Abstract In this essay, I will argue that images can play a substantial role in argumentation: exploiting information from the context, they can contribute directly and substantially to the communication of the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusion. Furthermore, they can achieve this directly, i.e. without the need of verbalization. I will ground this claim by presenting and analyzing some arguments where images are essential to the argumentation process. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9259-y Authors (...) Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Cto. Mario de la Cueva s/n, Cd. Universitaria, Coyoacán, 04500 DF, Mexico Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X. (shrink)

Chomskyian claims of a genetically hard-wired and cognitively autonomous “universal grammar” are being promoted by generative linguistics as facts about language to the present day. The related doctrine of an evolutionary discontinuity in language emergence, however, is based on misconceptions about the notions of homology and preadaptation. The obvious lack of equivalence between symbolic communicative capacities in existing nonhuman primates and human language does not preclude common roots. Normal and disordered language development is strongly influenced by the genome, but there (...) is no evidence for the existence of specific genes underlying “universal grammar.” In the mature brain, stages of language processing can be distinguished and “first-pass” syntactic analyses appear to precede semantic decoding. However, this partial seriality – as well as behavioral and clinical dissociations between lexical and functional categories – can be best described, not in terms of serially activated and discrete modules, but in terms of classes of cell assemblies that differ in their distributional properties. Whereas cell assemblies involved in semantic interpretation (“content word” assemblies) are widely distributed and are generally less vulnerable to focal lesion, those involved in structural decoding (functor assemblies) are primarily distributed within the left perisylvian cortices and are selectively vulnerable to left perisylvian lesion. These distributional differences are explained in terms of the perceptuomotor components involved in the acquisition of relevant representations. The emerging “motivated” or “toposemantic” brain regional specificity can only be accommodated with “soft” and maturational versions of modularity. The failure to reproduce double dissociations in current connectionist models is due to overly simple neuroscientific assumptions, notably that of overall equipotentiality. Linguistic models should not be expected to be “implemented” in the brain, but need to be constrained by neuroscientific evidence on how biological brains function. (shrink)

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith provide evidence from computational modeling against modular assumptions of “Residual Normality” in developmental disorders. Even though I agree with their criticism, I find their choice of empirical evidence disappointing. Cognitive neuroscience cannot as yet provide a complete understanding of most developmental disorders, but what is known is more than enough to debunk the idea of RN.

In Christian Europe of the High Middle Ages, saints played a central role in the everyday life of the ailing. Alongside healing attempts which involved magic and/or scientifically-based medicine, the invocation of specific patron saints for protection against evils or for the curing of ailments was a widespread practise. A large choice of patron saints was "available" for a wide range of diseases, especially those nowadays classified as neurologic or psychiatric. For the falling sickness alone, e.g., there is evidence of (...) some twenty patron saints reputed to have a particular involvement. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a comparable devotion to patrons for apoplectics. This "negative result" is confirmed by a thorough examination of medieval sources. St. Wolfgang and St. Andreas Avellino are the only two proven stroke patrons. Both, however, were only known within their respective locations. The absence of a specific supportive Christian figure for stroke victims deserves particular analysis: The high fatality rate of apoplexy and the lack of commercial interest on the part of the Christian places of pilgrimage may serve as possible explanations. (shrink)

Dienes & Perner's target article is not a satisfactory theory of implicit knowledge because in endorsing the representational theory of knowledge, the authors also inadvertently accept that only explicit knowledge can be causally efficacious, and hence that implicit knowledge is an inert category. This conflation between causal efficacy, knowledge, and explicitness is made clear through the authors' strategy, which consists of attributing any observable effect to the existence of representations that are as minimally explicit as needed to account for behavior. (...) In contrast, we believe that causally efficacious and fully implicit knowledge exists, and is best embodied in frameworks that depart radically from classical assumptions. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDas verdrängte Sachproblem, das der Aufsatz in Erinnerung rufen will, ist die systematische und epistemische Verwandtschaft von Philosophie und Religion. Verdrängt wurde dieses Sachproblem im Zuge der positivistischen und historistischen Verkürzung des Denkens: Wie der Schlaf der Vernunft Ungeheuer und Dämonen gebiert, so entfesselt die Verkürzung des Denkens den modernen »Polytheismus der Lebenswerte« , dem die Gegenwart besonders hilflos ausgeliefert ist, weil sie der Versuchung nachgegeben hat, das anspruchsvolle Konzept der Vernunft durch das vermeintlich leichter und sicherer zu handhabende Konzept (...) der positiven Wissenschaften zu ersetzen. Eine solche Dialektik der Aufklärung läßt sich mit Kant und Hegel des Näheren als eine Dialektik der Säkularisierung begreifen, in deren Verlauf weder Vernunft noch Religion das bleiben, was sie ihrem eigenen Begriff nach sind. Dementsprechend breiten sich die Pathologien der Vernunft und die Pathologien des Glaubens immer stärker aus, weil sie sich in der mißlungenen Säkularisierung der Moderne gegenseitig verstärken. Denn eine Vernunft, die die »Lebensprobleme« der Menschen nicht mehr zu berühren vermag, ist eine pathologische und reduzierte Form der Vernunft. Dieser pathologischen Form der Vernunft antworten dann ebenso pathologische Kompensationsversuche, die das »ganz Andere« der Vernunft in einem pseudo-religiösen Jargon anpreisen – und womöglich für die eigentliche, »tiefere« Philosophie ausgeben. Im kritischen Gegenzug hierzu will der Aufsatz an die Einsicht erinnern, daß die Philosophie, als Wissenschaft der Wahrheit, nur sich selbst expliziert, indem sie den Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion expliziert, und indem sie umgekehrt das Wesen der Wahrheit expliziert, expliziert sie die Religion.SUMMARYThis essay calls to mind the suppressed problem of the systematic and epistemic relationship between philosophy and religion. This substantive issue has been suppressed by reductionist views of thinking which followed in the wake of positivism and historicism. Just as the sleep of reason brings forth monsters and demons, so the reductionist tendencies of thinking unleash the “polytheism of the values of life” . Our present age is helplessly at the mercy of these tendencies because it has given in to the temptation of replacing the ambitious concept of reason with the concept of the positive sciences which are supposedly easier to handle and can more successfully fulfil the promise of assured results. Such a dialectic of enlightenment can be conceived as a dialectic of secularisation, in the course of which neither reason nor religion remain what they are according to their own genuine conception. Consequently, the pathologies of reason and the pathologies of faith spread ever more rapidly, because they enhance one another in the context of the failed secularisation of modernity. A form of reason that is no longer in touch with the problems of human life is a pathological and reductionist form of reason. Strategies of compensation, however, which celebrate the “totally other” of reason in a pseudo-religious jargon, possibly even presenting it as the real, the “deeper” form of philosophy, are no less pathological. In contrast to such tendencies, this essay is intended to serve as a reminder of the insight that philosophy as the science of truth only explicates itself by explicating religion, and only explicates religion by explicating the character of truth. (shrink)

