베르그손의 도덕과 종교의 두 원천은 우리에게 주체화에 관한매우 독특한 이론을 제시한다. 이에 따르면, 인간이 자신의 실존을장악하는 주체가 되는 것은 종교를 통해서이다. 지성적 동물인 인간은 인간의 존재가 무의미한 세계 표상을 통해 인간을 허무주의의 고뇌에 빠뜨린다. 주체화는 이러한 지성의 자기 해체적 위험에대한 방어적 반작용에서 시작된다. 그런데 베르그손은 두 종류의주체화, 즉 정태적 종교의 작화 본능에 따른 사회적 주체화와 역동적 종교의 신비주의적 직관에 따른 우주론적 주체화를 제시한다. 이 두 주체화 방식에 대한 검토로부터 우리는 주체와 종교의 관계에 관한 다음의 결론들에 이르게 된다. 1) 종교는 주체화의 (...) 필수적인 요소이다. 2) 하지만 두 가지 주체화 양태에 따라서 두 가지 종류의 종교가 있다. (shrink)

This essay explores the relationship between Kant's and Kierkegaard's treatment of morality and religious faith. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant invokes Christian categories in an effort to resolve certain contradictions which arise in consequence of the introduction of the notion of radical evil. I initially argue that Kant's Enlightenment confidence in the autonomy of ethical selfhood ultimately entails the subordination of these categories to the demands of rational ethical subjectivity. I then suggest that Kierkegaard's defence (...) of the independence of Christian faith, against the encroachments of Kantian Enlightenment humanism, largely proceeds on a foundation of shared epistemological principles, such that the Kierkegaardian existential individual's paradoxical Christian faith offers no genuine alternative, but rather a radically subjectivized extension of Kant's demythologized version of orthodox Christian principles. (shrink)

Tibetan Buddhism, the Gelug school specifically, promotes a deep skepticism about the ability to know others’ minds. Its scripture is rife with cautionary tales allegorizing and extolling this skepticism in adherents, while claiming a buddha, by contrast, has eradicated this skepticism with their omniscience. I describe a buddha’s purported privileged epistemic access to others’ minds as “double-hiddenness.” On this skepticism, not just what a buddha knows, but if they know it is hidden, making their authority irreputable. I use critical theory (...) to investigate the ramifications of this double hiddenness, demonstrating that the resultant subjectivization brought about by this extreme skepticism—although the product of power—is not merely a type of subjugation, as suggested by Foucault, but also constitutes a robust agency. (shrink)

In the pre-history of the concept of recognition Spinoza’s social philosophy deserves a special place. Although we rarely think of Spinoza as a social philosopher, Spinoza understood well the ways in which individual subjectivity is shaped by the social forces. I will argue that Spinoza offers a mechanism to understand the way in which recognition works, in order to untangle the web of affect, desire and ideas, which support the recognitions and misrecognitions at the foundation of social life. Spinoza sets (...) out this mechanism in Book Three of the Ethics, but his extended example of the first Hebrew Kingdom in the Theological-Political Treatise, shows how he applied his theory of social recognition to the great problem of his times – the debate between faith and reason, and the need to unify a commonwealth. Social unity based on shared religion, for Spinoza, could be powerful, though not so powerful as democracy. Only through understanding Spinoza’s views of social subjectivization can we understand why. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss, in a Heideggerian context, the possibility of de-subjectivizing the notion of the transcendental time-horizon and reinterpreting it as a formally indicated ‘whereto’ of releasement. The structures of the time-horizon depict the way beings unfold in the fullness of time in their alterity, and they orient the subject’s activity of ‘projection.’ What results is a field-oriented (as opposed to self-oriented) transcendental philosophy which would survive Heidegger’s critique of his own transcendental project, and which would avoid mystification. (...) I take three steps. First, I point out that the problematization of ‘transcendental Heidegger’ is based on the subjectivist interpretation of the time-horizon. I problematize a recent account in the subjectivist vein, arguing that it is neither indispensable, nor very plausible, nor the most illuminative of Heidegger’s work. Second, with the help of Dahlstrom, Golob, Engelland, Sheehan, and Vasterling, I gradually dissociate the notion of the horizon from subjectivism, the visual metaphor, and the assumption of an absolute ground. I suggest instead that the horizonality of the horizon be understood temporally, i.e., as an interplay of presencing and absencing where what matter most are the structures, themselves affected by time, which the transcendental field displays when beings unfold themselves within it. Third, I identify three of those structures when performing a de-subjectivizing reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis in Kant’s A-Deduction. These structures capture the way every being manifests itself, without themselves being necessarily grounded in the subject’s activity. This gives an example of how transcendental philosophy can clarify what the time-horizon is like while bracketing the question of its provenance. (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also (...) criticizes Bergson’s “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

