Irigaray turns to Merleau-Ponty's intuitions about the perception of color to develop her own insights into the creative emergence of sexuate identity. As a quality of the flesh, color cannot be reduced to formal codes. The privileging of word and text inherent to Western culture suppresses the coming into being of the embodied subject in his or her own situated context. Color, tied as it is to a corporeal creativity could provide an important link since it facilitates reflection, and a (...) re-enfleshing through color of a differentiated sexuate identity tied to the imagination as well as to genetic identity. (shrink)

Hrushovski proved that the theory of difference-differential fields of characteristic zero has a model-companion, which we shall denote DCFA. Previously, the author proved that this theory is supersimple. In supersimple theories there is a notion of rank defined in analogy with Lascar U-rank for superstable theories. It is also possible to define a notion of dimension for types in DCFA based on transcendence degree of realization of the types. In this paper we compute the rank of a (...) model of DCFA, give some properties regarding rank and dimension, and give an example of a definable set with finite rank but infinite dimension. Finally we prove that for the case of definable subgroup of the additive group being finite-dimensional and having finite rank are equivalent. (shrink)

Hrushovski proved that the theory of difference-differential fields of characteristic zero has a model-companion, which we shall denote DCFA. Previously, the author proved that this theory is supersimple. In supersimple theories there is a notion of rank defined in analogy with Lascar U -rank for superstable theories. It is also possible to define a notion of dimension for types in DCFA based on transcendence degree of realization of the types. In this paper we compute the rank of (...) a model of DCFA, give some properties regarding rank and dimension, and give an example of a definable set with finite rank but infinite dimension. Finally we prove that for the case of definable subgroup of the additive group being finite-dimensional and having finite rank are equivalent. (shrink)

In this paper we study predimension inequalities in differential fields and define what it means for such an inequality to be adequate. Adequacy was informally introduced by Zilber, and here we give a precise definition in a quite general context. We also discuss the connection of this problem to definability of derivations in the reducts of differentially closed fields. The Ax-Schanuel inequality for the exponential differential equation (proved by Ax) and its analogue for the differential (...) equation of the j-function (established by Pila and Tsimerman) are our main examples of predimensions. We carry out a Hrushovski construction with the latter predimension and obtain a natural candidate for the first-order theory of the differential equation of the j-function. It is analogous to Kirby's axiomatisation of the theory of the exponential differential equation (which in turn is based on the axioms of Zilber's pseudo-exponentiation), although there are many significant differences. In joint work with Sebastian Eterović and Jonathan Kirby we have recently proven that the axiomatisation obtained in this paper is indeed an axiomatisation of the theory of the differential equation of the j-function, that is, the Ax-Schanuel inequality for the j-function is adequate. (shrink)

Let G be a finite group. We explore the model-theoretic properties of the class of differential fields of characteristic zero in m commuting derivations equipped with a G-action by differential fie...

There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are (...) initially inclined to understand debates about logic. Can one find a pluralist thesis that is high on the interest scale, and also true? (shrink)

Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if (...) we reject excluded middle, with special emphasis on the conditional. There is also discussion of higher order indeterminacy (in several different senses) and of penumbral connections; and there is a suggested definition of determinateness in terms of the conditional and a discussion of the extent to which the notion of determinateness is objective. And there are suggestions about a unified treatment of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

This paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory.

The term ‘social capital’ is a way of defining the intangible resources of community, shared values and trust upon which we draw in daily life. It has achieved considerable international currency across the social sciences through the very different work of Pierre Bourdieu in France and James Coleman and Robert Putnam in the United States, and has been widely taken up within politics and sociology as an explanation for the decline in social cohesion and community values in western societies. It (...) has also been adopted by policy makers, particularly in international governmental bodies such as the World Bank. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and ResponsibilityLloyd Fields (bio)AbstractIn this paper I seek to show that at least one kind of psychopath is incapable of forming other-regarding moral beliefs; hence that they cannot act for other-regarding moral reasons; and hence that they are not appropriate subjects for the assessment of either moral or legal responsibility. Various attempts to characterize psychopaths are considered and rejected, in particular the widely held (...) view that psychopaths are, in general, incapable of understanding moral concepts. The particular disability proposed here, the incapacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs, is then derived from an analysis of what is required for someone to be a responsible agent. This is illustrated with a detailed case history. A defect of this kind is shown to vitiate moral responsibility, because it renders the psychopath irresponsive to the social pressures which normally ensure respect for moral norms. It is also shown that the psychopath is not a suitable subject for the assessment of legal responsibility, because he lacks the capacity to act from common prudence to avoid sanctions. I conclude that the attempt to characterize particular defects from among the heterogeneity of psychopathic subjects, could lead to better targeted, and hence to more effective, management of particular cases.KeywordsCriminality, mental illness, personality disorder, blame, liability, moral beliefs, guilt, social moralityIntroductionThe term “psychopath” has been used with a wide variety of different meanings and, no doubt, covers a heterogeneous group of subjects (Criminal behaviour and mental health 1992). My aim in this paper is to argue that at least a subgroup of those subjects are characterized by an inability to form other-regarding moral beliefs—and hence, for this particular reason, are not morally responsible agents—and that they also lack the capacity for prudence, and hence are not legally responsible agents.I begin by distinguishing the particular sense in which I will be using the term “psychopathy.” I then consider some suggestions in the literature regarding the defect by which psychopaths might be characterized—that they are mentally ill, or incapable of understanding moral concepts. In rejecting these, I come to the suggestion that the relevant defect is an inability to form other-regarding moral beliefs, a defect which is graphically illustrated by a case report from the literature. I explore the implication of this kind of defect for [End Page 261] moral responsibility as a socially-embedded notion, and the implication of the psychopath’s inability to exercise prudence in relation to legal liability.Nothing in this paper should be taken to suggest that psychopaths are irredeemable. On the contrary, as I argue in an endnote, correctly characterizing the defect from which they suffer leads directly to forms of treatment whose effectiveness has acquired a measure of empirical support.The Nature of PsychopathyPsychopathy is not a homogeneous concept; there are different types of psychopaths. For example, Henderson identified a type of psychopath who he classified as “Predominantly Creative,” exemplified by such figures as T. E. Lawrence and Joan of Arc. In people of this type genius is associated with heightened sensitivity, psychosexual immaturity and emotional instability (Henderson 1939, 108–20; Henderson and Gillespie 1969, 317). Predominantly creative psychopaths do not come within my purview.By “psychopathy” I shall mean the specific form of personality disorder described by Cleckley in his book, The Mask of Sanity (Cleckley 1964). Cleckley’s description forms the basis of Hare’s Revised (20-item) Psychopathy Checklist. The Checklist includes the following personality traits and deviant behaviors:1. Glibness/superficial charm.2. Grandiose sense of self-worth.3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom.4. Pathological lying.5. Conning/manipulative.6. Lack of remorse or guilt.7. Shallow affect.8. Callous/lack of empathy.9. Parasitic lifestyle.10. Poor behavioral controls.11. Promiscuous sexual behavior.12. Early behavior problems.13. Lack of realistic, long-term plans.14. Impulsivity.15. Irresponsibility.16. Failure to accept responsibility for own actions.17. Many short-term marital relationships.18. Juvenile delinquency.19. Revocation of conditional release.20. Criminal versatility (Hare 1986, 18). 1This conceptualization resembles in many respects the category of Antisocial Personality Disorder as described in the American Psychiatric... (shrink)

