In this chapter, we analyze intellectual patience as a character trait. We look at the contexts that call for patience and at what patience demands in those contexts. Together these constitute our account of patience, though the focus is on patience in the life of the mind. We also consider how patience and perseverance differ, which offers a better understanding of the former and sheds light on how character traits can cooperate. We then consider how to become virtuously patient. (...) We conclude reflecting on some remarks made by the poet Rilke. (shrink)

This research, couched in the resourcebased view of the firm, investigates the potential for reducing an organization's decision uncertainty within its structural equation modeling, we empirically test if organizational design can reduce the perceived uncertainty related to an IC context, which we refer to as knowledge uncertainty. We found evidence that decentralization and technology infrastruture support a resultsbased IC mangement contrl system which in turn is associated with reduced support a good overall fit for our model. Our findings suggest that (...) if managers structure their organizational control systems appropriately for developing IC capabilities, these systems can lead to reduced internal uncertainty regarding human, structural, and relational capital. (shrink)

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views (...) about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 29 This essay offers a working analysis of the trait of intellectual perseverance. It argues that intellectual perseverance is a disposition to overcome obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual actions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. The trait of intellectual perseverance is not always an intellectual virtue. This essay provides a pluralist analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when it is one. Along the way, it (...) argues that the virtue of intellectual perseverance can be contrasted with both a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess. It also suggests that the virtues of intellectual courage and intellectual self-control are types of intellectual perseverance. The essay ends with several open questions about the virtue of intellectual perseverance. My hope is that this essay will stimulate further interest in, and analysis of, this important intellectual trait. (shrink)

This essay offers a working analysis of the trait of intellectual perseverance. It argues that intellectual perseverance is a disposition to overcome obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual actions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. The trait of intellectual perseverance is not always an intellectual virtue. This essay provides a pluralist analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when it is one. Along the way, it argues that the virtue of (...) intellectual perseverance can be contrasted with both a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess. It also suggests that the virtues of intellectual courage and intellectual self-control are types of intellectual perseverance. The essay ends with several open questions about the virtue of intellectual perseverance. My hope is that this essay will stimulate further interest in, and analysis of, this important intellectual trait. (shrink)

Advocates of “Mendelism” early on stressed the usefulness of Mendelian principles for breeders. Ever since, that usefulness—and the favourable opinion of Mendelism it supposedly engendered among breeders—has featured in explanations of the rapid rise of Mendelian genetics. An important counter-tradition of commentary, however, has emphasized the ways in which early Mendelian theory in fact fell short of breeders’ needs. Attention to intellectual property, narrowly and broadly construed, makes possible an approach that takes both the tradition and the counter-tradition seriously, (...) by enabling a more complete description of the theory-reality shortfall and a better understanding of how changing practices, on and off the Mendelians’ experimental farms, functioned to render that shortfall unproblematic. In the case of plant breeding in Britain, a perennial source of lost profits and disputes over ownership was the appearance of individual plants departing from their varietal types—so-called “rogues.” Mendelian plant varieties acquired a reputation for being rogue-free, and so for demonstrating the correctness of Mendelian principles , at a time when Mendelians were gradually taking control of the means for distributing their varieties. Mendelian breeders protected their products physically from rogue-inducing contamination in such a way that when rogues did appear, the default explanation—that contamination had somehow occurred—ensured that there was no threat to Mendelian principles. (shrink)

The rapid emergence of digital media has created both new economic opportunities and new risks for authors, publishers, and users in regards to intellectual property. There is a theoretical conflict raging between those who believe "information should be free" and those attempting to protect intellectual property through surveillance and control of access. The Intellectual Commons works to develop a theory of intellectual property that is based on a theory of natural rights that assumes the existence of (...) a "natural world" of intellectual resources. (shrink)

This paper is intended to investigate the role of Venture-Capital Syndication background in the relationship between intellectual capital and portfolio firm performance ; specifically, this article examines the moderating effect of VCS’s leading firm background and member heterogeneity on the effect of IC on PFP. This study used a modified VAIC model to measure IC to compose a 4-component variable including human capital, structural capital, relational capital, and innovation capital. The data were collected from VCS-backed and listed firms in (...) China during 2014 to 2018 applying the pooled OLS model for hypotheses test, Generalized Method of Moments to reduce endogeneity and unobserved factor control, and also return on equity instead of ROA for the robustness test. Empirical results showed that IC and its components can improve PFP for VCS-backed firms in China; in detail, IC showed greater impact on performance of firms invested by foreign lead investors than in private or government VCS, specially reflected in the impact of innovation capital on PFP. Furthermore, IC showed weaker impact on PFP of mixed VCS-backed firms compared to pure VCS-backed firms and showed diminished effect on higher VCS member heterogeneity mainly reflected in the impact of relational capital on firm performance. These findings propose a new way of combining IC and VC to improve firm performance and are beneficial to theoretical development of IC and VC as well as a perspective for VC firm managers to choose suitable partners prior to join a VCS. (shrink)

