This chapter clarifies the different varieties of dispositional nativism (DN) that John Locke addresses. In the light of this clarification, the chapter then identifies the basic structure of Locke's arguments and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. It points out that Locke's polemic fails to undermine nativism. The chapter analyzes Locke's reasoning for dismissing nativism in its cognitive form. It explains Locke's arguments against the postulation of innate ideas. The chapter examines three problems with Locke's argumentative strategy. (...) In light of the three problems, the chapter concludes that Locke's attack on non‐cognitive dispositional nativism (NCDN) fails because it either establishes that nativism and empiricism are indistinguishable but it has the undesired effect of collapsing empiricism into nativism; it fails to establish that empiricism and nativism are indistiguishable and, hence, Locke's polemical strategy is undermined. Consequently, Locke's arguments neither undermine nativism nor shift the burden of proof on the nativists’ shoulders. (shrink)

Political liberalism, conceived of as a response to the diversity of conceptions of the good in multicultural societies, aims to put forward a proposal for how to organize political institutions that is acceptable to a wide range of citizens. It does so by remaining neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good while giving all citizens a fair opportunity to access the offices and positions which enable them to pursue their own conception of the good. Public educational institutions are at the (...) center of the state’s attempt to foster both of these commitments. I argue that recent empirical research on the role that non-cognitive dispositions (such as assertiveness) play in enabling students to have access to two important primary goods – opportunities for higher education and desirable jobs – creates a distinctive challenge for a liberal egalitarian education in remaining neutral with respect to conceptions of the good while promoting equal opportunity. (shrink)

To measure non-cognitive facets of competence, we developed and tested a new method that we refer to as Embedded Experience Sampling (EES). Domain-specific problem-solving competence is a multi-faceted construct that is not limited to cognitive facets such as domain knowledge or problem-solving strategies but also comprises non-cognitive facets in the sense of domain-specific emotional and motivational dispositions such as interest and self-concept. However, in empirical studies non-cognitive facets are usually either neglected or measured by generalized self-report questionnaires that are detached (...) from the performance assessment. To enable an integrated measurement, we developed the EES method to collect data on non-cognitive facets during scenario-based low-stakes assessments. Test-takers are requested to stop at certain times and spontaneously answer short items (EES items) regarding their actual experience of the problem situation. These EES items are embedded in an EES event that resembles typical social interactions with non-player characters. To evaluate the feasibility and validity of the method, we implemented EES in a series of three studies in the context of commercial vocational education and training (VET): A feasibility study with 77 trainees, a pilot study with 20 trainees, and the main study with 780 trainees who worked on three complex problem scenarios in a computer-based office simulation. In the present paper, we investigate how test-takers perceived the EES events, and whether social desirability biased their answers, and investigate the internal structure of the data and the relationship between EES data and data from several other sources. Interview data and survey data indicated no biases due to social desirability and no additional burden for the test-takers due to the EES events. A correlation analysis following the multitrait-multimethod approach as well as the calibration of a multidimensional model based on Item Response Theory (IRT) also supported the construct validity. Furthermore, EES data shows substantial correlations with test motivation but almost zero correlations with data from generalized retrospective self-report questionnaires on non-cognitive facets. Altogether, EES offers an alternative approach to measuring non-cognitive facets of competence under certain conditions. For instance, EES is also based on self-reporting and thus might not be suitable for high-stakes testing. (shrink)

This paper makes an attempt at the conceptual foundation of descriptive ethical theories in terms of evolutionary anthropology. It suggests, first, that what human social actors tend to accept to be morally valid and legitimate ultimately rests upon empirical authority relations and, second, that this acceptance follows an evolved pattern of hierarchical behaviour control in the social animal species. The analysis starts with a brief review of Thomas Hobbes'' moral philosophy, with special emphasis on Hobbes'' authoritarian view of moral validity (...) and of the common political origins and ultimate basis of legitimacy of moral and legal systems. Hobbes'' philosophical conceptions are then put into the context of Max Weber''s influential empirical theory of legitimacy, especially charismatic revelation and authority as the ultimate source of all moral, legal and religious obligations. Weber''s concept of charismatic authority is given a biobehavioural interpretation in terms of ritualised status signals indicating an individual''s superior physical and emotional dispositions to control the social actions of others. Various conclusions are drawn concerning the concept of moral validity and its possible evolutionary interpretations. (shrink)

