Critique of Hindu Advaita philosophy as interpreted by Krishnachandra Bhattacharya, 1875-1949.

INTRODUCTION I have purposely limited myself to a rather brief statement in this introduction, in order that the summing up be not misrepresented for the ...

In recent work, Amie Thomasson has sought to develop a new approach to the philosophy of the categories which is metaphysically neutral between traditional realist and conceptualist approaches, and which has its roots in the ‘correlationalist’ approach to categories put forward in Husserl’s writings in the 1900s–1910s and systematically charted over the past few decades by David Woodruff Smith in his studies of Husserl’s philosophy. Here the author aims to provide a recontextualization and critical assessment of correlationalism in (...) a Husserlian vein. To this end, the author presents, first, the reasons why, later in his life, Husserl himself found his earlier treatment of categories philosophically naive, and why he increasingly advocated for a more genetic-teleological account. The author then draws upon arguments made a century earlier by Schelling and Hegel, in criticism of Fichte, to point up what might remain philosophically unsatisfying about even the post-correlationalist genetic position of the later Husserl, in light of the pronounced trend in Husserl’s own development, on the questions of reason and spirit, toward absolute idealism. (shrink)

It is McRae’s “position that the link between absolute knowing, and the system proper [in Hegel], cannot be understood aside from the act of presentation itself”. In a word, “absolute knowing is nothing but the presentation of the system itself”. This ongoing activity of presentation occurs in the theater of language, there being different speculative levels as well as particular “regional” languages, each in its own way capturing, in its “thick immediacy,” some stage of this process. Expressed another (...) way, “the absolute speaks… and consequently can be known and known most perfectly in language”. (shrink)

This paper draws out the "speculative" consequences of Husserl's late philosophy which centers around the two major forms of life, the prephilosophical and philosophical attitude. Husserl also calls the philosophical sphere that of the "absolute," since every other form of life is relative upon it. The way to attain this state is, as I try to show, carried out in a certain "dialectical" fashion which attempts to synthesize both at first seemingly contradictory attitudes. In conclusion, I am drawing (...) out a critique of this idea. (shrink)

This paper draws out the "speculative" consequences of Husserl's late philosophy which centers around the two major forms of life, the prephilosophical and philosophical attitude. Husserl also calls the philosophical sphere that of the "absolute," since every other form of life is relative upon it. The way to attain this state is, as I try to show, carried out in a certain "dialectical" fashion which attempts to synthesize both at first seemingly contradictory attitudes. In conclusion, I am drawing (...) out a critique of this idea. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Religion of the Future, or Outlines of Spiritual Philosophy 1. A new and glorious science of man, of his origin and destiny, has been developed within the last few decades. A new philosophy has been evolved of human life here and hereafter, based upon demonstrated facts and data accessible to all. Stupendous as the science of objective nature has become, it is as the mere shadow thrown upon the canvas of time and matter by the (...) radiant light of immortal spirit. Modern agnosticism had set up a way-mark on the road of human progression, inscribed: "No thoroughfare!" "Unknowable!" The truths most indispensable for man to know, the destiny of man and the immortality of the soul, were declared absolute mysteries. What ought to have merely been designated as unknown was declared to be unknowable. This way-mark has to be removed. It is now seen that the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, as formulated by the Kantian school of modem philosophical thought, misled men into too hasty generalizations and unwarrantable conclusions. It needed only the right method to find the way out; it required only the right key to open wondrous realms to the astonished gaze. Again the supremacy of mind is restored; the saying is verified that "there is nothing on earth great but man, and in man there is nothing great but mind." About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s ultimate aim was to give an overall philosophical explanation of the totality of Being. In this endeavour, the term “absolute” was crucial for him. In this paper, I aim to clarify the most important ways in which Husserl used this notion. I attempt to show that, despite his rather divergent usages, eventually three fundamental meanings and coordinated levels of the “absolute” can be differentiated in his thought: the epistemological, the ontological, and the theological or metaphysical level. (...) According to Husserl, we can approach this ultimate level of the Absolute, through the method of phenomenological construction. A closer reading of Husserl’s texts shows that his conception of the absolute was astonishingly modern. The main features of the conception—on all three levels—were non-foundationalism, contextualism, openness, and circularity. Each level mutually founds and determines the others. It is a non-foundational Absolute, the moments of which constitute an organic and open totality which is essentially processual. In my interpretation, this theory opens a fruitful working area, which has enormous philosophical potential and is surprisingly up-to-date. (shrink)

