Results for ' phenomenal experiences'

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  1. Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-251.
    In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this paper provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, (...)
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  2. Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
    This is the first in a series of instalments aiming at a minimal model explanation for conscious experience, taking the phenomenal character of “pure consciousness” or “pure awareness” in meditation as its entry point. It develops the concept of “minimal phenomenal experience” as a candidate for the simplest form of consciousness, substantiating it by extracting six semantic constraints from the existing literature and using sixteen phenomenological case-studies to incrementally flesh out the new working concept. One empirical hypothesis is (...)
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  3. Phenomenal experience and the aesthetics of agency.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (3):380-391.
    In his fascinating new book Games: Agency as Art, Nguyen endorses an experiential requirement on aesthetic judgment: apt aesthetic judgment requires phenomenal experience. His own aesthetics of agency captures three phenomenally manifest and aesthetically significant harmonies (and corresponding disharmonies). But his view can be significantly extended to capture much more of the rich texture of human agency. In this discussion, I argue that emotions of agency, patterns of attention, and affordances all can be phenomenally experienced as aspects of agency, (...)
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  4.  38
    Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology.David Bourget - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):673-687.
    One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and (...)
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  5. Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being.Mark Pharoah - 2018 - Biosemiotics 11 (3):427-446.
    I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a trichotomous hierarchy of emergent categories. I claim that each category employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful kind of environmental discourse. I advocate, therefore, that each have a causal relation with the environment but that their specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses. Consequently, I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive value-laden constructions that are (...)
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  6.  87
    Correction to: Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being.Mark Pharoah - 2019 - Biosemiotics 12 (1):193-194.
    In the article Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being, by Mark Pharoah, the following corrections have been made.
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  7.  8
    Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the capgras delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
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  8.  33
    A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be (...)
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  9. Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.Uljana Feest - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):927-939.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  10.  31
    Hidden Differences in Phenomenal Experience.Gary Lupyan, Ryutaro Uchiyama, Bill Thompson & Daniel Casasanto - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (1):e13239.
    In addition to the many easily observable differences between people, there are also differences in people's subjective experiences that are harder to observe, and which, as a consequence, remain hidden. For example, people vary widely in how much visual imagery they experience. But those who cannot see in their mind's eye, tend to assume everyone is like them. Those who can, assume everyone else can as well. We argue that a study of such hidden phenomenal differences has much (...)
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  11.  4
    Phenomenal experience and the measure of information.Craig DeLancey - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):329-352.
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  12. Phenomenal experience and functionalism.Anthony J. Marcel - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
  13. Phenomenal Experience and the Scope of Phenomenology: A Husserlian Response to Some Wittgensteinean Remarks.Andrea Staiti - 2015 - In Nicolas de Warren & Jeffrey Bloechl (eds.), Phenomenology in a New Key: Between Analysis and History: Essays in Honor of Richard Cobb-Stevens. Cham: Springer.
  14. Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish (...) from cognitive factors. (shrink)
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  15.  8
    Phenomenal Experience and the Metaphysics of Persistence.Michael Traynor - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):381-388.
    I will adapt part of an argument in Prosser to the case of persistence, to conclude that our experience does not favour any particular theory of persistence—our immediate experience cannot rightly be considered as evidence in this context. Even if it does in fact seem that objects persist by enduring, this cannot be because they do in fact endure; and if things do in fact persist by perduring, this should not be considered to be in spite of appearances. Thus any (...)
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  16.  44
    Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Zoran Josipovic & Vladimir Miskovic - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  17.  9
    Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
  18.  1
    Phenomenal experience and science: Separated by a “brick wall”?Michael Pauen - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):968-968.
    Palmer's principled distinction between first-person experience and scientific access is called into question. First, complete color transformations of experience and memory may be undetectable even from the first-person perspective. Second, transformations of (say) pain experiences seem to be intrinsically connected to certain effects, thus giving science access to these experiences, in principle. Evidence from pain research and emotional psychology indicates that further progress can be made.
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  19.  3
    Phenomenal experience in laboratory and autobiographical memory.William F. Brewer - 1992 - In Martin A. Conway, David C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & W. Wagenaar (eds.), Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 31--51.
  20.  16
    On the Nature of Phenomenal Experience.Richard Taye Oyelakin - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (2):293-310.
    In response to Putnam’s computational hypothesis on the question of the nature of the mind, Searle and Churchland argue that the nature of mental states essentially consists of neurophysiological processes in an organic brain. However, this seems to imply that mental states are products of the brain and thus, contra Putnam, that an adequate account of mental states which excludes an implementing organic structure is impossible. To this extent, an attempt is made in the paper to structure a biological-organic program. (...)
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    Attention, working memory, and phenomenal experience of WM content: memory levels determined by different types of top-down modulation.Jane Jacob, Christianne Jacobs & Juha Silvanto - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  22.  4
    The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's “Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap”.Thomas C. Dalton - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.
    J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an understanding of the (...)
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  23. The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
    Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of (...) character. -/- Here I show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)
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  24.  15
    Feelings and phenomenal experiences.Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore - 1996 - In Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford Press. pp. 2--385.
  25. Internalism and the snapshot conception of phenomenal experience: A reply to Fisher.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
    Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the (...)
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    Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily (...)
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  27. Ansgar Beckermann.Phenomenal Consciousness - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 409.
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  28.  14
    Can Scientists Help Philosophers Regarding the Nature of Phenomenal Experience?Richard Taye Oyelakin - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (2):293-310.
    In response to Putnam’s computational hypothesis on the question of the nature of the mind, Searle and Churchland argue that the nature of mental states essentially consists of neurophysiological processes in an organic brain. However, this seems to imply that mental states are products of the brain and thus, contra Putnam, that an adequate account of mental states which excludes an implementing organic structure is impossible. To this extent, an attempt is made in the paper to structure a biological-organic program. (...)
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  29.  16
    A Subjective Representationalist Approach to Phenomenal Experience.Neil J. Mehta - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal experiences are simply certain kinds of representations of subjective (i.e., suitably mind-dependent) physical properties of environmental objects or of one’s body. Chapter 1 focuses on the thoroughly spatial character of experience. Here I argue against views of experience according to which phenomenal properties – roughly, the properties which constitute “what it’s like” to have an experience – are internal to the subject’s mind. If (...)
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  30. The developmental gap in phenomenal experience: A comment on J. G. Taylor's "cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. J:Consciousness and cognition 7 (2):159-164. [REVIEW]Thomas C. Dalton - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.
    J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible (...)
     
