This essay is dedicated to elaborating some of the stylistic elements at work in Nietzsche's polemical book, On The Genealogy of Morals with particular attention to the nature of the aphorism from its inception in ancient Greek literaure, Nietzsche's specific deployment of the aphorism as such, including Nietzsche's argument structure and rhetorical technique as well as the language of Greek and Jewish antiquity, master and slave. -/- In: Christa Davis Acampora, ed., Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical (...) Essays (Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 177-190. (shrink)

The article examines the transformation of the understanding of humanism from the Renaissance to the modern era, focusing on the mechanism of exclusion that defines the key framework of social action, including in the present day. This social mechanism pushes declared values beyond observable reality, generates cognitive paralysis, and ultimately points to the existence of an alternate reality that dominates a morally depleted society. The replacement of reality with constructs fabricated by various doctrinal groups is identified as a major delusion (...) of our times, luring people into self-deception, seducing them with illusory values, and confusing the noble with the ignoble. The mechanisms of exclusion serve as the essential foundation for excluding thought, values, and ideals from everyday social life. This exclusion is evident in ancient democracy, which despised slaves; in Russian literature, which flirted with serfdom; and most notably in modern autocracy and liberalism, which focus solely on their own kind. The article takes as its starting point the transitional state of society where, under the conditions of the Reformation, Renaissance values understood as humanism are reduced to post-Renaissance “humanism.” From this perspective, the treatise of F.I. Niethammer is analyzed for its contribution to the modern understanding of humanism in contrast to the educational philanthropinism of J.B. Basedow. The article reveals the connection between the term “humanism” and German anti-Semitism, showing that humanism, as conceived in the German context, was intended for ethnic insiders and educationally stood as an antithesis to the Frankfurt Philanthropin, the largest German educational institution opened in a Jewish ghetto for children from poor families. The author concludes with historical parallels and findings that identify the characteristics of modern societies shaped by the discussed mechanism of exclusion. (shrink)

Purpose. Nietzschean proponents classify people into seemingly two distinct groups: those possessing 'Master' moralities and those with 'Slave' moralities. Each type of person is characterized to have certain qualities, traits, ideologies, and methods of dealing with everyday situations. This paper attributes these moralities to the personnel working in the corporate sector of Pakistan to observe their prospects of success. Originality. A specialized survey instrument was designed to gauge different Morality Types of the study subjects by calculating a (...) Morality Quotient. The respondents were then categorized into three categories possessing, Slave, Master and Neutral or Mixed traits. These traits are then contrasted to the position held by the subjects to see which morality type was more prevalent in higher management levels and whether the association was significant. Conclusions. Our results prove to be contradictory to common wisdom and shows that despite the leadership-like qualities of those with Master moralities, the proportion of those with Slave moralities was significantly higher at senior management levels of the corporate sector in Pakistan. Moreover, a trend of declining Master morality traits is observed with the rise in managerial level. In addition, an association between work experience and Morality type was also observed indicating adaptability of cross morality traits with increasing job experience. These findings are in line with the increasing focus on democratic and adaptable leadership instead of autocratic leadership styles in contemporary organizations. (shrink)

Marrying lyrical close reading with critical awareness, Novel Style argues for the ethical value of elaborate styles of writing and demonstrates that artistic excessiveness can provide dynamic responses to the moral complexities of our times.

Nietzsche distinguishes between “slave morality” (the morality of the weak) and “master morality” (the morality of the strong), and he believes the structure of modern society to be rooted in slave morality. According to Nietzsche, slave morality is the morality of modern “bourgeois” (commerce-based) society, whereas “master morality” was the morality of ancient caste-based societies. In this paper, I argue for the legitimacy of the distinction between (...) these two kinds of morality but argue against Nietzsche's contention that contemporary (capitalist or semi-capitalist) society embodies slave morality. (shrink)

Given that charges of anti-Semitism, racism, and the like continue to be potent weapons of moral and intellectual critique in our culture, it is important that we work toward a clear understanding about just what sorts of conduct and circumstances constitute these moral offenses. In particular, can criticism of a state (such as Israel), or other social or political institution or organization (such as the NAACP), ever amount to anti-Semitism, racism, or other bigotry against the people represented by (...) or associated with it, even if no explicit denigration of them occurs? That a renowned scholar of rhetoric and philosophy takes up the challenge of answering such a question would seem to be cause for optimism, but the recent attempt by Judith Butler turns out to be subverted by faulty logic and blatant misreading. As a result, it obfuscates the issue, and wrongly suggests that expressive acts cannot be blameworthy on grounds of bigotry if they are not intentionally designed to serve such purposes. (shrink)

In the context of the Dutch immigration debate, tributes to the Holocaust and the memory of Europe’s dead Jews increasingly serve to dismantle multiculturalism as a failed paradigm and to drive a wedge between a revitalized, redeemed, color-blind, post-racial Europe and disenfranchized immigrant, minority and Muslim populations. Embedded in these invocations of the Holocaust and its moral imperatives is a ‘spectropolitics’ of tolerance, in which tolerance, staged as an essential touchstone of Dutch identity, supplies a differential norm that measures the (...) civilizational and racial disjuncture between Europeans, minorities, and Muslims, and validates the new dual paradigm of Dutch citizenship and immigration policy: securitization and disciplinary integration. The centrality of the Holocaust as paradigmatic of Dutch and European racial history meanwhile sidelines the colonial past as constitutive of European identity; displaces an alternative understanding of race as instruments of colonial rule; and disavows the continued application of these instruments of racial rule in Dutch and European post-colonial societies. (shrink)