The article offers an analysis of the concept of the Absolute in Fichte’s philosophy. Despite the difficulty of the definition, this concept receives a rich and creative rethinking in Fichte and will further influence the philosophical systems of thought. Gradually introducing this concept into his philosophical project of Wissenschaftslehre Fichte often changes its interpretation. So, starting with a somewhat vague understanding of the concept of the "absolute I" through Schelling's criticism of the Absolute, he develops the (...) theory of the manifestation of the Absolute, each time choosing new metaphors to denote it, and sometimes filling it with religious content, when the Absolute becomes a substitute for the concept of God. On the one hand, it’s important not to reduce the Absolute to a simple object of thought because this would indicate the limitation of the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider the Absolute as an empty or neutral concept or something completely enclosed in itself. Then, its existence will be doubtful. Fichte is careful about a clear definition of the Absolute. He solves this dilemma through the idea of the manifestation of the Absolute. Manifestation is the exit of the Absolute beyond itself while remaining unchanged. The ability to manifest itself is a prerequisite that the Absolute can be recognized and thought. This is how the Absolute manifests itself in the form of knowledge. Fichte emphasizes that the Absolute is not a projection of our mind, it may not depend on our thinking, however with such peculiarity that truth and knowledge have their basis in it. Thereby, with the theory of the Absolute, Fichte develops the idea of the foundation that is outside of ourselves, has transcendental character, and thus allows knowledge or truth not to be trapped in subjective tenets. Analyzing step by step the process of evolution of this concept, we will be able to see how in the last years of his life, Fichte states the importance of two realities: the “I” and the “Absolute” and how he explains the connection between them. (shrink)

It is McRae’s “position that the link between absolute knowing, and the system proper [in Hegel], cannot be understood aside from the act of presentation itself”. In a word, “absolute knowing is nothing but the presentation of the system itself”. This ongoing activity of presentation occurs in the theater of language, there being different speculative levels as well as particular “regional” languages, each in its own way capturing, in its “thick immediacy,” some stage of this process. Expressed another (...) way, “the absolute speaks… and consequently can be known and known most perfectly in language”. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.

Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty, and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, (...) nor on the proportion h/n. This paper reassesses that result and explores its implications. First, using the classical Condorcet jury model, I derive a more general version of Condorcet's formula, confirming the significance of the absolute margin, but showing that the probability that H is true given E depends also on an additional parameter: the prior probability that H is true. Second, I show that a related result holds when we consider not the degree of belief we attach to H given E, but the degree of support E gives to H. Third, I address the implications for the definition of special majority voting, a procedure used to capture the asymmetry between false positive and false negative decisions. I argue that the standard definition of special majority voting in terms of a required proportion of the jury is epistemically questionable, and that the classical Condorcet jury model leads to an alternative definition in terms of a required absolute margin between the majority and the minority. Finally, I show that the results on the significance of the absolute margin can be resisted if the so-called assumption of symmetrical juror competence is relaxed. (shrink)

