This paper analyses Steven Vogel's claim that his account of a post-natural environmental philosophy solves the dualism problem within the field. Through what I will call a novel critique of social constructionism, this paper examines whether Vogel's attempt succeeds or whether it reinforces the problem he wants to solve. Could the ontological foundations of social constructivism themselves be in conflict with Vogel's stated aim of overcoming the human/nature dualism? The last part of the paper focuses on (...) the significance and role of a post-natural environmental philosophy for the field of environmental philosophy in general. (shrink)

The doctrine that emotions are products of natural mechanisms is critiqued from a social constructionist perspective. Evidence marshalled in support of the naturalistic theory is also subjected to critical analysis and found wanting. The social constructionist theory of emotion is proposed as more adequate than the naturalistic theory. Since emotion exemplifies psychological phenomena in general, the social constructionist theory that explains it is considered worthy of explaining the entire range of psychological phenomena.

Much theorizing about altruism has been undertaken within a naturalistic and deterministic sociobiological framework that has sought to explain altruistic action in terms of underlying genetic selfishness. Recently, however, social constructionist thinkers have developed an alternative to such theorizing which suggests that human action arises out of fundamentally open-ended and malleable social relationships. This paper intends to show, however, that a reductive egoism is nonetheless still at work in such accounts, typically taking the form of an underlying concern (...) for matters of personal status and social recognition. As a response, this paper will briefly outline the work of the French phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas as an example of non-reductive and fundamentally Other-oriented alternatives to both sociobiological and social constructionist accounts of altruistic action. (shrink)

This paper seeks to inquire into the constructionist knowledge practices by further exploring the interchange outlined by philosopher Gaston Bachelard between the naive realist's conjuration of reality as a precious good in her possession and the miser's complex of savings the pennies. In fact, this elective affinity holds true not just for naive realism, but also for its very critiques, most of which remaining passionately attached to a little something that is prior to any socio-historical process. This realistic little something (...) is better understood as a double negation, namely as a not-nothing, in that it precisely survives the critique of a pre-existing reality out there as is the case for the discourse of social construction. I will suggest here that this not-nothing proceeds from knowledge practices that enact "epistemic covetousness" as their critical gesture. (shrink)

Harding’s aim in Science and Social Inequality is to integrate the insights generated by diverse critiques of conventional ideals of truth, value freedom, and unity in science, and to chart a way forward for the sciences and for science studies. Wylie assesses this synthesis as a genre of social constructionist argument and illustrates its implications for questions of epistemic warrant with reference to transformative research on gender-based discrimination in the workplace environment.

This book delves deep into the Social Construction of Theory, comparative epistemology and intellectual history to stress the interrelationship between diverse cultures during the colonial period and bring forth convincing evidence of how the 19th century was shaped. It approaches an interesting relation between the linguistic studies of 19th century’s scientific world and subsequent widespread acceptance of the empirically weak theory of the Aryan invasion. To show entangled history in a globalized world, the book draws on the Aryan Invasion (...) Theory to highlight how different socio-religious parties commonly shape a new theory. It also explores how research is affected by the so-called social construction of theory and comparative epistemology, and deals with scholarly advancement and its relation with contemporary socio-political demands. The most significant conclusion of the book is that academic studies are prone to comparative epistemology, even under the strict scrutiny of the so-called scientific methods. (shrink)

To what extent does the common claim that childhood is ‘socially constructed’ affect the ethical debate on the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘special’ goods of childhood? Philosophers have referred to this kind of goods in their critique of overly adult-centred and future-oriented conceptions of childhood. The view that some goods are child-specific, in the sense that they are only good for children, not for adults, seems to presuppose an understanding of what children ‘are’, and how they differ from adults. However, if (...) the social-constructionist view is accepted, it cannot be assumed that childhood is a given. This essay claims that the social-constructionist understanding of childhood does not undermine the debate on the moral status and the goods of childhood, but that nevertheless important lessons can be drawn from the insight that childhood, as we know it, is not a natural and universal phenomenon. (shrink)

