Descartes's epistemology, morals, and metaphysics – each offer reason to look on real life as a spectator looks on a theater production. The meditator seeking certainty watches his body move as in a dream and employs an entirely passive faculty of knowledge. In order to act firmly and yet not risk disappointment, the moral subject confines action to the soul, refusing to count bodily activities as actions, and cultivates a desire free from passion. After the Meditations, the metaphysician abandons (...) the thesis that soul and body constitute a human being, consequently limiting human goods to goods of the soul alone and devaluing embodied life in the world. (shrink)

This article develops a novel approach to the relationship between public space and democracy. It employs the concept of the spectacle to show how public space can serve to destroy or weaken solidarity just as easily as it can foster a democratic ethos of equality. A close reading of Rousseau's Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre helps illuminate the political implications of modern public life, which increasingly takes the form of passive individuals assembling in order to view a spectacle. (...) According to Rousseau, spectacles like the theater are depoliticizing because they undermine the opportunity for active participation and interaction with other citizens. By habituating the audience to theatrical modes of self-presentation, they also weaken the capacity for empathy. This article concludes by showing how contemporary theorists including Sennett, Debord and Habermas also contribute to our understanding of the concept of the spectacle. Key Words: citizenship • democracy • festival • public space • Jean-Jacques Rousseau • Richard Sennett • spectacle • theater. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.2 (2003) 73-79 [Access article in PDF] Does Film Weaken Spectator Consciousness? R.D. Boyd and S.K. Wertz The role of spectator is crucial for an actor, for there are "no actors without spectators." 1 At times the success of the actor depends upon the role taken by the spectator. Thornton Wilder's "Our Town" depends upon an active,creative, involved audience. Other artists (...) expect their audience to be passive,almost unconscious. Whether the medium of creativity is film or the printedpage, examples of both dependencies abound. The focus of this essay is ona classic piece in the literature about film. In the Theory of Film, Siegfried Kracauer provides us with a mesmerizing printed discussion of film. 2 In this essay we wish to examine his reasoning that is in a self-contained argument by analogy. Since Kracauer does not use or mention the argument thereafter, we feel that we can isolate the argument from its context and deal with it as it stands. After an extended analysis of the argument, we will relate some of the points to the literature on film. The following analogical argument is our focus. Films...tend to weaken the spectator's consciousness. Its withdrawal from the scene may be furthered by the darkness in moviehouses. Darkness automatically reduces our contacts with actuality, depriving us of many environmental data needed for adequate judgments and other mental activities. It lulls the mind....Devotees of film and its opponents alike have compared the medium to a sort of drug and have drawn attention to its stupefying effects....Doping creates dope addicts. It would seem a sound proposition that the cinema has its habitues who frequent it out of an all but physiological urge. They are not prompted by a desire to look at a specific film or to be pleasantly entertained; what they really crave is for once to be released from the grip of consciousness, lose their identity in the dark, and let sink in, [End Page 73] with their senses ready to absorb them, the images as they happen to follow each other on the screen. 3To support his main point, "Films...tend to weaken the spectator's consciousness," Kracauer develops three intermediate arguments (IA's), which support his major argument (MA). If each sentence in the above passage were numbered one through nine, with the last full sentence being broken into two sentences at the semicolon, the following schema emerges. In English the chain of reasoning is: IA-1 Some habitues of film are not prompted by a desire to look at a specific film or to be pleasantly entertained. What they really crave is release fromthe grip of consciousness, to lose their identity in the dark, and let sink in, with their senses ready to absorb them, the images as they happen to follow each other on the screen. Therefore, the cinema has its habitues who frequent it out of an all but physiological urge.IA-2 Some habitues of film frequent it out of an all but physiological urge. Doping creates dope addicts. Therefore, devotees of film and its opponents alike have compared the medium to a sort of drug and have drawn attention to its stupefying effects.IA-3 Darkness automatically reduces our contacts with actuality, depriving us of many environmental data needed for adequate judgments and other mental activities. Darkness lulls the mind. Therefore, consciousness withdrawal from the scene may be furthered by the darkness in moviehouses.MA Devotees of film and its opponents alike have compared the medium to a sort of drug and have drawn attention to its stupefying effects. Consciousness withdrawal from the scene may be furthered by the darkness in moviehouses. Therefore, films...tend to weaken the spectator's consciousness. The above chain of arguments influences us, the spectators, to embrace his main point. However, before we are lulled into accepting his reasoning, it will be helpful to examine and evaluate each link. [End Page 74]IA-1 Some habitues of film are not prompted by a desire to... (shrink)

Alfred Hitchcock's Vertigo skilfully continues to stimulate different views of it – hence the volume of writing – different ways of viewing it, different ways of being a viewer of it . One purpose of the piece is to provide a little caution to those students coming to study Vertigo , and Spectatorship, for the first time: not to presume that the film, and by association any film, has one type of spectator. It is through examining various responses to (...) it – rather than presenting one view of it – that we can see perspicaciously that Vertigo has a special capacity for teaching us about the complexity of film spectatorship. This is possibly because Vertigo is so concerned to make the act of viewing an active part of viewing it. (shrink)

This book offers a new account of Aristotle's practical philosophy. Pavlos Kontos argues that Aristotle does not restrict practical reason to its action-guiding and motivational role; rather, practical reason remains practical in the full sense of the term even when its exercise does not immediately concern the guidance of our present actions. To elucidate why this wider scope of practical reason is important, Kontos brings into the foreground five protagonists that have long been overlooked: spectators or judges who make non-motivational (...) judgments about practical matters that do not interact with their present deliberations and actions; legislators who exercise practical reason to establish constitutions and laws; hopes as an active engagement with moral luck and its impact on our individual lives; prayers as legislators' way to deal with the moral luck hovering around the birth of constitutions and the prospect of a utopia; and people who are outsiders or marginal cases of the responsibility community because they are totally deprived of practical reason. Building on a wide range of interpretations of Aristotle's practical philosophy, Kontos offers new insights about Aristotle's philosophical contribution to the current debates about radical evil, moral luck, hope, utopia, internalism and externalism, and the philosophy of law. Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in Aristotle's ethics, ancient philosophy, and the history of practical philosophy. (shrink)

This essay argues that §49 of Kant’s third Critique pursues the question of the nature of genius through an analysis of the spectator’s response to beautiful art. It presents and defends a spectator-centered interpretation of §49’s opening paragraphs, which clarifies Kant’s notion of aesthetic ideas and reveals that beautiful art provokes a productive imaginative activity in its spectators. This interpretation is significant because it elucidates the character of Kant’s account of genius and his understanding of art criticism. (...) Moreover, it suggests that the imagination’s productive activity may provide a certain satisfaction to theoretical reason’s natural but unrequited desire for knowledge of the transcendent. (shrink)