Incoherence is usually regarded as a bad thing. Incoherence suggests irrationality, confusion, paradox. Incoherentism disagrees: incoherence is not always a bad thing, sometimes we ought to be incoherent. If correct, Incoherentism has important and controversial implications. It implies that rationality does not always require coherence. Dilemmism and Incoherentism both embrace conflict in epistemology. After identifying some important differences between these two ways of embracing conflict, I offer some reasons to prefer Incoherentism over Dilemmism. Namely, that Incoherentism allows us to deliberate (...) about what we ought to believe using ordinary epistemology, and it does a better job of accommodating the positive features of incoherence. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes two approaches to understanding the representational content of sentences and intentional states, and its role in describing people, predicting and explaining their behavior, and so forth. It sets forth the case for one of these approaches, the “egocentric” one, initially on the basis of its ability to explain the near‐indefeasibility of ascriptions of content to our own terms (“‘dogs’ as I use it means dogs”), but more generally on the basis of its providing an attractive overall picture (...) of the descriptive and explanatory role of representational content. In doing this, the paper relates the egocentric view to an “immanent” or “deflationary” view of reference and truth conditions, and also to the view of reference‐talk and truth‐talk as anaphoric devices. It discusses the indeterminacy of content ascriptions to those in communities with radically different theories, a phenomenon that is unsurprising on the egocentric approach, and connects this to the thesis of the normativity of meaning. (It does all this in rather broad brush: many strands of the egocentric account will be familiar, and are the subject of familiar controversies; the point of the paper is less to address these controversies individually than to tie the strands together into what is hoped to be an appealing package.). (shrink)

ABSTRACT Section 1 discusses properties and propositions, and some of the motivation for an account in which property instantiation and propositional truth behave ‘naively’. Section 2 generalizes a standard Kripke construction for naive properties and propositions, in a language with modal operators but no conditionals. Whereas Kripke uses a 3-valued value space, the generalized account allows for a broad array of value spaces, including the unit interval [0,1]. This is put to use in Section 3, where I add to the (...) language a conditional suitable for restricting quantification. The shift from a value space based on the ‘mini-space’ {0,, 1} to one based on the ‘mini-space’ [0,1] leads to more satisfactory results than I was able to achieve in previous work: a vast variety of paradoxical sentences can now be treated very simply. In Section 4 I make a further addition to the language, a conditional modeled on the ordinary English conditional, paying particular attention to how it interacts with the restricted quantifier conditional. This is all done in the [0,1] framework, and two alternatives are considered for how the ordinary conditional is to be handled; one of them results from adding a tweak to a construction by Ross Brady. Section 5 discusses a further alternative, a standard relevance conditional (for the ordinary conditional, perhaps for use with a different quantifier-restricting conditional), but argues that it is not promising. Section 6 discusses the identity conditions of properties and propositions (again in the setting of a value space based on [0,1]); the issue of achieving naivety for coarse-grained properties is seen to be more complicated than some brief remarks in Field [2010] suggested, but a way to get a fair degree of coarse-grainedness is shown. (shrink)

Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...) and indeterminacy, there is no worry about inconsistency; but a central intuition is that we must reject the factual status of certain sentences, and it hard to see how we can do that while claiming that the law of excluded middle applies to those sentences. So despite the different routes, we have a similar conclusion in the two cases. (shrink)

Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, advocating instead an extreme pluralism. The early parts of the paper will try to elucidate this anti‐objectivist position, and question whether conventionalism really offers a third form of it distinct from fictionalism and the multiverse view. The paper (...) then turns to anti‐objectivism about logic, and suggests that here too conventionalism offers no distinct alternative, and that there are limits on the extent of pluralism/anti‐objectivism. It also argues that these limits can't be used to argue for more extensive objectivity within mathematics, and also that they do allow for more limited pluralism within logic, e.g. as regards resolution of semantic and property‐theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

When the history of life on earth is viewed as a history of cell division, all of life becomes a single cell lineage. The growth and differentiation of this lineage in reciprocal interaction with its environment can be viewed as a developmental process; hence the evolution of life on earth can also be seen as the development of life on earth. Here, in reviewing this field, some potentially fruitful research directions suggested by this change in perspective are highlighted. Variation and (...) selection become, for example, bidirectional information flows between scales, while the notions of “cooperation” and “competition” become scale relative. The language of communication, inference, and information processing becomes more useful than the language of causation to describe the interactions of both homogeneous and heterogeneous living systems at any scale. Emerging scale‐free theoretical frameworks such as predictive coding and active inference provide conceptual tools for reconceptualizing biology as the study of a unified, multiscale dynamical system. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Genevieve Lloyd argues that when we follow Spinoza in understanding reason as a part of nature, we gain new insights into the human condition. Specifically, we gain a new political insight: we should respond to cultural difference with a pluralist ethos. This is because there is no pure universal reason; human minds find their reason shaped differently by their various embodied social contexts. Furthermore, we can use the resources of the imagination to bring this ethos about. In my (...) response, I offer a friendly challenge to Lloyd’s characterisation of the lessons of Spinoza’s philosophy. I argue that Lloyd’s Spinoza remains excessively unpolitical, even in the moment that he is brought to bear on contemporary politics. An unpluralistic attitude may well be rationally inferior, but is it really explained by insufficient or inappropriate imagination? To the contrary, a properly Spinozist account of reason must include an account of the concrete determinants of reason’s imperfect realisation in the world. In Spinoza’s own oeuvre, this is carried out through an ever-increasing—and ever more sociological—interest in the political structures within which individual reason flourishes or withers. (shrink)

