Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Memory and Consciousness.Paula Droege - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:171-193.
    Philosophical theories of memory rarely distinguish between importantly different sorts of memory: procedural, semantic and episodic. I argue for a temporal representation theory to explain the unique characteristic of episodic memory as the only form of conscious memory. A careful distinction between implicit and explicit representation shows how the past figures in memory. In procedural and semantic memory, the influence of the past is implicit by which I mean that the past experience is used but not represented in the skill (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations.Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator - 2003 - Cognitive Science 23 (1):73-110.
    The problem of representing the spatial structure of images, which arises in visual object processing, is commonly described using terminology borrowed from propositional theories of cognition, notably, the concept of compositionality. The classical propositional stance mandates representations composed of symbols, which stand for atomic or composite entities and enter into arbitrarily nested relationships. We argue that the main desiderata of a representational system — productivity and systematicity — can (indeed, for a number of reasons, should) be achieved without recourse to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • What is Implicit Culture?Omar Lizardo - forthcoming - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Guest Editor’s Introduction: The Recorporealization of Cognition in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Brady Thomas Heiner - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):115-126.
  • Predictive Processing as a Systematic Basis for Identifying the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy & Anil Seth - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II).
    The search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of a systematic, principled foundation that can endow putative neural correlates with greater predictive and explanatory value. Here, we propose the predictive processing framework for brain function as a promising candidate for providing this systematic foundation. The proposal is motivated by that framework’s ability to address three general challenges to identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and to satisfy two constraints common to many theories of consciousness. Implementing the search (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective.Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez - 2002 - In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.
    While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Sidestepping the Semantics of “Consciousness”.Michael V. Antony - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.
    Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term “consciousness.” However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that “consciousness” is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of “consciousness.”.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Representation and Knowledge Are Not the Same Thing.Leslie Smith - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):784-785.
    Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Optimizing Subjective Measures of Consciousness.Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):682-684.
    Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge.Zoltan Dienes & Josef Perner - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.
    The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of implicit knowledge, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.
    This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Correlating Consciousness: A View From Empirical Science.Axel Cleeremans & John-Dylan Haynes - 1999 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 (209):387-420.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
  • Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980.Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. New York: Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness.J. Opie - 2011 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia:
    Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Criteria for an Effective Theory of Consciousness and Some Preliminary Attempts.Ron Sun - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):268-301.
    In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   683 citations  
  • Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Oppy & Steve Gardner (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne, Australia: Monash University Press. pp. 371-372.
    Philosophy and Literature is an internationally renowned refereed journal founded by Denis Dutton at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. It is now published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. Since its inception in 1976, Philosophy and Literature has been concerned with the relation between literary and philosophical studies, publishing articles on the philosophical interpretation of literature as well as the literary treatment of philosophy. Philosophy and Literature has sometimes been regarded as iconoclastic, in the sense that it repudiates academic pretensions, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Explicitness: The Case of Representational Contents.Pierre Steiner - 2005 - Abstracta 2 (1):3-23.
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the question, the first one coming from the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.Drew McDermott - 2007 - In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150.
  • Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or Is Experience Limited to What’s in Attention?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
    It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Varieties of Consciousness.Paolo Bartolomeo & Gianfranco Dalla Barba - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):331-332.
    In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Towards a Computational Theory of Experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • First- and Third-Person Approaches in Implicit Learning Research.Vinciane Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.
    How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience?”. [REVIEW]Allen Lane - unknown
    Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations.Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (1):73-109.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Dynamical Emergence Theory (DET): A Computational Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (1):1-21.
    Scientific theories of consciousness identify its contents with the spatiotemporal structure of neural population activity. We follow up on this approach by stating and motivating Dynamical Emergence Theory, which defines the amount and structure of experience in terms of the intrinsic topology and geometry of a physical system’s collective dynamics. Specifically, we posit that distinct perceptual states correspond to coarse-grained macrostates reflecting an optimal partitioning of the system’s state space—a notion that aligns with several ideas and results from computational neuroscience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Consciousness: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape.Anthony P. Atkinson, Michael S. C. Thomas & Axel Cleeremans - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.
    What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Thinking Without Global Generalisations: A Cognitive Defence of Moral Particularism.Nancy Salay - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):390 – 411.
    In their article entitled “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith (JPS henceforth) argue that moral particularism is a cognitively implausible theory since it appears to entail the view that one might have a skill that is not grounded in an ability to recognise and represent natural patterns in the world. This charge echoes the complaints of computational theorists of cognition against their embodied cognition counterparts, namely that, theories of cognition that eschew talk of mental representation (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Exploring the Computational Explanatory Gap.James Reggia, Di-Wei Huang & Garrett Katz - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (4):5.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Connectionist Models.James L. McClelland & Axel Cleeremans - 2009 - In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  • Know Thyself: Metacognitive Networks and Measures of Consciousness.Antoine Pasquali, Bert Timmermans & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):182-190.
  • Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
    Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality , transparency , subjectivity or reflexivity . However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Makes Us Conscious?Anthony P. Atkinson & Michael S. C. Thomas - 1999 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 9 (5-6):307-354.
  • The Emergence of Emotions.Richard Sieb - 2013 - Activitas Nervosa Superior 55 (4):115-145.
    Emotion is conscious experience. It is the affective aspect of consciousness. Emotion arises from sensory stimulation and is typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body. Hence an emotion is a complex reaction pattern consisting of three components: a physiological component, a behavioral component, and an experiential (conscious) component. The reactions making up an emotion determine what the emotion will be recognized as. Three processes are involved in generating an emotion: (1) identification of the emotional significance of a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: New Experimental Approaches Needed?Jakob Hohwy - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):428-438.
    It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • The Connectionist Framework for Gene Regulation.Roger Sansom - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):475-491.
    I show that gene regulation networks are qualitatively consistent and therefore sufficiently similar to linearly seperable connectionist networks to warrant that the connectionist framework be applied to gene regulation. On this view, natural selection designs gene regulation networks to overcome the difficulty of development. I offer some general lessons about their evolvability that can be learned by examining the generic features of connectionist networks.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis.Huiming Ren - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):313-326.
    ABSTRACT: I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rosemary wouldn’t learn anything new upon release. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
    Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Inattentional Awareness.Donelson E. Dulany - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--could be so classified despite representing the stimulus literally in inattentional awareness. The study is illuminated, I believe, by seeing it in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation