Weak evidence for a strong case against modularity in developmental disorders

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):764-765 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith provide evidence from computational modeling against modular assumptions of “Residual Normality” in developmental disorders. Even though I agree with their criticism, I find their choice of empirical evidence disappointing. Cognitive neuroscience cannot as yet provide a complete understanding of most developmental disorders, but what is known is more than enough to debunk the idea of RN

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidence for a domain-specific deficit in developmental dyslexia.Franck Ramus - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):767-768.
What can developmental disorders tell us about modularity?Gary F. Marcus - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):762-763.
The beauty of models for developmental disorders.J. Briscoe - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):750-752.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
23 (#584,438)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references