This chapter focuses on four questions which help to understand the presupposition accommodation as Lewis defines it. The first is a question about how we recognize that an utterance involves a presupposition. The second question is about what it is to accommodate. The third question has to do with the role of scoreboard in accommodation. The fourth question has to do with Lewis's ceteris paribus condition. The chapter considers the characterization of accommodation due to Thomason, and argues (...) that it appropriately extends the range of phenomena taken to involve accommodation. It discusses a theory of the scoreboard building on Lewis's characterization which crucially reflects the interlocutors’ recognized goals and plans in language game, and argues that this type of scoreboard plays a natural role in facilitating and constraining accommodation. The author argues that some strong limits are a natural consequence of the nature of the game and its scoreboard. (shrink)

The ethical and philosophical issues of choosing disability accommodations, particularly regarding human service provider accommodations, have not received much attention in the academic literature. Signed language interpreting is an especially complex accommodation that requires assessment of the deaf person's language knowledge and facility in a society where the many varieties of deaf education have generated a continuum of American Sign Language and signed English. Signed language interpreters with variable levels of skill and proficiency flock to (...) work in locations with high demand for their services, sometimes with little regulation and consumer protection, due to laws that mandate the provision of... (shrink)

Abstract: Chomsky (1986) has claimed that the prima facie incompatibility between descriptive linguistics and semantic externalism proves that an externalist semantics is impossible. Although it is true that a strong form of externalism does not cohere with descriptive linguistics, sociolinguistic theory can unify the two approaches. The resulting two-level theory reconciles descriptivism, mentalism, and externalism by construing community languages as a function of social identification. This approach allows a fresh look at names and definite descriptions while also responding to Chomsky's (...) (1993, 1995) challenge to articulate an externalist theory of meaning that can be used in the scientific investigation of language. (shrink)

This article draws on 35 months of ethnographic fieldwork and apprenticeship in a boxing gym located in Chicago's black ghetto to explicate how prizefighters apperceive and express the fact of being live commodities of flesh and blood, and how they practically reconcile themselves to ruthless exploitation in ways that enable them to maintain a sense of personal integrity and moral purpose. The boxer's experience of corporeal exploitation is expressed in three kindred idioms, those of prostitution, slavery and animal husbandry. The (...) first likens the fighter-manager combo to the prostitute-pimp duo; the second depicts the ring as a plantation and promoters as latter-day slave masters; the third intimates that boxers are used in the manner of livestock. All three tropes simultaneously enounce and denounce the immoral marketing of disquiescent bodies. But this acute consciousness is neutralized by the doxic belief in the normalcy of exploitation, in the `agency' of corporeal entrepreneurship, and in the possibility of individual exceptionalism. This practical belief, inscribed in the bodily dispositions of the fighter, helps produce the collective misrecognition whereby boxers collude in their own commercialization. (shrink)

All of us, including scientists, make judgments about what is true or false, probable or improbable. And in the process, we frequently appeal to concepts such as evidential support or explanation. Bayesian philosophers of science have given illuminating formal accounts of these concepts. This paper aims to follow in their footsteps, providing a novel formal account of various additional concepts: the likelihood-prior trade-off, successful accommodation of evidence, ad hocness, and, finally, consilience—sometimes also called “unification”. Using these accounts, I also (...) provide a new Bayesian analysis of how someone such as Charles Darwin hypothetically could have reasoned in favor of evolution over special creationism. Lastly, I explore how these accounts relate to other topics and accounts in philosophy, and I chart out some areas for further research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ‘Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game’, Rae Langton and Caroline West borrow ideas from David Lewis to attempt to explain how pornography might subordinate and silence women. Pornography is supposed to express certain misogynistic claims implicitly, through presupposition, and to convey them indirectly, through accommodation. I argue that the appeal to accommodation cannot do the sort of work Langton and West want it to do: Their case rests upon an overly simplified model of that phenomenon. (...) I argue further that, once we are clear about why Langton and West's account fails, a different and more plausible account of pornography's influence emerges. (shrink)

Individuals shift their language to converge with interlocutors. Recent work has suggested that convergence can target not only observed but also expected linguistic behavior, cued by social information. However, it remains uncertain how expectations and observed behavior interact, particularly when they contradict each other. We investigated this using a cooperative map task experiment, in which pairs of participants communicated online by typing messages to each other in a miniature “alien” language that exhibited variation between alien species. The overall (...) task comprised three phases, in each of which participants were told that they would be paired with a different partner. One member of the pair was given explicit linguistic expectations in each phase, while the software controlled whether or not observed behavior from their partner would be consistent or inconsistent with these expectations. The other participant was given no such expectations, allowing us to control for the role of expectation. Participants converged to both observed and expected linguistic behavior, and convergence was boosted when observation and expectation were aligned. When expected and observed behavior were misaligned, participants updated their expectations, though convergence levels did not drop. Furthermore, participants generalized what they learned about one partner to apparent novel partners of the same alien species. We also discuss individual variation in convergence patterns and the lack of a relationship between linguistic convergence and success at the map task. Findings are consistent with observations outside the laboratory that language users converge toward expected linguistic behavior. They also have broader implications for understanding linguistic accommodation and the influence of social information on linguistic processing and production. (shrink)

For Calvin, if we are to relate to God then he must accommodate himself to us, to our space-bound and time-bound condition. Such divine accommodation is fundamental to Calvin's idea of revelation, to the way in which God discloses his purposes in different eras, and deals with his people individually. This Chapter therefore examines Calvin's use of language about God, particularly in connection with divine change and divine-human dialogue.