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  31. Are all instances of phenomenal experience conscious in the sense of their being objects of inner consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - American Journal of Psychology 105:605-12.
  32.  2
    Powers and Phenomenal Experience.Max Kistler - unknown
  33.  13
    Attention sheds no light on the origin of phenomenal experience.Victor A. F. Lamme & Rogier Landman - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-993.
    In O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) account for the phenomenal experience of seeing, awareness is equated to what is within the current focus of attention. They find no place for a distinction between phenomenal and access awareness. In doing so, they essentially present a dualistic solution to the mind-brain problem, and ignore that we do have phenomenal experience of what is outside the focus of attention.
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    Clarifying" familiarity": Examining differences in the phenomenal experiences of patients suffering from prosopagnosia and capgras delusion.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):29-37.
  35.  15
    Conscious and unconscious perception: An approach to the relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes.Anthony J. Marcel - 1983 - Cognitive Psychology 15:238-300.
  36. Nativism, Transcendentalism and Phenomenology: Revisiting the Non-Placement of the Source of Phenomenal Experience in the World.Diana Gasparyan - 2024 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 13 (1):150-176.
    Nativism as a theory that interprets certain abilities and ideas as innate [The contexts we will consider prefer to speak precisely of innateness in the sense of New European philosophical discussions and avoid the notion of “a priori”/“a posteriori”, respectively, and we will stick to this terminological pair.], is considered by some contemporary philosophers as an echo of outdated philosophical approaches. Critics for the most part reproach it for being unscientific and metaphysical. In one of its most extreme forms, nativism (...)
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    A phenomenal conservative perspective on religious experience.Aaran Burns - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):247-261.
    Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And Does testimony about such experiences provides any justification for believing that there is a God for those who are not the subject of the experience? The most popular affirmative answers trace back to the work of Richard Swinburne, who appeals to (...)
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  38. Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character.Tomáš Marvan & Sam Coleman - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-18.
    Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims (...)
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    Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience.Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.) - 2012 - Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
    The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.
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  40.  19
    Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. [REVIEW]Vittorio Gallese - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.
    The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode (...)
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  41.  16
    Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience.Richard Swinburne - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 322-338.
  42. Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Renewing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.François Kammerer - 2016 - Argumenta 1 (2):233-243.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal (...)
     
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  43.  6
    Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
    Relying on a range of now‐familiar thought‐experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state‐consciousness, which contrasts with creature‐consciousness, or perceptual ‐consciousness. The different forms of state‐consciousness include various kinds of access‐consciousness, both first‐order and higher‐order–see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when (...)
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    Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience.Jennifer Matey - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):241-254.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a view about the representational content of conscious experiences that grounds the content of experiences in their phenomenal character. The view is motivated by evidence from introspection, as well as theoretical considerations and intuitions. This paper discusses one potential problem with the view. The view has difficulty accounting for the intentionality of color experiences. Versions of the view either fail to count things as part of the content of color experience that should (...)
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  45. The phenomenal content of experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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    The Phenomenal Content of Experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. M.Üller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom‐up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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  47. Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists (...)
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  48. Is the experience of pain transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well (...)
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  49. The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.
    When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to (...)
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  50. The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.
    When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to (...)
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