A specifically rational understanding of the philosophical tradition, which addresses the question of truth, is opposed to a purely historical understanding of philosophy. Nevertheless this rational understanding of philosophy remains critically related to history: It frees the philosophy of the past from solidification into an antiquity, while it integrates earlier thought into an autonomous re-thinking, and it frees the thinking of the present from its prejudices, while it confronts its comfortable ways of understanding with the unsatisfied truth of the tradition.

A specifically rational understanding of the philosophical tradition, which addresses the question of truth, is opposed to a purely historical understanding of philosophy. Nevertheless this rational understanding of philosophy remains critically related to history: It frees the philosophy of the past from solidification into an antiquity, while it integrates earlier thought into an autonomous re-thinking, and it frees the thinking of the present from its prejudices, while it confronts its comfortable ways of understanding with the unsatisfied truth of the tradition.

An original work of philosophy that highlights the connection between self-understanding and narrative form.

In this pathbreaking study, Axel Honneth argues that "the struggle for recognition" is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts. Moving smoothly between moral philosophy and social theory, Honneth offers insights into such issues as the social forms of recognition and nonrecognition, the moral basis of interaction in human conflicts, the relation between the recognition model and conceptions of modernity, the normative basis of social theory, and the possibility of mediating between Hegel and Kant.

Traditional frameworks for evaluating scientific models have tended to downplay their exploratory function; instead they emphasize how models are inherently intended for specific phenomena and are to be judged by their ability to predict, reproduce, or explain empirical observations. By contrast, this paper argues that exploration should stand alongside explanation, prediction, and representation as a core function of scientific models. Thus, models often serve as starting points for future inquiry, as proofs of principle, as sources of potential explanations, and as (...) a tool for reassessing the suitability of the target system. This is illustrated by a case study of the varied career of reaction-diffusion models in the study of biological pattern formation, which was initiated by Alan Turing in a classic 1952 paper. Initially regarded as mathematically elegant, but biologically irrelevant, demonstrations of how, in principle, spontaneous pattern formation could occur in an organism, such Turing models have only recently rebounded, thanks to advances in experimental techniques and computational methods. The long-delayed vindication of Turing’s initial model, it is argued, is best explained by recognizing it as an exploratory tool. (shrink)

Consciousness has many elements, from sensory experiences such as vision and bodily sensation, to nonsensory aspects such as memory and thought. All are presented as experiences of a single subject, and all seem to be contained within a unified field of experience. This unity raises many questions: How do diverse systems in the brain co-operate to produce a unified experience? Are there conditions under which this unity breaks down? Is conscious experience really unified at all? Such questions are addressed in (...) this thought-provoking book. (shrink)

The System of Pragmatic Idealism is of special importance for Nicholas Rescher's philosophical work, because here he has presented the systematic approach at once. Dedicated to his 70th birthday a group of European and U.S-american philosophers discuss the main topics of Rescher's philosophical system. The contributions which are presented here for the first time and Nicholas Rescher's responses cover the most important topics of philosophy and give a deep and detailed insight into the strenght of Rescher's pragmatic idealism. This volume (...) is of interest for philosophers studying Rescher's philosophy and for all those who are interested in systematic philosophy and the vividnes of pragmatism and idealism in present philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that joint attention solves the “base problem” as it arises for Schiffer’s and Lewis’s theories of common knowledge. The problem is that an account is needed of the perceptual base of some forms of common knowledge that gets by without itself invoking common knowledge. The paper solves the problem by developing a theory of joint attention as consisting in the exercise of joint know-how involving particular and sometimes distal targets and arguing that certain joint perceivers can always have (...) a minimal form of propositional common knowledge about the location of these targets. On such a view, perceptual common knowledge is based on the experience of a process that is maintained by way of perceivers’ exercise of an object-involving form of joint know-how. Some reductive theories of collective intentionality require that agents’ intentions and subplans are common knowledge (or “out in the open”) between them. For these theories the base problem arises again. The enacted theory of joint attention can solve the problem. The argument is exactly parallel to the common knowledge case. The openness of joint agents’ intentions and meshing subplans is explained by appeal to their practical knowledge of how to maintain the process by way of which they pursue the collective intention. They can then make this knowledge explicit by linguistic communication. When they succeed in communicating knowledge of their meshing subplans as pursued in a joint action context, they necessarily have this knowledge in common. For theories of collective intentionality that include a common knowledge condition, the experience of participating in a perceptually constituted joint action provides the base that renders harmless the regress that otherwise threatens reductive analyses. (shrink)