Irigaray's insistence on sexual difference as the primary difference arises out of a phenomenological perception of nature. Drawing on Heidegger's insights into physis, she begins with his critique of the nature/culture binary. Both philosophers maintain that nature is not matter to be ordered by technical know-how; yet Irigaray reveals that although Heidegger distinguishes physis from techn in his work, his forgetting of the potentiality of matter, the maternal-feminine, and the two-fold essence of being as sexual difference means (...) that his own concept of physis can be understood as another techn. Focussing in particular upon Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's privileging of morphé over hylé as a description of presencing into appearance, I show that for Irigaray the movements of presencing and absencing emerge out of a metaphysics that does not take into account the fluidity, the mixtures and interpenetrations of a nature that is limited by fecundity not by death. Our oblivion to nature is the greatest danger, and thus attending to our embodied and hence sexuate nature holds the promise of a new age, since it is rooted in the possibilities of the flesh revealed through the cultivated perception of sexual difference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Sanity and Irresponsibility”Lloyd Fields (bio)AbstractI make two criticisms of Wilson’s proposal to dispense with a loaded axiological criterion of sanity. First, Edwards’s axiological criterion of sanity, which Wilson accepts, involves the requirement of impartiality, which at least excludes some standards of right and wrong. Second, value pluralism applies only to morally acceptable forms of life and thus presupposes a standard of right and wrong. I conclude (...) by noting that mental illnesses are not sufficiently characterised by extreme and persistent deviance from practical rationality, as conceived by Edwards and Wilson.KeywordsSanity, responsibility, mental illness, value pluralismWilson’s paper is set in an important tradition of which Susan Wolf is a notable exemplar. He tackles the crucially important issue of how practical rationality is related to mental health and of how certain forms of irrationality are connected with mental illness. This issue must be taken into account in order to avoid infecting the criteria of sanity with “idiosyncratic or culturally biased norms.” Like Wolf (1989, 137–151), Wilson holds that sanity is a necessary condition of responsibility. But Wilson rejects the second of Wolf’s two criteria of sanity on the grounds that it invokes a definite normative theory of right and wrong. He proposes instead that whether an agent is sane should be decided on the basis of whether s/he displays practical rationality, as defined by Edwards’s list of seven items. Following Edwards, Wilson implicitly equates “sanity” with “mental health” and “insanity” with “mental illness.” By rejecting an axiological criterion of sanity that depends on a normative theory of right and wrong, Wilson is able to ensure that individuals like JoJo are not judged to be insane and hence not morally responsible for their actions. Wilson is right to stress the importance of our not applying notions such as “mental illness” or “insanity” too widely, especially in such a way as to allow blameworthy persons to escape blame and punishment.But are Wilson’s own criteria of sanity free from dependence on a normative theory, or a normative standard, of right and wrong? First, let us note that Wilson states Edwards’s seventh condition of practical rationality as follows: “holding values that are or would be adopted under the conditions of (negative) freedom.” Edwards’s own formulation of this condition is the following: “having values which have been (or would be) adopted under conditions of freedom, enlightenment and impartiality” (1982, 315). Wilson explains “freedom” as the absence of coercion. It is uncertain what “enlightenment” means in this context. Impartiality would seem to include being impartial between oneself and others and between one’s own tribe, nation or race and that of others. Although this requirement is perhaps too general to be regarded as a sufficient standard [End Page 303] of right and wrong, it is at least part of such normative theories as utilitarianism and Kant’s moral theory, while it is inconsistent with ethical egoism, i.e., the view that an action is right or wrong depending on whether it serves or frustrates the agent’s overall best interests. One could dispute Wilson’s claim, therefore, that Edwards’s seventh item is not a “loaded” axiological criterion.Second, Wilson maintains that we can avoid assuming a loaded axiological criterion for sanity by adopting the position of value pluralism. Wolf’s axiological criterion for sanity is that the agent should be capable of knowing the difference between right and wrong. Wilson holds that this criterion, as presented, invokes a normative theory of right and wrong. The criterion would not do so if it were applied in accordance with value pluralism, which, Wilson says, “rejects the notion that there is one monolithic theory of right and wrong without denying that an actor may behave virtuously or viciously.” Wilson appears to assume that an “unloaded” version of Wolf’s axiological criterion would be more or less equivalent to Edwards’s seventh condition of practical rationality.Value pluralism maintains that there are incompatible forms of life that display distinct virtues. “Whichever form of life one is pursuing there are virtues which elude one because they are available only to people pursuing alternative and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to the CommentariesLloyd FieldsAbstractIn this response, I address three points raised in the commentaries: the question of whether there is a legitimate formal use of “moral,” the claim that a certain sort of affective capacity is required for acquiring the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs, and the problem of how to show that psychopaths lack the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs. I maintain that there is (...) a use of “moral” according to which moral beliefs need not be rational. Regarding the affective capacity that Adshead identifies, I explain that I had not intended that such a capacity be constitutive of a moral belief, even an other-regarding one. I then try a new approach, in the light of Adshead’s commentary, to the third point addressed, according to which the psychopath is unable to form other-regarding moral beliefs because a causally necessary condition for doing so is absent in him.KeywordsMoral beliefs, moral understanding, personality disorder, empathy, incapacity, responsibilityThe criticisms offered in the three excellent commentaries on my paper raise deep and important issues. I agree with many of the points made and will respond to three key issues: (1) the question of whether there is a legitimate formal use of “moral”; (2) the claim that there is a certain sort of affective capacity that is required in order to form other-regarding moral beliefs; (3) the problem of how to show that psychopaths lack the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs.I concede that Duff establishes (Duff 1977) that the psychopath lacks moral understanding in Duff’s own content-based sense of “moral.” It is illuminating, however, to emphasize that in my formal sense a psychopath of the kind that I consider in my paper is capable of some degree of understanding of “moral” concepts. Unlike Duff, I do not build rationality into my account of moral principles. Hence, I can accommodate eccentric, irrational or even “crazy” moral beliefs like that of Duff’s split-infinitive fanatic. A person can have irrational factual beliefs; why not irrational moral beliefs?Adshead in her commentary attributes to me the claim that moral beliefs, including other-regarding beliefs, “result” in a disposition to experience certain emotions, and to have certain attitudes in certain situations. She then writes, “it is arguable that the disposition to experience certain emotions and have certain attitudes towards others could be critical to acquiring the capacity to have other-regarding beliefs.” There is only an apparent disagreement here. First, I intended to claim that a disposition to experience certain emotions, etc., is partly constitutive of having a moral belief, not a result of having one. Second, in specifying my third condition of having a moral belief, I had in mind such attitudes and emotions as approval, disapproval, indignation and remorse. Adshead identifies an affective capacity, aspects of which are the recognition of, empathy with, and sympathy with, another’s distress. This capacity seems to correspond more or less to what Rousseau described as “natural compassion” (Rousseau [End Page 291] 1973, 66–69), which arises prior to reflection and the use of reason, and which is exemplified by a mother’s responsiveness to the distress of her child. Rousseau distinguished natural compassion from moral virtues, which require the use of reason. I agree with Adshead that having this affective capacity is likely to be critical to acquiring the capacity to have other-regarding moral beliefs.Radden’s incisive commentary poses the problem of how to show that the psychopath lacks the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs, since this does not follow from the fact that he fails to form them. In the light of Adshead’s commentary, I should like to try a different approach to this problem. At least one type of situation in which we say that something, x, cannot do a certain sort of thing, d, is one where a causally necessary condition for x doing d is absent. For example, we should say of a car, not simply that it does not run, but that, as it is presently constituted, it cannot run, if we found that the carburetor of its... (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhether valence change during evaluative conditioning is mediated by a link between the conditional stimulus and the unconditional stimulus or between the CS and the unconditional response is a matter of continued debate. Changing the valence of the US after conditioning, known as US revaluation, can be used to dissociate these accounts. Changes in CS valence after US revaluation provide evidence for S-S learning but if CS valence does not change, evidence for S-R learning is found. Support for S-S learning (...) has been provided by most past revaluation studies, but typically the CS and US have been from the same stimulus category, the task instructions have suggested that judgements of the CS should be based on the US, and USs have been mildly valenced stimuli. These factors may bias the results in favour of S-S learning. We examined whether S-R learning would be evident when CSs and USs were taken from different categories, the task instructions were removed, a... (shrink)