This volume contains the Cassirer Lectures delivered by Professor Beck at Yale University in 1974. The strategy of the four lectures is to examine the categorical structures of two competing images of man, the humanistic and the scientific. Alternative descriptions of simple actions are given by Spectator I, a commonsense humanist, and Spectator II who is "a fool, a physiologist". Another guiding motif is provided by the differences between understanding ourselves as active agents and the perspective we have (...) of ourselves and others in the role of spectators. We also hear, from time to time, from an angelic point of view, i.e., one based on actual knowledge of what is in fact going on "backstage and onstage" as opposed to beliefs which reflect our limited perspectives. (shrink)

The presence of sports fans in the stands is considered a natural and essential element of sporting events. Beyond the atmosphere fans create and the color they add to the game, their presence reflects the idea that the game is more than a competition between two teams —it is a grand battle between communities and identities, which is also the reason that fans are willing to sacrifice so much on behalf of their team. As is other areas of life, the (...) COVID-19 pandemic created an unusual situation, in which sporting events were held without spectators in the stadium stands. In many places around the world, professional sporting activities were permitted but spectators were not allowed into the stadiums due to social distancing restrictions. The current study examines this unique situation and through it, gains an understanding of fans’ beliefs concerning the significance of spectators and their presence in the stadium. Through in-depth interviews with football fans who regularly attend games, the current study explores football fans’ experiences as they viewed “ghost games”. Findings show that this unique situation, caused by the global pandemic, heightened fans’ deep-rooted connection to sports and to their favorite team, and also exacerbated the social, emotional, and professional implications of viewing football games with no spectators. (shrink)

This article proposes how theatre, as a site of expert adult imaginative play, provides a unique window into how E-cognition can advance our understanding of imagination as a lifelong practice. I characterize theatrical activity as highly developed actions and strategies for wielding bodies, objects, and environments as imaginative practice. Through an enactively based case study of the play _Provenance_ by Autopoetics ( 2018 ), I reveal how creation and performance processes literally and epistemically engineer novel niches for the (...) class='Hi'>spectator. This case study investigates how _Provenance_’s recurring theatrical device of newspaper manipulation constitutes a cognitive device for an affordance-oriented and predictive spectator. As I track the priorities and processes of these longstanding play development and performance techniques informed by the theatrical tradition of Jacques Lecoq (1921–1999), I suggest how concepts such as affordances, affordance spaces, predictive engagement, and the free energy principle are apt conceptual tools for understanding how these practices engender imaginative encounters. I follow this analysis by suggesting, via the free energy principle’s conception of “models,” that there may be cognitive consequences to the possible changes experienced by the spectator that exceed theatrical experience. I conclude this discussion by pointing toward how my 4-E inflected insights on the imaginative practices of _Provenance_ may be applicable to imagination and pretense in other arenas not just behind but also beyond the footlights. (shrink)

While thinking remains a solitary activity, it does not cut itself off from all others. in this book address the philosophical and moral questions raised by ...

In this paper I discuss the development of Kant’s Critical project in the pre-critical writings. I am particularly focusing upon the problems that Kant encounters in developing the idea of a transcendental subject. This helps us to understand the radical nature of Kant’s project in which he does not merely turn around the relationship between subject and object, but also has to redefine the nature of the subject. The development of the subject starts with Kant’s idea of an observer who (...) actively determines qualities in the object (instead of passively taking it in). Ultimately the spectator becomes a subject that is constituted a priori, independent of experience. In order to arrive at this idea of a subject, Kant needs to overcome the tradition that in many ways still determines his thinking. (shrink)

Ambiguity in the athlete’s perception and description of pain that opens the door to a series of reinterpretations of athletic experience and events that argue the development of an increasingly inauthentic relation to self and others on the part of those who consume performance as third parties (spectators) and ultimately those who produce it first hand (athletes). The insertion of the spectator into the sport situation as a consumer of the athlete’s activity and the preference given to (...) class='Hi'>spectator interpretation shift control of meaning away from the athlete and encourage a demand for athlete suffering in aid of the spectator’s own need for meaning. Through discussions of the function of narrative in sport spectacle, the witnessing role of spectators, and the phenomenon of vicarious substitution, I discuss the representation of the athlete as a character ideal and moral exemplar. At a more developed level of external interpretation, the athlete (or team) becomes the champion of the spectator, the role model or focal point of civic pride whose victory asserts the ascendence of my team and town over yours; and finally, the athlete or team is the intentional object of fan identification: my team is me. I conclude that the existential commitment of the spectator as devoted fan is an inauthentic one. (shrink)

Ambiguity in the athlete’s perception and description of pain that opens the door to a series of reinterpretations of athletic experience and events that argue the development of an increasingly inauthentic relation to self and others on the part of those who consume performance as third parties (spectators) and ultimately those who produce it first hand (athletes). The insertion of the spectator into the sport situation as a consumer of the athlete’s activity and the preference given to (...) class='Hi'>spectator interpretation shift control of meaning away from the athlete and encourage a demand for athlete suffering in aid of the spectator’s own need for meaning. Through discussions of the function of narrative in sport spectacle, the witnessing role of spectators, and the phenomenon of vicarious substitution, I discuss the representation of the athlete as a character ideal and moral exemplar. At a more developed level of external interpretation, the athlete (or team) becomes the champion of the spectator, the role model or focal point of civic pride whose victory asserts the ascendence of my team and town over yours; and finally, the athlete or team is the intentional object of fan identification: my team is me. I conclude that the existential commitment of the spectator as devoted fan is an inauthentic one. (shrink)

First published in 1954, The Contemplative Activity analyses our knowledge of aesthetic experience, making the basic assumption that the existence of such experience is a hard core of fact which can only be described. Haezrahi's approach to the problem of aesthetic judgment is analytical, concerned with clarifying its preconditions, determining its categories and tracing its implications. Her analysis reveals it consists a particular mode of perception and a particular attitude adopted towards what is so perceived. The various philosophies of (...) art and beauty, though they represent attitudes different from the purely aesthetic one, are carefully examined too since the contemplative spectator is indebted to them for the achievement of adequate aesthetic responses to specific works of art. Haezrahi also discusses methods of objective evaluation of the aesthetic experience as well as possible means to reduce the margin of error involved in the particular responses of critics and theorists. This book will be particularly important for students of philosophy and of art. (shrink)