Written at the height of the philosopher's intellectual powers, Friedrich Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_ has become one of the key texts of recent Western philosophy. Its essayistic style affords a unique opportunity to observe many of Nietzsche's persisting concerns coming together in an illuminating constellation. A profound influence on psychoanalysis, antihistoricism, and poststructuralism and an abiding challenge to ethical theory, Nietzsche's book addresses many of the major philosophical problems and possibilities of modernity. In this unique collection focusing on (...) the _Genealogy_, twenty-five notable philosophers offer diverse discussions of the book's central themes and concepts. They explore such notions as _ressentiment_, asceticism, "slave" and "master" moralities, and what Nietzsche calls "genealogy" and its relation to other forms of inquiry in his work. The book presents a cross section of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship and philosophical investigation that is certain to interest philosophers, intellectual and cultural historians, and anyone concerned with one of the master thinkers of the modern age. (shrink)

Written at the height of the philosopher's intellectual powers, Friedrich Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_ has become one of the key texts of recent Western philosophy. Its essayistic style affords a unique opportunity to observe many of Nietzsche's persisting concerns coming together in an illuminating constellation. A profound influence on psychoanalysis, antihistoricism, and poststructuralism and an abiding challenge to ethical theory, Nietzsche's book addresses many of the major philosophical problems and possibilities of modernity. In this unique collection focusing on (...) the _Genealogy_, twenty-five notable philosophers offer diverse discussions of the book's central themes and concepts. They explore such notions as _ressentiment_, asceticism, "slave" and "master" moralities, and what Nietzsche calls "genealogy" and its relation to other forms of inquiry in his work. The book presents a cross section of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship and philosophical investigation that is certain to interest philosophers, intellectual and cultural historians, and anyone concerned with one of the master thinkers of the modern age. (shrink)

Despite his strong objections to anti-Semitism, it will be argued that Nietzsche held a curious conspiracy theory about the Jews that is uniquely his own. Modern Jews, he declared, had the power to have mastery over Europe. And Ancient Jews exercised a remarkable power of self-preservation when they got others to accept the slave morality of Christianity. The second claim is shown to have a setting in Nietzsche’s own theory of the genealogy of morals. But it is (...) argued that that theory is defective as an explanation of the genealogy of the Judeo-Christian morality Nietzsche despised. It is also argued that Nietzsche thinks that the noble lie, as opposed to the asceticism of truth seeking, is itself an expression of the “will to power”. But this raises a serious problem for what Nietzsche thought was the status of his own genealogical enterprise. Is his genealogy of morals an example of ascetic truth seeking to be depreciated? Or is it a (not so) “noble lie” that Nietzsche has tried to foist upon us? This is not a profound issue of Nietzsche hermeneutics that Nietzsche apologists might have us believe; rather it is an epistemological muddle on the part of Nietzsche. (shrink)

This paper raises three questions: Can Nietzsche provide a satisfactory account of how the slave revolt could have begun to "poison the consciences" of masters? Does Nietzsche's affinity for "master values" preclude him from acknowledging claims of justice that rest upon a sense of equality among human beings? and How does Nietzsche's story fare when looked on as an empirical hypothesis? The first question is answered in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and the third with the (...) verdict "quite well". Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates is held to vindicate the affirmative answer to question one; his conception of nobility as spontaneously self-affirming to justify the negative answer to question two, and historical, anthropological and etymological evidence to support the favorable answer to question three. (shrink)

This paper raises three questions: (1) Can Nietzsche provide a satisfactory account of how the slave revolt could have begun to "poison the consciences" of masters? (2) Does Nietzsche's affinity for "master values" preclude him from acknowledging claims of justice that rest upon a sense of equality among human beings? and (3) How does Nietzsche's story fare when looked on as (at least in part) an empirical hypothesis? The first question is answered in the affirmative, the second in (...) the negative, and the third with the verdict "quite well". Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates is held to vindicate the affirmative answer to question one; his conception of nobility as spontaneously self-affirming to justify the negative answer to question two, and historical, anthropological and etymological evidence to support the favorable answer to question three. (shrink)

In the second half of 1944, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote an essay entitled ‘Anti-Semite and Jew’. He analyses what might be termed the moral pathology of the anti-Semite. Such a person, Sartre suggests, has chosen to enact a passion, a passion of hatred. The motive is the desire for ‘impenetrability’ – a disavowal of reasoned argument – and a pleasure taken in the assertion and re-assertion of what is known to be false. Sartre’s essay was written hurriedly and looking (...) back over 70 years, we can see its flaws. But I suggest that the kernel of his analysis of the anti-Semite is compelling, especially in the context of the growth of anti-immigrant prejudice in the UK and elsewhere. Using Sartre as a starting point, I discuss the nature of prejudice and suggest that to counter prejudices, a civic education is needed that emphasises a narrative of liberty. (shrink)

It is frequently remarked that Merleau-Ponty did not write about race, gender, or anti-Semitism. Overall, this is true, but the relatively recent re-publication of his Sorbonne lectures, along with some new materials, shows that his lectures did address the issues of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism. In addition, Emily Lee’s framing of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the human body provides a useful way to understand its relationship to race and gender. While humans are fundamentally the same biologically, “secondary biological characteristics” (...) such as skin color (and gender), situated in various social contexts, have a significant impact on the formation of one’s personal and social identity. What I seek to do here is find in Merleau-Ponty’s work the philosophical roots of Lee’s claim. I also seek to find the moral recognition of the other in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of time and how his treatment of time relates to the two-dimensionality of the human body. It is this treatment that allows us to recognize the sameness of the other but that also allows us to recognize and respect differences. (shrink)