Alan Barnard's Language in Prehistory attempts to find an accommodation between linguistic and evolutionary theory and apply insights from archeology and anthropology to the origins and purposes of language. Rudolph Botha's Language Evolution: The Windows Approach is a critique of employing evidence from other fields. Botha also critiques conclusions drawn from pidgins and creoles, homesign, motherese, grammaticalization, language acquisition, protolanguage, and comparative animal behavior. This review attempts in turn to bring into question the appropriateness of (...) applying the framework of generative linguistics, and its style of argumentation, to prehistory. (shrink)

The focus of much sensory language research has been on vocabulary and codability, not how language is used in communication of sensory perceptions. We make a case for discourse-oriented research about sensory language as an alternative to the prevailing vocabulary orientation. To consider the language of sound in authentic textual data, we presented participants with 20 everyday sounds of unknown sources and asked them to describe the sounds in as much detail as possible, as if describing (...) them to someone who could not hear them. We explored how the participants use language to describe these sounds. Do they describe their listening experiences (stressful), sound properties (intermittent beeping), and/or the events that caused the sounds (eating an apple)? The results show that out of these three soundscape elements, events are the most frequent and most indispensable element. We let the results from the study illustrate the need for more discursive data in studies of sensory language and argue that there is no designated language of sound. Our study highlights that in order to account for sensory language use, we need an analytical framework that accommodates discursive language in a non-trivial way beyond stable couplings between individual words and meanings. (shrink)

Languages spoken in larger populations are relatively simple. A possible explanation for this is that languages with a greater number of speakers tend to also be those with higher proportions of non‐native speakers, who may simplify language during learning. We assess this explanation for the negative correlation between population size and linguistic complexity in three experiments, using artificial language learning techniques to investigate both the simplifications made by individual adult learners and the potential for such simplifications to influence (...) group‐level language characteristics. In Experiment 1, we show that individual adult learners trained on a morphologically complex miniature language simplify its morphology. In Experiment 2, we explore how these simplifications may then propagate through subsequent learning. We use the languages produced by the participants of Experiment 1 as the input for a second set of learners, manipulating (a) the proportion of their input which is simplified and (b) the number of speakers they receive their input from. We find, contrary to expectations, that mixing the input from multiple speakers nullifies the simplifications introduced by individuals in Experiment 1; simplifications at the individual level do not result in simplification of the population's language. In Experiment 3, we focus on language use as a mechanism for simplification, exploring the consequences of the interaction between individuals differing in their linguistic competence (as native and non‐native speakers might). We find that speakers who acquire a more complex language than their partner simplify their language during interaction. We ultimately conclude that adult learning can result in languages spoken by more people having simpler morphology, but that idiosyncratic simplifications by non‐natives do not offer a complete explanation in themselves; accommodation—by comparatively competent non‐natives to less competent speakers, or by native speakers to non‐natives—may be a key linking mechanism. (shrink)

This volume brings together a wide array of papers which explore, among other things, to what extent languages and cultures are variable with respect to the interactions around the event of death. Motivated by J. L. Mey's idea of the pragmeme, a situated speech act, the volume has both theoretical and practical implications for scholars working in different fields of enquiry. As the papers in this volume reveal, despite the terminological differences between various disciplines, the interactions around the event of (...) death serve to provide solace, not only to the dying, but also to the family and friends of the deceased, thus helping them to "accommodate" to the new state of affairs. (shrink)

Moral language displays a characteristic duality. On the one hand, moral claims seem to be similar to descriptive claims: To say that an act is right seems to be a matter of making an assertion, thus indicating that the speaker has a moral belief about which she can be correct or mistaken. On the other hand, moral claims seem to be different from descriptive claims: There is a sense in which, by claiming that an act is right, a speaker (...) indicates that she is inclined to perform the act, to want others to perform it, and to react with praise towards those who do it. Hybrid theories maintain that utterances of moral sentences have both a descriptive and a practical linguistic function. In this thesis, I investigate how a hybrid theory can best accommodate the descriptive and the practical aspects of moral language. I evaluate and criticize the way that existing hybrid theories have proposed to explain the duality of moral language. The main arguments against these views are that they either: fail to accommodate the way that the practical or attitudinal import of moral claims vary across different contexts and linguistic environments; or that they fail to show how the practical or attitudinal import is reliably inferred by interlocutors in virtue of general communicative principles. I develop and defend a new hybrid theory called ‘dynamic descriptivism’. This theory accommodates the duality of moral language by appeal to the way that moral utterances affect a dimension of communication which consists of the shared assumptions that interlocutors mutually assume to mutually accept. Moreover, I discuss a problem which has affected a wide range of theories of moral language – including existing hybrid theories – which is the problem of explaining what it is that interlocutors disagree about when they disagree about matters of morality. I argue that that dynamic descriptivism offers new resources for solving this problem. (shrink)