Ce livre est le fruit d'un travail mené par Jacques Arènes depuis plusieurs années sur les conditions psychiques du fait religieux dans le monde contemporain. La démarche de l'ouvrage réfute l'approche fonctionnaliste du fait religieux - étudié dans le contexte chrétien -, et cherche à mettre en tension mutuelle les discours laïcs, "scientifiques", concernant l'intériorité et ceux, plus anciens, issus du christianisme. L'auteur soutient l'hypothèse que la "laïcisation" du psychisme, induite par les nouvelles théories de l'intériorité, s'est traduite en un (...) travail psychique inédit, sur le plan individuel autant que collectif. L'intuition fondamentale de l'ouvrage est que la religion est aujourd'hui en relation forte avec le processus de subjectivation : dans un cadre historique où les institutions productrices de sens sont devenues incertaines, le sujet contemporain "utilise" ainsi la religion comme lieu de construction personnelle. L'ouvrage aborde les configurations, hautement individuelles, de la spiritualité d'aujourd'hui, et analyse la manière dont la quête de sens s'articule avec des démarches religieuses plus classiques. Le fait spirituel contemporain se saisit ainsi des méthodes et des démarches psychothérapiques pour les intégrer dans une problématique croyante. La confrontation des paradigmes utilisés par les théories religieuses de l'intériorité et par les sciences du psychisme conduit à une discussion approfondie sur les articulations du psychique et du spirituel. Cette tension entre les différents discours sur l'intériorité joue à l'intérieur d'une nouvelle donne anthropologique où le sujet coupable des temps freudiens, hanté par la faute, laisse progressivement la place au sujet blessé, peinant à porter sa destinée. Plus largement qu'une approche de la sphère religieuse, cette étude donne donc des éléments de compréhension sur le sujet contemporain en recherche de sens et en quête de soi. Un ouvrage du même auteur, à paraître prochainement aux Editions du Cerf, explorera plus précisément le positionnement du sujet croyant affronté au "trauma" d'une culture commune remettant en cause les racines de sa foi. (shrink)

In his book Foucault and Religion, Jeremy Carrette presents a compelling argument against Foucault’s genealogical method (what he terms “relations of force”). In brief, Carrette holds that while Foucault’s genealogical method effectively unmasked the origins of “rationality” and “madness,” it was less successful when explaining the materialization of “the spiritual.” Foucault’s analysis of spiritual practices is at best functional and, according to Carrette, fails to explain the psychophysical state of subjects engaged in religious customs. In the following paper, I (...) argue that Carrette is correct; there are limitations to Foucault’s genealogical method, especially when explaining subjectivization processes, such as conversion experiences. However, I demonstrate that we can perform a successful genealogical investigation of the spiritual by adding an additional lens of analysis to “the relations of power” and “the relations of meaning” Foucault employs. I call this lens “the relations of affect.” I use this tool to explain Augustine’s transformative process, as observed in the saint’s Confessions. (shrink)