Models of nature have usually referred to ecological, or more generally, scientific understandings, and have seldom included cultural factors. Recently, however, there has been a trend toward defining nature as a “social construction,” that is, as an artifact of human social and linguistic capability. I argue that constructionism attempts to assimilate nature to an exclusively anthropocentric “reality,” and that it should be seen as expressing long-term industrialist tendencies to separate the “human” and the “natural” realms and to (...) assimilate the latter to the former. Consequently, the constructionist approach, rather than offering us a fertile means of incorporating cultural influences within environmental theorizing, is better viewed as a cognitive counterpart to industrialism’s physical assimilation of the natural world. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSocial constructionism, and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory in particular, are well-known for their anti-essentialist understanding of identity. Hence these discourses have theoretically been utilized for understanding social identity construction and for deconstructing identities. However, I claim that social constructionism and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory may have the as yet non-theorized operation of detecting and combating wholesale indictments of identities. This operation helps us diagnose how ethnic identity and affect become incriminated as supposedly (...) inextricably intertwined with racism, chauvinism and related pathologies. Yet interestingly, instead of unveiling and critiquing the new hegemony of blanket indictment of ethnic identity/affect, social constructionism and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory have been used to incriminate identity as such. The present article interprets Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory against the grain to chastise the tendency to declare ethnic identity/affect as the new enemy. It shows how such new, hegemonic incrimination aspires to fill the empty signifier of peaceful coexistence with otherness, yet runs the risk of effacing otherness. The article concludes with an example of a reconstructive alternative. (shrink)

The starting point of the following inquiry addresses John Searle’s and Ian Hacking’s most prominent critique of contemporary “constructionism” in the 1990s. It is stimulated by the astonishing fact that neither Hacking nor Searle take into account Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s classical essay and sociological masterpiece The Social Construction of Reality in their contributions. Critically revisiting Searle’s and Hacking’s critique on the so-called constructivist approach, the article demonstrates that both authors have failed to put forth (...) a sociologically valid understanding of the approach in question. The following analysis aims to deconstruct the conceptualizations offered by Searle and Hacking, and to reconstruct and defend the original sense of the term “social construction” as most prominently introduced by Berger and Luckmann to sociology, and social sciences in general. (shrink)

Critiques G. Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection , from the perspectives of social constructionism, contemporary theory of metaphor, and existential-phenomenological psychology. This theory provides a contemporary biological view of consciousness and the self. Edelman's notion of consciousness as purely biological, and his attempt to ground intentionality in the body, are reductionistic. It is suggested that phenomenological descriptions must be taken into the center of the problem of consciousness. An understanding of the relation of the experiential basis of (...) metaphor and its ensuing ontological status, can offer a view of the influence of particular biological metaphors which could help to eliminate their reification in psychology and induce their critique. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Reviews the book, Social discourse and moral judgment by Daniel N. Robinson . It is not every day that a group of such original scholars in any field come together to debate a topic of genuine significance. Social Discourse and Moral Judgment is the result of such an occasion, a symposium dedicated to examining social constructionist contributions to the study of moral judgment, conducted at Georgetown University during March of 1991. Although all of the articles in this (...) volume assume some level of familiarity with psychological theory and vocabulary, Social Discourse and Moral Judgment should appeal to the philosophical novice as well as those well-versed in social constructionist theory. While it is entirely impossible to adequately describe or summarize the complex argument and debate presented in this volume in so brief a space, some examination of the issues discussed should serve to illuminate its worth. Although there are many themes which reoccur throughout the book, discussion of only three are dealt with in this review. As a genuinely significant contribution to research in morality and moral judgment, this book has only two drawbacks. The first, which Robinson acknowledges, is simply that there were not more selections presented from the final discussion, and that the selections presented are sometimes sketchy and hard to follow. The second drawback is that there is no critique of the social constructionist position from a clearly hermeneutic or other continental perspective. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