The accommodation of evidence has been argued to be associated with several methodological problems that should prompt evaluators to lower their confidence in the accommodative theory. Accommodators may overfit their model to data (Hitchcock and Sober, Br J Philos Sci 55(1):1–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.1), hunt for (spurious) associations between variables (Mayo, Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, pp 294–318), or ‘fudge’ their theory in the effort to accommodate a particular datum (Lipton, Inference to (...) the best explanation. Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 164–183). The converse of accommodation, novel prediction, has been offered as a solution. If theorists novelly predict empirical results rather than accommodate those results, the potential risks of accommodation are avoided, and the theory warrants greater confidence. This paper evaluates if the problems of accommodation justify a preference for novel prediction over accommodation for evaluators of a scientific theory. I argue that there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that the problems of accommodation result in a predictivist advantage in theory confirmation. Taking into consideration the disadvantages of novel prediction and the advantages of accommodation, the impact of further evidential factors, and recent scientific evidence about the consequences of novel prediction and accommodation, novel prediction and accommodation appear roughly on a par, or accommodation is even superior in the current context. (shrink)

In the generative tradition, the language faculty has been shrinking—perhaps to include only the mechanism of recursion. This paper argues that even this view of the language faculty is too expansive. We first argue that a language faculty is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary considerations. We then focus on recursion as a detailed case study, arguing that our ability to process recursive structure does not rely on recursion as a property of the grammar, but instead emerges gradually (...) by piggybacking on domain-general sequence learning abilities. Evidence from genetics, comparative work on non-human primates, and cognitive neuroscience suggests that humans have evolved complex sequence learning skills, which were subsequently pressed into service to accommodate language. Constraints on sequence learning therefore have played an important role in shaping the cultural evolution of linguistic structure, including our limited abilities for processing recursive structure. Finally, we re-evaluate some of the key considerations that have often been taken to require the postulation of a language faculty. (shrink)

There are three ways to refer to a fact from the complement of afactive verb: (1) Via abstract object anaphoric reference, or, witha full sentential complement that will be interpreted either (2) asa bound presupposition or (3) as triggering a presupposition of afact that will have to be accommodated. Spoken corpus examplesreveal that these three possibilities differ in relation to thetype of information they tend to contribute, and this has twoeffects. First, the information status of the fact and its role (...) inthe discourse seem to affect the preference for one constructionover another in a particular context. Second, presupposed factivecomplements that need to be accommodated tend to be hearer-new andthe focus of the utterance, meaning that information structureseems to contribute to the felicity of accommodation ofpresupposed facts. (shrink)

Quine and Davidson are among the leading thinkers of the twentieth century. Their influence on contemporary philosophy is second to none, and their impact is also strongly felt in disciplines such as linguistics and psychology. This book is devoted to both of them, but also questions some of their basic assumptions. Hans-Johann Glock critically scrutinizes their ideas on ontology, truth, necessity, meaning and interpretation, thought and language, and shows that their attempts to accommodate meaning and thought within a naturalistic (...) framework, either by impugning them as unclear or by extracting them from physical facts, are ultimately unsuccessful. His discussion includes interesting comparisons of Quine and Davidson with other philosophers, particularly Wittgenstein, and also offers detailed accounts of central issues in contemporary analytic philosophy, such as the nature of truth and of meaning and interpretation, and the relation between thought and language. (shrink)

The present study attempts to investigate and analyze the relationship between the language used by the Hui nationality, its social situation, and identity construction from a sociosemiotic perspective, and makes a further discussion on the process of identity construction via language convergence, divergence, and maintenance. It goes further to put forward the distinction between social identity/ethnic identity and group identity/personal identity as well as the roles that language convergence and divergence have played within these identity constructions, proposes (...) that language convergence and divergence are the two crucial language strategies utilized by people in code switching, therefrom constructing a dynamic balanced identity system recursively. (shrink)

