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David Henderson [68]David K. Henderson [24]David Graham Henderson [4]David G. Henderson [3]
David L. Henderson [1]David Konstan Henderson [1]David R. Henderson [1]David W. Henderson [1]

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  1.  54
    Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences.David K. Henderson - 1993 - State University of New York Press.
    Refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences, and develops complementary accounts for interpretation and explanation, ...
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  2.  80
    The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Terry Horgan.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  3. Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?David Henderson - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):281-300.
    People develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear (...)
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  4. Motivated contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.
    The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of (...)
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  5. Epistemic Norms and the "Epistemic Game" They Regulate: The Basic Structured Epistemic Costs and Benefits.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):367-382.
    This paper is a beginning—an initial attempt to think of the function and character of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm. We draw on social scientific thinking about social norms and the social games to which they respond. Assume that people individually follow epistemic norms for the sake of acquiring a stock of true beliefs. When they live in groups and share information with each other, they will in turn produce a shared store of true beliefs, an epistemic (...)
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  6.  84
    Gate-Keeping Contextualism.David Henderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    This paper explores a position that combines contextualism regarding knowledge with the idea that the central point or purpose of the concept of knowledge is to feature in attributions that keep epistemic gate for contextually salient communities. After highlighting the main outlines and virtues of the suggested gate-keeping contextualism, two issues are pursued. First, the motivation for the view is clarified in a discussion of the relation between evaluative concepts and the purposes they serve. This clarifies why one's sense for (...)
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  7. Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
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  8. Epistemic Norms as Social Norms.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 425-436.
    This chapter examines how epistemic norms could be social norms, with a reliance on work on the philosophy and social science of social norms from Bicchieri (on the one hand) and Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin and Southwood (on the other hand). We explain how the social ontology of social norms can help explain the rationality of epistemic cooperation, and how one might begin to model epistemic games.
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  9.  63
    Iceberg Epistemology.David Henderson & Terrence Horgan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  10. The A Priori Isn’t All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually or jointly have produced that does not in its (...)
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  11. Testimonial beliefs and epistemic competence.David Henderson - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):190–221.
  12.  25
    Corrigendum.Stephen Turner, Deborah Tollefsen, Paul Roth, Mark Risjord, Kareem Khalifa & David Henderson - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (2):163-163.
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  13.  61
    A Refined Account of the "Epistemic Game": Epistemic Norms, Temptations, and Epistemic Coorperation.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):383-396.
    In "Epistemic Norms and the 'Epistemic Game' They Regulate", we advance a general case for the idea that epistemic norms regulating the production of beliefs might usefully be understood as social norms. There, we drew on the influential account of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri, and we managed to give a crude recognizable picture of important elements of what are recognizable as central epistemic norms. Here, we consider much needed elaboration, suggesting models that help one think about epistemic communities (...)
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  14. Some ins and outs of transglobal reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100.
     
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  15. What’s the Point?David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 87-114.
    The chapter rehearses the main outlines of gatekeeping contextualism—the view that it is central to the concept of knowledge that attributions of knowledge function in a kind of epistemic gatekeeping for contextually salient communities. The case for gatekeeping contextualism is clarified within an extended discussion of the character of philosophical reflection. The chapter argues that normatively valenced, evaluative concepts constitute a broad class of concepts for which a sociolinguistic point or purpose may be readily sensed—and for which the intimate connection (...)
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  16. The principle of charity and the problem of irrationality (translation and the problem of irrationality).David K. Henderson - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):225 - 252.
    Common formulations of the principle of charity in translation seem to undermine attributions of irrationality in social scientific accounts that are otherwise unexceptionable. This I call the problem of irrationality. Here I resolve the problem of irrationality by developing two complementary views of the principle of charity. First, I develop the view (ill-developed in the literature at present) that the principle of charity is preparatory, being needed in the construction of provisional first-approximation translation manuals. These serve as the basis for (...)
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  17.  95
    Practicing safe epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  18.  28
    What’s the Point of Knowledge?David Henderson - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):87-100.
    Michael Hannon advocates an epistemological methodology – tracing its roots, articulating refinements, distinguishing it from alternative methodologies and giving reasons for preferring it to the alternatives. He also advances an account of knowledge as a compelling application of this methodology. As reflected in his title, both projects are pivotal to the work and intimately related. In its general outlines, I judge that that case for the method should be taken to heart – although details could stand for further attention – (...)
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  19. Transglobal evidentialism-reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
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  20. Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.
    The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal (...)
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  21.  63
    Winch and the Constraints on Interpretation: Versions of the Principle of Charity.David K. Henderson - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):153-173.
  22.  37
    Transglobal reliabilism.David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  23.  44
    The place of non-epistemic matters in epistemology: norms and regulation in various communities.David Henderson - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3301-3323.
    This paper brings together two lines of thought. The first is the broadly contextualist idea that what is takes to satisfy central epistemic concepts such as the concept of knowledge or that of objectively justified belief may vary with the stakes faced in settings or contexts. Attributions of knowledge, for example, certify an agent to those who might treat them as a source on which to rely. Henderson and Horgan write of gate-keeping for an epistemic community. The second line of (...)
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  24.  30
    Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
  25. What Is a Priori and What Is It Good For?David Henderson - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):51-86.
    The doctrine is familiar. In a sentence, a priori truths are those that are knowable on the basis of reflection alone (independent of experience) by anyone who has acquired the relevant concepts. This expresses the classical conception of the a priori. Of course, there are those who despair of finding any truths that fully meet these demands. Some of the doubters are convinced, however, that the demands, are somewhat inflated by an epistemological tradition that was nevertheless on to something of (...)
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  26. Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation.David Henderson & John Greco - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1-28.
    This introductory chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section characterizes the general approach to epistemology around which the volume revolves—purposeful epistemology—and examines the general motivation for that approach. The guiding idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. The second section explores the approach by characterizing some important versions of it. Several themes and issues that we see running through the volume are here articulated (...)
     