How are we to understand dementia? The main argument involves an analysis (in Chapter 2) of intentional mental states, using Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following, which suggests that such states demonstrate an irreducible, transcendental normativity. This externalist account of intentional mental states highlights the worldly embedding of practices. In Chapters 3,4 and 5, this analysis is applied respectively to the disease, cognitive neuropsychology and social constructionist models of dementia. Whilst clinically and scientifically useful, none generates an adequate account of normativity. (...) The Wittgensteinian analysis supplies a constitutive (as opposed to causal) account that supports the notion of dementia-in-the-world (Chapter 6). A full understanding of dementia requires the human-person-perspective in order to accommodate all that dementia amounts to in the normatively-constrained world. The sub-plot considers our understanding of the person. Rather than the Locke-Parfit view, which stresses psychological continuity, the Wittgensteinian analysis supports the situated-embodied-agent view of the person (Chapters I and 6). This view and the notion of the human-person-perspective are mutually supportive, so that main and subplot both encourage a broader understanding. The works of Wittgenstein have acted as a primary source, with secondary literature commenting on his works. In discussing the models of dementia, I have cited primary sources. I have also considered philosophical works pertinent to the particular models, usually in connection with the mind-brain problem. The thesis concludes that there is no single way to understand dementia, but any understanding will be from the human-person-perspective, in accord with the situated-embodied-agent view and reflecting an externalist construal of intentional psychological states. This has implications for further research in philosophy, medical ethics and gerontology. The unique application of the Wittgensteinian philosophical analysis to clinical reality suggests an approach to people with dementia that stresses personhood in the context of embedded, embodied histories and continuing relationships with others. (shrink)

The Politics of Constructionism presents a broadranging and critical overview of the many themes of social constructionism and its relevance to contemporary social and political issues. Clearly structured and bringing together leading international contributors from across the social sciences, it offers an invaluable may through this rich body of literature. Major questions and topics explored in its critique and application of constructionist ideas include the theory and practice of scientific method, the development of (...) class='Hi'>social and political policy, the use of social science statistical methods, self-identity and the politics of collective identities, and technological advances in reproductive medicine. Drawing on insights from psychology, sociology, politics, philosophy, cultural, gender, and social studies, The Politics of Constructionism links the discourse of constructionism to the wider social and political world and offers much to suggest that, contrary to the final impoverishment claimed by some of postmodernism, social science is witnessing the beginning of a new enrichment. It will be essential reading for all students and academics interested in social constructionism and contemporary issues and debates across the social sciences. (shrink)

This article interrogates Andrew Feenberg’s thesis that modern technology is in need of ‘re-aestheticization’. The notion that modern technology requires aesthetic critique connects his political analysis of micro-contexts of social shaping to his wider concern with civilization change. The former involves a modified constructionism, in which the motives, values and beliefs of proximal agents are understood in terms of their wider sociological significance. This remedies a widely acknowledged blind-spot of conventional constructionism, enabling Feenberg to identify democratic (...) potential in progressive agency at the scene of technology design. Feenberg argues that the aesthetics of naturalistic modernism may serve as a bridge between such interventions and cultural transformation. Referring to developments in design culture, especially as this relates to the human-machine interface on digital artefacts, the article suggests that this part of Feenberg’s argument has been falsified. This kind of aesthetic modernism is hegemonic in contemporary design and it has not brought about significant progressive advance. In conclusion, the article suggests a different approach to aesthetic critique that is based on difference rather than wholeness, and on the principle that there is no inherent correspondence of aesthetic standards and ethics in technology design. (shrink)

