The protagonist of Edith Wharton’s 1904 short story “The Descent of Man” is both scien­tist and satirist. The target of his satire-“false interpreters” of evolutionary theory-allows Wharton to combine analysis of genre with inquiry into the cultural controversy Darwin’s ideas inspired. Anthropocentric anxieties explain popular preference for soothing “pseudo-science” over unsparing accounts of natural selection; they likewise explain widespread obtuseness to Professor Linyard’s ridicule of hazy illogic posing as science. Motivated more strongly by fitness interests than by allegiance to scientific (...) truth, however, the professor becomes complicit in widespread misreading of his own text. He thereby encourages the ignorance he intended to dispel, and Wharton highlights the ironies inherent in this self-sabotage. She insists that susceptibility to evolved adaptations is universal, moreover, and that it often impedes the discovery and promulgation of truth. (shrink)

A constructive interpretation is given of Paul Feyerabend's philosophy'of science as being not really irrationalistic but only pseudo-irrationalistic, and as being in need of an account of how science is distinct and how related to other activities. To this end, Benedetto Croce's philosophy is considered, constructively criticized, and shown to be unexpectedly promising; its valuable element is not the instrumentalistic theory of science officially present in his Logica but the distinctionism-relationism that he practiced everywhere and especially in his literary (...) criticism. A summary is then given of results obtained or expected from an investigation of Galileo Galilei's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems carried out in the spirit of such a modified Crocean approach. (shrink)

As a concrete extension of analyses of scientific method and social study already undertaken in the pages of this journal and elsewhere, the present article will endeavor to clarify certain long-standing preconceptions in classical and neo-classical economic doctrine which still persist and which, in the light of 20th century methodology, can be given no other label than that of pseudo-scientific. These preconceptions revolve primarily about the ideas of “value,” “cost,” “utility,” and “price,” which ideas have suffered little change to the (...) present day and which even early writers recognized as being vague and ambiguous. (shrink)

The analyses thus far undertaken of cost theory and utility theory have viewed these doctrines as they originally were, namely, as the contentions of two conflicting groups of value theorists. And had the two rival groups been allowed to continue to match strength on the plane on which Macvane, for example, contended, the result would probably have been the destruction of them both. Underneath surface conflicts, however, the rival theories had much in common. As the twentieth century got under way, (...) this state of affairs was discerned, with the result that in the end there was hand-shaking and backslapping all around and the inauguration of a live-and-let-live policy. Although at first regarding each other as mortal enemies, these two groups of price-determination theorists later came to see in one another something resembling blood kinship. But are the underlying assumptions which classicism and neoclassicism have in common any more realistic and scientific than the specific assumptions already examined? This is a question to which we now turn. (shrink)