Educational research in the UK has for some time been criticised in terms of both its relevance and its quality. Indeed, these issues of relevance and quality have been presented by some critics as linked with each other. One way forward that has been suggested is greater political (and thereby user and practitioner) control of research and its funding. This would presumably ensure the immediate practical relevance of future work, encourage flexibility of approach, and remove some responsibility from the 'dead-hand' (...) of academic departments of educational research. This paper considers some of the counter-arguments, and contrary evidence, to this approach. It presents examples of projects by teachers, a large-scale study of teacher effectiveness contracted to consultants by the DfEE (as it then was), and of political self-censorship by intellectual fields. On this basis the paper suggests that the link between quality and relevance in research has been exaggerated, and that increasing political control of academic research alone is unlikely to lead to a marked improvement in quality. (shrink)

Among the divers factors that have encouraged and sustained scientific inquiry through its long history are two pervasive human concerns which provide, I think, the basic motivation for all scientific research. One of these is man's persistent desire to improve his strategic position in the world by means of dependable methods for predicting and, whenever possible, controlling the events that occur in it. The extent to which science has been able to satisfy this urge is reflected impressively in the vast (...) and steadily widening range of its technological applications. But besides this practical concern, there is a second basic motivation for the scientific quest, namely, man's insatiable intellectual curiosity, his deep concern to know the world he lives in, and to explain, and thus to understand, the unending flow of phenomena it presents to him. (shrink)

This article explores the normative assumptions about the self that are implicitly and explicitly embedded in critiques of organisational control. Two problematic aspects of control are examined – the capacity of some organisations to produce unquestioning commitment, and the elicitation of ‹false’ selves. Drawing on the work of Rom Harré, and some examples of organisational-self processes gone awry, I investigate the dynamics involved and how they violate the normative expectations that we hold regarding the self, particularly its moral autonomy and (...) authenticity. The article concludes by arguing that, despite post-structuralist challenges, some notion of a ‹core’ or ‹real’ self still holds salience for employees negotiating their identities within regimes of control. The assumptions and expectations surrounding this aspect of self are also a pivotal element in the western intellectual tradition that promotes and enables critique. (shrink)

Finding ways to foster intellectual humility (IH)—the willingness to own one’s limitations—is an important goal for facilitating effective learning. We report the results of a longitudinal, quasi-experimental study, conducted across six undergraduate, culturally diverse (58% racial/ethnic minority) introductory philosophy courses, that evaluates how social perceptions and cross-cultural reasoning change following a course on epistemology and social ethics. Critically, we manipulated whether each class received a standardized lesson in IH at the start of the course or not. Participants provided self-ratings (...) of IH, gave round-robin judgments of their classmates, and completed a wise-reasoning writing exercise focusing on a cultural conflict at both the beginning and end of the summer course session. Results revealed no change in self-reported IH, but an increase in perceived peer IH and conscientiousness within classes where IH was taught. Moreover, an analysis of the participants’ writing suggested greater levels of compromise-seeking when dealing with a cultural conflict among the students taught about IH, relative to those in the control classes. This study provides initial insights regarding the relationship between IH and cultural humility, as well as the efficacy of facilitating the development of IH among undergraduate students. (shrink)

This book reveals the sense in which our postmodern societies are characterized by the obscene absence of the intellectual. The modern intellectual--who had once been associated with humanism and enlightenment—has in our day been replaced by media stars, talking heads, and technical experts. At issue is the ongoing crisis of democracy, under the aegis of the société du spectacle and its vast networks of politically-induced idiocy, industrially-produced biocide, and militarily-provoked genocide. Spectacle fills the resulting moral and intellectual (...) vacuum with electronic technologies of control, punishment, and destruction. This postmodern tyranny reduces intelligence to mechanistic, positivist, and grammatological models of inquiry, while increasing the segmentation, fragmentation, and dissolution of human existence. The apotheosis of the spectacle explains the intellectual void that lies at the heart of our postmodern decadence; it also accounts for the need to recuperate the humanist values of enlightenment promoted by the modern intellectual tradition. (shrink)