This article seeks to develop an under-appreciated aspect of spectator activity: the way in which viewers make use of film to enter or sustain a project of bad faith. Based on Jean-Paul Sartre's account of bad faith in Being and Nothingness (1943), the article explains the aspects of bad faith that are pertinent to viewer activity, then explores the way viewers can make use of filmic depictions to facilitate self-denial. For example, spectators may emphasize the fact that (...) persons are depicted in narrow terms as corroboration for their belief that human nature is just as its depicted, thereby denying that we have the freedom to be otherwise. Or spectators may deny the relevance of problematic aspects of themselves when they find it depicted in characters who are admirable in other ways. I then consider whether films themselves can be described as being in bad faith. While technically they cannot, I identify ways that a film may encourage or discourage bad faith in viewers. I also examine how the immersive aspect of film enables viewers to turn attention away from themselves while they engage in self-denial. The case for this approach to viewer activity and film analysis is supplemented by a distinction between traits that do apply to film, e.g., being racist, sexist, or homophobic, and the resources it gives persons to be in bad faith about these social attitudes. I argue that a film can have traits like these while not encouraging bad faith and vice versa, demonstrating the unique perspective offered by approaching film and spectator activity in terms of bad faith. (shrink)

At the heart of recent feminist theorizing about art is the claim that various forms of representation--painting, photography, film--assume a "male gaze." The notion of the gaze has both a literal and a figurative component. Narrowly construed, it refers to actual looking. Broadly, or more metaphorically, it refers to a way of thinking about, and acting in, the world. . . . In examining this key feminist notion more carefully, I shall make clear the intrinsic interest of this approach to (...) aesthetics and suggest why its concerns merit serious consideration. To this end, I investigate how gendered vision work in one specific representational practice: film. Film is a natural choice for such a study because it is a medium so fundamentally built around the activity of looking. It is also, not surprisingly, the medium where the male gaze has been most extensively discussed. The relationship of gender and cinematic vision is extremely complicated. A complete analysis of this topic would require several hundred pages. In what follows, I focus on two key claims: that in cinema the gaze is male, and that the cinematic text is a male text. I make clear how these claims should be understood and situate them philosophically. In confining myself to the core claims of this debate, I shall of necessity leave aside many important, but internal, issues in film theory. (shrink)

A conference held in Manchester University in 2007 and a subsequent book containing papers presented therein (entitled Aesthetics and radical politics) attempt to legitimize certain radical political activities as art, that is, by confercing the status of art onthese protest activities. Inarguing that these works would probably fail to be accepted by the artworld, I have resorted to some form of essentialism, i.e., they will likely fail because they were never intended (by their organizers) as ant activities, and the activities (...) themselves do not appear to have an aesthetic function, and the spectators do not expect to see an art performnnce when they encounter one of these protests. But the failure (or potentinlfoilure) of these activities to be accepted as art has broader implications, for it reveals that one of the most influential versions of the institutional theory of art ( George Dickie's ) has failed to describe the sufficient conditions of art. (shrink)

The article explores the realm of sport from an aesthetic point of view. Making a sustained physical effort regularly may have a positive impact on our psycho-somatic being and can sustain our health and well-being. But what exactly is this aesthetic component in sport and is it possible that this aesthetic component prevails over other components when it comes to individual sport? Moreover, is this aesthetic component complex in its nature or can it be reduced to some unique underlying principle? (...) These are the main philosophical questions that this article strives to answer by exploring the aesthetic experience proper to sport. Abandoning the much-acclaimed perspective of the spectator (which consists of seeing sport as a spectacle or drama to be enjoyed and judged from a distance) entails that the aesthetic in sport has to be studied from the perspective of an active and individual participator. Ultimately, the article makes the claim that sport is both a way of interacting with one’s environment and a way of aesthetic self-fulfilment which allows the individual to lead a meaningful life rich in aesthetic experiences and events. (shrink)

Kichul Kim, né en 1969 à Séoul, a ceci de remarquable qu’il prétend — et réussit — à sculpter le son. En effet, il a une formation de sculpteur. Mais il se fascine très tôt pour le son, pour des raisons spirituelles. L’énigme du bodhisattva Gwan-eum qui, selon l’étymologie de son nom, « voit ou fait voir les sons », l’intrigue. Une intuition lui révèle — pense-t-il — de quoi il s’agit. Il va s’efforcer de le faire voir à son (...) tour. Le son fait voir, visualiser, évoquer, et on peut donc, en ce sens, voir le son. Ses installations sonores sont en général réalisées dans des formes minimales et simplifiées. Ces formes pures ne correspondent qu’au son qu’il veut diffuser. C’est le son qu’émettent des haut-parleurs, un son qu’il a enregistré et qui parle. En effet, le son, tout invisible et intangible qu’il est, par l’espace qu’il recrée et modèle, est tridimensionnel, et sculptable. Le spectateur ne peut certes pas voir ce travail sonore par ses yeux de chair, pas plus qu’il ne peut le toucher de sa main, mais son œil de l’imagination, son imagination visuelle, le construit, et en ce sens il le perçoit bien : à partir du son se crée une image, une image dont l’intensité frôle l’illusion. On a là un véritable environnement créé par le son. Inspiré par l’Extrême-Orient ancien, son art et sa pensée, Kichul Kim puise dans ses sites historiques, religieux souvent, et dans la nature, son inspiration et ses enregistrements. L’environnement particulier d’origine est rendu présent par son son, si puissamment que l’auditeur devient spectateur, recréant activement la scène originelle : spect-acteur. Plongé si profondément en lui-même, il est graduellement conduit aux portes d’une sorte de méditation, ici et ailleurs à la fois, comme hors du temps. Kichul Kim, born in 1969 in Seoul, is remarkable in that he claims—and succeeds—to carve the sound. He trained as a sculptor but was fascinated very early with the sound, for spiritual reasons. The enigma of the Bodhisattva Gwan-eum which, according to the etymology of its name, “sees or makes one see sounds”, intrigued him. He understood intuititvely what it means and tried to examplify it himself. The sound makes you see, visualize, evoke, and you can, in this sense, see the sound. His sound installations are generally performed in minimal and simplified forms. These pure forms correspond only to the sound he wants to produce. This is the sound emitted through loudspeakers, a sound that he recorded and that speaks. Indeed, the sound, as invisible and intangible as it is, thanks to the space it recreates and models, becomes three-dimensional, and “sculptable”. The spectator certainly cannot see this sonic work through his/her eyes of flesh, any more than he/she can touch it with his/her hand. But his/her eye of the imagination, the visual imagination, builds it, and in this sense he/she perceives it well: from the sound is created an image whose intensity borders on illusion. This is a real environment created by sound. Inspired by the ancient Far East, its art and thought, Kichul Kim draws from historical sites, often religious, and from nature, for his inspiration, and recordings. The particular environment of which the sounds originates is made present by the sound, so powerfully that the listener becomes a spectator, actively recreating the original scene: spect-actor. So deeply immersed in himself, he is gradually led to the gates of a kind of meditation, here and elsewhere at once, as if out of time. (shrink)

