147 found
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  1.  26
    What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
    The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct awareness : mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark (...)
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  2.  84
    Perhaps the Most Difficult Problem Faced by Behaviorism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Behaviorism 11 (April):1-26.
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  3. Dimensions of Perceptual Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1982 - Behavior and Philosophy 10 (1):85.
     
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  4.  18
    Your Use of the JSTOR Archive Indicates Your Acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, Available At.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
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  5.  14
    Haugeland's First Hurdle.Thomas Natsoulas - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):243-243.
  6.  9
    On Perceptual Aboutness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
  7. Concepts of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 4 (1):195-232.
  8. Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1978 - American Psychologist 33:906-14.
     
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  9.  40
    Why Do Things Look as They Do? Some Gibsonian Answers to Koffka's Question.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):183-202.
  10.  23
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Interpersonal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):63-89.
  11.  16
    An Examination of Four Objections to Self-Intimating States of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1989 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):63-116.
  12.  16
    George Herbert Mead' S Conception of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1985 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):60–75.
  13. Toward a Model for Consciousness in the Light of BF Skinner's Contribution.Thomas Natsoulas - 1978 - Behaviorism 6 (2):139-175.
  14.  25
    Consciousness: Consideration of an Inferential Hypothesis.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (April):29-39.
  15.  30
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Personal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):339-67.
  16.  53
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (2):199-225.
  17.  85
    Reflective Seeing: An Exploration in the Company of Edmund Husserl and James J. Gibson.Thomas Natsoulas - 1990 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21 (1):1-31.
    Discusses reflective seeing in the context of the works of J. J. Gibson (published 1963–79) and E. Husserl (published 1960–83). Topics discussed include (1) naive-realistic seeing, (2) the nature of visual experiences, (3) the relation of reflective seeing to naive-realistic seeing, and (4) levels of consciousness with reference to reflective seeing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  18. The Unity of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1979 - Behaviorism 7 (2):45-63.
     
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  19.  18
    The Concept of Consciousness1: The Interpersonal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (1):63-89.
  20. A Selective Review of Conceptions of Consciousness with Special Reference to Behavioristic Contributions.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Cognition and Brain Theory 6:417-47.
     
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  21. Conscious Perception and the Paradox of "Blind-Sight".Thomas Natsoulas - 1982 - In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.
     
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  22.  14
    On the Radical Behaviorist Conception of Cosciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1986 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (1).
  23.  20
    Towards the Improvement of Gibsonian Perception Theory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):231–258.
  24.  12
    The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
    The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness4. According to such theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 on its own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a prominent phenomenologist’s argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness4, and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all (...)
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  25.  6
    The Pluralistic Approach to the Nature of Feelings.Thomas Natsoulas - 1990 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (2):173-218.
    This article contains an initial statement of the pluralistic approach together with some justification for its adoption by psychologists. Two alternative coneptions of the nature of feelings, William James's and Edmund Husserl's, are discussed with the pluralistic approach in mind. Psychologists who would practice the pluralistic approach with respect to the nature of feelings must develop a plural conception of the nature of feelings. A plural conception differs from a singular conception by simultaneously including more than a single account of (...)
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  26. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
    This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account (...)
     
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  27. Consciousness and Self-Awareness: Part I: Consciousness1, Consciousness2, and Consciousness3.Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-74.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies under the word consciousness. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness1: a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness2: a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness3: being occurrently aware of anything at (...)
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  28.  62
    Blindsight and Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - American Journal of Psychology 110:1-33.
  29.  51
    Roger W. Sperry's Monist Interactionism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1987 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.
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  30.  21
    How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  31.  38
    The Concept of Consciousness4 the Reflective Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373–400.
    In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...)
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  32. The Conceptual Representation of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Consciousness is familiar to us first hand, yet difficult to understand. This book concerns six basic concepts of consciousness exercised in ordinary English. The first is the interpersonal meaning and requires at least two people involved in relation to one another. The second is a personal meaning, having to do with one's own perspective on the kind of person one is and the life one is leading. The third meaning has reference simply to one being occurrently aware of something or (...)
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  33.  8
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2):199-25.
  34.  81
    Sympathy, Empathy, and the Stream of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1988 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.
  35.  23
    The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception.Thomas Natsoulas - 1974 - Psychological Bulletin 81:611-31.
  36. An Introduction to the Perceptual Kind of Conception of Direct Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1985 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (3):333-356.
     