The universal attempt to link computers by means of business process reengineering, enterprise integration, and the management of technology is creating large systems that structure and control the flows of information within institutions. Human work associated with these systems must be reorganized in the image of these technologies. The transformation of office work now parallels that of factory work as a result of the intellectual assembly line: Each so-called knowledge worker adds and transforms information in a manner almost entirely (...) prescribed by the system, which, in turn, takes this information to the next work station and so on. The result is a loss of control coupled with growing demands and a new kind of organizational structure. It would appear that the implications for human health are possibly even greater than those associated with traditional assembly-line work. (shrink)

Generally known for its advanced, often radical suggestions of reform in politics, religion, morality, and human behavior, the Greek Enlightenment has long been studied in terms of its doctrines and theories. To understand the environment in which the new ideas flourished and their impact, Friedrich Solmsen explores the novel intellectual methods that developed during the period. A variety of new modes of thought was introduced at this time or, if known before, was applied with delight in experimentation. Among those (...) that Friedrich Solmsen examines are new methods of argumentation: persuasion aimed at the control of man's emotions; Utopian speculation; experiments with language; and the emergence of a secular psychology and its use in the reconstruction of human motives and historical events. Concentrating on the work of nonphilosophical authors such as the historian Thucydides and the tragedian Euripides, the author presents a portrait of a restless and spirited age engaged in an adventure of reason. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Intellectual Ethics of Revealed Truth:A Thomistic ApproachRoger PouivetIAt the beginning of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], Thomas Aquinas says that "we must first show what way is open to us in order that we may make known the truth which is our object" (SCG I, ch., 3, no. 1).1 To question ourselves in this way is to do what we, today, call epistemology. So, in my opinion, (...) in the first chapters of the SCG, Aquinas examines questions belonging to the so-called "Epistemology of religious beliefs."2 Aquinas wonders how we may have the right to claim that God exists and what his attributes are, and to believe the revealed truths.So understood, epistemology of religious beliefs is part of what I will call "intellectual ethics." It is less about beliefs themselves—to know whether or not they are justified—than about believers, about persons and their intellectual virtues. Do they have a blameless and even a superior intellectual life? Or, are they immoral in having received their religious beliefs in the way that they did? In particular, it raises as a central question whether it is consistent with intellectual virtue for a person to receive beliefs by revelation, that is in the name of God. Is it possible to receive truths from the divine external source and donor, through the biblical text itself, or even through those who are purportedly in charge of manifesting the Word of God, and be an epistemologically virtuous, irreproachable person? [End Page 1289]My hypothesis is that the opening chapters of the SCG may be viewed as a step into the field of intellectual ethics examining the acquisition of religious beliefs from the perspective of intellectual virtue and defending the legitimacy of certain intellectual attitudes.IILet us distinguish two accounts of epistemology. What we may call an "epistemology of justification" deals with the norms or rules whose observance ensures the justification of our beliefs and the legitimacy of our claims to knowledge. It does not concern itself with the norms of behavior of a seeker after knowledge, but rather with the question whether what someone believes or claims is backed by evidence; and it debates what does or does not count as evidence and which are the rules by means of which evidence may support, or fail to support, beliefs or knowledge claims. Such an epistemology likewise concerns itself with the reflective control that we exert over our beliefs.In the second account, epistemology explores intellectual virtues as qualities of character. Our epistemic life is laudable when our acquisition of beliefs depends upon these virtues. However, in the perspective that we find in Aquinas, virtues are not understood simply as skills (or competences) that ensure that we arrive at beliefs that are justified by evidence, in the usual meanings given to that term. So, this second account of which I speak here differs from so-called "virtue reliabilism," for which, ultimately, virtues are simply faculties functioning properly for the maximization of our knowledge.3 An "epistemology of intellectual virtues" in a Thomistic approach addresses the question of what a "good epistemic life" is. So, it is not intended to define justification or knowledge to indicate what are the right rules (as in an epistemology of justification) to control beliefs, or even not what are the right procedures (as in an epistemology of skills) to acquire beliefs.In epistemology of the first type, the main epistemic commandment to persons is to believe only on the basis of sufficient evidence. It is essential that this evidence be recognized internally, through an examination of the reasons to believe. Any defense of the legitimacy of revealed beliefs or of any claim to know through revelation will prove, on this basis, utterly [End Page 1290] implausible, and so epistemically blameworthy. Revealed beliefs suppose our complete intellectual dependence upon an external source. We are not in the position to exert any internal control. The standard of such control would itself be received from the same source, and not grounded in our own epistemological initiative. So, in modern epistemology, the primacy of the rule of evidence has led to religious beliefs being deemed to... (shrink)

