A central problem for the international governance of heritable germline gene editing is that there are important differences in attitudes and values as well as ethical and health care considerations around the world. These differences are reflected in a complicated and diverse regulatory landscape. Several publications have discussed whether reproductive uses would be legally permissible in individual countries and whether clinical applications could emerge in the context of regulatory gaps and gray areas. Systematic comparative studies that explore issues related to (...) the governance of this technology from different national and international perspectives are needed to address the lack of knowledge in this area. In this research report, we contribute to filling this gap by presenting views of stakeholders in the United Kingdom on challenges to the governance of heritable genome editing. We present findings from a multistakeholder study conducted in the United Kingdom between October 2016 and January 2018 and funded by the Wellcome Trust. This research included interviews, literature analysis, and a workshop. We involved leading U.K. scientists, in vitro fertilization clinicians, and representatives from regulatory bodies, patient organizations, and other civil societal organizations, as well as fertility companies. Part one of this article explores stakeholder perceptions of possible global developments in heritable genome editing and associated risks and governance challenges. Part two presents a range of policy options that were generated during the workshop in relation to the challenges discussed in part one. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

Review by: Achim Blumensath The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 394-396, September 2013.

According to Humeanism, actions cannot be adequately explained without reference to the desires of an agent. Desires are viewed as sources of motivation or as motivating states and thus as having an indispensable role to play in the explanation of actions. One of the main rivals of Humeanism is pure cognitivsm. According to this view, actions are to be explained exclusively by beliefs. The present paper's focus is on arguments Jonathan Dancy has put forward in favor of this pure cognitivist (...) picture. His main line of argument tries to convince us of the claim that desires have no explanatory value at all as regards the explantion of an agent's actions. I argue that none of Dancy's arguments against Humeanism is successful, and moreover that the pure cognitivists position fails on its own terms because pure cognitivism is unable to provide an account of desires that makes intelligible their role in the mental economy of agents. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last much longer. I will explore (...) what their sources are, and how they impact one another, other affective processes, and our being in the world. I follow several eminent emotion researchers and try to carve out their insights, many seemingly mutually excluding each other. As it will turn out, most of them are, in fact, not excluding each other, but contribute to a layered picture of moods that fits well in between emotions and personality traits. Eventually, I will shortly discuss what we can do with our moods. (shrink)

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action depends on its maxim. As he explains, particularly in the Groundwork, moral worth accrues to an action when the action rests on a maxim selected for its accordance with the moral law. With respect to Religion, however, Kant modifies his understanding of the moral worth of actions. He now expresses the view that an agent acts morally worthy only if he possesses a moral Gesinnung as a character trait. According to this (...) opinion, only such persons can act in a manner that has moral worth who own a good Gesinnung and seek to express it in their actions. But to be in possession of a good Gesinnung depends, according to Kant, on strict conditions that ordinary actors will not realistically be able to fulfil. This accords with Kant's verdict that moral progress has not yet taken place because the conversion in Gesinnung that it would require is still outstanding. (shrink)

Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” (...) The twofold purpose of this paper is to complement the debate about situated affectivity in general and about “mind invasion” in particular by, firstly, connecting it to situationist research in social psychology and, secondly, broadening the perspective to not only accommodate decidedly detrimental “invasions” but also potentially beneficial forms of “mind shaping” that include the manipulation of an agent’s experiential life and behaviour through the moulding of both the agent’s environment and the agent’s body. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Eine Karriere im Hochleistungssport ist mit hohen zeitlichen Belastungen verbunden. Da die Spitzensport- Karriere lebenszeitlich beschränkt ist und in der Regel in der vierten Lebensdekade beendet wird, stellt sich die Frage nach den Auswirkungen eines Engagements im Hochleistungssport auf die Berufskarriere. Hierzu wurden im Rahmen einer quantitativ orientierten Kohortenanalyse ehemalige Spitzensportler zu ihrem beruflichen Werdegang und möglichen Einflussfaktoren des Hochleistungssports retrospektiv befragt. Die Befunde der beiden Teiluntersuchungen zeigen, dass die hohen zeitlichen Anforderungen des Spitzensports den beruflichen Werdegang nur zum (...) Teil beeinträchtigen. Dies gilt nicht nur für sehr erfolgreiche Sportler, sondern auch für Hochleistungssportler, die weniger erfolgreich sind, sowie für Profisportler, die besonders intensiv in das System Hochleistungssport eingebunden sind. Dabei wirken sich Faktoren, wie institutionelle Unterstützungsmaßnahmen, Bekanntheit und soziale Kontakte sowie die Chance im Berufsfeld Spitzensport zu arbeiten, positiv auf die Berufskarriere aus. Allerdings haben sich aufgrund der Professionalisierung des Hochleistungssports die Risiken im kohortenspezifischen Vergleich vergrößert. (shrink)