This paper examines the differences and affinities between Karl Popper’s critical rationalism and Theodor Adorno’s critical theory through renewed attention to the original documents of their 1961 debate. While commentaries often describe the Popper-Adorno encounter as a theoretical disappointment, I reveal a confrontation between conceptually opposed programs of social research. Though both theorists are committed to critique as a political and epistemological struggle for human freedom, their conceptions of this struggle are starkly different. In the original seminar papers, (...) we find a conflict between critique as a practice of social rationality (Popper) and a critique of social rationality itself (Adorno). The versions of critical rationalism and critical theory meeting in this debate thus emphasize opposite dimensions of a reflexive practice of immanent critique. In closing, I suggest dissolving this conceptual tension by recovering the educational orientation of critique. (shrink)

It is easy to envision marked progress in biological and physiological approaches to emotion, due to technological advances in imaging and other recording techniques. The future of social-constructionism appears more hazy: Progress will likely depend as much on new ideas as on new empirical discoveries. The most fruitful breeding ground for new ideas is where disciplines meet. Hence, the contributors to this special section represent diverse disciplines: biology, computer science, and the arts, as well as areas more traditionally (...) associated with the social construction of emotion, for example, interpersonal relations, cultural influence, and individual development. (shrink)

The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis Although discourse analysis emerges as a multi-faceted research method reflecting various schools of thought, disciplines and approaches, it is possible to pinpoint some meta-theoretical issues or fundamental assumptions common for most of them. This article aims to investigate different philosophical aspects and theoretical foundations that inform discourse analysis, such as the interplay between epistemological and ontological dimensions or the definition of language itself. Because space does not allow an in-depth discussion of (...) all the theoretical orientations collectively contributing to the development of social constructionist discourse analysis, this paper focuses on poststructuralist, constructivist, and social realist positions, and also attempts to trace the roots of social constructionism in linguistic philosophy, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. Hopefully, this article will provide the opportunity to develop meta-theoretical reflections on discourse analysis, thus striking the balance between the philosophy, methodology and practice. (shrink)

In 1985, a member of the Canadian judiciary handed down a written judgment in which he distinguished between erotica and obscene matter. The judgment attracted the scorn of some normative sociologists, who complained of the insufficiency of the social psychological research on which it was based. Their reaction prompts a review of the judgment in the light of social constructionism and of ethnomethodology; this, in turn, prompts a comparison of social constructionist and ethnomethodological methodologies, in which (...) the legal judgment serves merely as a test case. It is argued that normative sociology and social constructionism, both being of an essentially ironic cast, occlude the judge's sense-making procedures, the very phenomena they purport to describe. Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, being nonironic, promises to capture those procedures. (shrink)

In an earlier article, I responded to Ted Benton's charge that Marx and Engels, upon realising the political conservatism associated with Malthusian natural limits arguments, retreated from materialism to a social-constructionist conception of human production and reproduction. I showed that Benton artificially dichotomises the material and social elements of historical materialism, thereby misreading Marx and Engels's recognition of the historical specificity of material conditions as an outright denial of all natural limits. In place of Marx and Engels's materialist (...) and class-relational approach to population issues and the reserve army of the unemployed, Benton employs a partially Malthusianised Marxism heavily reliant on ahistorical notions of natural limits. (shrink)

The republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work but also provides the clearest evidence of the shortcomings of the enterprise. The new Afterword of Bloor's second edition addresses criticisms of the Strong Programme, but the theses which Bloor now defends are substantially weaker claims than the iconoclastic tenets of the original manifesto. Moreover, in a related strategy, Bloor asserts that criticisms made since 1975 have given him no (...) reason to modify the original text, but there are judicious alterations which are revealing. These unacknowledged alterations are documented here. Bloor's Strong Programme was founded on the diametrical opposition between his causal sociological approach and the allegedly a?causal rationalist, psychologist or ?teleological? approach. However, once it was shown that the teleological position is not the straw?man he represented it to be, Bloor's diametrical opposition left him no retreat. Just as Bloor weakens the original claims of the Strong Programme to make them appear compatible with cognitive science, so he eradicates the suggestion that the opposing teleological position was ever as absurd as he had portrayed it. The common rationale of these independent tactics leaves little question about their purpose ? and their futility. (shrink)

This article evaluates the social contract theorizing of Professors Thomas DonaIdson, Thomas Dunfee and Michael Keeley. This theorizing is tested with G.E. Moore’s concept of moral authority, with moral psychology, and by managerial utility. Both strengths and weaknesses are found in the theories and the author concludes that while there is great potential, much work in theory development remains.

