Contains a wide selection from writings on Medieval political theory during the period from the investiture struggle to the end of the 15th century. The text is organized in terms of eight basic topics of political theory and is about equally divided between the selections themselves and the interpretative essays which introduce each group.--R. H.

The problem of perception is one of specifying correct and consistent meanings for the concepts we use in talking about it. The most frequent mistake in the history of this concept has been to "reduce" perception either to sensation or to judgment. With this in mind, the author deals primarily with the period from Descartes to Kant, though ancient, medieval, and contemporary developments are also treated.--R. H. K.

An attempt to reconcile the finite and the infinite by postulating a cosmic cycle in which infinity realizes itself through finitude.--R. H.

The existence of consciousness in animals may have been overlooked. Continuity in consciousness between humans and animals is predicted by evolutionary theory. However, there are specific methodological difficulties associated with investigating such a phenomenon: it cannot be directly measured; animals, unlike humans, cannot directly tell us about their conscious experience; experiments which have made comparisons to human consciousness cannot detect consciousness of a different form; application of the law of parsimony in science has traditionally led to the conclusion that (...) it does not exist. (shrink)

This is the first of a number of volumes designed to review the philosophical work which has been done in various areas of philosophy between the years 1956 and 1966. It succeeds an earlier three volume publication entitled Philosophy in the Mid-Century which covered the period from 1949 to 1955. This first volume in the series covers the fields of logic, philosophical logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. For anyone interested in these fields, the book is an indispensable guide. The (...) procedure is that an expert in a given area writes a summary of the work done in the area in the last ten years and adds a bibliography covering the same period. In all there are thirty-two such essays, most written in English, but a few in French and German. Some representative essays and their authors are the following: On the logical side, Modal Logic, Many Valued Logics, Logic of Practical Discourse, Semantics, Model Theory, Pragmatics, Chronological or Tense Logic, The Logic of Questions, Combinatory Logic and others. There are two general essays on recent developments in philosophical logic and a number of essays on the development of logic in various Eastern and Western European countries and Japan. On the mathematical side are three essays on foundations of set theory and mathematics, essays on Intuitionism in mathematics, and general essays by A. Church, H. Freudenthal and others. The essays are generally of high caliber and the bibliographies in most cases very comprehensive. Occasionally the essays contain not only summary of work done but original suggestions and development of ideas. It would be hard to find a more useful guide for the philosopher overwhelmed by the many developments in these fields in recent years.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The Bhagavad-Gītā is the most important text in the smrti literature of India, as distinct from the śruti literature which is traditionally regarded as ultimately authoritative. The Bhagavad-Gītā has been assigned a date ranging from the fifth century B.C. to the second century B.C. The Indian religious tradition places the Gītā at the end of the third age of the present cycle of the universe and the beginning of the fourth, namely the Kali Yuga to which we belong.

The groundwork for a reliable edition of Seneca's tragedies was done fifty years ago by three men who died in the First World War: C. E. Stuart, T. Düring and W. Hoffa. Yet no complete edition since has taken full account of their work. It is even now not widely enough known that the papers of all three are readily available; Stuart's papers are now in Trinity College Library, Cambridge,2 and those of Hoffa and Düring are in Göttingen University Library.3 (...) Stuart's work has lain in particular obscurity, and for my work on the tradition I have given especial attention to it. (shrink)

From the beginning of the seventeenth century it has generally been held that the second Medicean is the parent of all the other extant manuscripts. In two articles C. W. Mendell has demonstrated that Leidensis B.P.L. 16. B is the manuscript once owned by Rudolphus Agricola and later by Th. Ryck, whose edition makes frequent allusion to its readings. Mendell's attempt to show further that L represents a tradition independent of the Medicean has found little support until recently, when E. (...) Koestermann, in the course of preparing the latest Teubner edition of Annals and Histories became convinced from his own study of L that Mendell's view—in spite of some arguments of dubious validity—was essentially correct. In an article in Philologus and in the preface to his edition of Histories Koestermann has marshalled the arguments which he believes prove L's independence of the Medicean line of descent. Since the new valuation that Koestermann puts upon L has produced a drastic revision of both text and apparatus criticus in his new editions, it may be worth while to examine the evidence that Koestermann adduces in support of his belief in L's independence. (shrink)