It is really impossible to say anything worth saying about Plato in general within the limits of a single article. Indeed, the more one studies Plato the more impossible does it become—if the concept of degrees of impossibility may be used in a philosophical journal. The reasons for this are manifold. The first lies in the supreme greatness of Plato as a thinker. Hardly anyone who has made a serious effort to study Plato has escaped receiving the impression of him (...) as probably the greatest thinker of all ages. The difficulty is intensified by the particular form in which his greatness is conveyed to us. One may make a distinction, a relative distinction at least, between different philosophers in this respect. With some, their message is conveyed to us with comparative rapidity, even perhaps on the first careful reading, and subsequent study adds little except in the way of detail. Among these it would perhaps not be unfair to place Hume. Others, on first reading, will appear obscure and difficult, sometimes even repellent. It is only after a much more careful study that their real greatness emerges, and they may go on increasing in stature at every subsequent reading. Such, I believe, to be the experience of the majority of readers with Kant. Plato is almost unique in that he makes his impression in both ways. Almost everyone is captivated by him at first reading, but it is only to those who take the trouble of reading him again and again with the intellectual effort that he himself would have demanded. (shrink)

To anyone who has been engaged in teaching and studying Plato, particularly the Republic , for the last thirty or forty years, one fact must stand out with special prominence. That is the remarkable increase during that period of the direct applicability of Plato's discussions to our own problems. Thirty-five years ago the concrete situations which Plato had in mind in these discussions, the general assumptions at the back of them, the possibilities for good or evil that he envisaged, would (...) all seem to the student of that time remote and almost unreal, and it required a considerable exercise of the imagination to discover that there were certain underlying ideas in them which had application to our own time. If we wanted contemporary illustrations of the rise of a tyrant we had to turn to some of the most backward States in South America. The idea of a completely planned society existed only in the minds of the writers of Utopias, to whom we were accustomed, sometimes, to say rather patronizingly that they had forgotten that constitutions, grow and are not made. We could study the criticisms of democracy as an intellectual exercise without any feeling that they might be one day applied in practice. How different is the situation now! Many of the possibilities are as near for us as they were to Plato. Many of the general ideas of Plato's day are as readily assumed by us as they were by him. Indeed the difficulty now is greater in trying to gain a sympathetic hearing for the ideas of thirty or forty years ago than for the ideas of the fourth century b.c. (shrink)

