead, (...) they may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

: This paper is concerned with the claim that epistemic terms and categories are historical entities. The starting point is the observation that recent attempts at historical studies of epistemic terms fail to bridge the gap between history and philosophy proper. I examine whether, and how, it is possible to forge a closer link between historical and philosophical aspects of conceptual analysis. The paper explores possible links by analyzing aspects of the concept of error. A "pragmatic" and a "mentalist" notion (...) of error are identified in current philosophical studies of error: according to the latter, errors can be ascribed only to mental operations, according to the former, errors can also be ascribed to things and processes. The paper then draws on historical accounts of optical instruments to highlight certain presuppositions and implications of these two uses of the term. Contextual features and trans-contextual structures of the notion of error are distinguished. In conclusion, I argue that an intimate link between history and philosophy of science can be forged by an analysis ofthe development of conceptual arrangements which allows for trans- contextual structural aspects while drawing attention to the contextual epistemological and scientific conditions of their re-arrangement. (shrink)

The general thesis of this paper is that the motives of the currently dominant global educational governance are rooted in a specific cultural milieu in the time of the Cold War, more precisely in the late 1950s, heading to a harmonious world. The more specific thesis is that a series of failures in the achievement of this harmonized globe led to reforms in educational governance, leading eventually to the development of instruments like large-scale assessments, such as PISA. The concluding thesis (...) of the paper is that precisely because the idea of global governance is rooted in a specific culture, its instruments run the risk of only affecting formal structures of education in other cultures rather the inner activities of the ‘educational fabric’. (shrink)

You should be specific, but also explain the context and relevance of the term. (Each ID is worth 5 points).

The instrumental character of Francis Bacon’s natural and experimental histories was often noted, but never fully investigated. In this paper I aim to reconstruct the theoretical and methodological background which supports this feature. I claim that we can read large parts of the second book of Bacon’s Novum organum as a guide to laboratory practices; and that it was read in this manner by some of Bacon’s seventeenth century followers. Key to this guide is Bacon’s theory of prerogative instances (...) which, in turn, provides the grounding for a whole theory of instruments of detection and instruments of measurement. I show, in particular, how Bacon suggested that such instruments can be used for ‘charting’ virtues and powers; a process in which instruments of detection can be transformed into instruments of measurement. I also show that Bacon’s views on instruments entail an elaborated conception of measurement which departs from the ethos of artisanal perfection. Instead of pursuing the ‘best results’, Bacon’s instrumental natural and experimental histories aim to offer a large enough corpus of correlations, estimates and calculations which, taken together, can represent more or less accurately changes and variations of natural virtues and powers. (shrink)

The nature of learning processes as well as evolutionary considerations suggest that aesthetic judgement is of central importance in the formation of custom. Learning and extrapolation rely on evaluations of non-instrumental features like simplicity, analogy, straightforwardness, and clarity. Further, learning is particularly effective if it is driven by an active desire to uncover new regularities, rather than merely gathering information in a passive way.From an evolutionary perspective, learning has evolved as an adaptation to fast and transitory environmental changes (...) which cannot be effectively traced by the slow and long-term evolutionary processes which take place on the genetic level. The evolutionary raison d’être of learning is to enable the individual to incessantly search for upcoming new regularities, and to act appropriately on them. As learning depends on aesthetic judgement, the evolutionary selection for learning implies an evolutionary molding of an aesthetic sense, and a preference for patterns and patterned action which ultimately leads to the formation of custom and social learning. The paper presents, thus, an evolutionary underpinning for the behavioral tendencies underlying my theory of custom. (shrink)

La nature des processus d’apprentissage ainsi que les considérations évolutionaires suggèrent que le jugement esthétique est d’une importance centrale dans la formation des coutumes. L’ apprentissage et l’extrapolation prennent appui sur les évaluations de caractéristiques noninstrumentales telles que la simplicité, l’analogie, la droiture et la clarté. De plus, l’apprentissage est particulièrement efficace s’il est animé par un désir actif de découvrir de nouvelles régularités, plutôt que de rassembler simplement des informations de manière passive.A partir d’une perspective évolutionaire, l’apprentissage a évolué (...) par adaptation aux changements rapides et environnementaux qui ne peuvent être efficacement traduits par les processus évolutifs lents et de long terme qui se situent au niveau génétique. La “raison d’être” évolutionaire de l’apprentissage est de permettre aux individus de chercher sans cesse à découvrir de nouvelles régularités et d’agir sur elles de manière appropriée. De même que l’apprentissage dépend des jugements esthétiques, la sélection évolutionaire pour l’apprentissage implique une matrice évolutionaire du sens esthétique, et une préférence pour des modèles et des actions stéréotypées qui en fin de compte conduisent à la formation de coutumes et d’une compréhension sociale. L’article est, ainsi, une présentation évolutionaire étayée des tendances “behaviorales” sous-tendant ma théorie des coutumes.The nature of learning processes as well as evolutionary considerations suggest that aesthetic judgement is of central importance in the formation of custom. Learning and extrapolation rely on evaluations of non-instrumental features like simplicity, analogy, straightforwardness, and clarity. Further, learning is particularly effective if it is driven by an active desire to uncover new regularities, rather than merely gathering information in a passive way.From an evolutionary perspective, learning has evolved as an adaptation to fast and transitory environmental changes which cannot be effectively traced by the slow and long-term evolutionary processes which take place on the genetic level. The evolutionary raison d’être of learning is to enable the individual to incessantly search for upcoming new regularities, and to act appropriately on them. As learning depends on aesthetic judgement, the evolutionary selection for learning implies an evolutionary molding of an aesthetic sense, and a preference for patterns and patterned action which ultimately leads to the formation of custom and social learning. The paper presents, thus, an evolutionary underpinning for the behavioral tendencies underlying my theory of custom. (shrink)

The history of philosophy provides examples of attempts to vindicate the adequation of thought with being. Thought has sometimes armed itself in the Cartesian manner with criteria for measuring its own conformity with being. But such an immediate and direct appeal to "pure" thought rests inescapably upon a tacit appeal to a human experience which includes sensible factors; and so it begs the question. Moreover, it seems to me that all attempts fail which try to join the knower and the (...) known by putting the idea or judgment between them. For whether the intervention is by criterion, instrument, or method, it merely complicates the problem of their union by adding a useless intermediary. Indeed, in the face of the idealism of Descartes and Locke, and within the presuppositions of a theory of noetic species, modern scholastics were right to insist upon the "non-entity" of ideas and judgments. They insisted that a noetic principle, such as an idea or judgment, is nothing in itself but a pure sign, and that it is not an object which, while signifying something else, also exists in its own right as a mental entity. In trying to account for the concrete unity of language and cognition—which I may be forgiven for calling "linguo-knowledge"—there is much to recommend a theory of signs which differentiates knowledge-signs from all other kinds. It is an attempt to do justice to the quasi-instrumental features of linguo-knowledge, while at the same time keeping before us its radical ontological openness. Nothing intervenes between knowing and being, least of all the "equipment" of knowing, its ideas and judgments. The relationship between language and knowledge, however, would have to be determined more precisely since linguistic signs lend themselves to being considered as odd sorts of instruments, and by some linguists even as entities. Nevertheless, although linguistic signs are inseparable in concreto from noetic signs, it remains true that noetic signs are non-entitative, for there is a fundamental sense in which knowing is not an affair of entities or instruments at all. The essential possibility of knowledge lies in what has traditionally been called its immateriality and even its spirituality. (shrink)