From the beginning of the seventeenth century it has generally been held that the second Medicean is the parent of all the other extant manuscripts. In two articles C. W. Mendell has demonstrated that Leidensis B.P.L. 16. B is the manuscript once owned by Rudolphus Agricola and later by Th. Ryck, whose edition makes frequent allusion to its readings. Mendell's attempt to show further that L represents a tradition independent of the Medicean has found little support until recently, when E. (...) Koestermann, in the course of preparing the latest Teubner edition of Annals and Histories became convinced from his own study of L that Mendell's view—in spite of some arguments of dubious validity—was essentially correct. In an article in Philologus and in the preface to his edition of Histories Koestermann has marshalled the arguments which he believes prove L's independence of the Medicean line of descent. Since the new valuation that Koestermann puts upon L has produced a drastic revision of both text and apparatus criticus in his new editions, it may be worth while to examine the evidence that Koestermann adduces in support of his belief in L's independence. (shrink)

Historians of medieval England have devoted little sustained attention to the law of usury, and what attention they have paid to the subject has not been focused on the law's enforcement in court practice. A common assumption has been that one could not go much beyond academic treatises and legislative enactments in studying the subject. This has left an undeniable gap, one which English historians have not made as much progress in filling as have Continental historians. In dealing with (...) enforcement of the law of usury in medieval England, therefore, most general treatments have had either to make reasonable guesses from secondary evidence or to be silent. (shrink)

Diogenes Laertius relates the tale that Aristotle, upon being reproached for giving alms to a debased fellow, replied, ‘It was not his character, but the man, that I pitied.’ Some such reply is equally apt in apology for a paper paying homage to an idea long discredited in the philosophical world, Aristotle's theory of Place. I have been moved, not indeed by the apparent character of Aristotle's theory, for that is easily reproached, but by what has proved for the philosophical (...) tradition of infinite worth, what we may call the theory's ‘latent virtue’. There is a danger, of course, as hard-headed philologists and commentators are always reminding us, that in attending to this latent virtue we may be paying sentimental homage to the dead. Thus it will be important that we first carefully and coldly examine the overt character of the Aristotelian doctrine before attempting to justify any philosophical compassion felt in its presence. More than likely in such a disinterested inquiry it will be found that our ‘debased fellow’ is a good deal more of a man than the modern reformers have allowed. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Reichenbach wrote this book just after taking the first course Einstein ever taught on the theory of relativity. His important and influential work The Philosophy of Space and Time was written several years later and relied in part on the axiomatization of the special and general theories of relativity already worked out in this book. For special relativity Reichenbach divides his axioms into two sets, the light axioms which relate light signals to the topology and metric of time and space, (...) and the matter axioms which do the same for rigid rods and clocks. Thus the axioms focus on the conventions uniting theory and observation and give more insight into the physical foundations of the theory than do most axiomatizations. Reichenbach's approach has been criticized by Weyl and others, but at least some of the criticism seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what Reichenbach was attempting to do. Now that this early work has been translated into English, there is hope that it will be more widely read. There is no doubt that students of the theory or of recent philosophical discussion of space and time will profit from a careful reading of this book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Foundations research in physics, according to Bunge, has lagged behind its sister discipline, the foundations of mathematics. His book is an attempt to partially remedy this situation by analyzing the form and content of some basic ideas in physics and presenting some of the fundamental theories of physics in an axiomatic fashion. The heart of the book consists of axiomatizations of Classical Mechanics, Classical Field Theories, and Quantum Mechanics. Bunge does not claim to be working without predecessors. While the idea (...) of a separate discipline in the foundations of physics is rather new, the existence of material that clearly belongs to foundations research is not. This is attested to by the substantial bibliography at the end of the book. But he is ideally suited to the task of bringing this difficult material together and welding it in his own fashion into a coherent whole. His grasp of physical theory is wide-ranging and he writes with clarity and wit. In the first chapter he states his views on a number of issues in the philosophy of science: explanation, prediction, operationalism, laws, and other topics. The arguments are usually summarized very briefly, or reference is made to other books. Thus those who disagree with his philosophical presuppositions will not be convinced; but friends or foes will miss a great deal of informative material if they do not push on to the axiomatizations which follow and which are the main concern of the book. This book will undoubtedly be a source-book for future foundations research in the physical sciences.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself is (...) sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This volume claims to offer first a correct interpretation of Hume's theory of causation, and second, a philosophical defense of it against many recent criticisms. The first two chapters try to reconcile Hume's two definitions of "cause," and to prove that Hume was not a skeptic about induction. The authors contend that Hume's views on causation can be rationally reconstructed as a unified theory that is, they believe, faithful to his intentions, namely that causation involves regularities or constant conjunctions, and (...) some kind of necessity. (shrink)