It is frequently remarked that Merleau-Ponty did not write about race, gender, or anti-Semitism. Overall, this is true, but the relatively recent re-publication of his Sorbonne lectures, along with some new materials, shows that his lectures did address the issues of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism. In addition, Emily Lee’s framing of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the human body provides a useful way to understand its relationship to race and gender. While humans are fundamentally the same biologically, “secondary biological characteristics” (...) such as skin color, situated in various social contexts, have a significant impact on the formation of one’s personal and social identity. What I seek to do here is find in Merleau-Ponty’s work the philosophical roots of Lee’s claim. I also seek to find the moral recognition of the other in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of time and how his treatment of time relates to the two-dimensionality of the human body. It is this treatment that allows us to recognize the sameness of the other but that also allows us to recognize and respect differences. (shrink)

The article analyzes the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in feminist theory on the example of the concepts of Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler. The first part of the article examines Hegel’s teaching on the role of women in the family, identifies the place of the feminine in Hegel’s system and analyzes the Hegelian interpretation of Sophocle’s “Antigone”. The second part of the article presents an interpretation of Si­mone de Beauvoir. I affirm that the oppositions “woman – man” (...) and “the Other – I” are heirs to the “slave – master” opposition. The third part of the article discusses Irigaray’s in­terpretation of Hegel’s Antigone. It is argued that Antigone in Irigaray’s view goes be­yond the dialectic of slave and master, and therefore becomes a symbol of anti-woman. The fourth part of the article examines the paradox of bodily submission during the transi­tion to the Unhappy Consciousness by Judith Butler. The historical and philosophical study of influence is accompanied by a conceptual analysis of the problems that arise in the inter­pretation of feminist versions of the slave – master dialectic. At the end of the article, I briefly formulate the problems identified during the study and present possible solutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 450-451 [Access article in PDF] Simon May. Nietzsche's Ethics and His War on 'Morality.' New York: Oxford University, The Clarendon Press, 1999. Pp. xi + 212. Cloth, $45.00. When Friedrich Nietzsche reviewed his career during his final year of intellectual activity, he wrote in Ecce Homo (1888) that his "campaign against morality" began with the publication of Daybreak (1880) (...) eight years earlier. With this autobiographical remark in mind, Simon May appropriately develops his study of Nietzsche's ethics, Nietzsche's Ethics and His War on "Morality," by attending to Nietzsche's writings of the 1880's, using the relatively late On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) as his textual keystone.For the sake of his English-speaking readers' convenience, May reiterates Walter Kaufmann's familiar translations of Nietzsche's works in all of his book's citations, and keeps a relatively tight leash on his references to Nietzsche's pre-1880 works and unpublished notebooks. Historical guideposts to authors within Nietzsche's surrounding cultural context are also limited, and the book unfolds around May's reflections on Nietzsche's publications, supplemented by contemporary references to the works of Bernard Williams in matters concerning ethics, and by references to a substantial number of English-speaking Nietzsche scholars in matters concerning Nietzsche's valuation of truth. Such are the book's methodological contours, which are defensible, but which will probably disappoint those who have philosophical sensibilities that are more philologically and historically pronounced.May divides his book in half, the first segment of which reviews a series of familiar Nietzschean thematics, Nietzsche's conception of values, his distinction between master and slave moralities, his analysis of guilt and bad conscience, his conception of life enhancement, and his conception of the ascetic ideal, all with the prospect of suggesting that Nietzsche's ethical ideal is best encapsulated by the phrase, "become what one is." This ideal, as May understands it, is to develop oneself maximally in a life-enhancing way, given the parameters of one's natural capacities. Although one would expect May to associate this prescription with Nietzsche's conception of the "superhuman" (Übermensch), he thought-provokingly sets the ideal of "becoming what one is" directly against Nietzsche's Übermensch, arguing that the latter is, in fact, "unattainable and undesirable." According to May, Nietzsche's discussion of the superhuman type is distractingly unrealistic, chiefly because a perfectly sovereign individual, unlike us, would be an infallible "man-god" (117) and would have nothing left to overcome.The second half of May's study concentrates on Nietzsche's crucial revaluation of the value of truth. May argues that although Nietzsche rejects an unconditional value for truth and its associated ascetic ideal, it is nonetheless consistent to "passionately" value truth and remain a Nietzschean life-enhancer. May respects Nietzsche's perspectivism, but his interpretation clearly runs against the grain of the more extremely relativistic, "anti-truth," readings of Nietzsche.May's short volume contains plenty of food for disagreement. To cite one notable example, May maintains that "with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic safety net against cruelty... and, to this extent, his philosophy licenses the atrocities of a Hitler" (132). May's fundamental reason is that since unfettered cruelty is consistent with what he understands to be Nietzsche's radically individualist [End Page 450] principle of life-enhancement, the Nietzschean conception of life-enhancement is ethically deficient. Some of Nietzsche's remarks do provoke May's criticism, but common knowledge also tells us that unfettered cruelty often backfires into either physical or spiritual self-destruction. So a wise Nietzschean would not "license" brutality. Neither, however, would such a Nietzschean seek to erect an absolute barrier against unfettered brutality, but would more discriminatingly consider what wisdom dictates in each circumstance, given the interests of life.May's study intends to exclude from the philosophically best interpretation of Nietzsche, what are recognized by most people as ethically undesirable qualities. His study also renders Nietzsche's key ideas workable, accessible, and palatable... (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revolt in moral philosophy against the idea that the purpose of moral philosophy is to produce the kind of highly abstract, universalistic, formal theories of morality that have been developed by such philosophers as Hare, Gewirth, and Rawls. Instead, it has been argued, moral philosophers should undertake more limited, contextualized, nonformal projects that focus on "local practices," moral traditions, and the role of the emotions in moral perception and action. This volume contains (...) twelve of the best essays in this new style. In addition, there is an excellent introduction and a short "Guide to Recent Literature" that, save for its near exclusive focus on work done in the analytic tradition, is nicely comprehensive. The selections are what one might expect, with a few notable exceptions. For example, it contains no essay by Isaiah Berlin, despite the editors' acknowledgment of the importance to this body of work of the idea of moral pluralism. On the other hand, it does contain MacIntyre's "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narratives, and the Philosophy of Science," which is only tangentially related to moral philosophy, rather than, for example, a chapter from his more directly related After Virtue. (shrink)