Caregivers’ language input supports children’s language development, and it is often tuned to the child’s current level of skill. Evidence suggests that parental input is tuned to accommodate children’s expressive language levels, but accommodation to receptive language abilities is less understood. In particular, little is known about parental sensitivity to children’s abilities to process language in real time. Compared to nonspectrum children, children on the spectrum are slower to process language. In this study, (...) we ask: Do parents of autistic children and those of nonspectrum children tune their language input to accommodate children’s different language processing abilities? Children with and without a diagnosis of autism and their parents viewed a display of six images, one of which was the target. The parent labeled the target to direct the child’s attention to it. We first examined children’s language processing abilities by assessing their latencies to shift gaze to the labeled referent; from this, we found slower latencies in the autistic group than in the nonspectrum group, in line with previous findings. We then examined features of parents’ language and found that parents in both groups produced similar language, suggesting that parents may not adjust their language input according to children’s speed of language processing. This finding suggests that capturing parental sensitivity to children’s receptive language, and specifically language processing, may enrich our models of individual differences in language input, and future work should investigate if supporting caregivers in tuning their language use according to children’s language processing can improve children’s language outcomes. (shrink)

Since formal logic courses are typically required in philosophy programs, students with certain cognitive disabilities are barred from pursuing philosophy degrees. Are philosophy programs (legally or morally) obligated to waive such requirements in the case of students with disabilities? A comparison is made between the formal logic requirement and the foreign language competency requirement, which leads to a discussion of what areas of study are essential to mastery of philosophy. Ultimately, it is concluded that at this point in the (...) discipline’s development, formal logic is required at the graduate level (but could be waived at the undergraduate level). (shrink)

Religions use linguistic and non-linguistic codes of meaning to express their contents: natural tongues, music, sculpture, poetry, rituals, practices... Also, religions provide the semantic context and the rules to produce, validate, and interpret their expressions: as such, religions can be considered languages. The Sophia Special Issue ‘Religions and Languages: A Polyphony of Faiths’ explores the multifaceted relationships of world religions with languages broadly construed, intended as other religious codes, natural tongues, artistic forms, digital media, and even science. Do natural languages (...) modify themselves in order to convey a divine message? How do artistic means of expression accommodate religious contents? What are the aspects of interaction between religions, technological advances, and scientific methods? The five contributions in this issue offer innovative, compelling, and engaging perspectives regarding this complex and fascinating issue. (shrink)

Since formal logic courses are typically required in philosophy programs, students with certain cognitive disabilities are barred from pursuing philosophy degrees. Are philosophy programs (legally or morally) obligated to waive such requirements in the case of students with disabilities? A comparison is made between the formal logic requirement and the foreign language competency requirement, which leads to a discussion of what areas of study are essential to mastery of philosophy. Ultimately, it is concluded that at this point in the (...) discipline’s development, formal logic is required at the graduate level (but could be waived at the undergraduate level). (shrink)

1This work was supported in part by the projects TRINDI (Task Oriented Instructional Dialogue), EC Project LE4-8314, SDS (Swedish Dialogue Systems), NUTEK/HSFR Language Technology Project F1472/1997, INDI (Information Exchange in Dialogue), Riksbankens Jubileumsfond 1997-0134, and SIRIDUS (Specification, Interaction, Reconfiguration in Dialogue Understanding Systems), EC Project IST-1999-10516, and ILT (Interactive Language Technology), Vinnova Project 2001-6340. To appear in Presuppositions and Discourse ed. by Rainer Bäuerle, Uwe Reyle and Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Elsevier, Amsterdam.

The idea that ambiguity can be productive in data science remains controversial. Efforts to make scientific publications and data intelligible to computers generally assume that accommodating multiple meanings for words, known as polysemy, undermines reasoning and communication. This assumption has nonetheless been contested by historians, philosophers, and social scientists, who have applied qualitative research methods to demonstrate the generative and strategic value of polysemy. Recent quantitative results from linguistics have also shown how polysemy can actually improve the efficiency of human (...) communication. I present a new conceptual typology based on a synthesis of prior research about the aims, norms, and circumstances under which polysemy arises and is evaluated. The typology supports a contextual pluralist view of polysemy’s value for scientific research practices: polysemy does both substantial positive and negative work in science, but its utility is context-sensitive in ways that are often overlooked by the norms people have formulated to regulate its use, including prior scholars researching polysemy. I also propose that historical patterns in the use of partial synonyms, i.e. terms with overlapping meanings, provide an especially promising phenomenon for integrative research addressing these issues. (shrink)

Articulate language is a form of communication unique to humans. Over time, a spectrum of researchers has proposed various frameworks attempting to explain the evolutionary acquisition of this distinctive human attribute, some deploring the apparent lack of direct evidence elucidating the phenomenon, whilst others have pointed to the contributions of palaeoanthropology, the social brain hypothesis and the fact that even amongst contemporary humans, social group sizes reflect brain size. Theologians have traditionally ignored evolutionary insights as an explanatory paradigm for (...) the origin of humankind. However, an increasing number are, of late, contributing to a worldview of humanity which accommodates both the epistemological realities of evolutionary biology as well as insights from theology. This includes reviewing and assessing the origins of articulate language and the physiological attributes necessary for its development. It is in this sense that the evolution of language is relevant from a theological perspective. The association between mental capacity and articulate language, already noted by Darwin, is relevant in explaining the larger group sizes found amongst humans, as is the incipient role played by the evolution of laughter in triggering the neuroendocrine system promoting bonding, to the eventual development of articulate language. Our aim is to review a selection of contemporary perspectives on the evolution of language, amongst others, reasons for the ease with which young children acquire language competency, and whether we may be hardwired for language from birth. Further reading is suggested in the footnotes.Contribution: This article is part of a special collection reflecting on the evolutionary building blocks of our past, present and future. It is based on historical thought and contemporary research with regards to the evolutionary emergence of language. It fits well with the intersectional and trans-disciplinary nature of this collection and journal. (shrink)

This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.