Those looking for extensive accounts of Islamic theological and philosophical systems will not find them in this survey. It presents rather a historical sketch of the political and social forces operating in the Islamic world, from the time of Mohammed to the present, which gave rise to the basic trends in theology and philosophy. The complexity of these forces will impress the Western reader, and those wanting a background for more detailed study of Islamic philosophers and theologians will find the (...) book useful. The first in a series of volumes on Islamic culture directed to the English-speaking student.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This scholarly and historically rich study shows the originality of Leibniz's moral and religious thought, and its coherence with his philosophy as a whole. At the basis of Leibniz's thought the author sees a stress on essence and the univocity of being, and a resulting belief that metaphysics studies being and truth as such, prior to distinguishing kinds of being and truth. This belief in truth is seen as the source of Leibniz's belief in a rationality and justice common to (...) God and man--the basic principle of his universal jurisprudence and theodicy. A thread of criticism runs through the book, to the effect that Leibniz's stress on essence and continuity causes him to blur the sharp difference between infinite uncreated Being and finite created beings.--R. H. (shrink)

Arguments from conflicting appearances are almost as ancient as philosophy itself, and in a sense the whole thrust of Burnyeat's essay is to emphasize the curious fact of the continual appearance of such arguments throughout the history of philosophy. The premise of conflicting appearances has led on the one hand to relativistic views of knowledge and sometimes beyond these to skepticism. On the other hand, however, the same premise drove Plato to the conclusion that knowledge could never be perceptual, and (...) Bradley to the affirmation of a necessary Absolute. (shrink)

