In this review article I examine Michel Tye’s recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye’s reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve ‘singular when filled’ content schema, as well as a version of (...) the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye’s theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp. (shrink)

A collection of essays in French or English on the reception of Cartesian philosphy.

In this review article I examine Michel Tye’s recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye’s reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve ‘singular when filled’ content schema, as well as a version of (...) the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye’s theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp. (shrink)

KANT’S GOAL IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION was to demonstrate that the categories are applicable to objects of sensible intuition. He carried out this task by disclosing the necessity of a transcendental synthesis. In the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental synthesis has two subspecies: synthesis intellectualis and synthesis speciosa. The distinction between the two types of transcendental synthesis is also mirrored in the structure of the proof of the B Deduction. As several commentators (...) have noted, the B Deduction in fact contains two parts. Each part seems to provide an account of a distinctive kind of transcendental synthesis. The first part provides an account of intellectual synthesis while the second part provides an account of figurative synthesis. (shrink)

Kant officially argues that the role of the representation of time in the synthetic a priori judgments of arithmetic and the general theory of motion implies that time must be an a priori condition...

What can Death mean today in times in which the technological conception of life conjures up new visions of overcoming death? We address this question here by critically examining the Heideggerian...

The ArgumentThe main subject examined in this paper is Immanuel Kant's controversy withPhilosophisches Magazinregarding Kant's new theory of judgments. J. A. Eberhard, editor ofPhilosophisches Magazin, and his colleagues wanted to vindicate the Wollfian traditional concept of judgments by undermining Kant's claims. As will be demonstrated, their arguments were effective mainly in exposing the ambiguity that was inherent in Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori; an ambiguity that resulted from Kant's desire—central to his critique of metaphysics—to present judgments pertaining to (...) mathematics, (dogmatic) metaphysics, and pure natural science as judgments which shared a common form. Exposing this ambiguity was not the intended result, and it was insufficient for the purpose of vindicating the Wollfian tradition. The contributors toPhilosophisches Magazinignored the important properties shared by the class of judgments falling under Kant's concept of synthetic a priori judgments. They also ignored the fact that their position was unable to account for the logical phenomena that motivated Kant to present a new theory of judgments. On the other hand, Kant's theory of judgments was insensitive to the important differences that exist among the distinct types of judgments falling under his concept of a synthetic a priori judgment. This latter point is clearly shown in the controversy regarding the novelty of Kant's concept of a synthetic a priori judgment, and in the controversy regarding the function of intuitions within synthetic judgments.A result of the controversy was that Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori, which he believed to be an exact concept, was revealed to be a metaphor: no more than an invitation to view certain intellectual fields in the light of others. On the other hand, Eberhard and his colleagues failed to come up with satisfactory answers to Kant's questions within their traditional concept of judgment. Both parties refused to acknowledge this result. Consequently, the search for a new logic, a new architectonic order, and a new unity within reason became a general problem for the new generation of philosophers. (shrink)

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

"El amor en su singularidad erótica es tratado en esta obra desde el auspicio de la poesía y la filosofía, las cuales nos llevan de la mano a los desolados parajes del mundo biológico-psíquico para retener aquello de lo que "no se puede decir nada". Aun así, no es éste un intento de explicar fenomenológicamente el amor, sino una modesta evocación de los momentos y comportamientos humanos en su tránsito hacia el Eros y la experiencia que de ellos se ha (...) obtenido."-- Cubierta trasera. (shrink)

Planteamiento de la naturaleza, de la filosof a y de su raz n hist rica, al contemplar panor micamente la totalidad de su pasado e intentar reconstruir el dram tico suceso de su origen.

Maquiavelo y su tiempo.--Reacción de algunos escritores españoles de los siglos XVII y XVIII ante la doctrina de Maquiavelo.--El maquiavelismo y las prácticas de gobierno.

DICTIONARY OF SPANISH VERBS WITH THEIR ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS AND MODELS OF CONJUGATION/DICCIONARIO CON LOS VERBOS EN ESPAÑOL, SU TRADUCCIÓN AL INGLÉS Y CONJUGACIONES.

1. Escritos doctrinales -- 2. Escritos histórico-filosóficos.

Appearing in English for the first time, this book comprises two of Ortega’s most important works, ¿Qué es conocimiento? and the essay “Ideas y creencias.” This is Ortega’s attempt to systematically present the foundations of his metaphysics of human life and, on that basis, to provide a radical philosophical account of knowledge. In so doing, he criticizes idealism and overcomes it. Accordingly, this book goes well beyond a treatise on epistemology; in fact, as understood in modern philosophy, this discipline and (...) its questions are shown to be derivative and, in that sense, they are transcended here by Ortega’s systematic effort. -/- Written during the time of his maturity, these works are representative of his fruitful and radical period. Both ¿Qué es conocimiento? and “Ideas y creencias” are equally decisive not only for the understanding and radical completion of Ortega’s work, but also for their relevance to the work of continental philosophers during the same period and for years to come (e.g., Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and others). (shrink)

The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines the Abhidhamma perspective on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which provides the ontological foundation for Abhidhamma philosophy. (The dhamma theory is an Abhidhammic innovation that gives an overview of the bare phenomenon that form this world; it's a theory of real existents.) He then explains the category of "the conceptual" as the Abhidhamma's answer to the objects of common-sense realism. Among the other topics discussed (...) are the theory of double truth (ultimate and conceptual truth), the analysis of mind, the theory of cognition, the analysis of matter, the nature of time and space, the theory of momentary being, and conditional relations. The volume concludes with an appendix that examines why the Theravāda came to be known as Vibhajjavāda, "the doctrine of analysis." Not limiting himself to abstract analysis, Karunadasa draws out the Abhidhamma's underlying premises and purposes--the Abhidhamma provides a detailed description of reality in order to identify all sources of suffering and thereby point to a complete cure for the problem of suffering. (shrink)