Television series explicitly pursue an entertainment goal rather than a learning one; nevertheless, they convey information about care. French and American series depicting doctors and care workers have reached record-breaking audiences. Spectators try to understand care as an activity through dramatic situations. They are all the more curious and liable to consider the activity of the nurses as a vicariant model that they wish to become a doctor or a care worker. Which behaviors get the spectators’ attention? Which (...) reasoning do they deduce from them? Does the paramedical training then modify the representations they form about care and the nursing profession while watching television series? (shrink)

This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...) and active euthanasia do not change according to the spectator's metaphysical beliefs. Yet answers to those issues can change according to the agent's metaphysical beliefs. Hume's theory cannot provide answers to stem cell research and abortion where the embryo or fetus is the receiver (the one affected by the agent's action) and to active euthanasia where the patient is unconscious. It may provide answers to abortion where the pregnant woman is the receiver and to active euthanasia where the patient is conscious. Yet the answers can vary depending on the woman's or the patient's metaphysical beliefs. Smith's theory can provide answers to stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. But the answers can vary depending on the agent's metaphysical beliefs. These show that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Must We Shoot to Kill? Hunting in the Real World The Mastery of the Spectator and the Humility of the Hunter What Photography Cannot Capture Notes.

In what sense can aesthetic experience be considered an opportunity for the development of personal identity, cognitive abilities, and emotions? Theatre proves to be an important field of investigation to approach this question. During a theatrical experience, the connection between fiction and reality can take the form of active cooperation between author, actor, and spectator. A better understanding of this point can be drawn by pointing out three kinds of spectator: we can distinguish a critical spectator, an (...) emotional spectator, and an instinctual spectator, who respectively represent: the imaginative and hermeneutic attitude; empathy and fictional emotions; the unconscious satisfaction of drives. So far, a parallel can be established between literature and theatre. However, these two aesthetic experiences are profoundly different: the type of immersion provided by the theatrical experience differs from reading, because the presence of the characters is physical and actual. The pragmatic theatrical framework is the same as that which underlies childhood games. This means that the public too is to some extent called to play, i.e. to act. To appreciate the implications of this thesis, a preliminary analysis of the performance Reality (Deflorian and Tagliarini 2012) is offered, examining how its experience contributes to the development of the spectating subject. (shrink)

The essay outlines modelling theory in terms of an active form of thinking. In contrast to concepts of theory whose validity can be described by a scientific explanatory approach with a systematic character and the claim to universalization regarding a specific field of research, the question here is about varieties of theory building. The focus is on theoretical activity, not on theory as a result. Based on ancient implications of the term θεωρία (theoria), models of a theoretical activity, (...) attitude or stance are brought into focus, whereby ways of distancing are constitutive in each case. What does theorizing mean from the perspective of a spectator and to what extent is purposelessness to be thought of as a critical potential? Does the theoretical performance of thought include a sense of possibility and to what extent is this articulated in the aesthetic forms of language? Do theoretical realizations in the literary medium move on a threshold between historical determinisms and the freedom of a conceivable future? To what extent do theoretical views have a synaesthetic dimension, and can we imagine poetic language as a medium of theoretical reflection? Is the nuanced linguistic nature of theoretical articulation modes the very condition of critical intervention? All these modellings of aesthetic distancing ask about the forms in which theory can be expressed, including ways of writing theoretical activity. (shrink)

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from (...) rooting. Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

In a wide-ranging study of unusual interest, Paul Weiss, Sterling Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, applies the principles and methods of philosophy to athletics. Every culture, he notes, has games of some kind; few activities seem to interest both children and young men as much as sports do; and few attract so many spectators, rich and poor. Yet none of the great philosophers, claiming to take all knowledge and being as their province, have made more than a passing reference (...) to sport, in part, Professor Weiss suggests, because they thought that what pleased the vulgar was not worth sustained study by the leisured. This seminal book breaks new ground and explores new paths: psychological and sociological forms of human behavior exhibited in games; the physiology of athletics, and the efforts of training and conditioning; and the motivation of athletics—the rhythm and aims of contests and games, and the meaning of team play. More importantly, however, Professor Weiss’s unique contributions lie in his discussions of the distinct contributions that sport makes to civilization. Professor Weiss discusses at length such topics as the Olympic Games and men and women as amateur and pro­fessional athletes—and their sacrifices, defeats, and humilia­tions. And he delineates the stages the athlete must go through in his progress toward self-completion. (shrink)

Rhetoric concerns how in speech human beings open up a place for civil possibility, a place where, as a community of speakers and hearers, they engage with questions of how best to conceive and respond to challenges arising out of the world that they share. In rhetoric the community of speakers and hearers is not only called into being but so too the nature of the topos or place that is shared, a determination that is timely or historical. The recent (...) publication of Heidegger’s 1924 lectures on Aristotle’s Rhetoric explores this idea of rhetoric. These lectures raise questions for how and whether Heidegger sustained this conception in his later work, and also questions for how this conception may have influenced Arendt’s approach to political thought. Arendt’s conception of the role of the spectator who engages in the activity of understanding in order to “try to be at home in the world” is especially pertinent here. Arendt’s writing, so far as it calls into being a rhetorical relationship between her “speech” and her hearers/readers, is best appreciated as rhetoric. (shrink)