In this paper, I show how a novel treatment of speech acts can be combined with a well-known liberal argument for multiculturalism in a way that will justify claims about the preservation, protection, or accommodation of minority languages. The key to the paper is the claim that every language makes a distinctive range of speech acts possible, acts that cannot be realized by means of any other language. As a result, when a language disappears, so does (...) a class of speech acts. If we accept that our social identities are in large part constituted by the decisions we make about how to speak, language loss, then, will amount to a substantial infringement on our autonomy in a particularly important domain. (shrink)

Thomas Reid draws a distinction between the social and solitary operations of mind—acts of mind that require other intelligent beings versus those that may performed on one’s own. Yet his distinction obscures the irreducibly social character of the solitary operations. This paper preserves Reid’s distinction while accommodating the social character of the solitary operations. According to Reid, the solitary operations presuppose the social operations, expressed in what he calls the ‘natural language’ of mankind—a language that communicates the intentions (...) that give rise to the agreements by which the conventions of artificial languages are developed. Using artificial languages, we begin to sort the world into kinds and to anticipate the regular events that make a practical difference in our lives, providing the general conceptions that give our trains of thought the order and regularity required to form the solitary operations. By using artificial languages, we adapt social operations to solitary ends, to think alone and in silence. (shrink)

Mutual accommodation is about co-operation, compromise, and inclusion. It's a big idea, equal to freedom, science, and compassion. The postwar global economic order led by the United States is one of the greatest historic achievements of mutual accommodation, yet it is now at risk from the centrifugal forces that have led to populism. Today, to many nations and people, Canada is the model country driven by successful mutual accommodation. In Might Nature Be Canadian? William Macdonald explores the (...) theme of mutual accommodation with a close lens on the Canadian experience. Canada has a drive toward mutual accommodation. The United States has a strong drive toward division. There has always been a divergence of ideologies between the two countries. The United States now appears to view the world as a never-ending struggle, which has become greater since 2000, between good and evil, while Canada, by contrast, leans toward the idea that there is an underlying order at the heart of things. Canada has always faced strong limits in creatively overcoming a challenging geography and French/English language differences within its own borders; on the other hand the United States sees itself as a country with virtually no limits. Throughout its history Canada's drive toward mutual accommodation, stronger than that of any other country, has allowed its increasingly diverse citizens to live together peacefully and successfully, even as they retain their own culture, language, and religion. Nature can be described as simultaneously either/or and both/and. Is there something fundamentally Canadian about this? Taking inspiration from British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who said that "civilization is the triumph of persuasion over force," Macdonald argues that the urgent spread of mutual accommodation, a charge led by Canada, is central to achieving a bearable world for everyone. (shrink)

Quasi-realists have proposed an “internal” reading of the mind-independence claim embedded in our moral discourse, according to which the claim to mind-independence itself is a moral claim. I argue against such a quasi-realist “internal” reading. My objection is that quasi-realists cannot plausibly explain why the majority of us, either implicitly or explicitly, take moral mind-independence to be a metaethical notion. Quasi-realists either must attribute a quite obvious mistake to most metaethical theorists without explaining why they cannot recognize it, or give (...) us an intolerably ad hoc explanation about why ordinary moral speakers fail to understand their own words. Without properly addressing this problem, we have good reason to reject the quasi-realist account of moral mind-independence. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to find out how people process the dialectal variation encountered in the daily linguistic input. We conducted an eye tracking study (Visual Word Paradigm) that targeted the predictive processing of grammatical gender markers. Three different groups of Norwegian speakers took part in the experiment: one group of students from the capital Oslo, and two groups of dialect speakers from the Western Norwegian town Sogndal. One Sogndal group was defined as ``stable dialect speakers'', and one (...) as ``unstable dialect speakers'', based on a background questionnaire. The students participated in two eye tracking experiments each, one conducted in the their own dialect, and one in the other dialect (i.e., Sogn dialect for the Oslo students, and Oslo dialect for the Sogndal students). The gender systems in the two dialects differ: the Sogn dialect makes an obligatory three-gender split (Masculine, Feminine and Neuter) whereas the Oslo dialect only obligatorily makes a two gender distinction. The research question was whether speakers could use gender markers to predict the upcoming target noun in both local and non-local dialect mode, and furthermore, if they correctly could adjust their expectations based on dialect mode. The results showed that the Sogn speakers could predict upcoming linguistic material both in the local and Oslo dialect, but only the stable group were able to adjust their predictions based on the dialect mode. The unstable group applied a more general Oslo-compatible parsing to both the local and the non-local dialect. The Oslo speakers on the other hand were able to use gender markers as predictors only in their own dialect. We argue that the stable Sogn group should be treated as a bilingual group, as they show native-like skills in both varieties, while the unstable Sogn group can be seen as accommodated monolinguals, in that they treat the two varieties as sharing an underspecified grammar. The Oslo group on the other hand lacks sufficient competence in the other dialect to make use of grammatical markers to make predictions. (shrink)