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  27.  79
    Epistemic competence.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.
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  28.  28
    Introduction.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):317-322.
    The papers in this issue all concern the normative standards by which we do or should regulate our joint epistemic lives in communities. Plausibly, reflection on how we should regulate ourselves—what one should insist on in one's own practice and that of one's epistemic partners—takes some cues from reflection on what we do insist on. The reverse is plausibly also the case. These papers also, more or less explicitly, suggest that our epistemic sensibilities themselves reflect the demands of epistemic practice (...)
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  29.  77
    Let’s Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools.David Henderson - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
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  30. Explanation and rationality naturalized.David Henderson - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):30-58.
    Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself significantly (...)
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  31.  38
    Valuing the Stars.David Henderson - 2010 - Environmental Philosophy 7 (1):17-26.
    The night sky has been radically altered by light pollution, artificially produced light that obscures the stars. The effects and costs of this are diverse and poorly appreciated. A survey of the economically quantifiable aspects of this problem demonstrates that the value of the starry sky is immense, and yet it remains stubbornly beyond the ken of the market. The attempts to quantify this value and the ultimate impossibility of the task give lie to the economic pretense that the dollar (...)
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  32.  94
    Norms, normative principles, and explanation: On not getting is from ought.David Henderson - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
    It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of norms. Key Words: (...)
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  33. The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.) - 2019 - New York, USA: Routledge.
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  34.  47
    Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
    We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
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  35. Norms.David Henderson - 2012 - In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press.
  36. Simulation and epistemic competence.David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  37.  52
    Simulation theory versus theory theory: A difference without a difference in explanations.David K. Henderson - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):65-93.
  38.  89
    Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know.David Henderson - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.
    In What Philosophers Know, Gary Gutting provides an epistemology of philosophical reflection. This paper focuses on the roles that various intuitive inputs are said to play in philosophical thought. Gutting argues that philosophers are defeasibly entitled to believe some of these, prior to the outcome of the philosophical reflection, and that they then rightly serve as significant (again defeasible) anchors on reflection. This paper develops a view of epistemic entitlement and applies it to argue that many prephilosophical convictions of the (...)
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  39. On the armchair justification of conceptually grounded necessary truths.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
     
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  40. Risk sensitive animal knowledge.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
    A discussion of Sosa's Knowing Full Well. The authors focus on the understood place and significance of animal and reflective knowledge.
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  41.  60
    Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4907-4926.
    Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are indeed basic beliefs with default entitlement status, (...)
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  42.  41
    Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):567-584.
    Disagreement affords humans as members of epistemic communities important opportunities for refining or improving their epistemic situations with respect to many of their beliefs. To get such epistemic gains, one needs to explore and gauge one’s own epistemic situation and the epistemic situations of others. Accordingly, a fitting response to disagreement regarding some matter, p, typically will turn on the resolution of two strongly interrelated questions: (1) whether p, and (2) why one’s interlocutor disagrees with oneself about p. When one (...)
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  43.  49
    Norms, invariance, and explanatory relevance.David Henderson - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
    Descriptions of social norms can be explanatory. The erotetic approach to explanation provides a useful framework. I describe one very broad kind of explanation-seeking why-question, a genus that is common to the special sciences, and argue that descriptions of norms can serve as an answer to such why-questions. I draw upon Woodward’s recent discussion of the explanatory role of generalizations with a significant degree of invariance. Descriptions of norms provide what is, in effect, a generalization regarding the kind of historically (...)
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  44.  16
    (1 other version)Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stüber (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 296-319.
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  45.  20
    The birth of comedy.David Konstan Henderson, Ralph Rosen, Jeffrey Rusten & W. Niall - unknown - The Classical Review 62 (2).
  46.  21
    Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 111.
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  47.  84
    (1 other version)On the testability of psychological generalizations (psychological testability).David K. Henderson - 1991 - Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
    Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by (...)
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  48.  56
    The Role and Limitations of Rationalizing Explanation in the Social Sciences.David K. Henderson - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):267 - 287.
  49.  48
    The Supervenient Causal Efficacy of Chromatically Illuminated Conscious Experience.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2022 - ProtoSociology 39:169-203.
    In our work we have drawn attention to an aspect of conscious experience that we have labeled chromatic illumination, which consists of conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We have also characterized the prototypical causal role of chromatic-illumination features of conscious intentional states, and we have detailed the specific (...)
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  50. American Wilderness Philosophy.David Henderson - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    American Wilderness Philosophy Wilderness has been defined in diverse ways, but most famously in the Wilderness Act of 1964, which describes it “in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape … as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is […].
     
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