과학 기술은 과도한 발전으로 말미암아 기존에는 우리가 경험하지 못했던 새로운 윤리적 문제들을 출현시키는 원인으로 작용하고 있다. 칼-오토 아펠은 지구적 문제를 해결하기 위한 새로운 윤리로 거시 윤리를 제안하였는데, 그의 주장은 조슈아 그린과 같은 최근의 신경 과학적 관점에서 해석하는 경우에도 유의미한 시사점을 가질 수 있다. 첫째로 문제상황의 진단에 있어서, 아펠이 말하는 ‘전환기적 수준의 위기’는 그린이 제시하는 ‘상식적 도덕의 비극’과 유사하다. 둘째로 문제 해결의 측면에 있어서 아펠이 말하는 ‘거시 윤리’는 그린이 제시하는 ‘수동 모드’와 유사하다. 도덕적 책임 주체의 확대 차원에서 아펠의 주장이 여전히 강점을 (...) 가지므로 현대의 신경 과학도 그를 참고하여 연구를 진행할 필요가 있다. 아펠의 담론 윤리에 근거한 의사소통이 새로운 윤리 문제 해결을 위한 단서가 될 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Although quantum mechanics has significantly advanced our understanding of the physical world, it has also been a source of great confusion. Myriad interpretations, and interpretations of interpretations, have been proposed to try and explain away the seeming inconsistencies which lie at the heart of quantum mechanics. All of these attempts at interpretation center on the seemingly intractable measurement problem. In this essay I argue that a number of interpretations of quantum mechanics are plagued by inadequate and misleading assumptions about (...) the observer. These assumptions are based on a naïve “folk conception” of the observer. In discussing two phenomena studied in modern cognitive science, I will argue for a rejection of the naïve conception of the observer and adopt a more sophisticated view which offers a significant interpretational payoff. I argue that although the measurement problem in quantum mechanics appears to be a scientific problem requiring a scientific solution, it is plausible that the problem might be a pseudo-problem resulting from a conceptual confusion. The conceptual confusion is caused by naïve assumptions about the nature of the observer.1 Based on these arguments I will reevaluate a number of interpretations and assess the role of philosophy in interpreting quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The second installment in a three‐part series on the Qurʾān and science, this article provides a systematic discussion of the scientific interpretation of the Qurʾān both inside and outside the Muslim world. This discussion reveals how Muslims’ interactions with Euro‐Americans have kept discourse on the Qurʾān and science alive. It also demonstrates how Muslims promoted this exegetical genre transregionally from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.

This chapter contains sections titled: New Evidence for the Intellectuals' Challenge to Greek Religion The Origins of Allegorical Interpretation “There Is Only One God and He Arranges Everything for the Best” Diagoras' Critique of the Mysteries and His Condemnation Diagoras of Melos and the Faith of Socrates Socrates Against the Poets The Religion of Socrates and His Condemnation The Dangers of Freethinking in Classical Athens.

The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory’s advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory’s introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two (...) criteria: whether the theory’s six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory’s predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful. (shrink)

Interpretation, Constraint, and the Prospects of Scientific Realism I explore the interaction between theory-based interpretations of scientific evidence and constraints on theories provided by that evidence. Interpretation is often viewed as a source of error and a reason for scepticism about scientific results. But, I argue, while interpretation does generate epistemic risk, it also points to new sources of evidence that can constrain our theories. This is especially clear in the development of instrumentation that increases the range (...) of our interactions with nature. While the design of such instruments and the interpretation of their outputs are deeply dependent on theory-based interpretations, these outputs can still challenge those very theories. At the same time, theory-guided instrumentation provides us access to aspects of nature that we cannot study with our unaided senses. This access allows us to extend the range of evidence that we collect, and thus increases the constraints on our theories. As a result, theory-guided evidence collection has a positive impact on the prospects of scientific realism since these increasing constraints on our theories provide our only reason for thinking that we may be approaching the development of true theories. (shrink)

This paper examines a variety of social scientific studies purporting to demonstrate that transracial adoption is in the best interests of children. Finding flaws in these studies and the ethical and political arguments based upon such scientific findings, we argue for adoption practices and policies that respect the racial and ethnic identities of children of color and their communities of origin.

Catholic theology’s traditional understanding of the spiritual nature of the human person begins with the idea of a rational soul and human mind that is made manifest in free will—the spiritual experience of the act of consciousness and cause of all human arts. The rationale for this religion-based idea of personhood is key to understanding ethical dilemmas posed by modern research that applies a more empirical methodology in its interpretations about the cause of human consciousness. Applications of these beliefs about (...) the body/soul composite to the theory of evolution and to discoveries in neuroscience, paleoanthropology, as well as to recent animal intelligence studies, can be interpreted from this religious and philosophical perspective, which argues for the human soul as the unifying cause of the person’s unique abilities. Free will and consciousness are at the nexus of the mutual influence of body and soul upon one another in the traditional Catholic view, that argues for a spiritual dimension to personality that is on a par with the physical metabolic processes at play. Therapies that affect consciousness are ethically problematic, because of their implications for free will and human dignity. Studies of resilience, as an example, argue for the greater, albeit limited, role of the soul’s conscious choices in healing as opposed to metabolic or physical changes to the brain alone. (shrink)

Metaphysical and epistemological dualism informs much contemporary discussion of the relationships of science and religion, in particular in relation to the neurosciences and the religious understanding of the human person. This dualism is a foundational artifact of modern culture; however, contemporary scientific research and historical theological scholarship encourage a more holistic view wherein human personhood is most fittingly understood as an emergent phenomenon of, but not simply reducible to, evolutionary and developmental neurobiology.