Rhetoric concerns how in speech human beings open up a place for civil possibility, a place where, as a community of speakers and hearers, they engage with questions of how best to conceive and respond to challenges arising out of the world that they share. In rhetoric the community of speakers and hearers is not only called into being but so too the nature of the topos or place that is shared, a determination that is timely or historical. The recent (...) publication of Heidegger’s 1924 lectures on Aristotle’s Rhetoric explores this idea of rhetoric. These lectures raise questions for how and whether Heidegger sustained this conception in his later work, and also questions for how this conception may have influenced Arendt’s approach to political thought. Arendt’s conception of the role of the spectator who engages in the activity of understanding in order to “try to be at home in the world” is especially pertinent here. Arendt’s writing, so far as it calls into being a rhetorical relationship between her “speech” and her hearers/readers, is best appreciated as rhetoric. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the thesis of the craft origins of scientific empiricism by demonstrating how the empirical practices of early experimentalism differed in significant ways from the activities of artisans. Through a phenomenological analysis of instrumental observation and experimental demonstrations, I aim to show how experimentalism privileged modes of experience that were foreign to craft traditions and which facilitated a newfound estrangement of human subjects from the objects of their knowledge. Firstly, we will review concerns surrounding the promotion (...) of optical instruments by early experimentalists to reveal how these technologies were understood not only to amplify the senses but also to obscure contextual and relative qualities available to unaided visual perception. Secondly, we will examine the experimental practices of the early Royal Society, to see how experimental demonstrations were deliberately structured to facilitate experiences of the natural world that were divorced from practical and personal contexts. It is here that the divergence from artisanal epistemology is rendered most apparent. For in contrast to craft practices, which favored forms of experience which were personal and engaged, I will argue that the new scientific practices of the 17th century played a central role in effecting the researcher's transformation into a new kind of epistemological subject – the spectator. (shrink)

This essay investigates the structure and meaning of the Mengzi’s 孟子 analogical inferences in Mengzi 6A7. In this chapter, he argues that just as the perceptual masters allowed the discovery of our senses’ uniform preferences, the sages enabled us to recognize our hearts’ universal preferences for “order and righteousness.” Regarding an unresolved question of how the sages help us understand our hearts’ preferred objects as such, I propose a spectator-based moral artisanship reading as an alternative to an evaluator-focused moral (...) connoisseurship view: the sages are moral artisans who refine their moral achievements, and people’s uniform approval of their achievements—firmly associated with “order and righteousness”—demonstrates our hearts’ same natural preferences for them. Furthermore, I argue that this chapter’s conclusion—we and the sages are of the same kind with natural moral preferences—implies the necessity of our transition from passive spectators to active moral performers for moral self-cultivation. (shrink)

Distant Suffering examines the moral and political implications for a spectator of the distant suffering of others as presented through the media. What are the morally acceptable responses to the sight of suffering on television, for example, when the viewer cannot act directly to affect the circumstances in which the suffering takes place? Luc Boltanski argues that spectators can actively involve themselves and others by speaking about what they have seen and how they were affected by it. Developing ideas (...) in Adam Smith's moral theory, he examines three rhetorical 'topics' available for the expression of the spectator's response to suffering: the topics of denunciation and of sentiment and the aesthetic topic. The book concludes with a discussion of a 'crisis of pity' in relation to modern forms of humanitarianism. A possible way out of this crisis is suggested which involves an emphasis and focus on present suffering. (shrink)

Although Ejzenštejn never writes about the ontology of cinema as such, the fundamental traits of such an ontology may be reconstructed by analysing some of the recurrent ideas that reappear throughout his large body of writings, from the essays on montage written during the 1920s, to the unfinished book projects of Metod (1932-48), Montage (1937), Nonindifferent Nature (1945-47), all the way up to the still unpublished notes for a General History of Cinema which he wrote in 1947-48. Throughout these writings (...) cinema emerges as a medium based on montage whose goal is that of activating, emotionally and intellectually, the spectator. In order to pursue this goal, all the elements of the cinematic dispositif may be modified, and the most effective forms of montage disseminated throughout the history of the arts have to be located, analyzed, and taken as examples for the cinema of the future. Cinema thus emerges as a medium which is at the same time unstable (since its features may be modified at will) and diffused (since the principle of montage does not constitute its medium specificity but is rather a principle which manifests itself throughout the entire spectrum of media). (shrink)

Although Ejzenštejn never writes about the ontology of cinema as such, the fundamental traits of such an ontology may be reconstructed by analysing some of the recurrent ideas that reappear throughout his large body of writings, from the essays on montage written during the 1920s, to the unfinished book projects of Metod (1932-48), Montage (1937), Nonindifferent Nature (1945-47), all the way up to the still unpublished notes for a General History of Cinema which he wrote in 1947-48. Throughout these writings (...) cinema emerges as a medium based on montage whose goal is that of activating, emotionally and intellectually, the spectator. In order to pursue this goal, all the elements of the cinematic dispositif may be modified, and the most effective forms of montage disseminated throughout the history of the arts have to be located, analyzed, and taken as examples for the cinema of the future. Cinema thus emerges as a medium which is at the same time unstable (since its features may be modified at will) and diffused (since the principle of montage does not constitute its medium specificity but is rather a principle which manifests itself throughout the entire spectrum of media). (shrink)

We argue that sport in general, and association football in particular, are activities that invite spectators and players alike to talk about them. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, we argued more...

In this research we will examine the paradox nature of self-reference. This concept appears in the form of pure feedback loops in language and mathematics and naturally extends towards many different domains such as biology, sociology, art and philosophy. The basic elements of human experience show the manifestations of such loops. Their results are noticeable in internal or external, mental or body processes. Our interest with these loops focuses on the domain of brain processes in observing, thinking and interpreting as (...) it is meticulously analysed in the books Gödel Escher Bach and I Am a Strange Loop. Through the interactive artistic experiments ‘Ouroboros VR Self-Reference Apparatus’ by John Bardakos (2015) and ‘Anima’ by Elhem Younes (2016) we explore applied and theoretical concepts and experiences in logic, dream aesthetics and the human creativity. These experiments were conducted using ‘perception’ as a natural model of aesthetics generator via self-reference. Within this model, the loops were enriched with an artistic metamorphose of data from measurements of the human space to the aesthetic objects in the virtual space. Through the quantifiable perception feedback loop and the digital interaction, the spectator changes his role and becomes an active artist expressing himself or herself to a digital output with the support of data. The now post-conscious artist, with the use of visual and audio-visual tool sets, observes the fusion of art technology and aesthetics being transformed into basic elements that form consciousness. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s is often falsely portrayed as having argued that radical selfishness is a force for the good and that this “invisible hand’ is his market mechanism. This paper argues that Smith’s real market mechanism, the sympathy manoeuvre, is a viable alternative to Schumpeterian and mainstream models of innovation in economics and also could help build a firmer theoretical basis for other approaches such as Responsible Innovation. To Smith all human activity was social and must be understood and explained (...) in terms of the sentiments involved. Discovery, for instance, is driven by three sentiments (wonder, surprise, admiration), economic activities by sympathetic imagination, the need for exchange, the need to better one’s position in life, and the need for gratitude. Through sympathetic imagination, his famous model of the impartial spectator, Smith elegantly connects the individual and society. Smith’s innovation process is thus an exercise in social construction and not a destructive process based on radical selfishness. The paper argues that this social innovation process is a viable alternative to the extant approaches that are essentially asocial and amoral (economism) or ideologically normative (Responsible Innovation). (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is renowned for defending the pity of the state of nature over and against the vanity, cruelty, and inequalities of civil society. In the standard reading, it is this sentiment of pity, activated by our imagination, that allows for the cultivation of compassion. However, a closer look at the "pathologies of pity" in Rousseau's system challenges this idea that pity is a pleasurable sentiment that arises from a recognition of the identity of our natures and leads ultimately to (...) communion with our fellow-creatures. Instead, pity rests inexorably on a sense of difference, is fueled by an aversion to suffering, and is more likely to yield a world of "reluctant spectators" than one of simple souls eagerly rushing to the aid of others. Because compassion is unlikely to encourage the moral equality and willful agency requisite to democracy, trying to make compassion central to democratic theory may very well prove counterproductive. (shrink)