What is social constructionism? Is it a form of relativism that is essentially similar to cultural relativism and historical relativism? Is it a thesis about the contingency of knowledge? What is the point of saying constructionism is 'social'? Partly as a result of the fact that the term 'social construction' had its origins in sociology, in Berger and Luckmann's influential book The Social Construction of Reality, these simple 'philosophical' questions have not been systematically addressed. (...) In this chapter I will give a kind of genealogy of relativism in terms of which these questions may be posed. I will distinguish two historically important forms of relativism, which I will call cold and hot relativisms. Cold relativisms are those that appeal to notions like 'culture' and 'epoch'. Cultures and epochs are totalizing notions. But precisely because they are totalizing notions, change is difficult to account for. Hot relativisms are those, like Thomas Kuhn's (1964) model of scientific revolutions, in which change plays a more central and dramatic role. But change is a puzzle for Kuhn as well. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to discuss some of the views put forward by Stephen Kemp in his recent critique of the Strong Program. In particular I will try to defend David Bloor’s SSK against the charge of weak idealism brought up by Stephen Kemp in his paper. The widely held accusation, namely, according to which the social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge is strongly idealist, is already rejected by Kemp himself. He argues, however that Bloor’s attempts to (...) divert the charge of idealism from the Strong Programme were not successful with respect to the kind of idealism that Kemp calls ‘weak idealism’, that is, treating scientific discourse as free-floating and unrelated to the world of things. I intend to argue that Kemp’s charges are unfounded when levelled at Bloor’s views on meaning and reference. Kemp deals with two issues of the Bloorian program: with the social constructionist approach to concepts as self-referential social institutions, and with the actor/analyst distinction introduced by the Strong Programmers. I will focus only on the first issue in my paper.Keywords: Strong Programme; David Bloor; Social constructionism; Self-reference; Idealism; Reference to external reality. (shrink)

Compared with another founder of philosophical anthropology Max Scheler, Plessner is desolated by Chinese academe. His works have not been translated into Chinese systematically, and there are few articles about his life and thoughts. The reasons for this are complicated, but the most important point of these is that Plessner has paid most of his attention to the German problems. However, Plessner’s thought, especially his critique of social radicalism, enlightens us a lot. Plessner’s critique of modernity stimulates (...) us to think about the controversy which broke out between New Left-wingers and Liberalists in the late 20th century and to discern the common ground between the two parties: Radicalism. (shrink)

It has been suggested that a new form of moral responsibility, labeled “social products liability,” is relevant to business ethics.In particular, this kind of responsibility might justify recent legal claims against firearm manufacturers. This paper argues that, as ithas been presented, social products liability must rest upon utilitarian considerations or on a deeper, more complete theory of moralresponsibility. In the first case, a new form of responsibility seems unnecessary, since liability could be directly apportioned on utilitariangrounds. In the (...) second case, proponents of social products liability face the tasks of presenting the more complete theory and then anchoring social products liability to it. (shrink)

Many theorists, including Nietzsche, Adorno, and Foucault, have regarded genealogy as an important technique for social criticism. But it has been unclear how genealogy can go beyond the accomplishments of other, more mundane, critical methods. I propose a new approach to understanding the critical potential of history. I argue that theorists have been misled by the assumption that if a claim is deserving of criticism, it is because the claim is false. Turning to the criticism of concepts rather than (...) criticism of claims, I expand on the distinction between "descriptive semantics" and "foundational semantics" to show that genealogy can be uniquely qualified to explore the foundations of concepts, and hence to criticize concepts that are problematic in nonobvious ways. (shrink)