The Modern Synthesis of Darwinism and genetics regards non-genetic factors as merely constraints on the genetic variations that result in the characteristics of organisms. Even though the environment (including social interactions and culture) is as necessary as genes in terms of selection and inheritance, it does not contain the information that controls the development of the traits. S. Oyama’s account of the Parity Thesis, however, states that one cannot conceivably distinguish in a meaningful way between nature-based (i.e., gene-based) and nurture-based (...) (i.e., environment-based) characteristics in development because the information necessary for the resulting characteristics is contained at both levels. Oyama and others argue that the Parity Thesis has far-reaching implications for developmental psychology, in that both nativist and interactionist developmental accounts of motor, cognitive, affective, social, and linguistic capacities that presuppose a substantial nature/nurture dichotomy are inadequate. After considering these arguments, we conclude that either Oyama’s version of the Parity Thesis does not differ from the version advocated by liberal interactionists, or it renders precarious any analysis involving abilities present at birth (despite her claim to the contrary). More importantly, developmental psychologists need not discard the distinction between innate characteristics present at birth and those acquired by learning, even if they abandon genocentrism. Furthermore, we suggest a way nativists can disentangle the concept of maturation from a genocentric view of biological nature. More specifically, we suggest they can invoke the maturational segment of the developmental process (which involves genetic, epigenetic and environmental causes) that results in the biological “machinery” (e.g. language acquisition device) which is necessary for learning as a subsequent segment of the developmental process. (shrink)

According to a persistent objection against metaethical expressivism, this view is committed to a strong version of internalism which is unable to account for cases where a person’s moral judgment and motivation come apart. Recently, leading expressivists have argued that they can meet this objection by maintaining that moral judgments consist in non-cognitive states that motivate in normal conditions. In this paper, it is maintained that an important dimension of internalism has, on the whole, gone unnoticed: Internalist claims vary depending (...) on whether moral judgments and motivation are understood as dispositional states or occurrent states. This variation can be invoked in an argument showing that expressivists are indeed committed to versions of internalism that make it impossible to account for cases in which moral judgment and motivation diverge. (shrink)

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle’s explicit (...) remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child’s affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle’s view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child’s sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child’s behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman’s primarily cognitive view. (shrink)

La question de l’innéisme reste un sujet de débat actuel dans le domaine des sciences cognitives. Cela vient du fait non seulement que les thèses innéistes restent controversées, mais aussi de ce que, à un niveau conceptuel, la manière dont la notion d’innéité doit être définie n’est pas claire. Le programme de recherche de Chomsky a joué un rôle fondateur, en montrant la portée méthodologique que pouvait avoir une perspective innéiste pour l’étude des facultés mentales et en particulier du langage. (...) Le but de cet article est de clarifier la signification qu’on peut attribuer à l’innéité de la faculté de langage dans la théorie de Chomsky, et de montrer que cela éclaire plus généralement l’usage de cette notion dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

La question de l’innéisme reste un sujet de débat actuel dans le domaine des sciences cognitives. Cela vient du fait non seulement que les thèses innéistes restent controversées, mais aussi de ce que, à un niveau conceptuel, la manière dont la notion d’innéité doit être définie n’est pas claire. Le programme de recherche de Chomsky a joué un rôle fondateur, en montrant la portée méthodologique que pouvait avoir une perspective innéiste pour l’étude des facultés mentales et en particulier du langage. (...) Le but de cet article est de clarifier la signification qu’on peut attribuer à l’innéité de la faculté de langage dans la théorie de Chomsky, et de montrer que cela éclaire plus généralement l’usage de cette notion dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the (...) input can be compared to the output and shown to be relatively impoverished. I argue that there are robust methods of comparing input to output without measuring them quantitatively. (shrink)