"Three Ends of the Absolute" discusses Schelling's notion of inhibition in the philosophy of nature, Hölderlin's notion of separation in his "Seyn, Urtheil, Modalität," and Novalis' notion of the density of God in his late scientific notes. All three thinkers can be contrasted with Hegel on the basis of their attacks on philosophical absolutes. Schelling, in his First Projection of a Philosophy of Nature, reflects on the conundrum of absolute inhibition in nature, an inhibition of (...) class='Hi'>absolute freedom that is necessary if there is to be a procession of natural products. Inhibition conditions all putative absolutes. Hölderlin argues that absolute separation is essential to consciousness of any kind. Whereas he advances no "doctrine" of the end of the absolute as such, he does emphasize the tragic separation and dissolution to which all intellectual intuition comes. The absolute "original" suffers from an irremediable "debility." Novalis, in his Universal Sketchbook, continues the work of his early Fichte Studies by resisting the notion of the absolute ego. "Everything pure is... a deception." For Novalis, the absolute can only be our absolute inability to think or act in conformity with an absolute. The article ends with a reflection on Goethe's opposition between "relative" and "absolute" death. (shrink)

The Book Presents The Darsana Mala Comprising Hundred Sanskrit Verses Of Mystic-Poet Narayana Guru, Along With Its Transliteration In Roman Script And Its English Translation, Word Meanings, And Extensive Commentaries. Nataraja Guru Spells Out His Mentor S Visions Of The Absolute In Contemporary Idiom And Shows That They Are Validated By Modern Science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and LawFrancis OakleyThe quintessentially scholastic distinction between God’s power understood as absolute and ordained (potentia dei absoluta et ordinata) has been described “as a ‘yes and no’ answer to the question whether God is able to do or arrange things other than he did in creating the orders (...) of nature and grace.” 1 The importance of that distinction the historical scholarship of the past forty years has served increasingly to indicate. 2 The idea that it expressed had emerged already in the twelfth century, and in the standard form familiar to us from later years we now know it to have surfaced among the theologians of Paris in the opening years of the thirteenth. We also know that long before the end of the thirteenth century it had come to be understood in the two distinct ways that were to persist on through the late medieval and early modern centuries and to be acknowledged in the neo-scholastic manuals of the late nineteenth century.According to the first of these understandings, embedded in the classical formulations given to the distinction by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and many other later thinkers, the term potentia absoluta was used simply to denote God’s power in itself, taken in abstracto and without reference to the orders of nature and grace he has actually willed de potentia ordinata to establish. There was no question, that is, of the absolute power’s [End Page 669] being understood as a presently-active power by means of which God intervenes in the world to act apart from or set aside the order established by the ordained power. It refers instead to God’s ability to do many things he does not choose to do. Or put in the temporal terms that William Courtenay favors, it refers to “the total possibilities initially open to God, some of which were realized by creating the established order,” the “unrealized possibilities” being “now only hypothetically possible.” 3Side by side with this “classical” usage, however, there had emerged already in the thirteenth century what has been called a “juristic” or “opera-tionalized” understanding of the potentia dei absoluta as a presently-active power of potential interposition in the established order. Thus Duns Scotus, who gave a most influential expression to this alternative understanding, drawing an analogy not only with kings but with any free agent within whose power the law falls, distinguished between the ordained power by which God acts de jure in accordance with the rightful law he has established and the absolute power whereby de facto he can act apart from or against the law. In such a formulation the absolute power clearly exceeds the ordained. Rather than referring simply to the realm of logical possibility prior to God’s ordination of things, that absolute power is now construed as a presently-active and extraordinary power capable of acting apart from the order established de potentia ordinata and prevailing in the ordinary course of things. This “juristic” understanding of the distinction was clearly affiliated closely with the cognate distinction that medieval canonists invoked as early as the thirteenth century in an attempt to elucidate what the pope, in the absoluteness of his plenitudo potestatis, or absolute power, could do that was not open for him to do when acting in accordance with his merely ordained or “ordinary” power.Philosophy and ScienceIn an earlier and complementary article, I traced the career of the power distinction, as well as the persistence of the two distinct ways of understanding it, across the fifteenth century and on into the thinking of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologians, Lutheran and Reformed as well as Catholic. 4 It remains now to go on to demonstrate that the currency of the distinction in these later centuries was no more confined to strictly theological circles or settings than it had been during the Middle Ages. The Coimbran commentators and Suárez certainly deployed it for more generally philosophical purposes, 5 [End Page 670] and in the seventeenth century they were by no means... (shrink)