It is the purpose of this short article to defend the realism of Holmes Rolston and other environmental philosophers against the social constructionism of Neil Evernden and others who have written on the social construction of nature. This defense is attempted through appeal to a deceptively simple example: seeing a bear in a zoo.The following four claims are defended in the effort to show the deficiencies of the anthropocentrism of social constructionists like Evernden: there is a (...) difference between a bear in a zoo and one in the wild; this difference legitimates the belief that the former is an attenuated version of the latter; the danger posed by a bear in the wild is not due to an overly active imagination; and experience of sublime beauty in the presence of a wild bear is only partly of one's own doing. (shrink)

Let us begin by posing a series of questions. Can there ever be such a thing as black reason, and if so what would that entail? If there can be such a thing as black reason, could such an idea ever be objective? What kind of properties or experiences may constitute black reason that only black people share? But if black reason exists, does this not essentialize blackness, thus running the risk of undermining the entire social constructionist project that (...) there is no black essence? These are some of the questions that Achille Mbembe sets out to explore in his new book. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. (...) Combining a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable. (shrink)

The sociology of knowledge is a heterogeneous set of theories which generally focuses on the social origins of meaning. Strong arguments, epitomized by Durkheim's late work, have hypothesized that the very concepts our minds use to structure experience are constructed through social processes. This view has come under attack from theorists influenced by recent work in developmental psychology that has demonstrated some awareness of these categories in pre-socialized infants. However, further studies have shown that the innate abilities infants (...) display differ in systematic and theoretically significant ways from adults' explicit knowledge. This paper moves beyond the constructionist/nativist dichotomy by outlining the complex relationships between innate intelligence and explicit knowledge. I end by suggesting that there are four, distinct ways the social world influences thought- facilitation, division, specification, and construction. (shrink)

False consciousness requires a general explanation for why, and how, oppressed individuals believe propositions against, as opposed to aligned with, their own well-being in virtue of their oppressed status. This involves four explanatory desiderata: belief acquisition, content prevalence, limitation, and systematicity. A social constructionist approach satisfies these by understanding the concept of false consciousness as regulating social research rather than as determining the exact mechanisms for all instances: the concept attunes us to a complex of mechanisms conducing oppressed (...) individuals to mistake social understandings of themselves as natural self-understandings—the limits lie where these overlap (sometimes), or are entirely absent. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to revisit, synthesize, and critique John R. Searle’s thinking over time concerning social ontology and what it means for something to be a social construction. Primarily, I undertake this task by elucidating and problematizing aspects of John R. Searle’s _The Construction of Social Reality_ (herein, _CSR_) (1995), though attention is paid to his later and corollary works. Certainly, there are many other philosophers who attend to analyzing the very meaning (...) of social ontology or social constructionism considered as a program and many other philosophers who concern themselves with what it means to say that something is socially constructed. I focus largely on _CSR_ because it remains both immensely influential and because it represents one of the earliest attempts by an analytic philosopher to provide an analysis of the very meaning of what it means to say that “X is a social construction” or what “social ontology/social constructionism” entails. Although much of what follows constitutes a revisitation of the crucial elements of _CSR_, what is novel about my analysis is that I synthesize and organize the main aspects of Searle’s thinking through time in a single article. I also draw attention to others’ concerns and amendments to his positions and offer my own novel objections and possible improvements to his corpus. This is no small feat: Many details, as well as others’ appraisals, amendments, and so forth must be overlooked for this endeavor to be possible at all. This being so, I do my best to point readers in directions to follow for further exploration or arguments against Searle’s views as I proceed. (shrink)