The sources show that two different groups of sheikhs were followed in the Hanafi usūl al-fiqh: ‘Iraqi and Samarqandi sheikhs. However, the perception of followers of ‘Iraqi sheikhs formed the dominant Hanafī tradition. This situation has caused different approaches of the theologian methodologists who followed the Samarqandi sheikhs to become in shadow. Considering this separation within this denomination, when the sunnah sections of usūl al-fiqh literature are compared it is possible to see the different points raised within the Hanafi usūl (...) al-fiqh. In this study, “the definition of sunnah”, “the acts of the Prophet”, “the imitating companions”, “the criteria of ard (submission) to the Qur’an” and “the problem of faqīh (jurist) narrator” are determined as differentiated notions. Considering these issues, since the concepts which differentiate theologian methodologists, whose perception have been taken into account in this paper, from the dominant Hanafi usūl tradition have been generally related to theological concerns, it is possible to argue that this distinction can be explained by their approach of usūl in which theological premises considered as important as other concerns. Eventually, this paper aims to show that like any denomination Hanafi sect also does not have a uniform approach about sunnah.Summary: In this study, the marks of differentiations in sunnah topics were followed based on the works of Ḥanafī usūl al-fiqh written in the Transoxanian region between 5th-8th centuries A.H. The reason for the limitation of this issue is that there have been some changes and developments in the sect in this region and period. It is because Ḥanafī usūl al-fiqh, which is in two different lines, namely ʿIrāqī sheikhs and Samarqandī sheikhs, has improved in favor of one side in this period. It is thought that this dual disintegration occurs due to the effect of different theological tendencies. This situation has caused the different approaches of the theologian methodologists who mostly followed the Samarqandī sheikhs to be overshadowed. Because Ḥanafī tradition, which became a permanent establishment, mostly followed the line of ʿIrāqī sheikhs in terms of both the topics that are discussed and the approaches in these issues. The aim of this study is to determine the different approaches of the line of Samarqandī sheikhs to sunnah. In the study which is based on comparative method, sunnah topics of Dabūsī, Pazdawī, Sarakhsī and those who followed them and the theologian methodologists Abū l-Yusr, Samarqandī, Lamishī and Usmendī’s sunnah topics were compared and the differentiation points of the second group were determined.In this context, it is seen that there are two different approaches in the Ḥanafī usūl al-fiqh regarding the definition and scope of sunnah. Because the Ḥanafī principals who followed the ʿIrāqī sheikhs, while describing the sunnah, they included the companions in the scope of sunnah. However, Abū l-Yusr, Samarqandī and Lamishī did not mention the companions in the sunnah description and stated that the only person to be subjected was the Prophet. In addition, the Ḥanafīs in the second group, unlike others, do not accept the opinion that the meaning of absolute sunnah word is only sunnah of the Prophet. At this point they have shared the same conviction with the ahl al-ḥadīth (the traditionists) and cumhūr al-ulemā (majority of ulema).There are two different approaches, which are based on ʿIrāqī and Samarqandī sheikhs in the show of the judgments of the acts of the Prophet. According to the ʿIrāqī Ḥanafīs, the Prophet's act is attributed to mubāh (permissible) when there is no evidence about its feature. According to the Samarqandī sheiks, such an act is attributed to vucūb (obligation) in terms of practice and stopped in terms of faith. Most of the later Ḥanafī scholars have adopted the idea of ​​ibāha (permissibility) of the ʿIrāqī Ḥanafīs. On the other hand, Samarqandī, Lamishī and Itkanī have tended to the opinion of the Samarqandī sheikhs.It is seen that two different approaches were adopted by Ḥanafī scholars in the field of imitation of companions. Most of the Ḥanafīs adopted the view of Bardaī. According to this view, it is necessary to imitate companions and their expression takes precedence over the qiyās (legal analogy). On the other hand Samarqandī and Lamishī adopted the opinion of Māturīdī. According to this opinion, a companion who has reached the rank of fatwā (legal opinion), it is necessary to imitate that person if one of his peers did not oppose his opinion on a subject that is not likely to be hidden because the general public needs it.There is also a dispute between the Ḥanafī scholars on the type of information expressed by the famous report. Dabūsī, Pazdawī and Sarakhsī and later Ḥanafīs believe that the famous report does not refer to certain knowledge but to assured knowledge. However, it is understood that, Abū l-Yusr, Samarqandī and Lamishī believe that the famous report refers to certain knowledge. But this conflict between the Ḥanafīs only affects the issue of the takfīr who denies the famous report. It does not cause any dispute on judgments.There are two different approaches in the sect about the issue of opposition to the Qur'an covered by internal interruption. In this matter, the issue of opposition to the Qur'an, especially through ziyāda alā al-nās, has been evaluated in different ways. According to the ʿIrāqī sheikhs and majority of the Ḥanafīs, which followed them, ziyada ala al-nas is naskh (abrogation). But according to Māturīdī and Ḥanafīs which followed him, it is also possible that ziyāda alā al-nās is naskh and statement. One of them cannot be preferred without any evidence. In addition, according to the ʿIrāqī sheikhs general and apparent words of the Qur'an express certain knowledge. However, according to the Samarqandī sheikhs the general words of the Qur'an don not express certain knowledge. So, these words can be specialized by isolated tradition. But it was observed that this conflict between the Ḥanafīs was related to the fact that the first opinion caused some problems related to the faith.In the issue of the faqīh narrator, it was determined that three different approaches were exhibited by Ḥanafī scholars. Firstly, the attitude towards not accepting the report of the non-faqih narrator, expressed by the ‘Īsā b. Abān in Abū Hurayra, is gradually being softened along with Dabūsī and adopted by the later Ḥanafī principals. However, despite the same scientific environment and period, Abū l-Yusr does not follow this approach. At the same time, it is possible to say that Samarqandī, Lamishī and Usmendī don not adopt the faqīh narrator criterion. While ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Bukhārī and Kakī did not adopt this approach but criticized it openly. As a result, it is seen that Ḥanafī sect which contains different orientations in itself does not have a uniform approach about sunnah. The points which differentiate theologian methodologists, whose perception have been taken into account in this paper, from the dominant Ḥanafī usūl tradition have been generally related to theological concerns. So, it is possible to say that this distinction can be explained by their approach of usūl in which theological premises considered as important as other concerns. In addition, it is seen that some of the opinions theologian methodologists present as an alternative to dominant Ḥanafī usūl al-fiqh tradition are close to the ahl al-ḥadīth and cumhūr al-ulemā. (shrink)

Drawing briefly on the quite different discourses of schooling-as-performance and education-as-exploration, the paper opens by exploring some of the consequences of the distinction between schooling and education for any system of school inspection. The second section of the paper examines the conceptual and practical inadequacy of ‘accountability’ as an agent of reciprocal public engagement in a participatory democracy. In its stead a more robust, more open notion of ‘reciprocal responsibility’ is offered as a more fitting means of professional and communal (...) renewal. Section III focuses on the relationship between means and ends that is at once central to democracy and so conspicuously absent from current inspection arrangements. The short conclusion suggests we need a radical break from OFSTED if we wish to approximate more closely to our democratic aspirations. (shrink)

Phenomenally strong artworks have the potential to anchor us in reality and to cultivate our perception. For the most part, we barely notice the world around us, as we are too often elsewhere, texting, coordinating schedules, planning ahead, navigating what needs to be done. This is the level of our age that shapes the ways we encounter things and others. In such a world it is no wonder we no longer trust our senses. But as feminists have long argued, thinking (...) grounded in embodied experience can be more open to difference; such embodied thinking helps us to resist the colonization of a singular, only seemingly neutral, perspective that closes down living potentialities. (shrink)

Serious re-examination of participatory traditions of democracy is long overdue. Iconically central to such traditions of democratic education is the practice of whole School Meetings. More usually associated with radical work within the private sector, School Meetings are here explored in detail through two examples from publicly funded education, Epping House School, a mixed residential primary/elementary school for students with severe emotional, social and behavioural difficulties and secondary/high schools within the Just Community School movement in the USA. In addition to (...) providing richly textured accounts of the multiple realities and challenges of pioneering overtly democratic practices such as School Meetings within the publicly funded sector of education substantial attention is paid to analytic engagement with the kind of organisational structures, practices and cultures that seem to play an important role in their successful operation and development. The different phenomenological and theoretical strands weaving their way through the texture of Meeting practices also raise a number of key issues within the fields of social and political philosophy, in particular, whether School Meetings are best understood as predominantly political or communal phenomena. In gesturing towards the philosophical groundwork of a satisfactory answer I argue for the importance of the undeservedly neglected notion of democratic fellowship within the lexicon of democratic polity and aspiration. (shrink)

Fulcher and Hammerl's (2001) important exploration of the role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC) raises a lot of issues for discussion: (1) what boundaries, if any, exist between EC and affective learning paradigms?; (2) if EC does occur without awareness does this mean it is nonpropositional learning?; (3) is EC driven by stimulus-response (S-R), rather than stimulus-stimulus (S-S), associations and if so should it then surprise us that contingency awareness is not important?; and (4) if S-R associations are (...) at the heart of EC, should we automatically assume EC is part of a different learning mechanism to autonomic Pavlovian conditioning (Field, 2000a, 2000b)? This article, after a critical review of Fulcher and Hammerl's work, discusses these issues with reference to what can be realistically inferred about the mechanisms underlying EC. (shrink)