In spite of their striking differences with real-life perception, films are perceived and understood without effort. Cognitive film theory attributes this to the system of continuity editing, a system of editing guidelines outlining the effect of different cuts and edits on spectators. A major principle in this framework is the 180° rule, a rule recommendation that, to avoid spectators’ attention to the editing, two edited shots of the same event or action should not be filmed from angles differing in a (...) way that expectations of spatial continuity are strongly violated. In the present study, we used high-density EEG to explore the neural underpinnings of this rule. In particular, our analysis shows that cuts and edits in general elicit early ERP component indicating the registration of syntactic violations as known from language, music, and action processing. However, continuity edits and cuts-across the line differ from each other regarding later components likely to be indicating the differences in spatial remapping as well as in the degree of conscious awareness of one's own perception. Interestingly, a time–frequency analysis of the occipital alpha rhythm did not support the hypothesis that such differences in processing routes are mainly linked to visual attention. On the contrary, our study found specific modulations of the central mu rhythm ERD as an indicator of sensorimotor activity, suggesting that sensorimotor networks might play an important role. We think that these findings shed new light on current discussions about the role of attention and embodied perception in film perception and should be considered when explaining spectators’ different experience of different kinds of cuts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 97 supposed by actual idealism is above all moral and involves what Gentile describes as an aspect of divinity or infinity,as well as a concrete, historical aspect. The following chapter treats of the philosophy of "actual" idealism and compares the views of Kant and Gentile on relations between moral conscience and freedom. According to Yalentini, Gentile's idealism is essentially an ethical view. This chapter concludes with noting (...) that Gentile 's solution to the problem of historical knowledge differs profoundly from that of Hegel and Croce. For "reason" is not, for Gentile, a particular interpretation of historical process, but is rather the "reason" of consciousness in activity. In Chapter In, Valentini discusses Gentile's views on art and religion. The section on art concludes with a comparison between Gentile on feeling and Kant on the transcendental unity of apperception. Whereas art is supposed to be one abstract moment of spirit, religion is the other abstract moment. Valentini suggests that Gentile and Feuerbach hold similar religious views on the attributes of divinity, which are nothing other than the loftiest qualities which man feels to possess in his essence. The history of religion is then the history of the progressive humanization of God. Gentile's religion represents a sort of modem Catholicism in that it understands revelation as a fact of conscience, church as a historical institution, dogma as having a negative character and God as a member of the dialogue between God and man. Moreover, Gentile's Catholicism has a national character; it is the religion of the Italian people. Chapter Iv treats of the relations between individual and state. For, according to Gentile, an individual is inconceivableapart from the social relations which lie within him. Here Valentini distinguishes in detail the differences and similarities between the views of Hegel and Gentile on the relations between state and individual. The differences between the views of these two philosophers are due to the differences between their methods. The method of Hegel is empirical and historical, and examines the state (which remains historical) from an external point of view. According to an idealistic method, however, thought is not to be the spectator of a process, but in every instance, an actor, and philosophizing does not result from an analysis of historical reality, but from the negation of this reality in the name of an ideal, which philosophy is to draw from it (reality). The Appendix includes a critical evaluation of the theory of the dialectic. Here Valentini hopes to distinguish between the imaginary and the real or historical applications of the dialectic. He begins his evaluation by asking: Does the doctrine of the dialectic, like the philosophy of idealism, possess negative connotations, which cannot be separated from it? Valentini suggests that in order to answer this question, we must determine the extent to which the dialectical scheme is constitutive of every concept or truth in general. For this is the way in which Hegel intended that the dialectic be understood and evaluated. Some views in Hegel's philosophy of nature are then criticized according to empirical criteria. In conclusion, Valentini attempts to answer both "internal" and "external" criticisms of Marx's view of the dialectic, and shows that there are problems involved in its application, which still have to be resolved. Mv~ M. MILBURN 9 ~an Jos~ ~ate College Husserl und Kant: eine Untersuchung ~ber Husserls Verh~iltni~ zu Kant und zum Neubantianismus. By Iso Kern. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.Pp. xxiii q- 448.) This is a very important book. In fact, it is indispensable for a study of Husserl and is, at the same time, almost as valuable for a study of Kant, for it deals with the kind of searching questions that must be asked when one deals with transcendental idealism in any one of its forms. But two reasons in particular, make this book significant. One is the fact that Iso Kern was able to make extensive use of hitherto unpublished materials (manuscripts, lecture notes, letters, etc.), available only in the Husserl Archives and here quoted for the first time--and 98 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY quoted in great numbers. The other is Kern's philosophical competence... (shrink)

Sports and competitive games of many kinds—from tag to chess to baseball—are often occasions for make-believe. To participate either as a competitor or as a spectator is frequently to engage in pretense. The activities of playing and watching games have this in common with appreciating works of fiction and participating in children’s make-believe activities, although the make-believe in sports, masked by real interests and concerns, is less obvious than it is in the other cases. What is most interesting about (...) tag and chess and baseball, however, are the ways in which the make-believe they involve differs from other varieties. (shrink)