‘The doubtful story of successive events’. With these words Bernard Bosanquet is often taken to have damned historical knowledge to oblivion. Although it is undeniably true that Bosanquet uttered these words and saw them into print, it is much less clear what he intended their import to be and whether he intended to damn history as a form of knowledge as such. Although he wrote little directly which can be construed as ‘philosophy of history’, he developed views both implicitly (...) and explicitly which bear on this question. My concern in this paper is to show that Bosanquet’s animosity to history derived not from a desire to condemn, but from a desire to draw more from history than the historiography of his time would, in good philosophical conscience, allow him to. His words were words of disappointment and despair, of thwarted hope, rather than outright rejection. I shall argue that Bosanquet needed an account of historical experience to flesh out his account of the concrete universal. A re-telling of the story of Bosanquet and history shows how, if it had been possible for him to draw together unresolved strands in his thinking, he could have affirmed historical experience as ‘the heart beat of the absolute’. Following Foster I shall claim that he was ultimately committed to this, but was reluctant or unable to draw it out explicitly from his leading doctrines. (shrink)

In the chapter about the religion of art Hegel differentiates between four ways of integrating the Absolute: 1. integration though statues of gods, 2. integration through language, 3. integration through a religious cult, mysteries and festivities, 4. integration through the higher language of tragedy. Integration is conducted by the artist – the spirit is an artist. Still, it was demonstrated that these attempts of integration fail. Only one using speculative philosophy can succeed where the artist cannot: unity with (...) the Absolute. Integration, which was presented by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and translated through different forms of the religion of art and the appropriation of the Absolute, leads to a point where the Absolute vanishes: at first the man uses it as a “cleaner, a house and in the feast of its victim“. Then, the inner being of the Absolute is consummated “in the mystery of bread of wine” and, finally, annihilated in the laughter of a comedy. The artist, an integrator of the Absolute in the life of the people, is at last so successful that the relationship is reversed: it is, finally, the true selfness, which rises as the master over the Absolute. The integration of the Absolute fails due to the hypocrisy of the artist’s work. The road the artist walks on, prepares the ground for uncovering an obvious religion and, thus, indirectly, for an appearance of speculative philosophy. (shrink)

A close reading of the final chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, with special attention to dialectical method, to the relation of ch.s 6c on Objective Spirit and 7c on Revealed Religion to ch. 8 on Absolute Spirit, and to the relations of the absolute standpoint to time and to history.

This book examines Hegel's presentation of the absolute as knowing and as spirit. McRae construes this absolute both metaphysically, as a self-sufficient existent, the conceptual articulation of which explains the essence and existence of reality, and as truth-oriented, as the conceptual integration of thought and being. He is not, however, aware of the distinction between these construals. He contends that Hegel fails to show that the theoretically inquisitive reader should accept the standpoint of the absolute, because it (...) is presented as self-explanatory in a way alien to what would serve as an explanation for the reader. But he also contends that Hegel's presentation should be accepted both as explaining reality for his time and culture, and as the basis for understanding our own. The reason to distinguish construals, I think, is that it is the absolute's metaphysical status which for McRae seems to make its articulation in purely systematic terms inaccessible to the reader, and it is the truth-oriented absolute which seems to ground his claim that the reader should seek to know it. (shrink)

Russell and Einstein shared a commitment to a form of pacifism which Russell termed "non-absolute pacifism", or "relative political pacifism". Despite a 1947 disagreement on the roles of the United States, the Soviet Union and the immediate measures to be taken for world peace, Russell and Einstein were able to collaborate again in 1955 due to their shared philosophy. Newly discovered annotations by Einstein on a 1947 Russell article are used to analyze their disagreement, while their later statements (...) are used to illustrate their shared commitment to a type of pacifism which allowed, exceptionally, for a justified war in the special circumstance of an enemy opposed to "life as such". (shrink)