We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it, or for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. for instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe are praised for what they come to know. sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain (...) ecological facts as a result of their refusing to countenance the evidence. the purpose of this paper is to explore what underlies the legitimacy of this practice—the praise or blame of people for what they know or fail to know as a result of investigation or otherwise—namely, the ability to exercise control over one’s doxastic states, and, in particular, as i will argue, one’s ability to exercise indirect generic control over one’s doxastic states. (shrink)

This article examines the antebellum popular culture that was created by pro-slavery intellectuals and that contributed to the subordination of female African slaves. It argues that southern ideologues produced a dominant ideology that facilitated the exploitation of enslaved Black women and contributed to the social construction of their gender. This article contributes to Black feminist theory that, since the early 1970s, has been developing as a counter-hegemonic advocate for the subaltern African American woman.

This paper explores the possibility of extending Locke’s theory with respect to tangible property so that it might offer a feasible theoretical basis for intellectual property too. The main conclusion is that such an attempt must fail. Locke’s theory comes in three parts: a general justification of property which serves to explain why assets ought to be under the exclusive control of individuals; a positive method of private appropriation whereby an individual acquires a prima facie exclusive claim to previously (...) commonly held natural resources; and third, a negative requirement that other individuals’ crucial interests are not harmed by such an appropriation. For each of these, the difficulties involved in applying that part of the theory to the sphere of ideas are discussed, and a central aspect of intellectual property that raises the problems of application is highlighted. (shrink)

Calls to regulate or restrict scientific research are often a matter of politics, and public desire to regulate science may have its source in several different underlying interests: on one side, people may be motivated by an interest to control risks, prevent harms, or limit access to powerful or dangerous technologies. These interests are easy to understand, and often provide entirely appropriate and creditable grounds for regulation. In a darker vein, people may be motivated by more general mistrust of science, (...) or by moral or religious disapproval of some kinds of research. While these motives may be easy to understand, clearly they should be resisted. But if researchers hope to avoid inappropriate regulations, we need to be prepared to explain our research to the public. And when research is funded by tax dollars, it is especially important that scientists should be able to justify its benefit to taxpayers and legislators. (shrink)

On the basis of these findings, I suggest that the structure and organisation of the field of Hungarian economics under state socialism should be described as a case of “partitioned bureaucracy”.9 The compromise between research economists and the political elite in the New Course era between 1953 and 195510 survived the post-1956 reaction in so far as political economy, with its predominantly legitimatory and ideological functions, remained partitioned from the other sectors in the field through the remainder of the state-socialist (...) period. This secured considerable protection both for Marxist-Leninist political economy—which faced the destabilising effects of exposure to the findings of serious empirical research—and for the other sectors, which were professionally oriented and earnestly interested in the pursuit of unbiased empirical research, free from stifling agitprop interference. Our data concerning the reputational control of the field reflects only one, although very important, aspect of this partitioning. Another and much plainer aspect is that, from the early 1960s, the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee no longer exercised control over the field, except in the political economy sector.The proposition about the “mechanism paradigm” should not be taken seriously as a statement of a Kuhnian type of intellectual organisation of Hungarian economics, with “reform economics” at its “hard theoretical core”. But it should certainly be taken seriously as a reflection of the sociopolitical structure which emerged and developed from the mid-1950s onwards. Neither the politicians nor the economists saw as necessary or even contemplated the integration of Hungarian economic research with Western mainstream economic thought. In exchange for the professional expertise and socio-economic intelligence necessary for the exercise of power, Hungary's state-socialist political class offered their economists relative autonomy and freedom from interference. The price the economists had to pay was partly to refrain from openly and systematically challenging the beliefs perpetuated by the political economy of socialism, and partly to accept in their research the paramountcy of policy orientation. But this burden they assumed willingly since it made them the only group within Hungary's academic intelligentsia—indeed, the only group in Hungarian society outside the political class—with the privilege of being coopted to the institutions with power over some restricted domains of policymaking. After 1989, especially under the conservative Antall government, this proved less than advantageous.11 Although the benevolence of many critics is open to question, it could greatly benefit the field if the economists' expulsion from contemporary politics went hand in hand with provision of the material, intellectual and institutional conditions for a new approach where a fundamentally scientific orientation is paramount. (shrink)