The expressed aim of Alf Ross' study is to lay the philosophical foundations for deontic logic by explicating the concepts of directive and norm. But there is a wider significance to his task, for he makes clear throughout that the concepts of directive and norm are central to a wide variety of disciplines, including moral, legal, and social philosophy, linguistics and the other social sciences. Moreover, the test of adequacy of his explications include an appeal to the usefulness the concepts (...) have, not only to the logician, but for the moral and legal philosopher and especially in the case of his account of norms, for the social scientist. He begins with a discussion of speech acts, developing a distinction between indicative and directive speech. A "directive" is defined in terms of directive speech as an action-idea conceived as a pattern of behavior in directive speech and a variety of different sorts of directives are distinguished. A "norm" is then defined as a directive which stands in a certain kind of relation to social facts and the elements of norms are discussed. Finally, Ross offers an interpretation of deontic logic as a set of postulates defining directive speech. He discusses some of the problems of interpretation although he does not make contact with some of the more recent discussion of deontic paradoxes, e.g., the paradoxes engendered by contrary-to-duty imperatives. This is an informative and thought provoking study. The writing is very clear and the reader is guided throughout by a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In an introductory sketch of history of scholastic interest in aesthetics, the author notes the reawakening of Thomistic interest in this subject since the last century. He adds, with evidence drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century works, that this interest has been accompanied by methodological confusions and a misunderstanding of the theory of beauty of St. Thomas himself. He seeks to remedy this situation with a scholarly treatment of Aquinas' theory of beauty, divided into two parts; the first a genetic (...) investigation of the development of Thomas's ideas on beauty, the second a systematic account of the mature theory. A notable attempt to develop Aquinas' ideas on this subject from the entire corpus of his writings and not merely from the Summas and one or two other major works.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This publication of the proceedings of the first of a new series of colloquia to be held at the University of Western Ontario contains an opening address on existence and quantification by W. V. Quine and three symposia. The paper discussed in the first of these symposia, "Descartes' Ontological Argument" by Anthony Kenny, follows closely one chapter of Kenny's recent book on Descartes. Kenny's paper contains both an interesting account of Descartes' views and some challenging remarks about ontological arguments in (...) general. His paper is discussed in separate commentaries by Norman Malcolm and Terence Penelhum. An interesting feature of this volume is that some comments from the floor are recorded and included along with the regular commentaries. Ernest Sosa and Bernard Williams comment on Kenny's paper along with Malcolm and Penelhum. Kenny responds to all four commentators. The other two symposia follow a similar format. The second, "On Events and Event-descriptions," features a paper by R. M. Martin which focuses on the logic of event descriptions and their role in scientific explanation. Events for Martin are extensional entities, unlike facts, but like facts they are "fictitious in the sense of being handled on virtually." His views are discussed by Donald Davidson, R. J. Butler and Wesley Salmon. In the third symposium on "Existence Assumptions in Practical Thinking," Stephan Körner elaborates on his view of effective choice, relating his account to those of Hume, Kant, and Peirce on the specific topic of the relationship of choice and natural necessity. The commentaries of J. J. Thomson and Bernard Williams are helpful here in getting Körner to clarify his interesting views. In sum, this first colloquium at the University of Western Ontario features genuine philosophical communication on some important issues.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to certain problems in the philosophy of science through the study of four case histories in the history of science. It is designed for undergraduate science majors whom, the author feels, often have difficulties connecting the usual discussions in the philosophy of science with the science they have studied and are studying. Each case history is followed by a commentary which considers its philosophical implications. The first case, Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, (...) is treated briefly and from it some implications are drawn about the relation of simple theories and the facts supporting them. The next three cases are considerably more complicated and receive more extended treatment. The first of these concerns scientific work on the motions and spacing of the planets from early Babylonian and Greek observations and theories to Kepler and Newton. The second concerns the development of the periodic table of the elements from Dalton to Mendeleev and the third discusses gene theories of inheritance from Mendel onward. In connection with these studies the author considers questions about the nature of theories and theoretical entities, methods of testing theories, the dependence of observation on theory and the issues of reduction among other topics. Although he limits his discussion to a few selected topics in the philosophy of science he has written an informative and interesting study which should fulfill its stated aims.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first of these two volumes is a second edition of the first part of Jonas' comprehensive scholarly study of Gnosticism, first published in 1934. Except for minor corrections the first edition has been left unrevised. The second volume carries the study up to the third century A.D. A final volume completing the second part is promised for the near future.--R. H.

Anyone interested in the highly active field of human communication will find this collection of essays by authors in different disciplines a very useful compendium of present results and problems. Communication theory is related in different essays to current work in Anthropology, Neurophysiology, Organization Theory, Philosophy of Language, Psychiatry, Psycholinguistics, Psychology, Sociology, and several other areas. The editor concludes with an essay "Toward a Theory of Human Communication." Each essay contains a very helpful bibliography of work in the appropriate area (...) and in addition the book contains a general bibliography prepared by Hugh Duncan which includes comments about the contents and nature of each book listed. The excellent essays of Searle and Fodor, Jenkins, and Saporta make the most direct connection with philosophical issues being widely discussed today, but most of the essays provide material which should be of interest to philosophers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers subjectivist, (...) empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A comprehensive study of the Critique of Pure Reason, viewed as a theory of knowledge. The author generally accepts Kant's formulation of epistemological problems, but is highly critical of the Kantian solutions. The discussion is largely kept to the text itself; references to other commentators are deliberately omitted.--R. H.