Contemporary theorists of constituent power recognize a tension in which the omnipotent novelty of constituent power is necessarily policed by constituted power. Beginning with Arendt’s claim that the categories of constitutional stability and political novelty should be thought together rather than treated as oppositional, this article presents an interpretation of her work that seeks to address this ‘paradox of constitutionalism’. While commentators have come to assert that Arendt repudiates ‘absolutes’ in favour of an account of ‘relative beginnings’, this article demonstrates (...) that Arendt’s argument involves a critical redescription of the absolute, rather than a repudiation. This is significant, for it illuminates the manner in which her account of founding seeks to dismantle the commonplace temporalizations we attribute to our political vocabulary. This is employed to argue that particular stylings of absolutes naturalize the appearance of the new only as temporal ruptures, allowing us to get a handl... (shrink)

I reconstruct Lukács’s immanent critique of German Idealism, found within his essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, in order to foreground his philosophical reflection on the concepts of mediation, logic, genesis and praxis. I situate this reflection within his philosophy of praxis as a whole before highlighting the dialectical development of these terms within it. They are posited initially as abstract, methodological demands and are subsequently concretised and enriched, via Lukács’s critical evaluation of the antinomies he discovers (...) in Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. My reconstruction is both exegetical and critical. I demonstrate that Lukács’s concept of praxis is explicitly intended to both bear the weight of Hegel’s Absolute and overcome it. On this basis, I propose a novel immanent critique of Lukács’s philosophy of praxis, suggesting that while Lukács wishes his concept of praxis to express a living, present and ontologically novel truth, his insight is won – in the fashion of Hegelian philosophy – after the historical event upon which it is built, as a philosophical reflection. Lukács’s self-contradiction is that while he regards his philosophy of praxis as having overcome speculative, Hegelian philosophy, in fact, the position he generates remains firmly but unconsciously within it. Consequently, Lukács’s philosophy of praxis possesses a theological dimension and must be regarded as an example of the kind of ‘conceptual mythology’ he sought to overcome. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.

In contrast to the discussion of theater in the tradition of Western philosophy from Plato and Aristotle through Rousseau and Diderot to Artaud and Brecht, who either devalued or valorized theatricality, Hegel adopts an intermediate point of view between these two extremes. He neither devalues nor valorizes theatricality, but rather maintains that it constitutes an essential dimension of poetic drama through which it presents its ideal and fictive reality to sense perception. While in pre-modernity dramatic poetry was able to (...) represent and reconcile the conflicts between ethical substantiality and individual subjectivity, it is a completely different matter in moder-nity. In the course of the progressing ethical de-substantialization of individual subjectivity, modern drama tends towards pure theatricality and loses its ability to reconcile ethical conflicts spiritually. (shrink)

ExcerptI. Blumenberg's Theses According to the introduction to a recent German volume of essays: “The reception of the Metaphorology, perhaps Blumenberg's most systematic theoretical work, has only just begun.”1 The Metaphorology appeared in English in 2010, translated by Robert Savage, and what goes for the German metaphorology-reception applies to a lesser degree to the rest of Blumenberg's work.2 His three big texts—The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1985), The Genesis of the Copernican World (1987), and Work on Myth (1988)—were published (...) in rapid succession by MIT Press, but they seem to have been quickly eclipsed by the…. (shrink)

Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la breve alusión que Hegel realiza a la cruz de Cristo en el parágrafo 564 de la Enciclopedia a partir de las Lecciones de filosofía de la religión en sus cuatro diferentes versiones. La tesis central del texto sostiene que si bien el tratamiento de la muerte de Dios en cruz corresponde en el sistema de Hegel al momento de la finitud del Espíritu absoluto, hay en él una reflexión existencial que no puede (...) ser pasada por alto y que en ella hay elementos que remiten inequívocamente a la teología de la cruz de Lutero.In this work the brief mention that Hegel makes to the cross of Christ at paragraph 564 of the Encyclopedia is analyzed from the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion in its four different versions. The central thesis of the work is that, although the treatment of the death of God at the cross corresponds in the Hegelian system to the moment of finitude of the absolute Spirit, there is also in it an existential reflection that should be overlooked and elements that refer unequivocally to Luther's theology of the cross. (shrink)

Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la breve alusión que Hegel realiza a la cruz de Cristo en el parágrafo 564 de la Enciclopedia a partir de las Lecciones de filosofía de la religión en sus cuatro diferentes versiones. La tesis central del texto sostiene que si bien el tratamiento de la muerte de Dios en cruz corresponde en el sistema de Hegel al momento de la finitud del Espíritu absoluto, hay en él una reflexión existencial que no puede (...) ser pasada por alto y que en ella hay elementos que remiten inequívocamente a la teología de la cruz de Lutero.In this work the brief mention that Hegel makes to the cross of Christ at paragraph 564 of the Encyclopedia is analyzed from the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion in its four different versions. The central thesis of the work is that, although the treatment of the death of God at the cross corresponds in the Hegelian system to the moment of finitude of the absolute Spirit, there is also in it an existential reflection that should be overlooked and elements that refer unequivocally to Luther's theology of the cross. (shrink)

All nations on this little planet earth, in all periods of their self-conscious history, are agreed on relating themselves back to an absolute world-ground which is also the goal of love; the source of existence is responded to in gratitude and awe. "Religio" literally means this "back-tie." Religion is the consensus gentium. The many world-religions appeal to the same Absolute in many linguistic symbols. We call a symbol which appeals to the Absolute a mythical expression. "Tao" or (...) "Central Harmony" in Chinese Taoism or Confucianism, the "Trimurti" or "Brahma," "Vishnu" and "Shiva" in Hinduism, "Allah" in Islam, "Jehova" in Judaism, and "God Our Father" in Christianity are such mythical appellations. "The realm of God is primarily the invisible church, which comprehends all zones and different religions; secondarily the external church.". (shrink)

This dissertation distinguishes Hume's anti-rationalist position from irrationalism. Hume's skepticism is a form of anti-rationalism, basically a defense of common life and tradition against the conceit of the rationalists' concept of reason. Modern rationalism is based on two fundamental dogmas. The first is the "principle of autonomy," which leads to the systematic elimination of the other as the irrational. In modern epistemology this means the disappearance of intentionality and, at the summit of modern moral philosophy, all forms of heteronomy (...) are held to coincide with immorality. Hume attacks as absurd the notion that the self is the center of all morality and rationality because there is no such a thing as the absolute self . He reduces the idea of the absolute self to a speculative chimera. To be sure, to say that there is no absolute self does not mean that there is no self: the alternative of either autonomy or heteronomy is false. There is only a relative self and a relative other, and this analysis is the core of the book Of the Passions in the Treatise. ;The second fundamental dogma of modern rationalism is the reification of the category of quantity. This is also expressed by the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and by the notion that the real is merely a primary quality . Hume overturns this dogma: secondary qualities are actually primary. This is the most fundamental meaning of the cardinal principle of the Treatise, "the primacy of impression over ideas", i.e., the primacy of experience over reason. Hume concentrates his analysis on the passions, but he uses this term in a special sense. Passions are not obstacles to knowledge but conditions of its possibility. Passions such as contempt, fear, love, hatred, hope, envy, pride, and humility, are perceptions and interpretations of the world. ;The passion of sympathy occupies a special place. Sympathy is simply the anatomy of friendship, adequately understood. Hume's ethics of sympathy is based on the elimination of the fictional absolute and isolated self. In common with the ancients, Hume locates friendship at the center of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Acquaintance with the Absolute is the first collected volume of essays devoted to the thought of Yves r. Simon, a thinker widely regarded as one of the great teachers and philosophers of our time. Each piece in this collection of essays thoughtfully complements the others to offer a qualifiedly panoramic look at the work and thought of philosopher Yves R. Simon. The six essays presented not only treat some major areas of Simon’s thought, pointing out their lucidity and originality, (...) but also his underpinning metaphysics, so central to his thought. Rather than attempt to present all aspects of this patient, careful, and penetrating thinker, these essays select enough to situate Simon’s philosophical excavations – especially his moral, political and action theory – among contemporary Thomistic philosophy. In defending philosophy as a valid way of knowing, Simon gives us an approach we can use to avoid contemporary dilemmas in the philosophy of science. Simon holds that philosophical truths both justify scientific method as a way of knowing the real and provide a basis for distinguishing what is ontologically significant in a scientific theory from what is not. This view allows us to avoid the apparently irrational conclusions of quantum mechanics without reducing scientific theories to being mere projections of our conceptual systems. Though aspects of some of the essays are suited for students of Simon’s thought, the essays as a whole introduce the less familiar reader to this great thinking and, further, invite him or her to pursue Simon’s own texts. The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a definitive Yves R. Simon bibliography 1923-1996. The annotated bibliography is cross-reference in detail, revealing the astonishing variety of topics Simon treated. (shrink)