Virtual enterprise is a dynamic alliance of businesses, in which multiple members undertake joint research, development, manufacturing, operation, etc. The complexity of the relationship between business members, coupled with many new technologies or methods applied in the alliance operation, leads to more uncertain factors and difficulties in the operation and risk management of the virtual enterprise. The distributed decision-making model is a fast and effective decision-making model, in which dispersed intellectual resources and information resources are dynamically integrated through virtual (...) organization forms and operating mechanisms, and the dynamic reorganization, result evaluation, and synthesis of the decision-making system are realized by certain control rules. On the basis of summarizing and analyzing previous research works, this paper expounded the research status and significance of the risk control of virtual enterprise; elaborated the development background, current status, and future challenges of distributed decision-making model; introduced the related works of decision-making variable calculation and constraint determination; constructed a risk control model for virtual enterprise based on distributed decision-making model; analyzed the multiobjective model and interval programming model of risk control; established a risk control approach for virtual enterprise based on distributed decision-making model; performed the optimal allocation of risk control funds and the selective optimization of backup allies; and finally conducted a case analysis. The study results show that, in view of the diversity of relationships between alliance businesses and the complexity of the distribution of cooperative areas, the distributed decision-making model can more reasonably describe the relationship between alliance members and accurately control the risks of virtual enterprise from multiple angles, which can effectively manage the risks of virtual enterprise. The study results of this paper provide a reference for further research on the risk control of virtual enterprise based on distributed decision-making model. (shrink)

There has been an intellectual debate at least since the 1960s in business ethics on the role of the media in relation to consumer choice driven by either habits or rationality. If consumers are totally rational, then the global media and global corporations provide just information and knowledge. If consumers are influenced by habit then large corporations and global media can greatly influence consumer choice and create problems of self-control (Ainslie, 1992, Pico Economics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational (...) States Within the Person, Cambridge University press, Cambridge). In this article, we provide a synthesis and integrated approach to this continuing debate. We provide a more institutional approach to consumer choice based on social conventions, rather than just on individual habits and lapses in self-control. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

If moral responsibilities prescribe how agents ought to behave, are there also intellectual responsibilities prescribing what agents ought to believe? Many theorists have argued that there cannot be intellectual responsibilities because they would require the ability to control whether one believes, whereas it is impossible to control whether one believes. This argument appeals to an “ought implies can” principle for intellectual responsibilities. The present paper tests for the presence of intellectual responsibilities in social cognition. Four experiments (...) show that intellectual responsibilities are attributed to believe things and that these responsibilities can exceed what agents are able to believe. Furthermore, the results show that agents are sometimes considered responsible for failing to form true beliefs on the basis of good evidence, and that this effect does not depend on the seriousness of the consequences for failing to form a belief. These findings clarify when and how responsibilities for belief are attributed, falsify a conceptual entailment between ability and responsibility in the intellectual domain, and emphasize the importance of objective truth in intellectual evaluations. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective (...) awareness or “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

Contemporary egalitarian political philosophy has become increasingly interested in the ways the international order may protect or undermine states’ capacities to deliver domestic egalitarianism. This paper draws on Miriam Ronzoni’s helpful discussion of the various different ways in which both philosophical and practical commitments can move beyond a contrast between a world of closed societies and a cosmopolis to explore how successful the theorizing prompted by that interest has been. Problems scholars like Peter Mair and Wolfgang Streeck have suggested the (...) EU faces also suggest that there are difficulties views like Ronzoni’s have to overcome to usefully orient us towards the threats posed by the interactions between domestic and international politics. These problems can be usefully framed by what the intellectual historian István Hont called jealousy of trade and used to understand debates between members of what is commonly understood as the republican tradition, especially in the eighteenth century. Jealousy of trade revolves around the way that international economic competition intensifies international political competition, requiring the restructuring of domestic politics to ensure the survival of the state, which then further intensifies international economic competition. The ways of navigating and controlling the increasing costs of an increasingly belligerent international order eighteenth century political theorists found help illustrate the challenges contemporary internationalising egalitarians face. Isaac Nakhimovsky’s work on Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s closed commercial state is, I argue, specially useful given the similarity of some of Fichte’s commitments to those of contemporary internationalising egalitarians. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the internal mechanisms of corporate governance (board of directors and ownership structure), which influence voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The results appear to corroborate the view that an increase in institutional investor shareholding has a negative effect on voluntary disclosure, supporting the hypothesis of entrenchment, whereas an excessive ownership by institutional investors may have adverse effects on strategic disclosure decisions. The results also indicate that an increase in the number of members of the (...) board to up to 15 has a beneficial effect on the disclosure of intangibles. However, as this number increases, the effect inverts and becomes adverse to improving the capacity for supervision and control in the decision-making process regarding the voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The findings endorse the recommendation of the most of the Corporate Governance Codes regarding an advisable maximum of 15 members on a board to ensure its effectiveness and internal cohesion. (shrink)