The author attempts to extract from Carnap’s writings a coherent theory of the nature of philosophical questions and then tries to defend this theory against criticism from various quarters. Special attention is given in the middle chapters to the alternative views of Quine on ontological questions and ontological commitment and to Quine’s criticisms of related Carnapian views.

In this book the author develops his own systems of and semantics for presupposition free logic. He calls his systems logics without existence assumptions, by which he means logical systems which are sound and complete with respect to a semantic theory in which a universe of discourse can be empty but any term which denotes must denote something in the universe, all predicates including identity represent relations holding among members of the universe and the quantifiers range over just all the (...) members of the universe. In a brief introductory chapter the author reviews the motivations for constructing non-standard logics of this kind and briefly discusses what he takes to be the limitations of previous work done in the field. Persons interested in the philosophical problems and uses of such logics are likely to find this chapter interesting though disappointingly brief. Four of the eight chapters are devoted to the development of a natural deduction system N which is a logic without existence assumptions in the author's sense. The system N is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the author's semantics. An axiomatic system L is later developed and shown to be equivalent to N. The final chapter is devoted to discussing the relation of his work to many-valued logics, modal logics, intuitionistic logic and the theory of classes among other topics. The author believes that logics without existence assumptions "will in the long run displace the less natural and more narrow standard logics."--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays written by Hintikka over a period of eight or nine years on logics of existence and on the semantics of modal logics, areas in which he has made pioneer studies. The introductory essay defends formal methods in philosophical analysis. Two essays follow on logics of existence, one of them relating such logics to discussions of the ontological argument. Of the four essays on the semantics of modal logics, the first two "Modality and Quantification" and (...) "The Modes of Modality" discuss the possibilities for philosophical work with the semantics of modal logics generally and the second two "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes" and "Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions" discuss philosophical applications and try to deal with some of Quine's objections to modal logics. Two final essays apply Hintikka's methods to problems in the philosophy of perception and metaethics. In a paper "On the Logic of Perception" he discusses the nature of immediate perception and sense-data theories and in a paper "Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals" he discusses the distinction between prima facie and absolute obligation and John Searle's attempted derivation of "ought" from "is." All essays but this last one have been previously published, but not all in places readily available to English-speaking readers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

When in 1950, the distinguished psychologist, Jean Piaget, published a book on the relation of logic and psychology, the book was severely criticized in the journal Methodos by the logician E. V. Beth. Piaget asked to get together with Beth to discuss the issues involved. The result, over 15 years later, is the present book. Beth is the author of the first half in which he defends the complete autonomy of logic in relation to psychology by means of a partly (...) philosophical, partly historical treatment of logicist, formalist, and intuitionist philosophies of mathematics. Briefly put, Beth's thesis is the now familiar one in contemporary philosophy that logic and mathematics are normative sciences, psychology is a factual science. As a consequence, Beth argues that we must renounce all "psychologism" in logic and mathematics, and all "logicism" in psychology. Piaget has come to accept these main contentions of Beth and affirms them in the second half of the volume. But Piaget is impressed by the fact that a good deal of human conceptual development must go on before human beings recognize and state normative laws of logical thought. Piaget attempts to chart this conceptual development and explain how it takes place. He attempts to show that this genetic-psychological approach to the study of logical and mathematical thought is complementary to and fully compatible with the deductive approach of the formal logician, and hence compatible with Beth's thesis about the conceptual autonomy of logic and psychology. Logician and psychologist can thus deal with the same material although their approaches are conceptually autonomous. The book repays careful reading not only for the arguments defending these challenging claims but also for many other details in both parts.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A critical treatment of four basic methodological principles of science: simplicity, micro-reduction, verification, and connectivity. In each case, the major question is whether, and on what grounds, the principle can be justified. This quest for justification should be of particular interest to those concerned with the philosophy of science from the standpoint of epistemology and metaphysics.--R. H. K.