This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The "triggering model" of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness (...) are forced to do. Relativization can be avoided in the case of cognitive capacities precisely because informational content is involved. Even though one cannot measure output relative to input in a precise way, there are indirect and approximate ways of assessing the degree of innateness of a specific cognitive capacity. (shrink)

Almost any mainstream reading about the nature of Kant's 'content of cognition' in both non-conceptualist and conceptualist camps agree that 'singular representations' (sensible intuitions) are, at least in some weak sense, objectdependent because they supervene on a manifold of sensations that are given through the disposition of our sensibility and parallel thus the real and physical components of the world (cf. McDowell 1996, Allison 1983, Ginsborg 2008, Allais 2009). The relevant class of sensible intuitions should refer, as they argue, only (...) to empirical and not to pure ones. Kant's transcendental argument creates, however, no implications as to the metaphysics of properties. Neither does he consider the world to be consisted of sensory content simpliciter nor do sensations refer to objects per se. Instead, he provides an all-encompassing pattern for sensible intuitions of any kind through the representation of space as a cognitive map in that an object can be represented if spatial properties are attributed to it. Sensible intuitions of any kind could be referring, that is to say, and can be conceptualized if they are spatial. Consequently and unlike the contemporary philosophy of perception, Kant contrasts sensible intuitions and pure concepts of understanding 'altogether' against one single experience, from which the justification of objects should proceed. In other words, what stands at the core of exposing the content of cognition concerns not the phenomenological status and actuality of sensible intuitions in the sense of 'bits of experiential intake', but the logical structure of possibility of sensible intuitions of any (external or internal) causal background. The aim of this discussion is to clarify that Kant's transcendental idealism mutatis mutandis reviews multiple and diverse kinds of 'data of mind' and cognition in the background, without reducing the content of cognition to metaphysically determined referents as 'matters of fact' and to pure concepts of understanding. Sensible intuitions in the sense of content of cognition vary, most importantly, from unstructured and unjustifiable data of mind including (physical) contents of perception and stuff of mind and also from reflective and intellectual intuitions that are the cognates of the structured complex singular representations. Put it in simple terms, Kant advocates the thesis that 'facts' are objects for concepts if they are already well-founded trough the cognitive map of the representation of space. -/- . (shrink)

One of the important challenges in the philosophy of mathematics is to account for the semantics of sentences that express mathematical propositions while simultaneously explaining our access to their contents. This is Benacerraf’s Dilemma. In this dissertation, I argue that cognitive science furnishes new tools by means of which we can make progress on this problem. The foundation of the solution, I argue, must be an ontologically realist, albeit non-platonist, conception of mathematical reality. The semantic portion of the problem can (...) be addressed by accepting a Chomskyan conception of natural languages and a matching internalist, mentalist and nativist view of semantics. A helpful perspective on the epistemic aspect of the puzzle can be gained by translating Kurt G ̈odel’s neo-Kantian conception of the nature of mathematics and its objects into modern, cognitive terms. (shrink)

This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology. -/- According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be (...) entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. This clause, he argues, is to require epistemic virtue. Virtuous cognitive dispositions provide the non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. The epistemic character of the agent who holds a particular set of hinges tells us something about the hinges’ epistemic status. Conversely, epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions and capacities that rely on hinge propositions – without trusting in some hinges, we would be unable to exercise our virtues. -/- Trust Responsibly will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on epistemology, Wittgenstein, and virtues. (shrink)

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...) of passionate moral judgments. This picture of moral judgments has implications for related debates in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists and between Humeans and anti-Humeans. (shrink)

