Huggins, AK When the debate about gay marriage really started to gain some momentum in Australia, probably a year or two before the last Labor Party Conference, I predicted amongst some of my gay friends that, as we got closer to a vote or other defining moments in this process, people and organisations would start 'crawling out of the woodwork' with distasteful, even despicable ways to demonise same-sex partnership and indeed gay people generally. I was right. I also mentioned (...) to my friends that in Sydney, Cardinal Pell and Archbishop Jensen would wait just before any parliament vote to politicise their pulpits by locking in the federal Liberal vote using their lap boy Tony Abbott to deny a conscience vote amongst his party colleagues. I was right again. I also said that any attempt by a State or Territory to pass their own gay marriage legislation would be countered by a Liberal Government in the High Court of Australia. I was right again. It is so difficult and regrettable to be right all the time!! (shrink)

A conceptual model of a partnership in ‘like-minded thinking’ consists of the following components: a relationship, a shared goal with mutual agreement to work toward that goal, and reciprocal encouragement between two people. A like-minded alliance is a relationship that offers support while at the same time encourages hope and establishes a reciprocating emotional attitude of hopefulness.The discussion focuses on the principles of such a model that is designed primarily as a lay intervention for anyone who has a close friend (...) with cancer and who wants to assist the friend in maintaining a hopeful attitude in the face of illness. While this model is not directed at healthcare professionals it may be transferable into psychosocial interventions to assist persons toward sustaining hopefulness in the context of the cancer trajectory. Much has been written in the literature about how hopelessness spawns despair for individuals who have cancer and in those near the end of life; it may even create a desire for hastened death (Breitbart W., Heller K.S.: 2003, ‘Reframing Hope: Meaning-Centered Care for Patients Near the End of Life; Journal of Palliative Medicine 6, 979–988; Jones J.M., Huggins M.A., Rydall A.C., Rodin G.M.: 2003, ‘Symptomatic distress, hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in hospitalized cancer patients’ Journal of Psychosomatic Research 55, 411–418).Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore how like-minded thinking for a person with cancer and his or her support person provides a framework for a personal shared worldview that is hope-based, meaningful and coherent. (shrink)

On the conception of God in the philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, 1861-1941.

We present the opinion of some authors who believe there is no force between a stationary charge and a stationary resistive wire carrying a constant current. We show that this force is different from zero and present its main components: the force due to the charges induced in the wire by the test charge and a force proportional to the current in the resistive wire. We also discuss briefly a component of the force proportional to the square of the current (...) which should exist according to some models and another component due to the acceleration of the conduction electrons in a curved wire carrying a dc current (centripetal acceleration). Finally, we analyze experiments showing the existence of the electric field proportional to the current in resistive wires. (shrink)

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...) are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

We know that since the Renaissance, scientific knowledge has increased exponentially. The amount of knowledge has now grown to colossal proportions and doubles every fifteen years . The question of digesting scientific information is acute. Even today its scope is such that assimilation of the accumulated knowledge even within a fairly narrow discipline has become virtually a lifetime undertaking for a scientist. It is also necessary to realize that modern science is developing quite rapidly at the junctions of its branches, (...) which makes it necessary to know adjacent and often quite remote disciplines. (shrink)