In the present work, I will review how Aristotle understood the connection between reason and emotion - particularly, angry actions - in order to demonstrate that it is due to the presence of intellectual factors that emotions become ethically relevant and not merely an uncontrolled reaction. Then, I will summarize Aristotle's repeated analogies between reason as the master and anger as the slave to explain their connection. My specific contribution to the topic will be to reverse this analogy (...) and, instead of using it as an example of the _lógos-thymós_ connection, make the latter an example of the _despótes-doûlos_ connection as described in Politics I. If my hypothesis is plausible, establishing the actions and virtues of a slave will help shed light on the type of morality inherent in angry actions. (shrink)

Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus (...) denied the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers. (shrink)

In the US, stem cell research is at a moral impasse—many see this research as ethically mandated due to its potential for ameliorating major diseases, while others see this research as ethically impermissible because it typically involves the destruction of embryos and use of ova from women. Because their creation does not require embryos or ova, induced pluripotent stem cells offer the most promising path for addressing the main ethical objections to stem cell research; however, this technology is still in (...) development. In order for scientists to advance induced pluripotent stem cell research to a point of translational readiness, they must continue to use ova and embryos in the interim. How then are we to ethically move forward with stem cell research? We argue that there is personal integrity and value in adopting a ‘moral compromise’ as a means for moving past the moral impasse in stem cell research. In a moral compromise, each party concedes part of their desired outcome in order to engage in a process that respects the values and desires of all parties equitably. Whereas some contend that moral compromise in stem cell research necessarily involves self-contradiction or loss of personal integrity, we argue that in the US context, stem cell research satisfies many of the key pre-conditions of an effective moral compromise. To illustrate our point, we offer a model solution wherein eggs and embryos are temporarily used until non-egg and non-embryonic sources of pluripotent stem cells are developed to a state of translational readiness. (shrink)

This work contributes to recent transdisciplinary efforts to view the Haitian slave revolt (1791–1804) as the historical inspiration for Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Reconstructions offered by contemporary postcolonial scholars argue that the Haitian revolt was chronicled in Minerva as Hegel raced to finish his Phenomenology. Benhabib recently recognized the Hegel-Haiti thesis as entailing the sort of inclusive dialogical learning process necessary to validate subaltern experiences. The thesis has also drawn its share of sceptical scrutiny as Badiou claims that (...) it risks forcing an unnecessary moral dissymmetry, neglects objectionable features of enslavement and imposes a mismatch between apolitical subject and revolutionary. In reply, we appeal to the pioneering work of Tavares to show that the asymmetrical construction of classification schemes for persons of mixed-racial statuses accords with decades of documented literary exchanges between Hegel and Gregoire. We then turn to the work of James on the role of mixed-race merchants in the testimonial accounts of late 18th century French historians to show that European literate publics were well aware of the extremely coercive forms of commodified labour found in Saint-Domingue. We then invoke the archival work of Du Bois on French, British and American parliamentary proceedings that show the provisional colonial identities ascribed to Caribbean subjects did not hinder their self-conscious exercise of political agency. Viewing Hegel in terms of the historiographic records of the racial ontologies of early modern transatlantic literary exchanges helps explain how he adapted these tropes concerning mixed-race subjects in a manner that better explains many of the anomalous features of the dialectic. However, conferring the Haitian revolution its proper world-historical warrant as inspiration for his infamous master-slave dialectic need not lead us to overlook Hegel’s complicity with many of the epistemic and ontological flaws of colonial tropes held in early modern transatlantic print. (shrink)

There is a widely acknowledged shortage of and an increasing demand for transplantable human organs and tissues (e.g., kidney, heart, lung, liver, cornea) in developed and developing countries around the world. In response to this need, Lott and Savulescu (2007) propose the creation of a human embryonic stem (hESC) bank to facilitate the equitable and efficient dissemination of human leukocyte anti- gen (HLA) matched tissues and organs to patients in need of replacement. Although not an unreasonable proposal, the authors (...) go on to make a much stronger claim. They argue that hESCs are such important tools for addressing the massive unmet global need for organs that it is ethically justified to require mandatory banking of spare embryos, and they argue for the use of financial (or other) inducements to procure embryos for the derivation of hESCs. (shrink)

Research concerning the link between morality and education-related variables is scarce. Thus, the present study addressed this issue by focusing on the connection between moral disengagement and academic engagement and the moderating roles of educational anti-mattering and psychological distress. Our sample comprised 363 university students aged 18 to 29 (M = 20.86, SD = 1.57) from Bachelor’s and Master’s programs. Correlation analysis suggested that academic engagement was negatively associated with psychological distress and educational anti-mattering. Moderation analyses (...) suggested that moral disengagement predicted academic engagement only at high levels of psychological distress (i.e. depression, anxiety, and stress). Educational anti-mattering, however, did not significantly moderate the link between moral disengagement and academic engagement. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the results in addressing students’ academic engagement. (shrink)