In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception (...) I defend here and Suárez’s inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else. (shrink)

Forms of understanding -- Understanding as organized beliefs -- On interpretation -- Representations -- Scientific explanation -- Causal explanations -- Other types of explanations -- The pragmatics of explanation -- Not just why-questions -- A rhetorical approach to explanation -- Pluralism and the unity of science.

Forms of understanding -- Understanding as organized beliefs -- On interpretation -- Representations -- Scientific explanation -- Causal explanations -- Other types of explanations -- The pragmatics of explanation -- Not just why-questions -- A rhetorical approach to explanation -- Pluralism and the unity of science.

Critics, then, who label theories such as objectivism or deconstructionism as “authoritarian” or “subversive” are committing a fallacy of overspecificity. To call Hirsch’s theory authoritarian is to assume that such a theory lends itself to one and only one kind of political use and that that use can be determined a priori. To refute such an assumption, one need only stand back from the present in order to recall that today’s authoritarian ideology is often yesterday’s progressive one, and vice versa. (...) Indeed, there’s considerable historical irony in the fact that objectivism has now acquired the status of a right-wing idea, while Nietzsche and Heidegger have emerged as heroes of literary leftism. As recently as a few decades ago, these alignments were different. George Orwell, for instance, thought that the tendency to deny the possibility of objective truth reflected a totalitarian mentality. “Totalitarianism,” he wrote, “in the long run probably demands a disbelief in the existence of objective truth.” He added that “the friends of totalitarianism in this country tend to argue that since absolute truth is not attainable, a big lie is no worse than a little lie. It is pointed out that all historical records are biased and inaccurate, or, on the other hand, that modern physics has proved that what seems to us the real world is an illusion, so that to believe in the evidence of the senses is simply vulgar philistinism.”10It’s not that it hadn’t occurred to Orwell that the notion of objective truth could easily be used to justify the actions of tyrants and oppressors. But Orwell’s experience of Fascist and Communist falsification of history showed how the denial of the possibility of objectivity could also justify oppressive actions, perhaps in a more disarming way. For various historical reasons, Orwell’s insight is easily lost today. His is one of those Enlightenment concepts of truth which have been compromised in usage. As the Enlightenment has come to be associated not with progress, democracy, and equality but with the ideological exploitation of those concepts in the interests of social control, a great moral and political transvaluation of the epistemological vocabulary has occurred. Enlightenment thinking is frequently associated with the bourgeois complacency or the menacing technology of Western democracies or is identified with the totalitarian regimentation of the Soviet Union. Thus the concepts of objective truth, nature, essence, identity, and teleology have come to be viewed as conservative or reactionary ideas, as if these ideas had never operated, and never could operate, in quite other ways.11 10. George orwell, “The Prevention of Literature,” The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, 4 vols. , 4: 63-64.11. As Frederic Jameson has noted, “it is certainly the case that a belief in the natural is ideological and that much of bourgeois art has worked to perpetuate such a belief…. Yet in different historical circumstances the idea of nature was once a subversive concept with a genuinely revolutionary function, and only the analysis of the concrete historical and cultural conjuncture can tell us whether, in the post-natural world of late capitalism, the categories of nature may not have acquired such a critical charge again”. (shrink)