Muhammad Iqbal sees each person as the “self” with an independent identity, and God as the “Absolute Self”. The human experience of the self is a constantly changing experience. This change develops around a center and eventually forms an organic unity. The independence of the self does not mean that it is closed to other-selves. It is wrong to see the essence of the self as an unchanging substance or to conceive it as an unstable flow. According to Iqbal, (...) the real personality of man is not a "thing" but an "action", a "sum of behaviors". The human being at the highest level of self-consciousness is the only being among all creatures capable of consciously participating in the creative life of the Creator. (shrink)

Walter Kasper, a German cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, is president emeritus of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, having served as its president from 2001 to 2010. Kasper explains that the interest of theology has been broken off by idealistic thinking, and advocates a new discussion between theology and idealism, of the fundamental importance of the theology of the twentieth century.

It is a fact that the reception of European codes into Turkish law was done bravely and without looking back. How and to what extent the European codes that were adopted in this way have affected social life is one of the difficult problems of sociology of law and philosophy of law. The above-mentioned historical perspective brings with it the following consequences: • The necessity of a uniform law; • The necessity to create a legal system that will deal (...) satisfactorily with new events and developments; and • The necessity of a uniform law uniting me national body as the key to meeting the obligation of absolute independence in order to get rid of external pressures. The Turkish Revolution started with these targets and has been progressing in the same direction without any changes in its substantial content. (shrink)

This article consists of three parts: the first part presents a synthetic outline of intellectual tendencies in post-Renaissance thought (hermeticism, alchemy, kabbalistics), which generated the iconic turn (emblematics, iconology). Its essence boils down to the integral relationship of the motto (lemma), the engraving (imago), and the poetic text (subscription). The second part is a more detailed analysis of one of the illustrations contained in the first volume of the German edition of Jacob Böhme’s works from 1682 (Amsterdam). The epoch, aesthetic (...) tastes prevailing at that time and the Theosophical content of the work allow us to read this illustration from the point of view of iconology. The third part is devoted to two issues. First, one of the central themes in German idealism was the discussion around the notion of the absolute: whether the absolute can be grasped in concepts (Hegel) or in internal intuition (Schelling). Romanticism was dominated by a tendency to a subjective and speculative approach to the absolute. The philosophy and art of Romanticism was modeled on, among others, medieval German mysticism and Böhme’s theosophy, seeking in these sources the best representation of what is unrepresentable, i.e., the absolute. Secondly, philosophical and artistic Romanticism developed a new type of imagery–language images. The dilemma that resulted from the discussion in German idealism–the notion or inner vision, from the modern point of view, should be solved by a compromise: word and image. (shrink)