"The greatest crisis of our times in a failure of the human imagination." -Editors The world is currently undergoing a period of unprecedented crises on virtually every front: economic, ecological, and humanitarian. It is starkly apparent that a shift is needed in our dominant structural systems - and that by addressing the collective thinking that has created and maintained these systems, scholars can do their part to catalyze such a shift. The interdisciplinary field known as the Anthropology of Consciousness offers (...) important insights for enacting this necessary shift. This book draws on the work of a group of diverse scholars to explore what the intersection of anthropology and consciousness studies can contribute to the "public turn" within anthropology and the academy in general. Its twelve chapters span disparate geographies and disciplinary frameworks, yet cohere in their focus on common themes such as imagination, empathy, agency, dialogue, and ethics. The answers to the question "So What? Now What?" differ for a linguistic anthropologist in the South Pacific, an environmental educator in Hawai'i, a grant-writing anthropologist serving a refugee agency in Portland, Oregon and the founder of a girls' school in Brazil. Nevertheless, they are united in the desire to reframe the anthropology of consciousness as an "anthropology of conscience," and this pioneering volume is the result. (shrink)

Drawing briefly on the quite different discourses of schooling-as-performance and education-as-exploration, the paper opens by exploring some of the consequences of the distinction between schooling and education for any system of school inspection. The second section of the paper examines the conceptual and practical inadequacy of ‘accountability’ as an agent of reciprocal public engagement in a participatory democracy. In its stead a more robust, more open notion of ‘reciprocal responsibility’ is offered as a more fitting means of professional and communal (...) renewal. Section III focuses on the relationship between means and ends that is at once central to democracy and so conspicuously absent from current inspection arrangements. The short conclusion suggests we need a radical break from OFSTED if we wish to approximate more closely to our democratic aspirations. (shrink)

How long does a quantum particle take to traverse a classically forbidden energy barrier? In other words, what is the correct expression for quantum tunnelling time? This seemingly simple question has inspired widespread debate in the physics literature. I argue that we should not expect the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics to provide a unique correct expression for quantum tunnelling time, because to do so it would have to provide a unique correct answer to a question whose assumptions are in (...) tension with its core interpretational commitments. I explain how this conclusion connects to time’s special status in quantum mechanics, the meaningfulness of classically inspired concepts in different interpretations of quantum mechanics, the prospect of constructing experimental tests to distinguish between different interpretations, and the status of weak measurement in resolving questions about the histories of subensembles. (shrink)

What are the ethical, political and cultural consequences of forgetting how to trust our senses? How can artworks help us see, sense, think, and interact in ways that are outside of the systems of convention and order that frame so much of our lives? In Cultivating Perception through Artworks, Helen Fielding challenges us to think alongside and according to artworks, cultivating a perception of what is really there and being expressed by them. Drawing from and expanding on the work of (...) philosophers such as Luce Irigaray and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Fielding urges us to trust our senses and engage relationally with works of art in the here and now rather than distancing and systematizing them as aesthetic objects. Cultivating Perception through Artworks examines examples as diverse as a Rembrandt painting, M. NourbeSe Philip's poetry, and Louise Bourgeois' public sculpture, to demonstrate how artworks enact ethics, politics, or culture. By engaging with different art forms and discovering the unique way that each opens us to the world in a new and unexpected ways, Fielding reveals the importance of our moral, political, and cultural lives. (shrink)

The Expanse does not provide an easy answer to the vexing question on making a decision when competing, but considering conflicts of values on the show can help us reason about tough choices in real life. Sometimes, scientific progress conflicts with the prudential value of self‐preservation. This chapter explains three ways of understanding value conflicts: as situations in which every option is forbidden, situations in which every option is permissible, or situations in which some options are obligatory and some options (...) are forbidden. The idea that all these different kinds of value can be traded with a common currency is tempting. But contra Keats, beauty is not truth; and it certainly is not goodness, as Tolstoy says. Epistemic, moral, prudential, and aesthetic values are very different. (shrink)

As we know, Merleau-Ponty was struggling with a dynamic shift in his thinking at the premature end of his life. In those last notes he raises the question of how to elaborate a phenomenology of “’the other world’, as the limit of a phenomenology of the imaginary and the ‘hidden’”—a phenomenology that would open onto an invisible life, community, other and culture (VI, Jan. 1960). In her essay on “Eye and Mind”, “To Paint the Invisible”, Luce Irigaray shows why Merleau-Ponty (...) was not yet ready to address this question, why he was not yet ready to engage the limits of his vision posed by the presence of an other. Against Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that the artist has no other task than to bring to appearance the world in the way he corporeally encounters it employing no “other technique than what his eyes and hands discover in seeing and painting”, Irigaray argues that the painter as phenomenologist then appropriates what is other to his vision without reflecting upon a limit to vision, as well as the limit provided by the invisible of an other, an other world. This is not to say that there are no intertwinings with this other, for there are other metabolisms with which we engage the world. Moreover, the sharing of vision with an other can alter the ways I see, challenging cultural complicity, rather than providing evidence that we share the same world. Irigaray is of course not the first to challenge a phenomenological approach to art and to vision—and here I turn specifically to Gilles Deleuze—who is critical of the phenomenological tendency to take on a world given to us by others. His artist, Francis Bacon, focuses on the sensation, which remains unmediated by narration or the feelings of others. Finally, the artworks of abstract expressionist artist Joan Mitchell are considered in the ways that they open up a different time-space; they suggest an other world with which we intertwine without appropriation. Her works, I argue, defy reduction to essences, but also do not rely merely on sensation—for this reason they point in the direction of how to think phenomenology anew. For I do think Merleau-Ponty would be open to these conversations, to these other worlds and other visions. (shrink)

As we know, Merleau-Ponty was struggling with a dynamic shift in his thinking at the premature end of his life. In those last notes he raises the question of how to elaborate a phenomenology of “’the other world’, as the limit of a phenomenology of the imaginary and the ‘hidden’”—a phenomenology that would open onto an invisible life, community, other and culture. In her essay on “Eye and Mind”, “To Paint the Invisible”, Luce Irigaray argues that Merleau-Ponty was not yet (...) ready to address this question, of the limits posed to his vision by the presence of an other. The artworks of abstract expressionist artist Joan Mitchell are considered in the ways that they open up a different time-space suggesting an other world with which we intertwine without appropriation. Her works, I argue, defy reduction to essences, but also do not rely merely on sensation—for this reason they point in the direction of how to think phenomenology anew. For I do think Merleau-Ponty would be open to these conversations, to these other worlds and other visions. (shrink)