To the question of the methodology of the study of modern nationalisms Anderson’s radical change in the perspective of the studies of nations allow to consider them beyond traditional subjectivation and objectification as imagined communities, standing on the same level as the worldviews of world religions. The article is devoted to clarifying the conditions of such comparison of nations and religions. Anderson himself explained this correlation with the concepts like “cultural artefacts” and “wide cultural systems”. These concepts, however, are (...) not very clear and are not provided with an appropriate methodology. The article argues that the juxtaposition of religious and national communities is methodologically grounded through the application of the phenomenological concept of symbolic universes to them. The latter are understood as the comprehensive horizons of meanings that legitimize local lifeworlds. The crite- rion for defining of the symbolic universe is the presence of legitimation of death as the man’s most marginalized experience. The application of the concept of symbolic universes to contem- porary communities reveals the ultimate forms of collective identity, the competition between which defines the outlines of actual world politics. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, Testing the Limit claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and the (...) first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology (chiefly the legacy of Merleau-Ponty), in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, Testing the Limit claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and the (...) first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology (chiefly the legacy of Merleau-Ponty), in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hegel and Herder on Art, History, and ReasonKristin GjesdalThe introduction of a historical perspective in aesthetics is usually traced back to Hegel's 1820 lectures on fine art. Given at the University of Berlin, these lectures were amongst Hegel's most successful and best attended.1 By then a recognized intellectual figure, Hegel sets out to salvage art from its subjectivization in Kantian and romantic aesthetics, but ends up declaring that art, (...) considered in its highest vocation, is a thing of the past. This judgment on art—that its greatness is a thing of the past—follows from Hegel's attempt to combine a notion of art's historicity with a conception of its absolute essence. Hegel, however, was not the first to think systematically about the historicity of art. For this aspect of art—and, indeed, of reason too—was explored philosophically a good sixty years before Hegel's Berlin lectures by a young and aspiring student of Kant's, namely Johann Gottfried Herder. In a series of essays and fragments, Herder develops an advanced and elaborate alternative to Hegel's conception, a fundamentally non-essentialist approach to art, history, and reason.Over the past twenty years or so, Hegel's attempt to combine an essentialist and an historicist approach to art has been revitalized, with increasing force and sophistication, by Arthur Danto.2 The attempts to rehabilitate Herder's aesthetics, however, have been few and far between.3 This is the aim of the present essay, which seeks to contrast the young Herder's non-essentialist understanding of the historicity of art with Hegel's essentialist views on the artwork's historicity, pleading for a rehabilitation of the former.4 I approach this task from three different directions. First, I offer a brief account of Herder's and Hegel's views on reason, history, and art. Second, I look closer at their conceptions of classical tragedy and sculpture, which, due to Winckelmann's studies, [End Page 17] were perceived at the time as the gateway to a historically sensitive conception of culture as such. Finally, I round off by looking at some of the hermeneutic implications of Herder's non-essentialist standpoint.IAccording to Hegel, a phenomenologically mature and accountable philosophy is distinguished by its readiness to reflect on its own, historical presuppositions. It must acknowledge the critical commitments of modern thinking, but also take into account how these commitments are the result of spirit's laborious journey through history. Only by combining the perspective of modernity with the resources of tradition may philosophy inhabit a place where systematicity and historicity concur. Reality may now be exhausted in the form of a speculative logic. This, according to Hegel, is the end of history, but as the end of history, it is also the dawn of a new era, that of free and self-determining spirit.Hegel's notion of the end of history testifies to a formidable optimism about the power of critical thought. In modernity, Hegel claims, art and religion no longer emerge as adequate media of self-reflection. It is philosophy that has taken on this task. Considered from the standpoint of modernity, religion and art are no longer appropriate forms of expression; now only the conceptual optics of philosophy adequately reflects our deepest truths and values.5Artistically speaking, this moment may well emerge as a loss. For even though Hegel never claims that art, as such, will no longer be produced,6 he reckons it will not be produced in the same spirit as before. No longer expressive of a shared, ethical and political commitment, art is not brought forth by necessity. Intellectually speaking, however, the end of art triggers a different response. Not only does the end of art represent another step towards the conceptual self-determination of spirit. It also follows that only when a phenomenon such as art has finally fulfilled its historical possibilities can it be brought to philosophical clarity about itself. Only after art can we know conceptually what art is. Aesthetics can only begin at the point when art, considered in its highest vocation, no longer holds a historical future.IIAs a young and... (shrink)