A simplified relationship between setting of a norm and an individual’s compliance can be characterized by three distinct stages: norm comprehension and processing; the deliberate compliance decision of the individual; and non-deliberate decision-making. On each stage, there is insight from social sciences, experimental psychology and behavioural law and economics making different predictions about individual compliance behaviour. We study the implications of extra-juridical insight as well as normative constitutional requirements on the optimal design of norms. We find considerable variance in norm (...) designs for improving compliance depending on the respective empirical insight. Regarding norm comprehension, there is ambiguity in the relationship between individual’s limited cognitive processing capacity and the constitutional law imperative for norm specificity. The stage of deliberate decision-making relates to the rationality model of human behaviour allowing for economic, reciprocal, communicative human dispositions, each of which requires different law designs to induce individual’s compliance. Homo oeconomicus responds to law design using costs as steering tool. Homo reciprocans can be directed through decentralized self-regulation, governance of small political units and belief management. And compliance of homo communicans can be induced when procedures are perceived as being fair and inclusive. Finally, the existence of non-deliberate decision-making may justify paternalistic legal measures. The findings may inform lawmakers in how to design and draft laws to optimize norm compliance. (shrink)

The principles offered by beliefs affect the thinking styles of individuals. Although it has been argued in recent studies that believers and non-believers have different thinking styles, there are few studies examining the relationship between belief and cognitive styles in Muslim groups. In this study, the relationships between intrinsic religious motivation and "critical thinking", which is one of the most desired thinking skills today, and " dichotomous thinking", which can be expressed as black-and-white thinking and primarily associated with negative structures, (...) were examined. The study was carried out with 395 university students, and the data was obtained by a socio-demographic information form, the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale, the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale, and the Dichotomous Thinking Scale. Findings suggested a positive significant relationship between intrinsic religious motivation and critical thinking and dichotomous thinking, and a positive significant relationship between critical thinking and dichotomous thinking. Regarding the relationship between dichotomous thinking and critical thinking, intrinsic religious motivation had a mediating role. The Islamic faith often invites reasoning and thinking and affirms this way of thinking; at the same time, it offers various conceptual tools for dichotomous thinking with discourses such as heaven-hell, good-evil, dark-light, and faith-denial. Although critical thinking and dichotomous thinking are seen as opposite constructs, the findings have been interpreted as the Islamic belief supporting both critical thinking and dichotomous thinking at the same time, thus reducing the rigidity of dichotomous thinking. The findings were discussed in the light of the relevant literature, and suggestions were made for further research. (shrink)

The “pre-intentional” is a proposed category of mental states that conditions a subject’s experience of what is possible for them by, for example, modifying the motivational efficacy or experienced quality of intentional states, like beliefs or desires, without necessarily modifying their propositional content. Matthew Ratcliffe, who has coined the term, identifies the pre-intentional with existential feelings, senses of possibility like “feeling alive” or “feeling deadened,” and argues that these feelings are conditions of the possibility of the scope and valence of (...) intentional states. Jussi Saarinen questions if existential feelings should be understood as consciously occurring episodes or background affective styles, which has implications for the problem of “bi-directionality”: how or if intentional states might affect the pre-intentional. I first argue that answering Saarinen requires, contra Ratcliffe, the introduction of a feeling-disposition distinction: existential feelings are not pre-intentional structures but ways of becoming aware of the “existential dispositions” that are pre-intentional structures. I then propose a new definition of the pre-intentional: existential dispositions are a category of states that are introspectively opaque and so ambiguous between being an intentional state, like a “quasi-belief,” or non-intentional state, like a reflex. This allows for a novel account of what I, following Saarinen’s terminology, call indirect bi-directionality, and thus of indirectly induced existential change, which Ratcliffe only understands as spontaneous. To clarify how intentional states may influence the pre-intentional also clarifies how change in, say, beliefs about what one’s experiences of depression signify may induce existential change that alleviates the suffering of these experiences. (shrink)