“One moral truism that should not provoke controversy is the principle of universality: We should apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others—in fact, more stringent ones,†writes Chomsky (Khaleej Times, August 6, 2004).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 373 in the analysis of the "artificial" virtue of justice. Though he uses the term "faculties" as synonymous with energies or powers, he warns against the "faculty psychology" that uses faculties as explanations or causes. Hume writes: "By will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel.., when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." A (...) voluntary action, being "knowingly" aroused, is not a mere "direct " passion arising immediately from sensation; nevertheless, it belongs to the realm of passions rather than of judgments. It is included in the "bundle of impressions" psychology. Hume attempts to explain how the passion of sympathy serves to communicate impressions. Emotional expressions require the operation of the "imagination" to generate the social controls of conscience and to explain the origin of responsibility in terms of approvals and disapprovals. In this connection, /~rdal points out the differences between Hume's and Adam Smith's psychology of sympathy, ttume is content to rely largely on "imagination" to explain social sensitivities, whereas Adam Smith develops the theory that by sympathy men are led to put themselves in the place of others and thus to get a "disinterested spectator" view of passions. This seems to me a minor difference, and Hume, though he knew of Adam Smith's theory, and though he criticized him on other points, does not directly obiect to this particular doctrine of Adam Smith. It is, in fact, related to Hume's own analysis of justice as an "artificial" virtue, not directly related to the self-regarding passions. What separates Smith from Hume is his discussion of sympathy in the context of pity and benevolence which the Scottish moralists had made basic, whereas ttume keeps sympathy as a passion distinct from the virtues. In general, I have the "impression" that Hume, after he made this elaborate effort to apply experimental method to the passions and to valuational expressions, left the further development of this psychology to his close friend, Adam Smith, while he turned to "political essays" and to the more practical problems of the Enquiry. In his political essays, which brought him into public recognition in England and on the Continent while the Treatise continued to be basic for the Scottish social psychologists, Hume became especially concerned to call attention to the social operation of "opinions" and faiths. Therefore, it seems to me to be a mistake to regard the Enquiry as merely a "popular" edition of the Treatise. Hume shifted his interest from the critique of Locke's psychology to the practical problems of politics and morals. His History deals less with the psychological "origins" of customs, beliefs, and habits, more with their power in shaping the course of events. In other words, for Hume's ideas about judgments of value and the motivation of policies and principles, one must turn to Hume's later writings. The reader of ~rdal's excellent analysis of the Treatise cannot refrain from hoping that the author will make a similar examination of Hume's later "moral science." For, in addition to clarifying Hume, it will give.Ardal an opportunity to continue his own critical insights on present-day discussion of emotivist and intuitional ethics, which are not the least valuable feature of this volume. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By Jean Gu~henno. Translated from the French by John and Doreen Weightman. (2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 460. Vol. II, pp. xi + 316. set $17.50.) Rousseau and Jean-Jacques It has been Rousseau's peculiar fate to exercise a double fascination. A major philosopher, especially in the fields of education, politics, and morality, Jean-Jacques has also been read, loved, and hated as a man. In reading again Jean Gu~henno's impressive biography, recently published in an excellent English translation, one wonders why so much attention has been paid to Rousseau's private life. Surely it is not because he lacks the credentials of a serious thinker; the Second Discourse alone, not to mention the Emile and Social Contract, would presumably ensure Rousseau's place in any historical survey of Western... (shrink)

In “An Obscure Rider Obstructing Science,” Sarah Rodriguez, Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Candace Tingen, and Teresa Woodruff (2011) adopt a “developmental view” when contrasting the moral status of embry...

This book explores various connections of John Stuart Mill's thought to ancient Greek philosophy primarily in relation to his conception of happiness. It argues that a better understanding of Mill's background in ancient Greek thought and his reading(s) of Plato's dialogues leads to innovative interpretations of his moral and political thought.

Although the field of bioethics usually emphasizes ethical dilemmas arising from contemporary biomedical research, at another level the foundation of ethical judgments can be explored in the light of evolutionary biology. Two scientific approaches illuminate the relationships between human nature, social environments, and standards of ethical judgment: first, ethology and the observational study of nonhuman primates; second, evolutionary theory and new developments in the understanding of natural selection. Ethology shows that humans, like the species most closely related to us, are (...) naturally both cooperative and competitive. Evolutionary theory can "explain" cooperation at diverse levels of social organization , suggesting which forms of social cooperation are to be expected in specific cases. By focusing on the emotions underlying the sense of justice, moreover, an evolutionary approach can provide a more realistic assessment of the motivations and intentions underlying ethical controversies. Because individuals inevitably have competing claims as well as competing moral obligations, evolutionary bioethics thus teaches the need for balance and judgment. Emotions elicited by the all-too-human tendency to engage in moralistic aggression need to be balanced by reasoned judgment of the consequences of our own actions. The ethicist, no more or less than any other human, needs to be aware of the risks of deceptions and self-deception. Or, to put it more simply, an evolutionary bioethics leads back to the humility of the Socratic injunction: know thyself. Im allgemein üblichen Sinne befaßt sich Bioethik meist mit ethischen Problemstellungen, die durch die Fortschritte der biologischen Forschung hervorgerufen werden. Unter einem anderen Blickwinkel kann sie aber auch die Grundlage ethischer Urteile im Licht der Entwicklungsbiologie untersuchen. Zwei Wissenschaftszweige befassen sich mit dem Verhältnis zwischen der menschlichen Natur, dem sozialen Umfeld und den Standards für ethische Urteile; erstens, die Ethologie und Verhaltensstudien an nichtmenschlichen Primaten; zweitens, die Evolutionstheorie und neue Entwicklungen beim Verständnis der natürlichen Selektion. Die Ethologie zeigt, daß Menschen genauso wie die Tiere, die ihnen am nächsten verwandt sind, von Natur aus sowohl zur Kooperation als auch zur Konkurrenz miteinander neigen. Die Evolutionstheorie kann die verschiedenen Weisen von Kooperation auf den verschiedenen Ebenen sozialer Organisation "erklären" und dabei Hypothesen aufstellen, welche Formen sozialer Zusammenarbeit in spezifischen Fällen erwartet werden können. Soweit sie sich mit den Emotionen befaßt, die dem Sinn für Gerechtigkeit zugrunde liegen, kann die Evolutionstheorie darüber hinaus eine realistischere Einschätzung der Beweggründe und Intentionen vermitteln, die hinter ethischen Kontroversen stehen. Weil Individuen unvermeidlich konkurrierende Ansprüche, aber auch konkurrierende moralische Verpflichtungen haben, zeigt die evolutionäre Bioethik das Bedürfnis nach Ausgleich und Schlichtung. Die Emotionen, die durch die allzu menschliche Neigung zu Aggression im Namen der Moral hervorgerufen werden, rufen nach Ausgleich durch begründete Urteile über die Folgen unserer eigenen Handlungen. Der Ethiker muß sich, nicht mehr und nicht weniger als jeder andere Mensch, des Risikos von Täuschung und Selbsttäuschung bewußt sein. Oder, um es einfacher auszudrücken, evolutionäre Ethik führt zurück zu der Bescheidenheit der Sokratischen Forderung: Erkenne dich selbst. (shrink)

The Issue of Abortion in America is an interactive multi-media CD-ROM created by the award winning Carnegie Mellon team that brought us A Right to Die?: The Dax Cowart Case. In this ground breaking CD-ROM, The Issue of Abortion in America gives users an opportunity to see and hear women and couples speak of the emotional struggles and moral dilemmas they face in their consideration of continuing or terminating a pregnancy. It also places the issue of abortion in the larger (...) social context of medical, legal, philosophical, and religious considerations. The information on the CD is presented in three student friendly sections: * Introduction: offers an introduction to the project as well as an overview of the program. * Case Histories: a set of interactive multimedia modules present situations in which women and couples describe their decisions to continue or terminate a pregnancy. * Resources: Reviews the background context that informs the discussion of the issue of abortion in America along with a summary section of the case histories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 373 in the analysis of the "artificial" virtue of justice. Though he uses the term "faculties" as synonymous with energies or powers, he warns against the "faculty psychology" that uses faculties as explanations or causes. Hume writes: "By will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel.., when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." A (...) voluntary action, being "knowingly" aroused, is not a mere "direct " passion arising immediately from sensation; nevertheless, it belongs to the realm of passions rather than of judgments. It is included in the "bundle of impressions" psychology. Hume attempts to explain how the passion of sympathy serves to communicate impressions. Emotional expressions require the operation of the "imagination" to generate the social controls of conscience and to explain the origin of responsibility in terms of approvals and disapprovals. In this connection, /~rdal points out the differences between Hume's and Adam Smith's psychology of sympathy, ttume is content to rely largely on "imagination" to explain social sensitivities, whereas Adam Smith develops the theory that by sympathy men are led to put themselves in the place of others and thus to get a "disinterested spectator" view of passions. This seems to me a minor difference, and Hume, though he knew of Adam Smith's theory, and though he criticized him on other points, does not directly obiect to this particular doctrine of Adam Smith. It is, in fact, related to Hume's own analysis of justice as an "artificial" virtue, not directly related to the self-regarding passions. What separates Smith from Hume is his discussion of sympathy in the context of pity and benevolence which the Scottish moralists had made basic, whereas ttume keeps sympathy as a passion distinct from the virtues. In general, I have the "impression" that Hume, after he made this elaborate effort to apply experimental method to the passions and to valuational expressions, left the further development of this psychology to his close friend, Adam Smith, while he turned to "political essays" and to the more practical problems of the Enquiry. In his political essays, which brought him into public recognition in England and on the Continent while the Treatise continued to be basic for the Scottish social psychologists, Hume became especially concerned to call attention to the social operation of "opinions" and faiths. Therefore, it seems to me to be a mistake to regard the Enquiry as merely a "popular" edition of the Treatise. Hume shifted his interest from the critique of Locke's psychology to the practical problems of politics and morals. His History deals less with the psychological "origins" of customs, beliefs, and habits, more with their power in shaping the course of events. In other words, for Hume's ideas about judgments of value and the motivation of policies and principles, one must turn to Hume's later writings. The reader of ~rdal's excellent analysis of the Treatise cannot refrain from hoping that the author will make a similar examination of Hume's later "moral science." For, in addition to clarifying Hume, it will give.Ardal an opportunity to continue his own critical insights on present-day discussion of emotivist and intuitional ethics, which are not the least valuable feature of this volume. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By Jean Gu~henno. Translated from the French by John and Doreen Weightman. (2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 460. Vol. II, pp. xi + 316. set $17.50.) Rousseau and Jean-Jacques It has been Rousseau's peculiar fate to exercise a double fascination. A major philosopher, especially in the fields of education, politics, and morality, Jean-Jacques has also been read, loved, and hated as a man. In reading again Jean Gu~henno's impressive biography, recently published in an excellent English translation, one wonders why so much attention has been paid to Rousseau's private life. Surely it is not because he lacks the credentials of a serious thinker; the Second Discourse alone, not to mention the Emile and Social Contract, would presumably ensure Rousseau's place in any historical survey of Western... (shrink)