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, _Testing the Limit _ claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and (...) the first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology, in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es sugerir algunas ideas sobre el tiempo y la impronta. Comenzando con una breve consideración de la expresión francesa maintenant, el texto pasa a examinar la diferencia, propuesta por G. Dumezil, entre impronta y fósil. En un primer momento, la inspiración viene de algunos aspectos de la religión; luego, de las dos dimensiones del tiempo de la historia que propone Peguy: una que solo considera la pura secuencia de los acontecimientos y la otra que retiene (...) lo posible, la impronta del pasado; finalmente, del poema de Baudelaire "Le Cygne", en el cual es posible distinguir una historia que lo arrasa todo y una conservación del pasado como forma de resistencia o protesta del individuo. A partir de aquí el texto presenta la impronta como la dimensión del tiempo en la que la subjetivación le añade profundidad, permanencia de lo que ya pasó, al tiempo de la historia. En un segundo momento, inspirado en la unidimensionalidad de Marcuse y en la sociedad de consumo de Pasolini, el texto trata las ideas de realidad y de progreso para sugerir que la realidad no es solo la actualidad y el progreso no es la moda: la impronta añade conservación. Para el tercer momento, la inspiración viene de Andy Warhol. Ahora la idea es presentar la impronta en su función de puente, de vínculo entre el arte contemporáneo y el antiguo. Finalmente, el texto alude a la noción de difracción, tomada de Fourier, para subrayar la idea de que la impronta implica contestación del puro presente, resistencia, liberación. The purpose of this text is to suggest some ideas about the issue of time and trace. Beginning with a short consideration about the French expression "maintenant", the text goes on examining the difference, pointed out by G. Dumézil, between trace and fossil. In a first moment, the inspiration comes from some aspects of religion. Then, from Peguy's two dimensions of the time of history: one concerned with the pure sequence of events and the other retaining the possible, the trace of the past. Finally from Baudelaire's poem "Le Cygne", where it is possible to distinguish between a history that sweeps everything and a conservation of the past as some sort of resistance or protest of the individual. With this in mind, the text presents trace as this dimension of time where subjectivation adds depth, permanence of what is already gone, to the time of history. In a second moment, inspired by Marcuse's unidimensionality and Pasolini's consumer society, the text examines de idea of reality and progress to say that reality is not just current events and progress is not fashion: trace adds conservation. For the third moment, the inspiration comes from Andy Warhol. Now the idea is to present the trace in its function ofbridge or link between the contemporary and the ancient art. Finally, the text considers the notion of diffraction, taken from Fourier, which helps to underline the idea that trace means challenge to the pure present, resistance, liberation. (shrink)