Using the analytic framework of normative logic presented in Fisher, Lovell, and Valero-Silva, provided here are five original business ethics mini-cases that may be used to teach and practice case analysis. We have taken the six questions that are used in the analytic framework of normative logic to solve ethical problems and have adapted them to seven steps that can be applied to conflict resolution of mini-cases in class. Then the adapted normative logic model has seven steps: Describe the “fundamental (...) needs of humankind” as they relate to the case, e.g. caring, supporting, reciprocity, fairness, trust; Explain the established norms, values, and laws that can be seen to apply in this case; State in brief the facts of the situation; Examine the network of circumstances that preceded the situation ; Generate at least three alternative positions and actions open to the actor in the case; Speculate on the hypothesized consequences of the different positions or actions the actor in the case may take; and Choose among the alternative positions the actor in the case might take and give your informed and judged reason for making that choice. A suggested answer is provided for one case, which could be reproduced as a class handout for students to examine after having done their own analysis and having discussed the case as a class. (shrink)

Some interpretations of the term “coercion” entail that a person who is coerced is morally entitled to do what she does. But there is a vague spectrum of uses of this term, in which one use shades into another. “Coercion” can legitimately be interpreted in a way according to which it is possible for a person who is coerced not to be morally entitled to do what she does and indeed to be blameworthy for her action. In order to distinguish (...) between cases in which a coercee is not blameworthy for compliance and those in which a coercee is blameworthy, an account of moral blameworthiness is presented. The account does not deal, however, with the question of when one harm or evil outweighs another. A person is morally blameworthy if and only if she performs an action which is, on balance, morally wrong, and for which she is morally responsible. Three different standards of moral responsibility are considered. The first two are found to be susceptible to counterexamples. The third, which is claimed to be adequate, is that a moral agent is responsible for a morally wrong action if and only if, first, either she has the psychological capacity to refrain from doing what she does, or, if she lacks this capacity, she nevertheless had a Isecond-order) psychological capacity to prevent the lack of capacity in question; and, second, the moral agent knows what she is doing, under the description of her action according to which it is a wrong action. Thus, where a moral agent is coerced into doing an immoral action, and lacked the psychological capacity to refrain from performing the action, this standard of responsibility enables us to decide whether or not she is blameworthy on the basis of whether the lack of the capacity was due to ordinary human weakness or to a fault of character. (shrink)

A relational-self theory claims that one’s self is constituted by one’s relationships. The type of ethics that is said to arise from this concept of self is often called an ethics of care, whereby the focus of ethical deliberation is on preserving and nurturing those relationships. Some environmental philosophers advocating a relational-self theory tend to assume that the particular relationships that constitute the self will prioritize the natural world. I question this assumption by introducing the problem of artifact relationships. It (...) is unclear whether a relational-self theory recognizes relationships with the artificial world as beingmeaningful in any moral sense, and whether such relationships, if they can exist, should be accorded equal value to relationships with the natural world. The problem of artifact relationships becomes particularly apparent when the relational-self theory is linked to place-based ethics. If our ethics are to develop from our relations to place, and our place is largely an artificial world, is there not a danger that our ethical deliberations will tend to neglect the natural world? I adapt Holmes Rolston’s concept of “storied residence” to show how the inclusion of the artificial world will lead to different questions regarding one’s resident environment, and perhaps a different emphasis on what is valued. My aim in raising these questions is to challenge the optimism that writers such as Karen Warren and Jim Cheney have shown in supporting relational-self theories and place-based ethics. I conclude that the challenge to develop a relational-self/place-based ethic does not appear to have been met within Western environmental philosophy, which has perpetuated a silence on the matter of our embedment in the artificial world. (shrink)

A relational-self theory claims that one’s self is constituted by one’s relationships. The type of ethics that is said to arise from this concept of self is often called an ethics of care, whereby the focus of ethical deliberation is on preserving and nurturing those relationships. Some environmental philosophers advocating a relational-self theory tend to assume that the particular relationships that constitute the self will prioritize the natural world. I question this assumption by introducing the problem of artifact relationships. It (...) is unclear whether a relational-self theory recognizes relationships with the artificial world as beingmeaningful in any moral sense, and whether such relationships, if they can exist, should be accorded equal value to relationships with the natural world. The problem of artifact relationships becomes particularly apparent when the relational-self theory is linked to place-based ethics. If our ethics are to develop from our relations to place, and our place is largely an artificial world, is there not a danger that our ethical deliberations will tend to neglect the natural world? I adapt Holmes Rolston’s concept of “storied residence” to show how the inclusion of the artificial world will lead to different questions regarding one’s resident environment, and perhaps a different emphasis on what is valued. My aim in raising these questions is to challenge the optimism that writers such as Karen Warren and Jim Cheney have shown in supporting relational-self theories and place-based ethics. I conclude that the challenge to develop a relational-self/place-based ethic does not appear to have been met within Western environmental philosophy, which has perpetuated a silence on the matter of our embedment in the artificial world. (shrink)

A relational-self theory claims that one’s self is constituted by one’s relationships. The type of ethics that is said to arise from this concept of self is often called an ethics of care, whereby the focus of ethical deliberation is on preserving and nurturing those relationships. Some environmental philosophers advocating a relational-self theory tend to assume that the particular relationships that constitute the self will prioritize the natural world. I question this assumption by introducing the problem of artifact relationships. It (...) is unclear whether a relational-self theory recognizes relationships with the artificial world as beingmeaningful in any moral sense, and whether such relationships, if they can exist, should be accorded equal value to relationships with the natural world. The problem of artifact relationships becomes particularly apparent when the relational-self theory is linked to place-based ethics. If our ethics are to develop from our relations to place, and our place is largely an artificial world, is there not a danger that our ethical deliberations will tend to neglect the natural world? I adapt Holmes Rolston’s concept of “storied residence” to show how the inclusion of the artificial world will lead to different questions regarding one’s resident environment, and perhaps a different emphasis on what is valued. My aim in raising these questions is to challenge the optimism that writers such as Karen Warren and Jim Cheney have shown in supporting relational-self theories and place-based ethics. I conclude that the challenge to develop a relational-self/place-based ethic does not appear to have been met within Western environmental philosophy, which has perpetuated a silence on the matter of our embedment in the artificial world. (shrink)