The study explores the impact of robots’ emotional displays on people’s tendency to cooperate with a robot opponent in prisoner’s dilemma games. Participants played iterated prisoner’s dilemma games with a non-expressive robot (as a measure of cooperative baseline), followed by an angry, and a sad robot, in turn. Based on the Emotion as Social Information model, we expected participants with higher cooperative predispositions to cooperate less when a robot displayed anger, and cooperate more when the robot displayed sadness. Contrarily, according (...) to this model, participants with lower cooperative predispositions should cooperate more with an angry robot and less with a sad robot. The results of 60 participants failed to support the predictions. Only the participants’ cooperative predispositions significantly predicted their cooperative tendencies during gameplay. Participants who cooperated more in the baseline measure also cooperated more with the robots displaying sadness and anger. In exploratory analyses, we found that participants who accurately recognised the robots’ sad and angry displays tended to cooperate less with them overall. The study highlights the impact of personal factors in human–robot cooperation, and how these factors might surpass the influence of bottom-up emotional displays by the robots in the present experimental scenario. (shrink)

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest (...) error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance. (shrink)

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the (...) existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects. (shrink)

Previous research using immersive virtual reality (VR) has shown that after a short period of embodiment of White people in a Black virtual body their implicit racial bias against Black people diminishes. Here we tested the effects of some socio-cognitive variables that could contribute to enhancing or reducing the implicit racial bias. The first aim of the study was to assess the beneficial effects of cooperation within a VR scenario, the second aim was to provide preliminary testing of the hypothesis (...) that empathy and political attitudes could contribute to implicit bias about race, while the third aim was to explore the relationship between political attitudes and empathy. We had (Caucasian) participants embodied in a Black virtual body and engaged either in a cooperative (Coop group) or in a non-cooperative (Neutral group) activity with a confederate experimenter embodying another Black avatar. Before and after VR, we measured participants’ implicit racial bias by means of Implicit Association Test (IAT) and their perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter. Before VR we also assessed participants’ political attitudes and empathy traits. Results revealed that, as compared to the Neutral group, the Coop group showed lower IAT scores after the social interaction. Interestingly, in the Neutral but not the Coop group the perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter was associated with the initial racial bias: the more the participants reduced their distance, the more they reduced their IAT score. Moreover, reported traits of empathy and political attitudes significantly explained the variance observed in the initial implicit bias, with perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress being significant predictors of the IAT scores. Finally, there was a relationship between political attitudes and empathy: the more participants considered themselves as left-wing voters, the higher their perspective-taking and empathic concern scores. We discuss these findings within the neuroscientific and social cognition field and encourage scholars from different domains to further explore whether and under which conditions a given manipulation for reducing racial bias could be efficiently transposed in VR. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s conception of the role of dispositions in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of (...) disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology. (shrink)

Non-cognitive dispositions have recently become psychological constructs of interest in the education, economics, philosophy, sociology, and psychology literature. In this article, I draw the distinction between property-first and measurement-first approaches to understanding the meaning of a particular non-cognitive disposition theoretical term, ‘grit’, as well as the relationship between this term and its corresponding measurement procedure. I argue that, depending on which approach one takes, one is confronted with different norms for judging the success of any disposition-measurement procedure pair, meaning that (...) the difference in philosophical approaches may have practical import. I argue that the measurement-first approach is the one educators and educational policy-makers ought to adopt towards grit as it is less likely to lead to over-valuing grit in situations where a gritty disposition may be harmful, better respects scientific virtues and values, and provides a clearer understanding of grit than the property-first approach. (shrink)

Jean Mandler proposes an original and richly detailed theory of how concepts relate to sensory and motor capacities. I focus on her claims about conceptual representations and the processes that produce them. On her view, concepts are declarative representations of object kind information. First, I argue that since sensorimotor representations may be declarative, there is no bar to percepts being constituents of concepts. Second, I suggest that concepts track kinds and other categories not by representing kind information per se, but (...) rather by being subject to the appropriate sort of inferential dispositions. These dispositions themselves may apply equally to perceptual and non-perceptual representations. Third, I argue that Mandler's proposed redescriptive mechanism for producing conceptual primitives can be viewed as a kind of Fodorian triggering device. Hence there may be less distance between her view and Fodor's than either one has supposed. I suggest that redescription needs to be supplemented with several other kinds of more flexible and open-ended concept learning mechanisms. Finally, I briefly sketch the view of conceptual development that results from adopting these proposals and contrast it with Mandler's. (shrink)