Very early experiments described in ancient literature usually have no detailed explanation of the methods used let alone the explicit Control expected by modern scientists for comparison with Treatments. Athenaeus describes a rarely recorded exception in The Deipnosophistae which has been briefly noted in scientific literature but not sufficiently contextualized. The experiment described has one treatment, a control and Athenaeus cites the desirability of replication, making this passage read like a modern text rather than an ancient one. Because technical processes (...) were invented in ancient times I assume that experiments were also practiced, even though they are not described in ancient literature. This passage in Athenaeus exemplifies, by rare contrast, the general lack of description for ancient scientific methods. This lack may be because the ancient practitioners of technical processes did not have the reason modern scientists use for disclosure of all methods and results. Moderns achieve monetization that is protected by Intellectual Property Law or by acquisition of authority followed by salaried teaching in the academy. Ancient experimenters protected their discoveries by secrecy and maintained monopolies by concealment, an inconvenience for modern scholars. The form of ancient literature is important for this subject: it is not like modern scientific literature. When the ancients mention scientific subjects in writing it is in the form of literary discourse and debate where the aim is cerebral. There is no description of technical details where the aim is to allow replication of the experiment. Comfortable logic not experiment is described and intellectual improvement was usually the aim of ancient literature, rather than practical outcomes. The only reason we have knowledge of ancient practitioners of something similar to modern scientific methods from literature is that their kind of technical antics were briefly mentioned by ancient authors, because of their surprising and amusing nature. (shrink)

© 2014 Shapiro, Tassone, Choudhary and Simon.Chromosome 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome is caused by the most common human microdeletion, and it is associated with cognitive impairments across many domains. While impairments in cognitive control have been described in children with 22q11.2DS, the nature and development of these impairments are not clear. Children with 22q11.2DS and typically developing children were tested on four well-validated tasks aimed at measuring specific foundational components of cognitive control: response inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory. Molecular assays (...) were also conducted in order to examine genotype of catechol-O-methyltransferase, a gene located within the deleted region in 22q11.2DS and hypothesized to play a role in cognitive control. Mixed model regression analyses were used to examine group differences, as well as age-related effects on cognitive control component processes in a cross-sectional analysis. Regression models with COMT genotype were also conducted in order to examine potential effects of the different variants of the gene. Response inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory were impaired in children with 22q11.2DS relative to TD children, even after accounting for global intellectual functioning. When compared with TD individuals, children with 22q11.2DS demonstrated atypical age-related patterns of response inhibition and cognitive flexibility. Both groups demonstrated typical age-related associations with working memory. The results of this cross-sectional analysis suggest a specific aberration in the development of systems mediating response inhibition in a sub-set of children with 22q11.2DS. It will be important to follow up with longitudinal analyses to directly examine these developmental trajectories, and correlate neurocognitive variables with clinical and adaptive outcome measures. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the social impacts of “silent control” of individuals by means of the architecture of dataveillance systems. It addresses the question whether individuals, in reality, can actually determine autonomously the kinds of information that they can acquire and convey in today's dataveillance environments. The paper argues that there is a risk of a “counter‐control revolution” that may threaten to reverse the “control revolution” described by Shapiro.Design/methodology/approachUsing relevant business cases, this paper describes the nature (...) of dataveillance systems, then it examines situations in which the intellectual freedom of individuals is silently constrained by the architecture of such systems. This analysis leads to the conclusion that individuals in today's information society face the risk of a “counter‐control revolution” that can threaten their intellectual freedom. Given this troubling conclusion, the present paper addresses the challenges of establishing socially acceptable dataveillance systems.FindingsIntentionally or unintentionally, the architecture of dataveillance systems determines what kinds of information an individual can access or receive. This means that social sorting occurs based upon the processing of personal information by dataveillance systems; and, as a result, individuals' intellectual freedom could be constrained without their realising that it is happening. Under this circumstance, the ability of individuals to control the transmission and flow of information, recently made possible by the “control revolution”, already has been compromised by business organisations that operate dataveillance systems. It is business organisations, and not the individuals themselves, that control the kinds of information that individuals are able to acquire and transmit.Originality/valueThis paper provides an analysis of social risks caused by the architecture of dataveillance systems, and it introduces the concept of a “counter‐control revolution”. These contributions provide a good starting point to evaluate the social impacts of dataveillance systems and to establish better, more socially acceptable dataveillance systems. (shrink)