Alongside the tradition in Western thought which glories in logic, metaphysics, and science , a more variegated tradition of thought is to be found--that of rhetoric and of "wisdom"--whose focus is on the workings of human society and on language as its bond and instrument of change. Wisdom Speaking is the attempt to read Vico within this tradition and to see what it became in his hands. ;From implacable foes to cautious allies, science and wisdom have a history of (...) conflict and accommodation. Chapter One, "Pedagogy and Culture," intercepts this history in Vico, shows its ancient roots, and argues that a concern for its issues unifies his pedagogical and cultural theories. This argument is unfolded in the remaining chapters, which treat successively of rhetoric, pedagogy, and culture, each proceeding from a major Vichian text. ;In Chapter Two, "Philosophy and Rhetoric," the tradition of rhetoric and its manifold involvements with philosophy is first laid out, in order to look closely at Vico's own Institutions oratoriae. From its analysis the classical cast of Vico's mind is discovered, as is his steadfast concern to see rhetoric, both in its substantive and linguistic aspects, as the logic of social discourse. Plain from the beginning is Vico's appreciation for metaphor as a necessity of communication and for ingenuity as the faculty of seeing connections and thus making and remaking social structures. ;These themes are deepened in Chapter Three, "Ingenuity and Public Life," where Vico's school writings, centering in the De studiorum ratione, are made to show the nature of civil life and the sagacity needed to manage it. With the presentation of the sage as jurisconsult, as "knower of human and divine institutions," the transformation of pedagogy into a theory of culture begins. ;Chapter Four, "Wisdom and Eloquence," draws all the leads together, using the final New Science and its prior formulations to show how Vico, with philological discoveries in the Homeric poems and early Roman Law, fashioned a theory of the "poetic" beginnings of language, mind, and society; of their gradual maturation; and of the tension between their youth and maturity, thereby turning a formal understanding of culture into a functional, and preparing the way for modern social theory. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code and symbols. (...) In what follows, I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful for the future of law and innovation. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the matter on binary code language, rivalrous to legal alphabetic language. Lastly, the study aims at emphasizing the pivotal role of the jurist as an interpreter in a changing society accommodating diverging realms of reality. The study is structured as follows. Firstly, a quick exam of the traits of blockchain networks would provide the contextual link to establish the arguments in support of the need of a standard legal language. Secondly, a comparison between liberal legal institutions and theory of semiotics is set to perceive their functioning and ascertain their limits in the light of todays unprecedented changes. Thirdly, a summary on blockchain networks’ legal features would constitute the thrust behind the idea of a uniform legal language. Methodologically, the argument does also establish some relations with classical laws of physics and philosophy of media. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggested legal interpretation and semiotic-based approach can contribute to overcome existing stumbling blocks including, but not limited to, the lack of cooperation at the international level as well as the gap in State norms when it comes to innovation. In this sense, the proposed strategies do not intend to replace current advances in the legal thought. In contrast, it seeks to harmonise their results providing a methodical approach that can concur to inform a new technique to address new controversial issues. In practice, the proposed method regarding the adoption of a uniform legal language would lower transactive costs in terms of normative coordination in the matter of international cooperation and in the definition of applicable law among different legal systems. Alternatively, it might contribute to the convergence of legal systems and/or their underlying concepts. Differently put, article’s contribution can be envisaged in fostering juridical consistency with regards to different forms of languages’ coexistence. (shrink)

The book explores the role of age in communication under consideration of various age groups, genres, cultures and languages. The social skewing of the contributions explains the book's focus on discourse-mediated social identities, with age implicated as a viable controller of how social action is strategically deployed for alignment and alienation, accommodation and divergence. The studies in the book show the particular importance of the discursive construction of age in the face of new challenges of globalization, increased human mobility (...) and rising intergenerational conflicts. (shrink)

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the (...) adjectives. Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception. (shrink)