Ken Gemes's “The Biology of Evil” makes significant advances over previous discussions in its recognition of the centrality of the Jews in Nietzsche's account of the rise of slave morality, and in its differentiation between Nietzsche's virulent opposition to the anti-Semitic movements of his era and his embrace of prejudice regarding Jews and Jewry. There are three areas in which his claims are deficient, however. He does not realize Nietzsche's lifelong interest in the contemporary Jewish Question in (...) Germany. He disregards Nietzsche's avid interest in eugenics and eugenic solutions in the discussion of degeneration; Nietzsche knew the works of Francis Galton and others, and he himself wrote explicitly about positive and negative eugenics. Finally, Gemes believes Nietzsche advocated a mixture of slave and master morality, while it is clear from his rhetoric and his substantive remarks that he envisions no harmony of these two antagonistic value systems. (shrink)

Recent work in the fields of ethics and entrepreneurship has raised the possibility that entrepreneurs may differ from other individuals in the moral issues they face, in their moral judgements and behaviors concerning those issues, and even in their level of cognitive moral development. While this work has been exploratory and its conclusions tentative, the findings raise two interesting questions: do entrepreneurs actually differ from non-entrepreneurs in their ethical orientations and, if so, why? We propose a model of ethical decision (...) making for small business entrepreneurs. We suggest some ways in which the ethical framework of entrepreneurs may differ systematically from that of other business people and propose some areas for future research. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Objectification Physical Bonds? Moral Bonds? Epistemological Bonds? The Upshot.

This article draws on 35 months of ethnographic fieldwork and apprenticeship in a boxing gym located in Chicago's black ghetto to explicate how prizefighters apperceive and express the fact of being live commodities of flesh and blood, and how they practically reconcile themselves to ruthless exploitation in ways that enable them to maintain a sense of personal integrity and moral purpose. The boxer's experience of corporeal exploitation is expressed in three kindred idioms, those of prostitution, slavery and animal husbandry. The (...) first likens the fighter-manager combo to the prostitute-pimp duo; the second depicts the ring as a plantation and promoters as latter-day slave masters; the third intimates that boxers are used in the manner of livestock. All three tropes simultaneously enounce and denounce the immoral marketing of disquiescent bodies. But this acute consciousness is neutralized by the doxic belief in the normalcy of exploitation, in the `agency' of corporeal entrepreneurship, and in the possibility of individual exceptionalism. This practical belief, inscribed in the bodily dispositions of the fighter, helps produce the collective misrecognition whereby boxers collude in their own commercialization. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} The study attempts to complete the conclusions of social-religious research undertaken up till now, and therefore analyzes the new religious phenomenon” ( Shin-shinshūkyō/ New New Religions ), especially the Aum Shinrikyō cult of the contemporary Japanese society, from an interdisciplinary perspective. Focusing upon the terrorist attack with sarin gas caused (...) by the Aum Shinrikyō cult, our analysis uses the method of Chinese boxes (the small box is in a bigger box which, in its turn, is placed in an even bigger box and so on), to deal with the complex issues beyond the criminal dimension. The study presents in this sense the victims’ confessions ( higaisha ) as well as the aggressors’ confessions ( kagaisha ) as published by the famous contemporary writer Haruki Murakami in the journalistic novel Underground (1997). The Aum Shinrikyō cult and the religious terrorist attack from the Tokyo subway eventually become important “ confession-evidence” in the process of knowing the Japanese spirituality and the way in which its religious feeling, permanently in search of a way of manifestation, reflects the “ normality” of a free modern society. By its aspects of antiutopian “ religious affair”, the Aum story urges mankind on an exercice of autoreflection. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The phrase “Enlightenment rhetoric” typically denotes discourses bent on rejecting classical oratorical styles in favor of purportedly scientific ones. Likewise, scholars often associate Enlightenment rhetorical styles with the scientific epistemologies that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This article reconsiders Enlightenment rhetoric by analyzing David Hume’s 1742 essay “Of Eloquence.” More specifically, the article argues that the Scottish Enlightenment context necessitated a rhetoric that compensated for the discursive limitations of new scientific worldviews. In so doing, the article argues (...) that Hume verbalizes the transcendent dimension of classical eloquence in ways commensurate with the emphasis on perspicuity emerging in English culture, a rhetorical maneuver that the author calls discursive transcendence. Hume’s “Of Eloquence” thus serves as a case study demonstrating how an Enlightenment writer advanced a rhetoric that both rejects and pulls from prior rhetorical traditions, constituting a new understanding of Enlightenment rhetoric. (shrink)