How do permanent artworks installed in public places shape the relations that take place around them? Drawing upon the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Luce Irigaray I claim that two public artworks, Richard Serra’s Tilted Spheres (2002-2004) and a bronze casting of Louise Bourgeois’ Maman (1999) work to open up embodied being and to creatively transform reality. Serra’s work reveals an important aspect of public space, that of the space/time of the anonymous body, as well as the ways in which (...) a shared and hence relational embodied perception is necessary for dwelling. Bourgeois’ Maman reveals possibilities for helping us to think out what it might mean to share the same world even as we dwell in different worlds, in a space/time that we cultivate as our own. (shrink)

This chapter is a study on Luce Irigaray’s engagement with Martin Heidegger’s approach to language. Although language is central to both thinkers, rather than privileging language in terms of the poëtic event of being, the arising of something out of itself, Irigaray reveals how language is privileged in terms of its promise of dialogue between two who are different. This difference provides for a limit to what can be known or recognized, as well as for a creative potentiality that (...) is directed towards the future. (shrink)

It is really impossible to say anything worth saying about Plato in general within the limits of a single article. Indeed, the more one studies Plato the more impossible does it become—if the concept of degrees of impossibility may be used in a philosophical journal. The reasons for this are manifold. The first lies in the supreme greatness of Plato as a thinker. Hardly anyone who has made a serious effort to study Plato has escaped receiving the impression of him (...) as probably the greatest thinker of all ages. The difficulty is intensified by the particular form in which his greatness is conveyed to us. One may make a distinction, a relative distinction at least, between different philosophers in this respect. With some, their message is conveyed to us with comparative rapidity, even perhaps on the first careful reading, and subsequent study adds little except in the way of detail. Among these it would perhaps not be unfair to place Hume. Others, on first reading, will appear obscure and difficult, sometimes even repellent. It is only after a much more careful study that their real greatness emerges, and they may go on increasing in stature at every subsequent reading. Such, I believe, to be the experience of the majority of readers with Kant. Plato is almost unique in that he makes his impression in both ways. Almost everyone is captivated by him at first reading, but it is only to those who take the trouble of reading him again and again with the intellectual effort that he himself would have demanded. (shrink)

This chapter is a study on Luce Irigaray’s engagement with Martin Heidegger’s approach to language. Although language is central to both thinkers, rather than privileging language in terms of the poëtic event of being, the arising of something out of itself, Irigaray reveals how language is privileged in terms of its promise of dialogue between two who are different. This difference provides for a limit to what can be known or recognized, as well as for a creative potentiality that (...) is directed towards the future. (shrink)

This exploratory paper considers the concept of generation in the context of learning across the life course. Although researchers have often found considerable inequalities in participation by age, as well as strongly articulated attitudinal differences, there have so far been only a handful of studies that have explored these patterns through the perspective of generational formations. The paper is primarily conceptual, exploratory and reflective, setting out a number of approaches to the concept of generations, most of which derive largely from (...) debates with the ghost of Karl Mannheim; it then considers how these concepts of generation have been applied to understandings of educational inequalities in recent research in Germany and the Nordic nations. It then examines the dynamics of inter-generational relations in learning, drawing on research undertaken as part of the Teaching and Learning Research Programme. The paper argues that although inter-generational dynamics are a relatively neglected dimension of Anglophone research on life chances and learning, there is a strong case for understanding their dual roles in both inequality and cohesion. It concludes by outlining some themes and areas for further investigation in the future. (shrink)

Prompted by the centenary of the founding of Summerhill, in my contribution to this JOPE Suite on Democratic Education, I briefly explore both the admiring reciprocity and the subsidiary but significant differences of praxis between A.S. Neill and Alex Bloom, two remarkable pioneers of education in and for participatory democracy as a way of life. Because A.S. Neill's work is internationally renowned and Alex Bloom's has yet to re-establish the worldwide recognition it had in his own lifetime, my emphasis is (...) on the contribution of Alex Bloom, in large part because he is amongst the most radical pioneers of democratic education the UK state sector has ever known. To a significant degree, the aspirations and actualities of Bloom's work rebutted Neill's insistence that pioneers within the state sector of education could not innovate in ways that would significantly challenge the status quo. Indeed, Alex Bloom extended participatory democratic educational aspirations in ways which Neill did not. Most importantly, these not only entailed a commitment to community engagement, they did so in conditions of abject poverty and profound psychological trauma following the ravages of the Second World War London Blitz with its attendant evacuation and subsequent return to the ruins of their former homes.In the first section, I take as my starting point Alex Bloom's strongly supportive review of A.S. Neill's book The Problem Family and Neill's visit to Bloom's school in the East End of London, some five years later. Foregrounding the dialectic of practice and aspiration, I touch on some of the key issues that emerged for both Neill and Bloom at that time.Challenging Neill's later affirmation that the only significant freedom one can introduce into a state school is ‘a free attitude on the teacher's part, his or her being on the side of the child’ and his reported view that Bloom and others might be able to experiment in methods of teaching or ways of organising the timetable, ‘but not in methods of living’, the second section explores the nature and interrelationship of six key strands woven into the fabric of Alex Bloom's truly remarkable work that exemplified the grounded possibility and vibrant actuality of participatory democracy as a way of living and learning together that prefigures a more just, creative and caring form of human engagement.Locating the foundation of Alex Bloom's praxis within the 20th-century personalist philosophical tradition and its Adlerian psychological counterpart, the brief concluding section draws in particular on the work of John Macmurray who argues, as did Bloom in his own writing and his daily praxis, that ‘The first priority in education—if by education we mean learning to be human—is learning to live in personal relation to other people. Let us call it learning to live in community’. (shrink)

The word "ontology" presently encompasses two different meanings. In the philosophical sense, ontology has been defined since the days of Aristotle as the "science of being," also called "metaphysics." In this sense, ontology is concerned with categorizing discrete entities in reality and the relationships that hold between those entities (Aristotle 1952). Ontology, in the tradition of philosophical realism, aims to describe every day, mesoscopic entities and relations as they are in themselves, and not from the specific viewpoint of some particular (...) domain or conceptual schema. The type of entities realist ontology concerns are those that exist "out there" in the world (such as tables, chairs, mountains, streams .. (shrink)

The framework for addiction offered by the target article can perhaps be simplified into fewer, more basic, vulnerabilities. covers a number of vulnerabilities, not just enhanced delay discounting. Real-world drug-use decisions involve both delay and probability discounting. The motivational salience of, and attentional bias for, drug cues may be related to a number of vulnerabilities. Interactions among vulnerabilities are of significance and complicate the application of this framework.