In the standard narrative of her life, Barbara McClintock discovered genetic transposition in the 1940s but no one believed her. She was ignored until molecular biologists of the 1970s "rediscovered" transposition and vindicated her heretical discovery. New archival documents, as well as interviews and close reading of published papers, belie this narrative. Transposition was accepted immediately by both maize and bacterial geneticists. Maize geneticists confirmed it repeatedly in the early 1950s and by the late 1950s it was considered a classic (...) discovery. But for McClintock, movable elements were part of an elaborate system of genetic control that she hypothesized to explain development and differentiation. This theory was highly speculative and was not widely accepted, even by those who had discovered transposition independently. When Jacob and Monod presented their alternative model for gene regulation, the operon, her controller argument was discarded as incorrect. Transposition, however, was soon discovered in microorganisms and by the late 1970s was recognized as a phenomenon of biomedical importance. For McClintock, the award of the 1983 Nobel Prize to her for the discovery of movable genetic elements, long treated as a legitimation, may well have been bittersweet. This new look at McClintock's experiments and theory has implications for the intellectual history of biology, the social history of American genetics, and McClintock's role in the historiography of women in science. (shrink)

The main function of vision in many animals is to control movement. In rodents, some visuomotor acts require the construction of models of the external world while others rely on Gibsonian invariants. Such findings support Norman's dual processing approach but it is not clear that the two types of processing rely on homologs of visual processing streams described in primates.

People with mild to moderate intellectual or multiple disabilities may have serious difficulties in accessing leisure events, managing communication exchanges with distant partners, and performing functional daily activities. Recently, efforts were made to develop and assess technology-aided programs aimed at supporting people in all three areas. This study assessed a new technology-aided program aimed at helping four participants with intellectual and multiple disabilities in the aforementioned areas. The program, which was implemented following a non-concurrent multiple baseline across participants (...) design, relied on the use of a smartphone or tablet connected via Bluetooth to a two-switch device. This device served to select leisure and communication events and to control the smartphone or tablet’s delivery of step instructions for the activities scheduled. Data showed that during the baseline phase, three participants failed in each of the areas while one participant managed to access a few leisure events. During the intervention phase, all participants managed to independently access leisure events, make telephone calls, and carry out activities. These results suggest that the program might be a useful tool for helping people with intellectual and multiple disabilities improve their condition in basic areas of daily life. (shrink)

The invariant left–right asymmetry of animal body plans raises fascinating questions in cell, developmental, evolutionary, and neuro‐biology. While intermediate mechanisms (e.g., asymmetric gene expression) have been well‐characterized, very early steps remain elusive. Recent studies suggested a candidate for the origins of asymmetry: rotary movement of extracellular morphogens by cilia during gastrulation. This model is intellectually satisfying, because it bootstraps asymmetry from the intrinsic biochemical chirality of cilia. However, conceptual and practical problems remain with this hypothesis, and the genetic data is (...) consistent with a different mechanism. Based on wide‐ranging data on ion fluxes and motor protein action in a number of species, a model is proposed whereby laterality is generated much earlier, by asymmetric transport of ions, which results in pH/voltage gradients across the midline. These asymmetries are in turn generated by a new candidate for “step 1”: asymmetric localization of electrogenic proteins by cytoplasmic motors. BioEssays 25:1002–1010, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The invariant left–right asymmetry of animal body plans raises fascinating questions in cell, developmental, evolutionary, and neuro‐biology. While intermediate mechanisms (e.g., asymmetric gene expression) have been well‐characterized, very early steps remain elusive. Recent studies suggested a candidate for the origins of asymmetry: rotary movement of extracellular morphogens by cilia during gastrulation. This model is intellectually satisfying, because it bootstraps asymmetry from the intrinsic biochemical chirality of cilia. However, conceptual and practical problems remain with this hypothesis, and the genetic data is (...) consistent with a different mechanism. Based on wide‐ranging data on ion fluxes and motor protein action in a number of species, a model is proposed whereby laterality is generated much earlier, by asymmetric transport of ions, which results in pH/voltage gradients across the midline. These asymmetries are in turn generated by a new candidate for “step 1”: asymmetric localization of electrogenic proteins by cytoplasmic motors. BioEssays 25:1002–1010, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

