Abstract
The history of philosophy provides examples of attempts to vindicate the adequation of thought with being. Thought has sometimes armed itself in the Cartesian manner with criteria for measuring its own conformity with being. But such an immediate and direct appeal to "pure" thought rests inescapably upon a tacit appeal to a human experience which includes sensible factors; and so it begs the question. Moreover, it seems to me that all attempts fail which try to join the knower and the known by putting the idea or judgment between them. For whether the intervention is by criterion, instrument, or method, it merely complicates the problem of their union by adding a useless intermediary. Indeed, in the face of the idealism of Descartes and Locke, and within the presuppositions of a theory of noetic species, modern scholastics were right to insist upon the "non-entity" of ideas and judgments. They insisted that a noetic principle, such as an idea or judgment, is nothing in itself but a pure sign, and that it is not an object which, while signifying something else, also exists in its own right as a mental entity. In trying to account for the concrete unity of language and cognition—which I may be forgiven for calling "linguo-knowledge"—there is much to recommend a theory of signs which differentiates knowledge-signs from all other kinds. It is an attempt to do justice to the quasi-instrumental features of linguo-knowledge, while at the same time keeping before us its radical ontological openness. Nothing intervenes between knowing and being, least of all the "equipment" of knowing, its ideas and judgments. The relationship between language and knowledge, however, would have to be determined more precisely since linguistic signs lend themselves to being considered as odd sorts of instruments, and by some linguists even as entities. Nevertheless, although linguistic signs are inseparable in concreto from noetic signs, it remains true that noetic signs are non-entitative, for there is a fundamental sense in which knowing is not an affair of entities or instruments at all. The essential possibility of knowledge lies in what has traditionally been called its immateriality and even its spirituality.