Neo-Skinnerianism differs from Radical Behaviorism in at least three important respects: (1) its willingness to entertain cognitive accounts of the processes underlying behavioral dispositions, (b) its reluctance to assert that the results of animal experiments can be used to predict and control human behavior, and (c) its ability to side step folk psychology's major criticism of operant theory. While eschewing Radical Behaviorism's ambition to transform psychology (and, indeed, human society itself), it nonetheless joins issue with a centuries-old debate over human (...) nature, and may eventually help to resolve it. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s conception of the role of dispositions in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of (...) disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology. (shrink)

In this dissertation I outline a theory of non-cognitive ethics--a theory of how ethics is possible in response to feeling rather than to concepts--that is drawn from the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the aesthetic thought of Immanuel Kant. In general I argue that in the work of Levinas we can find a description of non-cognitive ethics in which community and subjectivity are still meaningful, and that Kant's third Critique can contribute to this project by providing some of the (...) transcendental conditions for such an ethics. ;I begin with a discussion of the general nature of Levinas's ethical project, and the three principal axes of that thought: the singular Other before whom we are obligated, the community of others to which we also belong, and the nature of the subject that must respond to both. Next, I focus on the contribution that Kant's third Critique can make to a Levinasian theory of non-cognitive ethics. After arguing that this contribution is rooted in a general affiliation between Kant's approach to aesthetics and Levinas's approach to ethics, I address three particular connections between Levinasian ethics and the third Critique. These connections involve the sublime and the fact of obligation, the beautiful and non-purposive communities, and finally orientation and ethical subjectivity. (shrink)

The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by (...) analyzing the issue of values with the help of a framework taken from the wider philosophical debate on science and values. Second, we study the principal conceptualizations used by scholars who have applied them to numerous case studies. Third, we appraise the links between those conceptualizations and learning processes in decision-oriented science. In this, we recur to the concept of methodological learning, i.e., learning about the best methodologies for generating knowledge that is useful for science-based regulatory decisions. The main result of our analysis is that non-cognitive values can contribute to methodological improvements in science in three principal ways: as basis for critical analysis, for contextualizing methodologies, and for establishing the burden of proof. (shrink)

La conception naïve de l’expérience visuelle dépeint celle-ci comme une relation directe, primitive, entre le sujet voyant et l’objet vu. Elle repose sur une opposition entre la relation visuelle et la représentation mentale de l’objet vu dans l’imagination visuelle ou la vision des images. Le but de cet article est de suggérer que l’opposition naïve entre relation et représentation présente un intérêt philosophique et scientifique parfois sous-estimé. Deux théories philosophiques de la perception sont présentées : le relationnisme reprend l’esprit de (...) la conception naïve en analysant l’expérience visuelle comme une relation non représentationnelle à l’objet vu, alors que l’intentionnalisme rejette la conception naïve comme inadéquate et considère que l’expérience visuelle est représentationnelle de part en part. Après avoir introduit une notion générale de « représentation » acceptable par les deux parties, nous examinons un ensemble de travaux issus des sciences cognitives et susceptibles d’arbitrer le débat entre relationnisme et intentionnalisme. La thèse principale défendue est que le relationnisme est compatible avec les données scientifiques à notre disposition sur les processus cognitifs liés à la vision. Le relationnisme présente également un avantage philosophique puisqu’il permet de comprendre comment les représentations mentales, y compris visuelles, peuvent être fondées sur un rapport cognitif plus direct, c’est-à-dire intrinsèquement relationnel, au monde visible. (shrink)