Resumen:¿Trae la posibilidad de mecanismos de mejoramiento cognitivo, como por ejemplo la posibilidad de implantar creencias en la mente de personas, preguntas nuevas a la epistemología? En este corto volumen, J. Adam Carter propone que sí. En particular, Carter argumenta que obliga a que consideremos la necesidad de una condición adicional en nuestras caracterizaciones del concepto de conocimiento: además de ser una forma de creencia verdadera justificada, que satisface una condición anti-Gettier, como aceptan la mayoría de los enfoques contemporáneos (...) (en particular desde la perspectiva de la epistemología de las virtudes), el conocimiento debe satisfacer una condición de autonomía. En la práctica, esto significa que sujetos a quienes se haya implantado creencias que de otro modo satisfarían los estándares del conocimiento no tengan, por lo tanto, conocimiento, en contra de las predicciones de ciertos futuristas. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo estudia los Elementos de Filosofía (EdF), dictados por Andrés Bello a Juan Alemparte en Santiago de Chile hacia los años 1840-1843 y conservados actualmente en una copia manuscrita. Se muestra que los EdF corresponden a un esbozo preliminar de las materias abordadas por Bello tanto en las entregas del periódico El Crepúsculo como en su obra póstuma Filosofía del Entendimiento. Por ello, se plantea que estas lecciones manuscritas constituyen un testimonio exclusivo de las clases particulares del maestro (...) venezolano en Santiago del siglo XIX y exhiben, además, un estadio de maduración temprano de ideas que llegarán a ser gravitantes en su obra magna. Se espera que este material represente un insumo para futuras pesquisas en torno a las percepciones en general, y desde la perspectiva del pensador caraqueño en particular. Abstract: The article examines the Elements of Philosophy, taught by Andrés Bello to Juan Alemparte in Santiago de Chile around 1840-1843 and currently preserved in a manuscript copy. It is shown that the Elements of Philosophy correspond to a preliminary outline of the matters addressed by Bello both in the newspaper El Crepúsculo and in his posthumous work Philosophy of the Understanding. For this reason, it is proposed that these manuscript notes constitute an exclusive testimony of the private lessons of the Venezuelan Master in Santiago of the 19th century and exhibit a stage of early maturation of ideas that will become gravitational in his magnum opus. It is expected that this material represents an input for future research on perceptions in general, and from the perspective of the thinker from Caracas in particular. (shrink)

Loughlin’s (2018) uses Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations to motivate his ‘wide’ view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of ability, the support for the wide view is not as straightforward. The criteria for using the concept of ability are highly context-dependent, and there is not a single account for them. This shows that at (...) best, a moderate form of anti-individualism for cognitive capacities can be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds. Furthermore, the suggestion that ontological questions can be bypassed is questioned. (shrink)

R. M. Hare has argued1 that there are conceivable circumstances in which it would be right not to abolish the institution of slavery: in the imaginary land of Juba established slave-plantations are managed by a benevolent elite for the good of all, no ‘cruel or unusual ’ punishments are in use, and citizens of the neighbouring island of Camaica, ‘free ’but impoverished, regularly seek to become slaves. Hare adds that it is unlikely, given human nature, that ‘masters ’would treat (...) ‘slaves ’humanely, and avoid a gradual corruption of their moral consciousness which would cancel out any possible advantages of the system. Slavery is wrong, he argues, not because it violates ‘fundamental human rights’, but I because it would in practice generally increase misery. (shrink)

The "aphoristic form causes difficulty," Nietzsche argued in 1887, for "today this form is not taken seriously enough." Nietzsche's Aphoristic Challenge addresses this continued neglect by examining the role of the aphorism in Nietzsche's writings, the generic traditions in which he writes, the motivations behind his turn to the aphorism, and the reasons for his sustained interest in the form. This literary-philosophical study argues that while the aphorism is the paradigmatic form for Nietzsche's writing, its function shifts as his thought (...) evolves. His turn to the aphorism in Human, All Too Human arises not out of necessity, but from the new freedoms of expression enabled by his critiques of language and his emerging interest in natural science. Yet the model interpretation of an aphorism Nietzsche offers years later in On the Genealogy of Morals tells a different story, revealing more about how the mature Nietzsche wants his earlier works read than how they were actually written. This study argues nevertheless that consistencies emerge in Nietzsche's understanding of the aphorism, and these, perhaps counter-intuitively, are best understood in terms of excess. Recognizing the changes and consistencies in Nietzsche's aphoristic mode helps establish a context that enables the reader to navigate the aphorism books and better answer the challenges they pose. (shrink)

R. M. Hare has argued 1 that there are conceivable circumstances in which it would be right not to abolish the institution of slavery: in the imaginary land of Juba established slave-plantations are managed by a benevolent elite for the good of all, no ‘cruel or unusual ’ punishments are in use, and citizens of the neighbouring island of Camaica, ‘free ’but impoverished, regularly seek to become slaves. Hare adds that it is unlikely, given human nature, that ‘masters ’would (...) treat ‘slaves ’humanely, and avoid a gradual corruption of their moral consciousness which would cancel out any possible advantages of the system. Slavery is wrong, he argues, not because it violates ‘fundamental human rights’, but I because it would in practice generally increase misery. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic and the quarantine undergone by children in many countries is a stressful situation about which little is known to date. Children and adolescents' behaviors to cope with home confinement may be associated with their emotional welfare. The objectives of this study were: to examine the coping strategies used out by children and adolescents during the COVID-19 health crisis, to analyze the differences in these behaviors in three countries, and to examine the relationship between different coping modalities and (...) adaptation. Participants were 1,480 parents of children aged 3–18 years from three European countries. The children's mean age was 9.15 years. Parents completed an online survey providing information on symptoms and coping behaviors observed in their children. The most frequent coping strategies were accepting what is happening, collaborating with quarantine social activities, acting as if nothing is happening, highlighting the advantages of being at home, and not appearing to be worried about what is happening. Compared to Italian and Spanish children, Portuguese children used a sense of humor more frequently when their parents talked about the situation. Acting as if nothing was happening, collaborating with social activities, and seeking comfort from others were more likely in Spanish children than in children from the other countries. Compared to Portuguese and Spanish children, Italian children did not seem worried about what was happening. Overall, an emotional-oriented coping style was directly correlated with a greater presence of anxious symptoms, as well as to mood, sleep, behavioral, and cognitive alterations. Task-oriented and avoidance-oriented styles were related to better psychological adaptation. Results also show that unaffected children or children with a lower level of impact were more likely to use strategies based on a positive focus on the situation. This study provides interesting data on the strategies to be promoted by parents to cope with the COVID-19 health crisis in children. (shrink)