One branch of virtue epistemology, Virtue-Responsibilism, has argued that the intellectual virtues are analogous in structure to Aristotelian moral virtues. Like Aristotelian moral virtues, intellectual virtues are acquired dispositions of motivation, emotion, action, and perception. Responsibilists argue that intellectual virtues, e.g., open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual autonomy, are praiseworthy character traits, over which we have some control and for which we are responsible. If Responsibilism is correct, is there a distinction between moral virtues and (...) class='Hi'>intellectual virtues? I address two different arguments for the claim that there is a distinction, in the sense that the intellectual virtues are a special subset of the moral virtues. Both Linda Zagzebski and Jason Baehr have argued that the criteria for intellectual virtue include all of the criteria for moral virtue, but also include additional criteria that set the intellectual virtues apart from other moral virtues. I contend that Zagzebski’s and Baehr’s arguments fail. Ultimately, we won’t be able to determine whether Responsibilist intellectual virtues are distinct from moral virtues until we decide on the scope of ‘the moral’ and ‘moral virtue’. (shrink)

An important issue for information ethics is how much control people should have over the dissemination of information that they have created. Since intellectual property policies have an impact on our welfare primarily because they have a huge impact on our ability to acquire knowledge, there is an important role for epistemology in resolving this issue. This paper discusses the various ways in which intellectual property policies can impact knowledge acquisition both positively and negatively. In particular, it looks (...) at how intellectual property policies can affect the amount of information that people create, the quality of that information, the accessibility of that information, the diversity of that information, and the locatability of that information. (shrink)

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article is dedicated to an exploration (...) and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source. (shrink)

From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium (...) and thus the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats. The non-determinism of the intellect’s causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons. (shrink)

The search for “usable” expert systems is leading somemedical researchers to question the appropriate role of these programs. Most current systems assume a limited role for the human user, delegating situated “decision-control” to the machine. As expert systems are only able to replace a narrow range of human intellectual functions, this leaves the programs unable to cope with the “constructivist” nature of human knowledge-use. In returning practical control to the human doctor, some researchers are abandoning focusedproblem-solving in favour of (...) supportiveproblem-analysis. Using ONCOCIN and QMR as examples, this article contrasts these approaches and suggests that the latter avoids many of the difficulties currently facing medical expert systems. (shrink)

I reply to Stephen White’s criticisms of my Influence View. First, I reply to his worry that my Appraisal Account of responsibility cannot make sense of doxastic responsibility. Then, I discuss in detail his stolen painting case and argue that the Influence View can make sense of it. Next, I discuss various other cases that are meant to show that acting in accordance with one’s beliefs does not render one blameless. I argue that in these cases, even though the subjects (...) act in accordance with their own beliefs, there is plenty of reason to think that at some previous point in time they violated certain intellectual obligations that led to them to hold those beliefs. Even on a radically subjective account of responsibility, then, we can perfectly well hold these people responsible for their beliefs. I go on to defend the idea that reasons-responsiveness will not do for doxastic responsibility: we need influence on our beliefs as well. Thus, doxastic compatibilism or rationalism is untenable. Subsequently, I defend my earlier claim that there is a crucial difference between beliefs and actions in that actions are often subject to the will, whereas beliefs are not. Finally, I respond to White’s worry that if one has a subjective epistemic obligation just because one believes that certain actions are epistemically bad, some people will have a wide range of absurd epistemic obligations, such as the obligation to listen to Infowars. (shrink)

An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa's (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (for example, the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance‐enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. This paper explores in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa's wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and (...) the solution proposed draws both from the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) and from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; and Carter 2017). (shrink)