This article explores how the thought that language is expressive, in the sense of bearing emotional or affective meaning, can be made sense of, with particular attention to two authors for whom this thought plays an important role. It begins by introducing the idea of language being “expressive” and using Charles Taylor's work to consider its potential interest, before showing how the expressiveness of language might be accounted for by a position that seems particularly suited to this (...) task, namely Merleau‐Ponty's view of embodied expression in Phenomenology of Perception. I then set out a significant challenge to that position based on Wittgenstein's “private language argument,” which implies there is no necessary connection between language use and a subject's internal (affective) states, thus contesting Merleau‐Ponty's explanatory emphasis on the body. I therefore propose a revised “complex” view of language's expressiveness that meets this Wittgensteinian challenge by reconceiving the body's role. Finally, I draw out some implications of this revised view, arguing that while language itself cannot be considered expressive, it remains significant that we can experience language as expressive. I also suggest that, although apparently threatened, Taylor's position can not only accommodate, but be better understood with, this revised view. (shrink)

In the worlds of philosophy, linguistics, and communications theory, a view has developed which understands conscious experience as experience which is 'reflected' back upon itself through language. This indicates that the consciousness we experience is possible only because we have culturally invented language and subsequently evolved to accommodate it. This accords with the conclusions of Daniel Dennett (1991), but the 'hermeneutic objection' would go further and deny that the objective sciences themselves have escaped the hermeneutic circle. -/- The (...) consciousness we humans experience is developed only within the context of crossing the 'symbolic threshold' (Percy 1975; Deacon 1997) and one of the earliest and most important symbols we acquire is that of the self, or 'the subject of experience'. It is only when we achieve self-awareness that the world, as such, comes to exist for us as an object (which contains categories and sub-categories of objects). Any consciousness imputed to prelinguistic stages of development is based on projection and guesswork, since we can know nothing directly of it. It can be said that any experience which does not separate an inner subject from an outer world is probably a continuum of sensation in which environmental stimulus and instinctive response are experienced as a unity; it may be 'lived experience' but it is experience 'lived' non-consciously. -/- Speech requires assertion and by learning to speak we find ourselves asserting, in essence, our selves into the world. The narrative form of language allows us to develop life stories, self-knowledge, and, most important, narrative memory coincident with narrative time. All this is made possible with the intersubjective 'net' of language which allows us to know ourselves by first identifying with the viewpoint of others; and, later, such allows us to identify with other minds as we anticipate their reception our communication. These three, assertion, narrative, and intersubjectivity are the essence of what language is and are the keystones that make culture possible outside of nature. (shrink)

A radical metaphysical theory typically comes packaged with a semantic theory that reconciles those radical claims with common sense. The metaphysical theory says what things exist and what their natures are, while the semantic theory specifies, in terms of these things, how we are to interpret everyday language. Thus may we “think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.” This semantic accommodation of common sense, however, can end up undermining the very theory it is designed to protect. (...) This paper is a case study, showing in detail how one popular version of temporal parts theory is self-undermining. This raises the specter that the problem generalizes to other metaphysical theories. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify the parallels and the differences between language and life as evolvable systems in pursuit of a framework that will investigate language change from the perspective of a general theory of evolution. Despite the consensus that languages change similarly to species, as reflected in the construction of language trees, the field has mainly applied biological techniques to specific problems of historical linguistics and has not systematically engaged in disentangling the basic concepts (population, reproductive (...) unit, inheritance, etc.) and the core processes underlying evolutionary theory, namely mutation, selection, drift, and migration, as applied to language. We develop such a proposal. Treating language as an evolvable system places previous studies in a novel perspective, as it offers an elegant unifying framework that can accommodate current knowledge, utilize the rich theoretical framework of evolutionary biology, and synthesize many independent strands of inquiry, initiating a whole new research program. (shrink)

The metalinguistic approach to conceptual engineering construes disputes between linguistic reformers and linguistic conservatives as metalinguistic disagreements on how best to use particular expressions. As the present paper argues, this approach has various merits. However, it was recently criticised in Cappelen’s seminal Fixing Language. Cappelen raises an important objection against the metalinguistic picture. According to this objection – the Babel objection, as I shall call it – the metalinguistic account cannot accommodate the intuition of disagreement between linguistic conservatives and (...) reformers who are speaking different languages. The objection generalises to metalinguistic approaches to e.g. moral disagreements. This paper discusses the Babel objection and shows how to dispel it. (shrink)

The ability to convey our thoughts using an infinite number of linguistic expressions is one of the hallmarks of human language. Understanding the nature of the psychological mechanisms and representations that give rise to this unique productivity is a fundamental goal for the cognitive sciences. A long-standing hypothesis is that single words and rules form the basic building blocks of linguistic productivity, with multiword sequences being treated as units only in peripheral cases such as idioms. The new millennium, however, (...) has seen a shift toward construing multiword linguistic units not as linguistic rarities, but as important building blocks for language acquisition and processing. This shift—which originated within theoretical approaches that emphasize language learning and use—has far-reaching implications for theories of language representation, processing, and acquisition. Incorporating multiword units as integral building blocks blurs the distinction between grammar and lexicon; calls for models of production and comprehension that can accommodate and give rise to the effect of multiword information on processing; and highlights the importance of such units to learning. In this special topic, we bring together cutting-edge work on multiword sequences in theoretical linguistics, first-language acquisition, psycholinguistics, computational modeling, and second-language learning to present a comprehensive overview of the prominence and importance of such units in language, their possible role in explaining differences between first- and second-language learning, and the challenges the combined findings pose for theories of language. (shrink)

