Attention sheds no light on the origin of phenomenal experience

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-993 (2001)
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Abstract

In O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) account for the phenomenal experience of seeing, awareness is equated to what is within the current focus of attention. They find no place for a distinction between phenomenal and access awareness. In doing so, they essentially present a dualistic solution to the mind-brain problem, and ignore that we do have phenomenal experience of what is outside the focus of attention.

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