Einleitung - S. Peetz: Subjekt und Freiheit. Antike Grundlagen moderner Konzeptionen der Willensfreiheit - G. Schmidt: Die Paradoxie des Subjekts - A. Friedrich Koch: Die Logik des Scheinens und der Sinn von "ich" - B. Tuschling: Epochen, Stufen und Dimensionen von Subjektivität und Transzendentalität bei Kant: 1770, 1781/87, 1790, 1799/1800 - M. Baum: Person und Persönlichkeit bei Kant - S. Sedgwick: Die Leerheit des 'Ich': Kants Transzendentale Deduktion in "Glauben und Wissen" - E. Düsing: Subjektivität und göttliches Sein bei Fichte (...) - mit Ausblicken auf Kierkegaard - J. Engfer: Kants Konzeption der menschlichen Vernunft und Plessners Begriff der Exzentrizität - T. Nenon: Freiheit, Verantwortung und Selbstbewusstsein bei Husserl - R. Cristin: Die Abenteuer des Bewusstseins. Zum Subjektbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger - C.-A. Scheier: Über logische und andere Subjekte. (shrink)

This book offers a faithful and meticulous reading of Heidegger's magnum opus , Being and Time .

Ein Gemeinplatz der modernen Ästhetik besteht darin, dass sich die Produktivität des Künstlers einem entfesselten Gebrauch seiner Einbildungskraft verdankt. Nach dieser Vorstellung kann der Künstler neue Werke hervorbringen, weil er sich der assoziativen Kraft seiner Einbildungskraft überlässt. Als eine historische Quelle für die Auffassung, dass der Künstler in der Verwendung seiner Einbildungskraft von zwingenden Regeln frei ist, wird dabei oft Kants Genietheorie des Künstlers angesehen. Kant wird damit als Opponent der Regelpoetik Gottscheds und Vorbereiter der Genieauffassung der Romantik wahrgenommen. Tatsächlich (...) stellt die Auffassung, dass das künstlerische Genie seine Einbildungskraft frei von begrifflichen Zwängen ausübt, einen wichtigen Teil von Kants Theorie der schönen Kunst dar. Wie sich jedoch leicht feststellen lässt, schreibt Kant dem schöne Kunst hervorbringenden Genie keine absolute Freiheit im Gebrauch der Einbildungskraft zu. Im Folgenden beschäftige ich mich mit den Beschränkungen, denen die Einbildungskraft des Genies trotz der ihr zugeschriebenen Freiheit laut der Kunsttheorie der Kritik der Urteilskraft unterworfen ist. (shrink)

Bioethical debates on the use of human embryos and oocytes for stem cell research have often been criticized for the lack of empirical insights into the perceptions and experiences of the women and couples who are asked to donate these tissues in the IVF clinic. Empirical studies that have investigated the attitudes of IVF patients and citizens on the donation of their embryos and oocytes have been scarce and have focused predominantly on the situation in Europe and Australia. This article (...) examines the viewpoints on the donation of embryos for stem cell research among IVF patients and students in China. Research into the perceptions of patients is based on in-depth interviews with IVF patients and IVF clinicians. Research into the attitudes of students is based on a quantitative survey study. The empirical findings in this paper indicate that perceptions of the donation of human embryos for stem cell research in China are far more diverse and complex than has commonly been suggested. Claims that ethical concerns regarding the donation and use of embryos and oocytes for stem cell research are typical for Western societies but absent in China cannot be upheld. The article shows that research into the situated perceptions and cultural specificities of human tissue donation can play a crucial role in the deconstruction of politicized bioethical argumentation and the assumptions about “others” that underlie socio-ethical debates on the moral dilemmas of technology developments in the life sciences. (shrink)

Several theories of emergence will be distinguished. In particular, these are synchronic, diachronic, and weak versions of emergence. While the weaker theories are compatible with property reductionism, synchronic emergentism and strong versions of diachronic emergentism are not. Synchronice mergentism is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. For such a theory, a system's property is taken to be emergent if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reductively explainable. Furthermore, we have to distinguish two different types of (...) irreducibility with quite different consequences: If, on the one hand, a system's property is irreducible because of the irreducibility of the system's parts' behavior on which the property supervenes, we seem to have a case of "downward causation". This kind of downward causation does not violate the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. If, on the other hand, a systemic property is irreducible because it is not exhaustively analyzable in terms of its causal role, downward causation is not implied. Rather, it is dubitable how unanalyzable properties might play any causal role at all. Thus, epiphenomenalism seems to be implied. The failure to keep apart the two kinds of irreducibility has muddled recent debate about the emergence of properties considerably. (shrink)

This article focuses on existential feelings. To begin with, it depicts how they differ from other affective phenomena and what type of intentionality they manifest. Furthermore, a detailed analysis shows that existential feelings can be subdivided, first, into elementary and nonelementary varieties, and second, into three foci of primary relatedness: oneself, the social environment, and the world as such. Eventually, five strategies of emotion regulation are examined with respect to their applicability to existential feelings. In the case of harmful existential (...) feelings, it turns out that none seems fitting except one, attentional deployment. (shrink)

‘Having a mind’ is construed as having a variety of mental capacities such as perceiving, memorizing, learning, or reasoning. In cognitive science, these capacities are studied from an integrative trans-disciplinary perspective that combines anthropology, artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. To approach mental phenomena by combining philosophical insights with those from the natural sciences is part of the Aristotelian tradition. Accordingly, the paper also portrays the most salient models of mental processing – the computer model, connectionism and situated (...) cognition. Eventually, an example of an artificial agent – Affective AutoTutor – is introduced that exhibits striking cognitive capacities, but still seems to lack what is expected from someone who ‘has a mind’. (shrink)

The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.

This article examines for the first time the jihadist global hegemonic masculinity of Osama bin Laden. Based on Bin Laden’s public statements translated into English, the authors examine how in the process of constructing a rationale for violent attacks primarily against the United States, he simultaneously and discursively formulates a jihadist global hegemonic masculinity. The research adds to the growing interest in discursive global hegemonic masculinities, as well as jihadist masculinities in the Middle East, by scrutinizing how Bin Laden’s jihadist (...) global hegemonic masculinity is produced in and through his public statements. The authors close their discussion by demonstrating how Bin Laden’s discursive practices are embedded in a clash of competing global hegemonic masculinities on the world stage. (shrink)

:Von einigen Ästhetikern ist die Auffassung vertreten worden, daß ästhetische Erfahrung der vorrangige oder sogar einzig legitime Gegenstand philosophischer Ästhetik sei. Diese Privilegierung ästhetischer Erfahrung läßt sich aber in keiner ihrer höchst unterschiedlichen Begründungsgestalten aufrechterhalten. Damit werden alle Konzeptionen, die ästhetische Erfahrung als eine Erfahrung sui generis konstruieren, hinfällig, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob es dann überhaupt noch einen legitimen Sinn gibt, in dem von ästhetischer Erfahrung die Rede sein kann. An der entfremdeten Erfahrungsgestalt einer rein auf Informationsbeschaffung (...) abgestellten Wahrnehmung läßt sich ein solcher durchaus ablesen. Ästhetische Erlebnisse erweisen sich dabei aber als Aspekte ganz gewöhnlicher Erfahrungen.GermanVon einigen Ästhetikern ist die Auffassung vertreten worden, daß ästhetische Erfahrung der vorrangige oder sogar einzig legitime Gegenstand philosophischer Ästhetik sei. Diese Privilegierung ästhetischer Erfahrung läßt sich aber in keiner ihrer höchst unterschiedlichen Begründungsgestalten aufrechterhalten. Damit werden alle Konzeptionen, die ästhetische Erfahrung als eine Erfahrung sui generis konstruieren, hinfällig, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob es dann überhaupt noch einen legitimen Sinn gibt, in dem von ästhetischer Erfahrung die Rede sein kann. An der entfremdeten Erfahrungsgestalt einer rein auf Informationsbeschaffung abgestellten Wahrnehmung läßt sich ein solcher durchaus ablesen. Ästhetische Erlebnisse erweisen sich dabei aber als Aspekte ganz gewöhnlicher Erfahrungen. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich die radikale und anspruchsvolle These, dass es intrinsisch unmoralisch und absolut verboten ist, sich selbst das Leben zu nehmen. Diese These verdient Interesse, insofern sie konstitutiv mit einer besonderen Auffassung über Wesen und Sinn der Moral verbunden ist. So behauptete Wittgenstein, dass alles erlaubt ist, wenn der Suizid erlaubt ist. Wie in der christlichen Tradition wird der Suizid damit als ein nihilistischer Akt interpretiert, welcher in Opposition zur Moral als solcher steht. Entsprechend gehört es dann (...) zum Sinn der Moral selbst, dass niemand sich selbst das Leben nehmen darf. Zur Begründung des absoluten Verbotenseins des Suizids kann eine säkulare Ethik entweder zu zeigen versuchen, dass die Unverfügbarkeit des eigenen Lebens aus dem Begriff der Moral folgt; oder sie kann zu zeigen versuchen, dass sie aus dem Sinn der eigenen sittlichen Existenz folgt. Ich zeige im Detail, warum alle beide dieser von Kant beschrittenen Wege scheitern, und ent­wickle schließlich Konsequenzen, die sich aus dieser Zurückweisung für einige grundlegende Fragen der Ethik ergeben. (shrink)