A successful theory of the language of subjective uncertainty would meet several important constraints. First, it would explain how use of the language of subjective uncertainty affects addressees’ states of subjective uncertainty. Second, it would explain how such use affects what possibilities are treated as live for purposes of conversation. Third, it would accommodate 'quantifying in' to the scope of epistemic modals. Fourth, it would explain the norms governing the language of subjective uncertainty, and the differences between (...) them and the norms governing the language of subjective certainty. Neither truth conditional nor traditional force modfier theories of the language of subjective uncertainty look adequate to the task of satisfying all four of these constraints. (shrink)

This book investigates the architecture of the language faculty by considering what the properties of language reveal about the mental abilities and processes involved in language acquisition. The language faculty, the author argues, must be able not only to accommodate what is general, exceptionless, and universal in language, but must also be capable of dealing with what is irregular, exceptional, and idiosyncratic. In Syntactic Nuts Peter Culicover shows that this is true not only of the (...) lexicon, but for syntax. Marginal and exceptional cases, where there is no straightforward form-meaning correspondence, are dealt with by the language faculty easily and precisely as the general cases. In considering how and why this should be the author argues against the prevailing trend in generative grammar, which takes the learner as either incorporating maximally global generalisations as part of its innate capacity for language, or projecting global generalisations from a very limited input on the basis of innate mechanisms. He suggests that the learning mechanism does not generalize significantly beyond the evidence presented to it, and further that it seeks to form generalizations based on all and only the evidence presented to it. Syntactic Nuts makes a fundamental contribution to generative grammar and syntactic theory. It situates syntactic theory within cognitive science in a novel way. It contributes to an alternative, and yet in many ways traditional, perspective on the manner in which knowledge is represented and processed in the mind. (shrink)

This paper shows the relevance of an evolutionary model for the study of language change. We focus on a cognitive and usage-based approach to language change, namely the Theory of Utterance Selection developed by Croft (2000). Croft's evolutionary approach takes its inspiration from neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, particularly the Generalized Theory of Selection developed by Hull (1988), a philosopher of science. Language is viewed as a system of use governed by convention, and language change results from breaking (...) with convention and propagating this innovation through the linguistic community until it becomes a new convention. Crucially, altered replication can be equated with language innovation, and propagation of individual changes is the linguistic counterpart of the differential perpetuation or selection of replicators. We will argue within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007) for a more systematic integration of cognitive and social factors in the explanation of language change. The mechanisms for language innovation are cognitive, as the pnnciples of cognitive efficiency like prototypicality constitute the main motivations for language change and metaphor and metonymy the main cognitive mechanisms of semantic change. The mechanisms for propagation are essentially social, including processes such as accommodation, identity and prestige. All of these mechanisms occur in individual communicative acts and operate like an "invisible hand" (Keller, 1994). We illustrate the sociocognitive evolutionary model of language change with some case studies on semantic change in Portuguese. (shrink)

Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experience for which words seem inadequate to express and communicate the experience. The focus of my remarks for the first paper will explore this situation of the potential limits of language for understanding experience. The question of these limits depends on an analysis of just what takes place in experience and language. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory for an answer to the question, (...) I will show just how experience and language are interrelated, and, as a result, I will show how the dynamic of language formation expands to accommodate what appears to be inaccessible and inexpressible, while allowing experience to sustain its own richness. (shrink)

These three papers, each constituting a chapter, lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Chapter 1 reviews and reassesses Kripke's puzzle about belief. I argue, contra Kripke, that the puzzle shows Millianism to be inadequate . It must be supplemented with a Fregean theory. But Millianism and Fregeanism need not be opposed. Developing a distinction between mental representation and linguistic representation, I divide the notion of proposition. It is one thing to be the object (...) of a propositional attitude, another to be the meaning of a declarative sentence. This perspective on entrenched difficulties in philosophy of mind and language discloses a unified theory accounting for all relevant intuitions. ;Chapter 2 discusses externalism in the philosophy of mind. I investigate the relation between the issue of Fregeanism and Millianism in philosophy of language and the issue of internalism and externalism in philosophy of mind. Having characterized externalism precisely, I argue that it faces a serious difficulty: it cannot correctly maintain the distinction between ignorance and incoherence. Mere empirical ignorance will be enough to make an agent logically incoherent. Worse, if externalism is correct, internal duplicates might differ with respect to logical coherence. ;In Chapter 3 I defend the Russellian conception of names from Kripke's modal argument. I offer a way to accommodate Kripke's claims about the rigidity of names without abandoning the Russellian theory. (shrink)