In his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief," William K. Clifford claimed "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." ). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford's Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe (...) in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade . In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call "begging the doxastic question." An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument's conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments. (shrink)

In his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief," William K. Clifford claimed "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." ). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford's Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe (...) in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade. In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call "begging the doxastic question." An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument's conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that most university campuses are considered bastions of liberalism (in contrast to the conservative “mainstream”), it remains difficult for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered faculty members and students to come out, and instances of poor treatment still occur. In addition, curricular issues related to LGBT identities and concerns continue to be met with resistance or outright hostility. In this paper, I argue that all faculty—not just LGBT faculty—have an obligation to play a more active role (...) in creating an LGBT-friendly environment on their respective campuses. I end with suggestions for achieving this goal. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that most university campuses are considered bastions of liberalism (in contrast to the conservative “mainstream”), it remains difficult for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered faculty members and students to come out, and instances of poor treatment still occur. In addition, curricular issues related to LGBT identities and concerns continue to be met with resistance or outright hostility. In this paper, I argue that all faculty—not just LGBT faculty—have an obligation to play a more active role (...) in creating an LGBT-friendly environment on their respective campuses. I end with suggestions for achieving this goal. (shrink)

Many philosophers have called for elimination of racial taxonomies in biomedical contexts, basing their arguments on one of two claims: that the use of racial terminology is unjust, and that the use of racial terminology in scientific contexts is inappropriate because race is scientifically meaningless. I argue that each of these claims is flawed, because justice sometimes demands the use of racial terminology, and because the utility of race in biomedical contexts makes it scientifically meaningful. I suggest a third argument (...) that eliminativists might utilize: in spite of its usefulness, we should forego racialized medicine because given our long history of racism, any use of race will tend to crowd out other relevant factors. So, instead of continuing to use race as a convenient proxy for unknown “x-factors,” we ought to forego race and insist that researchers name the x-factors. The result will be better science, both morally and epistemically. (shrink)

Since formal logic courses are typically required in philosophy programs, students with certain cognitive disabilities are barred from pursuing philosophy degrees. Are philosophy programs (legally or morally) obligated to waive such requirements in the case of students with disabilities? A comparison is made between the formal logic requirement and the foreign language competency requirement, which leads to a discussion of what areas of study are essential to mastery of philosophy. Ultimately, it is concluded that at this point in the discipline’s (...) development, formal logic is required at the graduate level (but could be waived at the undergraduate level). (shrink)

Since formal logic courses are typically required in philosophy programs, students with certain cognitive disabilities are barred from pursuing philosophy degrees. Are philosophy programs (legally or morally) obligated to waive such requirements in the case of students with disabilities? A comparison is made between the formal logic requirement and the foreign language competency requirement, which leads to a discussion of what areas of study are essential to mastery of philosophy. Ultimately, it is concluded that at this point in the discipline’s (...) development, formal logic is required at the graduate level (but could be waived at the undergraduate level). (shrink)