This article explores a theoretical legacy that underpins the ways in which many social scientists come to know and understand obesity. In attempting to distance itself from essentialist discourses, it is not surprising that this literature focuses on the discursive construction of fat bodies rather than the materiality or agency of bodily matter. Ironically, in developing arguments that only critique representations of obesity or fat bodies, social science scholars have maintained and reproduced a central dichotomy of Cartesian (...) thinking – that between social construction and biology. In this article I examine the limitations of social constructionist arguments in obesity/critical fat studies and the implications for ignoring materiality. Through bringing together the theoretical insights of material feminism and obesity science’s attention to maternal nutrition and the fetal origins hypothesis, this article moves beyond the current philosophical impasse, and repositions biological and social constructionist approaches to obesity not as mutually exclusive, but as one of constant interplay and connectedness. (shrink)

This article evaluates the view that the self is social constructed. It explains that a social constructionist approach to the self is critical insofar as it targets many of the traditional conceptions of self under discussion in this volume. It analyses the primary use of the term self in psychological and mental discourse, suggesting many ways in which the sources of knowledge about the realm of the mental are open to question. It cites the work of Michel Foucault (...) and others who develop a sustained critique of what may be the dark side of the construction of the self as an autonomous, alienated entity differentiated from the other. (shrink)

Examines the assumption of hedonism that lies at the core of many social constructionist accounts of human interaction, and illustrates how it precludes an adequate understanding of agency, morality, and intimacy. The implications of such a hedonism are discussed, and a possible alternative to this hedonism which would allow for a more adequate account of agency, morality, and intimacy is briefly explored. It is argued that if social constructionism is going to come to grips with morality and (...) agency it must abandon explanations that invoke the necessary causation of metaphysical abstractions such as hedonism. In order to successfully accomplish this task, social constructionist accounts of human motivation and action must take into account the moral obligation to others that is intimately associated with becoming a person. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The thesis of social constructionism is that emotions are shaped by culture and society. I build on this insight to show that existing social constructionist views of emotions, while providing valid research methods, overly restrict the scope of the social constructionist agenda. The restriction is due to the ontological assumption that social construction is indissociable from language. In the first part, I describe the details of the influential social constructionist views of Averill and Harré. (...) Drawing on recent theorizing in psychology, I suggest that their fixation on language makes these approaches inadequate to the analysis of the social construction of human emotional experience. In the second part, I extend the argument to other species, suggesting that these social constructionist views are incapable of accommodating the fact, ascertained by primatologists, that animals have cultures, and that part of animal culture concerns the social molding of their emotions. I conclude that a reconstructed social constructionism should be regarded not as inimical to, but as part and parcel of, a nonreductive biology of emotions. (shrink)

Summary Heidegger’s jeremiads against metaphysics are amongst the most influential and iconoclastic in the annals of continental philosophy; and none is more trenchant than the Destruktion of Descartes’ ontology of self with which Sein und Zeit begins. Yet for all the intellectual energy he expends on attempting to uncover the social texture of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, many remain convinced that Heidegger simply transposes the Cartesian ego into a phenomenological key. One of the first thinkers to arouse these suspicions was an (...) erstwhile colleague of Heidegger, the Jewish-born phenomenologist and Carmelite spiritual writer, Edith Stein, in an unjustly neglected work, Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie. What sets Stein’s critique apart from more influential treatments is that in the course of diagnosing weaknesses in Heidegger’s account from within his own methodological constraints, she reaches some strikingly theological conclusions. The task of the present study is to offer an assessment of her dissection of the status and function of sociality in the Daseinsanalytik. After setting out Stein’s early phenomenology of empathy, I examine Stein’s argument that Heidegger’s tacit and mistaken appeal to theological categories ironically collapses his account of sociality back into the very subjectivism his Destruktion had been directed against. I conclude that Stein deftly reverses Heidegger’s strategy of atheological expropriation strategies by taking up a central theme in his own thought to articulate the theological unity of all finite existents. For Stein, unity at the level of fundamental ontology is most plausibly analysed by reference to the creaturely participation in the plenitude of Trinitarian being. (shrink)