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  37. Consciousness and Memory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1986 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (4):463-501.
  38. Toward an Improved Understanding of Sigmund Freud's Conception of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):171-92.
    This article seeks to render Sigmund Freud's unfamiliar conception of consciousness more evident and accessible; because Freud was the greatest theorist psychology has so far known, and because present-day psychologists stand in special need of a variety of conceptual frameworks in whose terms they can give coherent and cogent expression to their different hypotheses pertaining to consciousness. The three main sections respectively address Freud's complex property of intrinsic consciousness, which characterizes each instance of every conscious psychical process and includes qualitative (...)
     
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  39. The Experience of a Conscious Self.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 4 (4):451-478.
  40. Ontological Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200.
    Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity which Searle has lately been calling our attention, while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features - in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the animal and his or her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on the first-person perspective. In his relevant discussions, Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences, (...)
     
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  41.  27
    A Rediscovery of Presence.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):17-41.
    When we see Wilfrid Sellars's favorite object, an ice cube pink through and through, we see the very pinkness of it. Inner awareness of our visual experience finds the ice cube to be experientially present, not merely representationally present to our consciousness. Its pinkness and other properties are present not merely metaphorically, not merely in the sense that the experience represents or is an occurrent belief in the ice cube's being there before us. Despite his behavioristic inclinations, Sellars acknowledges experiential (...)
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  42. Consciousness and Perceptual Experience: An Ecological and Phenomenological Approach.Thomas Natsoulas - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book describes and proposes an unusual integrative approach to human perception that qualifies as both an ecological and a phenomenological approach at the same time. Thomas Natsoulas shows us how our consciousness - in three of six senses of the word that the book identifies - is involved in our activity of perceiving the one and only world that exists, which includes oneself as a proper part of it, and that all of us share together with the rest of (...)
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  43.  33
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Personal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (September) 339 (September):339-367.
  44. Concerning Introspective "Knowledge".Thomas Natsoulas - 1970 - Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111.
    Discusses the nature of introspective awareness, those events by whose occurrence acquire knowledge of our own mental episodes. Present orienting attitudes towards mental episodes and awareness of them are made explicit, as are some of the basic concepts to be used. Introspective awarenesses are discussed from the perspective of S; afterimages, pains, sense impressions, visual contents, and thoughts are examined as contents of introspective awarenesses. The intrinsic or factual character of such awarenesses is considered from the perspectives of 3 materialist (...)
     
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  45. Viewing the World in Perspective, Noticing the Perspectives of Things: James J. Gibson's Concept.Thomas Natsoulas - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):265-288.
    Gibson distinguishes among activities of the visual system, including viewing a room as opposed to seeing it, and, in effect, between a visual-system activity and the stream of experience that is a product and part of it. During viewing, one perceives the surfaces projecting light to one's point of observation, and one’s location in relation to them. Thus, one does not view some of the surfaces that one sees when, instead, one engages in straightforward seeing at the same observation point. (...)
     
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  46.  8
    The Distinction Between Visual Perceiving and Visual Perceptual Experience.Thomas Natsoulas - 1989 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):37-61.
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  47. Freud and Consciousness I-XI.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 7:195-232.
  48. Gustav Bergmann's Psychophysiological Parallelism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1984 - Behavior and Philosophy 12 (1):41.
     
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  49. On the Causal Self-Referentiality of Perceptual Experiences and the Problem of Concrete Perceptual Reference.Thomas Natsoulas - 1984 - Behavior and Philosophy 12 (2):61.
     
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  50. The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
    More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one of his (...)
     
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