Le présent article revient sur la polémique qui anime les sphères politiques européenne et française depuis les années 1990 autour de la suppression du mot « race » des textes normatifs. Au-delà des enjeux idéologiques que ce débat cristallise, il propose d’élargir la perspective d’analyse à un phénomène plus englobant : la confrontation d’ordres juridiques hétérogènes engagés dans des processus intégratifs : « le droit français et le droit communautaire diffèrent dans leur démarche en matière de lutte contre les discriminations (...) ». Si le droit français « dit » la race, il lui nie une existence normative. A l’inverse, le droit de l’Union en fait un critère distinctif susceptible d’activer des dispositions juridiques liées au principe de non-discrimination. Ce changement de paradigme conduit le juge interne à modifier son approche traditionnelle des droits de l’Homme fondée sur le principe d’égalité. Les décisions du juge et du rapporteur public portent les traces d’aménagements dénominatifs lorsqu’il raisonne dans le cadre d’une approche plus relativiste, légitimant la différence de traitement. (shrink)

In the debate about values in science, it is a time-honored tradition to distinguish between the normative question of whether non-cognitive values should play a role in science and the descriptive question of whether they in fact do so or not.1 Among philosophers of science, it is now an accepted view that the descriptive question has been settled. That is, it is no longer disputed that non-cognitive values play a role in science. Hence, all that is left to do on (...) the descriptive front is to describe these values and their roles in more detail. In the words of Longino: “We should stop asking whether social values play a role in science and ask which values and whose values play a role and how” (2004, p. .. (shrink)

The present paper discusses some concepts and materials that may be linked to Īśvarasena’s theory of non-cognition. These include the concept of feiliang 非量 as found in the writings of Dharmapāla, Asvabhāva, Jinaputra and their Chinese counterparts, and apramāṇatā (or apramāṇatva), as found in the works of Dharmakīrti and his commentators. I shall demonstrate that the two concepts in many ways mirror the theory of three pramāṇas, proposed by Īśvarasena. As most of these materials are from the sixth to eighth (...) century, they are extremely helpful for clarifying the early development of the theory of non-cognition and filling gaps in our understanding of the early development of this theory. (shrink)

The dominant model for interpreting brain imaging experiments assumes that the brain is organized to support mental processes that control behavior. However functional neuroimaging experiments, particularly of cognitive tasks, have not shown a high level of reproducibility and localization. This lack of clear functional segregation has been blamed on limitations in imaging technology and non linearity and regional overlap in how the brain implements these processes. However the validity of the underlying cognitive models used to describe the brain have rarely (...) been questioned or directly tested against imaging results. We propose an alternative model of brain function which correlates observed human behavior directly with measured brain activity without assumptions about intervening cognitive processes, that we term the Non-Cognitive Behavioral Model (NBM). Our model derives from Behavioral Psychology but is extended to include brain activations in addition to behavior as an observable. A further extension is the role of neuroplasticity as opposed to innate cognitive processes in the development of the brains support of cognitive behavior. Applications of NBM to neuroimaging studies are described and contrasted with the standard methodology which we refer to as the Standard Cognitive Model (SCM). In one application, the NBM correctly predicted the global, total energy consumption as the brain parameter that best correlates with a person being in the state of consciousness, a correlation missed by studies using the SCM due to its assumption that global activity does not support cognitive processes. Neuroplasticity is shown to provide a natural explanation of findings that object recognition activating the fusiform facial area comes from expertise through raining as opposed to the SCM explanation of an innate cognitive process specialized for face recognition. The conclusions are generalized to explain the poor reproducibility of cognitive processes reported in functional neuroimaging and to suggest how such studies can be used to better explain how the brain supports behavior. (shrink)

Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn from a pool of (...) cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or generality, to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses. What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, argued that cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification, but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories, methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relationships (Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly self-validating nature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudan rejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational criticism and disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system he identifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizing those of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about the distinction arises. (shrink)