A comprehensive and lucidly written account of Origen's life and thought, relating Origen's writings to his active role in the Christian community, as well as to the religious and philosophic thought of his time. The book's main thesis is that Origen's thought cannot be reduced either to biblical theology or to neo-platonic speculation, but must be understood as an effort to make Christian faith intelligible and systematic.--R. H.

Combines a critical analysis of the theories of Bridgman and his followers with an outline of the problems facing an operationalist theory of knowledge. The primary criticism is that operationalists have been reluctant to spell out the philosophical implications of their theory, and hence have wavered between too strict and too liberal an interpretation of its consequences.--R. H.

The problem of the impact of traditions of romantic literature on Dostoevsky’s novel ‘The Idiot‘ is examined in the article. The author points out that the attitude of Russian novelist towards the phenomena of the outgoing culture was essentially devoid of dogmatism: the very approach to different cultural trends and styles was always notable for amazing flexibility and diversity. A novel by Charles Nodier, ‘Jean Sbogar‘, is considered as one of the precedent texts. Its motivic repertoire is reproduced in full (...) in the novel by F. Dostoevsky. A comparison of the protagonist of the French novel, Jean Sbogar, which is depicted in two masks, with the main characters of the novel ‘The Idiot‘ Prince Myshkin and Rogozhin, suggests that, starting from a given source, Dostoevsky developed Nodier’s art idea. Russian writer abandoned the principle of a split personality in favor of representation of two heroes that are fighting and, at the same time, there is a mystical connection between them. Comparison between Myshkin and angel-like Lothario and between Rogozhin and the rogue Jean Sbogar once again confirms the idea that in Dostoevsky’s novel there is an introduction of high philosophical symbolism in realism: ‘splitting‘ a romantic image sends a thoughtful reader to the Gospel legend about Christ and the robber. Thus, reading of the images of "The Idiot" through the prism of romantic novels of Charles Nodier detects correlation not only between the plot of the novel and literary tradition, but also between the plot and the Christian symbolism. Someone else’s text not only becomes Dostoevsky’s material for improvisation, but also serves as a secret pointer to the reader and reconstructs his cultural memory. (shrink)

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

After a condensed and lucid summary of Classical Psychoanalysis, this Indian philosopher applies the criterion of self-referential consistency to criticize Freud's application of psychoanalytic categories to the phenomenon of religion. Professor Masih argues that Freud's account of religion fails to account for other religions than Monotheism. He interprets this desire to dethrone the God of Monotheism as a consequence of Freud's repressed father-hatred and extends this technique of psychoanalyzing Freud to see in his metaphysics of materialism a subconscious love of (...) the mother. There are elements of experience that transcend any psychoanalytic account of that experience. Whereas neurosis is necessarily infantile, the infantile aspects of such adult experiences as religion is not necessarily neurotic. Freud's genius in developing the psychoanalytic method is a case in point. Masih then argues that Freud's mistaken application of this method of treating individuals to social phenomena involves regression into a neurotically determined prejudice. The final irony is that even Freud's psychoanalytic method has the religious dimension of a humanistic concern for man's salvation from illness.—T. R. H. (shrink)

In a highly conscious break with what is termed "orthodox Darwinism," i.e., evolution by natural selection of individual adaptive character, the author presents his forceful and suggestive attempt to recast evolutionary theory by taking Darwin's later concept of the reproductive mode of genetic groups as fundamental. The goal of this reorientation is a "descriptive behavioral science" of evolution from the most primitive clusters of inorganic matter to human societies. The book is "Blakean" in its scope and tone of vision, but (...) suffers from heaviness of style and its misplaced messianic pretensions and prophetic wrath. However, in arguing for a continuity of cosmological, natural and human evolution, and in suggesting a synthesis of the insights of Darwin and Freud, the book is powerful and convincing.—T. R. H. (shrink)