Human beings are the only creatures known to engage in sport. We are sporting animals, and our favourite pastime of football is the biggest sport spectacle on earth. The Philosophy of Footballpresents the first sustained, in-depth philosophical investigation of the phenomenon of football. In explaining the complex nature of football, the book draws on literature in sociology, history, psychology and beyond, offering real-life examples of footballing actions alongside illuminating thought experiments. The book is organized around four main themes considering the (...) character, nature, analysis and aesthetics of football. It discusses football as an extra-ordinary, unnecessary, rule-based, competitive, skill-based physical activity, articulated as a social kind that is fictional in character, and where fairness or fair play - contrary to much sport ethical discussion - is not centre stage. Football, it is argued, is a constructive- destructive contact sport and, in comparison to other sports, is lower scoring and more affected by chance. The latter presents to its spectators a more unpredictable game and a darker, more complex and denser drama to enjoy. The Philosophy of Footballdeepens our understanding of the familiar features of the game, offering novel interpretations on what football is, how and why we play it, and what the game offers its followers that makes us so eagerly await match day. This is essential reading for anybody with an interest in the world's most popular game or in the philosophical or social study of sport. nstructive- destructive contact sport and, in comparison to other sports, is lower scoring and more affected by chance. The latter presents to its spectators a more unpredictable game and a darker, more complex and denser drama to enjoy. The Philosophy of Footballdeepens our understanding of the familiar features of the game, offering novel interpretations on what football is, how and why we play it, and what the game offers its followers that makes us so eagerly await match day. This is essential reading for anybody with an interest in the world's most popular game or in the philosophical or social study of sport. (shrink)

There are many murderer protagonists in recent American television series. Rape, however, is most often used to mark a character as clearly villainous—and more so than a murderer. This chapter argues that rape is morally disgusting. Nonetheless, in real life laws rape is not in the same way marked as being worse than murder. This chapter suggests that the explanation for this asymmetry between fiction and real-life moral psychology is that we as spectators rely more heavily on moral emotions when (...) engaging in fiction, and that rape is emotionally disturbing in a way that murder need not be. Our attitude towards the rapist as repulsive becomes more evident when we engage in fiction. This points to a difference between the morality activated by fiction and the morality activated by real-life events. (shrink)

This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while (...) the Spectator does not. I highlight the implications of this construal for a theory of action, and call attention onto some other interesting normative relations between the self-reflective agent and the Other that escape both the first-person and the third-person approach. My contention is that the authority of self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self and others, hence from a second-person stance. (shrink)

Ugo Spirito's _Memoirs of the Twentieth Century_ is the intellectual autobiography of one of the most original and anticonformist contemporary Italian philosophers. In it, Spirito makes an evaluation of his long career (spanning from the decade of the 20's to that of the 70's of the twentieth century) as a thinker who was never satisfied with any theoretical or philosophical system, while constantly aiming at finding a definitive truth: the “incontrovertible” or absolute. The various stages of his search deal with (...) different philosophical and scientific systems - from positivism to actual idealism, from problematicism to omnicentrism, from scientism to neoproblematicism - revealing at the same time an inherent antinomic procedure that does not permit him to take any truth for granted. At the end of his life, Spirito realized that he could only be sure of his present state of “unawareness,” thus challenging the validity of his lifelong investigative activity. “Man cannot know himself,” Spirito wrote. Confronted with the manifestations of life and universe, he could not help but feel a sense of “surprise and astonishment.” Throughout his life, he was only a spectator of his destiny, not the conscious creator of it, as he believed in the early stage of his career. Consequently, he reached a position of negating any value system, bordering on skepticism and nihilism. Within this context, he offered a post-modern interpretation of life. This interpretation was also Spirito's conclusion, and as such, implied a rethinking about other faiths, both political and ideological, that for more than fifty years would develop parallel to philosophical faith. Consequently, he revisited some of the most important philosophical and political personalities who interpreted or materialized those faiths, from Benedetto Croce to Gentile, from Benito Mussolini to Giovanni Bottai, from Togliatti to Pope Paul VI. Spirito was not a thinker who remained secluded within the ivory tower of pure investigation, but in an effort to modify society according to principle of the identification of philosophy with life, he tried to act upon it by following thoughts with action. _Memoirs of the Twentieth Century_ is divided in two parts: one purely autobiographical and theoretical, and the other more historical, where Spirito narrates his relationship with the above-mentioned personalities, as a way of testing the validity of his beliefs. Indeed, one can perceive his moment of adherence to each of the different approaches expounded, only to subsequently detach himself from them. For the English-speaking reader, the second part will appear more interesting and poignant, since Spirito's involvement with history foretells the intellectual fate of a nation. _Memoirs of the Twentieth Century_ is a reflection on life, in which personal history serves as a vehicle for judgment upon an entire century. (shrink)

Visual culture can be considered from semiotic point of view as a system of visual codes. Several of them have natural routs. So the perceptual code is formed already on biological level mediating translation of sensory data into perceptual images of the spatial world. The means of natural perceptual code are transformed in culture, where they are involved in communication by depictions. The depiction on the flat performs the function of a “perceptogram”, which, on one hand, is an external record (...) of an internal perceptual image or an idea, and, on the other hand, serves as a program for a spectator’s visual perception. The means of this “perceptography” form an artificial code, which is, on the contrary to the perceptual code, communicative, deliberately used and transformed in various ways at different periods of time in diverse kinds of practical and artistic activity. Not all perceptograms become pieces of art, but all history of pictorial arts can be considered as a process of development and mastering with the different versions of this perceptographic code. The changes of this code in visual culture are connected with the intrinsic development of “vision forms” as well with invention of external means of communication. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 14.1 (2006) 77-88 [Access article in PDF] Revealing the Habitual: The Teachings of Unconventional Piano-Playing Tuomas Mali Vantaa, Finland Playing Experiences as a Source of Knowledge As a pianist, I know piano-playing from the inside as something I am accustomed to doing. For me, as for every serious pianist, playing is an everyday activity that has become so habitual as to be inseparable (...) from myself. As I am absorbed in piano-playing, I become musical in a way that more or less makes me forget myself. In the tumult of playing there is no objectifying gaze, no clear distinction between subject and object, performer and music; there is just skilful coping with musical tasks and concerns.1 For an experienced pianist the centrality of the lived body is a commonplace: to know piano-playing is to know one's own body in and through playing as one cultivates a "pianistic" way of existing. This calls for daily training.2 Although it is not always this obvious, the lived body is important to all knowing. Through regular practicing and performing I know piano-playing in the same direct way as we all know the world in and through living "in" it as human bodies, in and through our everyday coping, our "dealings" in the world.3 Juha Varto, the Finnish phenomenologist, uses the word "inspective" to describe this way of knowing, in a sense that emphasizes active bodily being-in-the-world.4 [End Page 77]To reflect on piano-playing, in contrast, requires one to distance oneself from playing, to adopt a perspective that is not present in the playing itself. The relationship between the knower and the world is now different. Here, Varto uses the word "perspective" as an adjective to designate this way of knowing. He illuminates the difference between "inspective" and "perspective" knowing with the image of a burning stake: the spectators certainly know that the stake is hot and that it kills, but the smell of one's own burning flesh makes it clear and certain in a radically different way without intermediary thought.5 Reflection makes it possible to "observe" piano-playing, to see it "in perspective," as part of a larger, ordered, cultural reality, as part of a considered "view" or "theory." When devoting oneself to reflection, it is typical to characterize the activity of playing as objective, as something that lies outside the lived experience of the body. But—and this is often deliberately ignored—a view or a theory arrived at through observation is also irrevocably bound to the embodied existence of the observer, even if the view often seems to be more or less a product of thought alone.While the distinction between concerned coping ("inspective" knowing) and reflective viewing ("perspective" knowing) is important, it should be kept in mind that in human life they are always interwoven. There is no way to eliminate one of them, no way to choose only one or the other. Rather, we are constantly negotiating between the "inspective" and "perspective," dealing on the one hand with our situated bodily experience and on the other hand with our recognition of a larger cultural perspective.Historically, valued knowledge about music-making has often been framed around a conception of reflection as detached, disinterested inquiry which as pure contemplation, has nothing to do with the lived body of the knower. A particular discourse or a quest for definition has often served as starting points for research—starting points that seemingly rule out the relevance of bodily experiences. However, it seems to me that there is no way to cut the link between knowing and experiencing; differences on the level of the lived body are often crucial for knowledge. For example, the difference in the experiential basis often results in a gap between the knowledge of a "maker" and that of a "viewer." When music is known mostly through making it, knowledge gained through observation often seems to miss what is essential, to distort and misinterpret the musical practice. This gap, and... (shrink)