Scientific and mathematical concepts are significantly different from everyday concepts and are notoriously difficult to learn. It is shown that particular instances of such concepts can be identified or generated by different possible modes of concept interpretation. Some of these modes use formally explicit knowledge and thought processes; others rely on less formal case‐based knowledge and more automatic recognition processes. The various modes differ in attainable precision, likely errors, and ease of use. A combination of such modes can be (...) used to formulate an “ideal” model for interpreting scientific concepts both reliably and efficiently. Comparisons are made with the actual concept interpretations of expert scientists and novice students. The discussion elucidates some cognitive and metacognitive reasons why the learning of scientific or mathematical concepts is difficult. It also suggests instructional guidelines for teaching such concepts more effectively. (shrink)

While the debate continues over whether Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power is intended as ontology, biology, psychology, or some variant of the three, there is a significant consensus on many sides that were the will to power intended as an ontology, it would be inconsistent with his anti-metaphysical stance, implausible from a contemporary scientific perspective, and very poorly supported, based only on wild metaphysical speculation or sloppy, pseudo-scientific generalization. In this paper, I suggest, to the contrary, that Nietzsche’s (...) published works contain a substantial, though implied, argument for the will to power as ontology. Further, this ontology and the supporting argument for it are fully consistent with a naturalist methodology. Indeed, I will suggest that Nietzsche believes the will to power ontology follows directly from his rejection of metaphysics and is grounded in a critical form of naturalism. Consequently, even if he is mistaken in this conclusion, we must take the will to power ontology as seriously as we do his critique of metaphysics, for it is intended as a direct consequence of that critique. I will further suggest that, once we have recognized Nietzsche’s implied philosophical argument for the will to power ontology, we can better understand the intended scope and purpose of the theory of the will to power, as well as reject many of the influential interpretations of the concept, including the vitalist (Heidegger, Schacht), intentionalist (Clark), evolutionary (Richardson), and teleological (Reginster) readings. In contrast to these interpretations, I argue that the will to power as ontology follows directly from his rejection of three principal metaphysical presumptions: substance, causal agency, and teleology. As a rejection of substance, the will to power describes reality as consisting of general will, not objects, agents, or discrete wills. As a rejection of causal agency, it describes events as maximal manifestations of power rather than as realized potencies—abilities, motives, or possibilities actualized by efficient causal agencies. Finally, as a rejection of teleology, the will to power is a descriptive principle of action and events as essentially active engagements of obstacles, rather than an explanatory final cause, purpose or aim. Consequently, the will to power is a not a theory of desires, intentions, or drives, but rather a basic descriptive principle of events or activity, describing not agency but the causal process as a whole, and tending not toward accumulating power or overcoming resistance, but rather toward the activity of resistance as such. I conclude that the will to power is a critical ontology about what reality is not, rather than a positive theory of reality, intended not to explain events but to reveal and reject the common metaphysical presuppositions that underlie many common-sense, philosophical and scientific explanations of reality, such as freedom of the will, rational and moral motivation, physical atomism and the concept of natural law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What a Wall Wants, or How Graffiti ThinksNomad Grammatology in the French BanlieueDavid Fieni (bio)[End Page 72]>> Nomad GrammatologyThe now infamous series of inflammatory remarks that Nicolas Sarkozy, as interior minister, repeatedly unleashed during the summer and fall leading up to the banlieue riots of 2005 sparked a swift and fierce public outcry. Commentators in both the French and foreign press were quick to criticize Sarkozy’s vow to “flush (...) out [the thugs of La Corneuve] with a Kärcher [pressure washer]” (il faut [les] nettoyer au Kärcher).1 It was pointed out by Azouz Begag, as the newly appointed minister of equal opportunities, that such “warlike” language indiscriminately victimizes young people in the banlieue, while journalist Doug Ireland argued that Sarkozy’s comments conveyed hints of ethnic cleansing by equating urban youth, largely of Maghrebi origin, with dirt that needed to be violently removed from the otherwise smooth and clean civic spaces of the French Republic.2 The populist rage that Sarkozy articulated by using the term racaille (rabble, scum) received most of the attention, including an essay in Le Monde that explored the word’s etymology (intended as a lesson in the politics of language for the French interior minister).3It is the Kärcher reference, however, that most interests me here. Kärcher, a company based in Germany, whose own website touts it as “the most recognized and trusted name in high-pressure cleaning equipment,” manufactures machines used to clean city walls and public latrines. By proclaiming that he wanted to “kärcherize” the “racaille,” Sarkozy evoked a specific technology of urban cleansing that vividly illustrates the increasingly brutal approach to the banlieue that marks French urban policy since the 1980s. The Kärcher water blaster is not a mere metaphor, but an actual machine used to scour graffiti from a variety of hard-to-clean surfaces. Sarkozy’s comments thus equate banlieue youth (la racaille) with their signs of passage through urban space (le graff, as graffiti is often called). The young banlieusards themselves become illegible signs on the new smooth spaces of the HLM housing estates. The rhetorical dehumanization of young people from “troubled neighborhoods,” combined with hostility to graffiti, reveals the neo-logocentrism operative in the penal republican state that reiterates colonialism’s pseudo-scientific rationale for depriving supposedly illiterate peoples of history, reason, and even the very capacity for thought, a rationale that ultimately justifies their exclusion from the entire chain of civilizational benefits and rights attendant upon literacy and reason. One piece of anti-Sarkozy graffiti in Brest near the port de commerce, depicting Sarkozy as the national cop wielding a billy club, displays an explicit awareness of this interpretation of what nettoyer au Kärcher means (fig. 1). Text accompanying the cartoonish caricature reads, “Article 1: Nettoyage des graffitis au Kärcher” (Article 1: Cleaning graffiti with a Kärcher).4It would be an error, however, to suggest that the category, “banlieue youth,” exists independent of the statements that construct it as an identifiable group. Mustafa Dikeç’s recent demonstration of the way that French urban policy “produces” the banlieue as a space to be policed and contained also extends to the way that specific groups within these spaces are produced through the media, statistics, law, and other techniques.5 The [End Page 73] act of naming the racaille effectively produces them as a social category precisely at the same moment that the necessity of cleansing their living inscription from the cité is asserted. I am calling this nettoyage or erasure of these groups “neo-logocentric” because part of its target is graffiti, which, as I hope to demonstrate, represents an important emerging global practice of inscription that produces multiple transnational connections among ghettoized spaces around the world. Graffiti functions as a kind of alternative literacy that operates within a plane that connects with literacy in the narrow sense of the term, but remains independent from it. The strong reactions that graffiti elicits, as adduced by Sarkozy’s remarks (and one could cite dozens of other examples), suggest that the new technologies of thought, mobility, and inscription that graffiti engineers are what make it... (shrink)