The thesis of social constructionism is that emotions are shaped by culture and society. I build on this insight to show that existing social constructionist views of emotions, while providing valid research methods, overly restrict the scope of the social constructionist agenda. The restriction is due to the ontological assumption that social construction is indissociable from language. In the first part, I describe the details of the influential social constructionist views of Averill and Harré. (...) Drawing on recent theorizing in psychology, I suggest that their fixation on language makes these approaches inadequate to the analysis of the social construction of human emotional experience. In the second part, I extend the argument to other species, suggesting that these social constructionist views are incapable of accommodating the fact, ascertained by primatologists, that animals have cultures, and that part of animal culture concerns the social molding of their emotions. I conclude that a reconstructed social constructionism should be regarded not as inimical to, but as part and parcel of, a nonreductive biology of emotions. (shrink)

나는 이 글에서 인종이라는 범주를 실마리로 하여 사회구성주의의 문제를 사고해보고자 한다. 여기서 나는 인간 사회종으로서 인종 개념을 중심으로 논지를 전개할 것인데, 먼저 생물학적인 인종 실재론을 간략히 검토하고, 인종 제거주의 같은 입장과는 구별되는바 사회구성주의적 입장을 어떻게 이해해야 하는지 논의한다. 이를 위해 나는 주로 이언 해킹의 사회구성주의를 검토하고, 이는 설명에 있어서 안정성 문제를 고려하지 않을 경우 문제적임을 지적할 것이다. 다음으로 나는 인종주의 등을 사회구성주의적으로 탐구함에 있어서 다양한 사회적 메커니즘에 대해 구조적인 입장을 견지하는 것이 중요하다고 주장한다. 이를 구체화하기 위해서 나는 상호개인적 수준 외에도 (...) 하위개인적인 심리적 수준과 상위개인적인 사회규범의 수준 모두를 고려해야 함을 보일 것이다. (shrink)

The phrase ‘social constructionism about race’ is so ambiguous that it is unable to convey anything very meaningful. I argue that the various versions of social constructionism about race are either false, overly broad, or better described as anti-realism about biological race. One of the central rhetorical purposes of social constructionism about race has been to serve as an alternative to biological racial realism. However, most versions of social constructionism about race are (...) compatible with biological racial realism, and there are some race scholars who endorse both positions. Going a step further, David Reich has recently defended both social constructionism about race and racial hereditarianism. While Reich’s defense of racial hereditarianism is unconvincing, I show that most versions of social constructionism about race are indeed compatible with racial hereditarianism. I argue that we ought to replace the social constructionist “consensus” about race with the view that there are no races, only racialized groups. (shrink)

A theory intended to bridge social constructionist and cognitive constructivist thought is presented, and some of its implications for psychotherapy and education are considered. The theory is mostly concerned with understanding the emergence and development of the psychological from its biological and sociocultural origins. It is argued that the psychological is underdetermined by the biological and sociocultural, and possesses a shifting, dynamic ontology that emerges within a developmental context. Increasingly sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination mediate and support the (...) emergence of genuinely agentic psychological phenomena from appropriated sociocultural forms and practices. (shrink)

In terms of the distinction between relationalist and substantialist philosophies of science opened up by American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey and Bentley, Bentham’s social ontology is relationalist and anti-substantialist. When the ontology is combined with his emphasis on ordinary language as the basis of social reality, it is seen to have thematic connections to later developments in social science such as social constructionism, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology and, due to its intent to critically question-received fictions, (...) to neo-Marxian and other concerns about objectivation and reification. Also, by re-reading Bentham’s theory of fictions as a theory of vernacular language habits, it can be shown to have empirical relevance for the sociology of language. (shrink)