Authors
Tobias Hoffmann
Sorbonne Université
Abstract
From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats. The non-determinism of the intellect’s causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons.
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick Chisholm - 1964 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will. Blackwell.
Asymmetrical Freedom.Susan Wolf - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):151-66.
Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 31.

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Citations of this work BETA

Freedom Without Choice: Medieval Theories of the Essence of Freedom.Tobias Hoffmann - forthcoming - In Thomas Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 194-216.
Aquinas on Mixed Actions.Tianyue Wu - 2019 - Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 61:45-64.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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