In order to account for the actual function of analogue models in extending theories to new domains, we argue that it is necessary to analyze the inference involved into a complex two dimensional form. This form must go horizontally from descriptions of entities used as a model to redescriptions of entities in the new domain, and it must go vertically from an observation language to a theoretical language having a different and exclusive logical syntax. This complex inference can only be (...) intelligible if we interpret theoretical terms in a platonic manner, a la Körner. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to give a philosophical analysis of inter-theoretical relations between the popular science and philosophy of nature and to formulate and the criteria of evaluation of correctness of such relations. The analysis is grounded in the domain of contemporary evolutionism. The main hypothesis is the following: The scientific theories do not imply philosophical theses directly. Nevertheless, they frequently appear in popular works as allegedly following scientific theories.. For example, papers on the theory of human evolution (...) derive metaphysical theses from certain types of naturalism or spiritualism. These popular, metaphysically loaded, pseudo-scientific theories work as the traps. While using them, it is impossible to realize the cognitive aspirations of scientific theories (the error of metaphysical aspirations) that are suggested in their popular elaborations (the error of naive extrapolations). Metaphysical aspirations of the popular science result from the social demand for the philosophy of life. The main purpose of metaphysical interpretations is to turn the "scientific world" into the world of everyday life. This can be done in the frame of so-called hobby-philosophies, which are implicite loaded with serious metaphysical premises. Philosophy of nature is an open forum for the interpretations of scientific theories. Philosophy of nature takes into considerations theoretical as well as practical human attitudes towards the nature. (shrink)