Retention of postgraduate students is a complex problem at higher education institutions. To address this concern, various forms of academic support are offered by higher education institutions to nurture and develop the pipeline of postgraduate students. The support provided to postgraduate students tends to emphasize academic support at times at the expense of psychosocial or non-academic support. Non-cognitive skills were underscored as integral to determining academic and employment outcomes and thus, may need to be investigated more. This manuscript reports on (...) an attempt to filter and consolidate the literature reporting on interventions for postgraduate students that include the development of non-cognitive skills. A systematic review was conducted, because it enabled rigorous and replicable process of consolidating literature. Covidence software was used as a digital platform for the systematic review. The review was conducted at four levels as per the PRISMA guideline namely, identification, screening, eligibility and final summation. The filtration process attempted to answer the following research questions: How are non-cognitive factors or skills defined? Which non-cognitive skills were included in support for postgraduate students in the higher education setting?, and How have non-cognitive skills been included in support interventions provided to retain postgraduate students? Descriptive and theory explicative metasynthesis was used for the summation and data extraction. The primary finding was that the term non-cognitive was not used explicitly in the included studies to describe skills or factors supporting student retention. The discourse centered around support and social support as non-academic factors and skills. This suggested that non-cognitive skills were constructed as co-curricular and not integrated into the postgraduate academic project or core learning outcomes. The findings highlighted the distinction between non-cognitive skills and factors and illustrated how skills and factors operate at different levels with different spheres of influence. The formats of support provide an intersectional space where skills and factors are combined. (shrink)

Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until recently it was claimed that the presence of non-cognitive values threatened the rationality and objectivity of science and it was a sign of a scientist’s weakness. This view appeared to be correct when cognitive and non-cognitive values were treated dichotomously, and science was seen as a set of theories and procedures. The analysis of science as a social practice shows however that this dichotomy cannot (...) be maintained and that the scientist, when planning and conducting research, makes assumptions which include value judgments encompassing certain non-cognitive values. Ignoring the presence of non-cognitive values does not secure objectivity and rationality of science. On the contrary, since they are constitutive elements of scientific research, pretending that they do not work in research exposes science to ideologization. Rational subordination of science to them becomes a vehicle and a warrant of not only rationality but also objectivity and social responsibility of science. This in turn allows us to restore the proper place of science in culture. (shrink)

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent (...) variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account. (shrink)

The key concept in Kant’s aesthetics is “aesthetic reflective judgment,” a critique of which is found in Part 1 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). It is a critique inasmuch as Kant unravels previous assumptions regarding aesthetic perception. For Kant, the comparative edge of a “judgment” implicates communicability, which in turn gives it a public face; yet “reflection” points to autonomy, and the “aesthetic” shifts the emphasis away from objective properties to the subjective response evoked by the (...) object. Contrary to the view he had inherited, Kant did not treat aesthetic judgments as confused perceptions or inferior cognitions, but rather put them in a category of their own. For Kant, aesthetic reflective judgments implicated not only the processes involved in understanding the empirical world but also the processes involved in ascribing ideas or meaning to experience (which go beyond what is given in perception/cognition). This “going beyond cognition” may have been referred to by Kant as non-cognitive, but it is conditioned on a way of cognizing the object. Kant describes the features of such judgments in the Analytic of the Beautiful before addressing their possibility in subtle ways throughout the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments. Kant’s critique gives rise to three apparent dichotomies: immediate intuition and prior learning; autonomy and communicability; and non-cognitive response and aesthetic ideas. An interpretation of Kant’s theory can be deemed correct to the degree that it succeeds in showing that the contradictions are only apparent. I will argue that the resulting positive account of Kant’s aesthetic theory offers an understanding of aesthetic reflective judgment that is quite different from the standard formalism that the critics of formalism usually target and by which they misrepresent Kant’s aesthetic theory. When I refer to Kant’s formalism, then, I mean something quite different by this than what is meant by “standard formalism.” The latter is the representation given Kant’s formalism by its contemporary critics and is the typical account of formalism found in the art theory and philosophy of art literature, as will be demonstrated. (shrink)