In this poster I compare two types of visualization that can be distinguished by the role of the viewer. In the first, which I call “closed visualization,” interpretation is seen as a decoding of meanings already set by the author. The other—“open visualization”—sees the viewer as an active co-creator of meanings. In its processual character, open visualization elicits the critical potential of the imagination and is open to new contexts and interpretations. As such, open visualization democratizes the production of knowledge (...) by enabling the critical analysis of the spectator. Instead of the hegemonic production of discourse typical of closed visualization, it introduces a “diagonal perspectivism” that allows problems to be seen from differentiated perspectives. As examples of the mentioned models of visualization I will analyze two projects: Neil Halloran’s The Shadow Peace: The Nuclear Threat and Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas. (shrink)

Accounts of video game play developed from an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic perspective remain relatively scarce. This study collects together an emerging, if scattered, body of research which focuses on the material, practical “work” of video game players. The study offers an example-driven explication of an EMCA perspective on video game play phenomena. The materials are arranged as a “tactical zoom.” We start very much “outside” the game, beginning with a wide view of how massive-multiplayer online games are played within (...) dedicated gaming spaces; here, we find multiple players, machines, and many different sorts of activities going on. Still remaining somewhat distanced from the play of the game itself, we then take a closer look at the players themselves by examining a notionally simpler setting involving pairs taking part in a football game at a games console. As we draw closer to the technical details of play, we narrow our focus further still to examine a player and spectator situated “at the screen” but jointly analyzing play as the player competes in an online first-person shooter. Finally, we go “inside” the game entirely and look at the conduct of avatars on-screen via screen recordings of a massively multiplayer online game. Having worked through specific examples, we provide an elaboration of a selection of core topics of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis that is used to situate some of the unstated orientations in the presentation of data fragments. In this way, recurrent issues raised in the fragments are shown as coherent, interconnected phenomena. In closing, we suggest caution regarding the way game play phenomena have been analyzed in this study, while remarking on challenges present for the development of further EMCA-oriented research on video game play. (shrink)

In modern philosophy acquires relevance a problem of confrontation of linguistic and visual practices of philosophical knowledge. Since Antiquity, ways of contemplation are formed as ways of recognition characterized as “ocularcentrism”. In the historical and philosophical prospective “sight” and “vision” are metaphors of thinking. They are considered as internal contemplation, and as a means of establishing human cognitive abilities. It is shown that technology and models of representation in Western culture of thinking are based on practices that appeal to “visualization”. (...) The create a “videological matrix” and make certain common stratagems of visual discourse like metaphors, diagrams, representation, etc. The article emphasizes that “the ocular dictionary” of philosophy represents a wide range of options for visual metaphors that occupy an important place in a number of key philosophical concepts. On the one hand, there are metaphors that appeal to visual perception, visual experience. But on the other hand there is a traditional interpretation of philosophical activity through the prism of visual metaphors. These includes a metaphor of vision, metaphor of light, metaphor of mirror and others. The author highlights a metaphor of vision as a key metaphor of philosophical activity, in which the philosopher is a spectator, contemplating the truth, just as the spectator of a play, sport event or religious mysteries. In antiquity this kind of contemplation was a specific activity, called “theory”. Contemporary studies show that a term “theory” can establish an association between theory as specific activity in social life and a theory as a specific activity of a philosopher. Philosophical theory is an act of “contemplation”, as evidenced by the writings of Plato and Aristotle. “Theory” was also associated with a certain contemplative work, public instruction, pilgrimage. The “theory” was the action, which took place in three steps: leaving home, contemplation, returning home. A contemplation was in the center of theory as an activity. Consequently, the philosophical theory, the article says, is born with cultural practices, the origins of which are located primarily in the social life of ancient Greek. Thus, contemplation as a “theory” is understood as the process of getting information about images, ideas which is transformed into something new in the processes if intellectual activity. Consequently, the visibility immanently contained in the philosophy and describes the philosophical activity, as a way of philosophical research and is associated with philosophical thinking. Activity of a philosopher in the contest of contemplation is essentially a “metaphor of vision”, which acts as a certain type of philosophical activity. (shrink)

This essay explores the 'structure of feeling' that is emerging today in tandem with new digital technologies, together with economic globalisation and the financialisation of more and more human activities. The 20th century was the age of film and television; these dominant media shaped and reflected our cultural sensibilities. In the 21st century, new digital media help to shape and reflect new forms of sensibility. Movies (moving image and sound works) continue to be made, but they have adopted new formal (...) strategies, they are viewed under massively changed conditions and they address their spectators in different ways than was the case in the 20th century. The article traces these changes, focusing on three recent moving-image works: Nick Hooker's music video for Grace Jones's song 'Corporate Cannibal'; Olivier Assayas' movie Boarding Gate , starring Asia Argento; and Richard Kelly's movie Southland Tales , featuring Justin Timberlake, Dwayne Johnson and other pop culture celebrities. (shrink)