This second volume is a continuation of the first volume’s 20th century conceptual foundations of quantum physics extending its view to the principles and research fields of the 21st century. A summary of the standard concepts, from modern advanced experimental tests of 'quantum ontology’ to the interpretations of quantum mechanics, the standard model of particle physics, and the mainstream quantum gravity theories. A state-of-the-art treatise that reports on the recent developments in quantum computing, classical and quantum information theory, the black (...) holes information paradox and the holographic principle to quantum cosmology, with some attention on contemporary themes such as the Bose-Einstein condensates as also to the more speculative areas of quantum biology and quantum consciousness. A final chapter on the connections between the quantum realm and philosophical idealism concludes this volume. Considering how the media (sometimes also physicists) present quantum theory, which focuses only on highly dubious ideas and speculations backed by no evidence or, worse, promote pseudo-scientific hypes that fall regularly in and out of fashion, this is a ‘vademecum’ for those who look for a serious introduction and deeper understanding of the 21st century quantum theory. All topics are explained with a concise but rigorous intermediate level style which may, at times, require some effort. However, you will finally acquire an unparalleled background in the conceptual foundations of quantum physics, enabling you to distinguish between the real science backed by experimental facts and mere speculative interpretations. (shrink)

One way to show that text interpretation can be treated as a scientific problem is to show that the standards that are currently used in the natural sciences when dealing with problems not involving meaningful material can also be successfully employed in the case of text interpretation. These standards involve intersubjective intelligibility, testability with the use of evidence, rational argumentation, and making methodological decisions aiming at the attainment of truth, accuracy, simplicity and other epistemic values. In the case (...) of text interpretation—despite the fact that we deal with meaningful material—hypotheses can be formulated, consequences can be drawn by deduction, and these can be tested against empirical data. This claim is substantiated by the provision of an example of a scientific text. (shrink)

본 논문은 심플리키오스의 저작으로 알려져 있는 『영혼론 주해』 (CAG XI)에나타난 프리스키아노스의 지성론에 대한 연구이다. 프리스키아노스는 아리스토텔레스의 『영혼론』을 풀이하면서 자신의 고유한 신플라톤주의적인 사상을 적극개진하고 있다. 본 논문은 『영혼론』에서 지성의 발전단계와 표상력 및 수동지성에관한 논의와 그에 대한 해석을 중심으로 프리스키아노스의 이론을 알아보고자한다. 따라서 본 논문은 아리스토텔레스의 『영혼론』의 신플라톤주의적인 해석과수용에 대한 한 가지 사례연구가 될 수 있다. 아리스토텔레스의 지성의 세 가지의 발전단계는 프리스키아노스의 인간 지성론에서의 신플라톤주의적인 삼중구조에 상응한다. 프리스키아노스에 따르면 인간의지성은 인간의 정신활동의 원인인 실체적 지성과 실체적 지성에서 유출된 발출지성으로 구성된다. 발출지성은 인식대상의 존재론적 (...) 지위에 따라 다시금 미완성 상태와완성 상태로 나뉜다. 인간의 지성은 미완성 상태에서 완성상태로 옮아가고, 그리고현실적으로 사유함으로써 실체적 지성과 동일하게 되는 것을 목표로 하는 발전과정으로 이해된다. 프리스키아노스는 인간의 표상력과 신체와의 결합을 감각기관에 대한 표상력의 전적인 종속으로 보지 않고, 감각기관을 규정하는 형상적 능력으로 이해한다. 또한 수동지성의 소멸은 신체의 소멸에 동반되는 소멸이 아니라, 유출된 자기 자신을 원인으로서의 자기 자신으로 되돌아가기 위해 지양한다는 의미에서의 소멸로 이해한다. 표상력과 수동지성에 대한 새로운 이해를 통해 프리스키아노스는 아리스토텔레스의 인간 지성의 발전단계를 신플라톤주의 체계 안에서의 지성의존재론적인 발전단계로 해석하는 데에 성공한다. (shrink)

Spencer's evolutionary philosophy is usually identified with right-wing doctrines such as individualism, laissez-faire liberalism and even conservatism. Since he himself defended similar positions, it is perhaps not surprising that the study of the political interpretations of his ideas has drawn relatively little attention. In this article I propose to examine a rather atypical reading of Spencer's organic analogy, though definitely not a marginal one: Enrico Ferri's Marxist doctrine of Scientific Socialism. Ferri is not a figure unknown to scholars interested in (...) the political aspects of the evolutionary debate. Nonetheless, the relation between his theory and Spencer's biosociology -- notably the complex dialectic of themes such as "the struggle for existence" versus "class struggle," or "evolution" versus "revolution" -- has not yet received full-length analysis. In my study I investigate the diffusion of Spencer's ideas in Italy and their impact on the new "positivist" sciences of psychology and sociology inasmuch as these questions are essential to understanding Ferri's position. Throughout, I stress the importance of the intellectual and political context in the process of appropriation of ideas that led to this unexpected shift in meaning. (shrink)

1. Preliminary Reconnaissance: Realism, Instrumentalism, and Interpretation On the one hand, I think it is fair to say that philosophers recognize a special problem or question about how we are to “interpret” scientific theories only in light of their concerns about whether we are really entitled to believe what those theories say when they are interpreted in what we see as the most natural or straightforward or intuitive way. On the other hand, this fundamental worry reaches all the way (...) back to the inception of scientific inquiry itself, no matter how liberally we conceive of that enterprise. Before the relatively recent professionalization of academic fields, such concerns were well-represented among the figures who served simultaneously as both the leading practitioners and the leading philosophers of science. This is nicely illustrated by the strident debates throughout this community in the 18th and 19th centuries concerning whether only pure inductive methods were legitimate for scientific inquiry and/or whether the competing “method of hypothesis” could produce any genuine knowledge of nature (see Laudan 1981 Ch. 8). (shrink)

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law’s dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of (...) the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications. (shrink)

This paper discusses the announcement by a team of researchers that they identified a genetic influence for a range of “antisocial” behaviours in the New Zealand Māori population (dubbed the “warrior gene”). The behaviours included criminality, violence, gambling and alcoholism. The reported link between genetics and behaviour met with much controversy. The scientists were described as hiding behind a veneer of supposedly “objective” western science, using it to perpetuate “racist and oppressive discourses”. In this paper we examine what went wrong (...) in the dissemination of the research. We chose as our framework the debate around the “internal/external” responsibilities of scientists. Using this discourse we argue that when the researchers ventured to explain their research in terms of social phenomena, they assumed a duty to ensure that their findings were placed “in context”. By “in context”, we argue that evidence of any genetic influence on behavioural characteristics should not be reported in isolation, but instead presented alongside other environmental, cultural and socio-economic influences that may also contribute to the studied behaviour. Rather than imposing a new obligation on scientists, we find this duty to contextualise results is in keeping with the spirit of codes of ethics already in place. Lessons from the “warrior gene” controversy may assist researchers elsewhere to identify potential areas of conflict before they jeopardise research relationships, or disseminate findings in a manner that fuels misleading and/or potentially discriminatory attitudes in society. (shrink)

The following three papers (by R.G.A. Dolby, R.N.D. Martin, and A. Thomson) were presented to the Science & Religion Forum at its annual meeting in Liverpool, Britain, in March 1988, under the general theme of Tradition & Authority in Science and Religion. An abbreviated version of the fourth paper given at that meeting re-entitled STS Perspective: Value Systems, by W.F. Williams, is printed on pp. 219-221 of this volume (Vol. 9, No. 4). A copy of the full version is available (...) from either the author or the editorial office. (shrink)