How relevant is Foucault's social thought to the world we inhabit today? This collection comprises several essays considering the contemporary relevance of the work of Michel Foucault. While Foucault is best remembered for his historical inquiries into the origins of disciplinary society in a period extending from the 16th to the 19th centuries, it seems that today, under the conditions of global modernity, the relevance of his ideas are called into question. With the increasing ubiquity of markets, the break up (...) of centralized states and the dissolution of national boundaries, together with new scientific and political discourses on biological life, the world of today seems far removed from the bounded, disciplinary societies Foucault described in his most famous books. Yet in recent years, it has become apparent that Foucault's thoughts on modern society have not been exhausted, and, indeed, that much remains to be explored. Within this volume, novel interpretations and thematic developments of key Foucauldian concepts are presented in the works of 24 authors. Prominent among them are new forms of neoliberal economic conduct framed by distinct governmentalities; new critical concepts of biological life reflected in Foucault's analysis of biopower, and new theoretical treatments of the effects of subjectivation. Moreover, included among these theoretical departures are empirical studies of contemporary formations of religion and spiritual practice, consumerism, race and racism, the discourse of genetics and the life sciences, surveillance and incarceration, and new social movements. Drawn from a conference held at the University of Massachusetts, Boston bearing the same title, A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governnentality, Biopolitics and Discipline in the New Millennium both expands our understanding of Foucault's central theoretical legacy, and applies his ideas to a range of contemporary empirical phenomena. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:702 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t99 5 appears more as an anomalous figure in the spirit of Kierkegaard than a thinker of the mainstream. For Jaspers, philosophy is a vehicle to provoke a spiritual sense of the wonder of existence rather than an autonomous vocation which strives to recast its questions in increasingly radical ways. Most typically, Jaspers's emphasis on darker aspects of the human (...) predicament--guilt, anxiety, and death as the seminal existential motifs--does not exclude a more positive vision of Existenz as revealed through transcendence. The limits do not provoke a discourse of radical finitude which skirts the edges of presence, but instead indirectly point toward a transcendent mystery, or the "encompassing" (19-2o). If there is an aspect of Jaspers's philosophy that remains inadequately addressed in either volume, it is his preoccupation with the role of tragedy in the post-war era? In light of the premier importance that Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all grant to tragedy, Jaspers's passionate treatment of this topic in the context of the catastrophe of Western Europe merits far closer attention. Does not the issue of tragedy provide indispensable dues to chart the landscape of twentieth-century thought, and to amplify the differences which prevail in the portrait of politics as displayed by such diverse philosophers as Jaspers and Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas? FRANK SCHALOW DiUard University Norman Malcolm. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Edited with a response by Peter Winch. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, a994. Pp. xi + 14o. Norman Malcolm at the outset of this, his posthumously published last book, focuses on the question: What did Wittgenstein mean when he said to his friend M. O'C. Drury, "I am not a religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view"? It was the right question. But Malcolm then--again on the first page of his book-proceeded to place restrictions on it, which were quite foreign to the spirit of Wittgenstein 's remark and which virtually crippled it. (1) He took Wittgenstein to be speaking of not social, psychological, or presumably even personal problems, but only of philosophical ones. (2) He chose to say that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy "there is not strictly a religious point of view, but something analogous to a religious point of view" (1, Malcolm's emphases). There is no reason to think that Wittgenstein would have accepted either of these restrictions on his remark. Nor does Peter Winch accept them in his forty-page discussion, which follows Malcolm's text in this book. In the upshot Malcolm finds "four analogies between Wittgenstein's conception of the grammar of language and his view of what is paramount in a religious life" (92). In both, he says, Wittgenstein emphasizes "an end to explanation," a sense of an "illness" pervading the human situation, "an inclination to be amazed at the existence of some ' Karl Jaspers, TragedyIs Not Enough, trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore, and Karl W. Deutsch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 31-4O,93- io5_ BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch... (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la littérature? Qu'en avons-nous fait? Que voulons-nous qu'elle soit? La littérature est une forme de partage. Elle institue le commun loin du mythe loin du mythe et de l'anomie douloureuse, pour conjurer toute communion aveugle de la masse et briser l'isolement démuni des exclus. Elle répond et pare à la panique collective. Mais la littérature est parfois elle-même figée dans une loyauté traumatique. C'est le cas, en France, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale : l'irreprésentable de l'holocauste hante un (...) certain sublime de l'écriture et le formalisme critique qui l'a défendu. Aussi ce livre propose-t-il de remonter le temps, comme un ressort, jusqu'au XVIIe siècle. Un nouveau régime sacral émerge alors, qui rompt avec la sorcellerie et libère une zone de profanation permanente où s'engouffre la littérature. Un horizon de subjectivation sans précédent succède à l'effroi laissé par la peste et les guerres de religion. Le partage transitionnel de la littérature devient alors pensable. Cette monumentale histoire culturelle de ce qui menace la culture n'a guère d'équivalent. La connaissance intime du passé y nourrit une conceptualisation audacieuse des liens affectifs et sociaux que la littérature ouvre et consolide. Et un souci du présent y projette dans l'avenir la question de la transmission d'une exigence démocratique."--Back cover. (shrink)

This paper confronts the medieval Church with Foucault´s conceptualization of Christendom in his writing on governmentality. In order to do so, this paper analyzes the formation of an ecclesiastical dual rule –jurisdiccional and pastoral– from the perspective of a genealogy of western political forms. For this purpose, a critical dialogue is stablished with Foucault’s analytics of pastoral power and of the subjectivation technologies involved in it. While the transformations supported by the pontifical power gave rise to the first western (...) juridical system, the ecclesiastical institution implemented services of c ura animarum throughout Christianity. Further, this salvation economy leaned on an unprecedented legal rule that turned pastoral power into a twofold rule, both sovereign and governmental. This paper argues that such an interpretation expounds the problems of the dichotomy government/sovereignity, on which Foucault founds his analytics of pastoral power and his genealogy of governmentality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of (...) which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch's Responseor Discussion(both words are used as titles) suggests that the pervasiveness of Wittgenstein's "religious point of view" can be seen in his question to Russell: "How can I be a logician before I am a human being?" (which certainly also extends to "How can I be a philosopher before I am a human being?"). With this goes the realization, expressed in the Preface to the PhilosophicalRemarks, that he will not be able to make his book more free of the "impurities" of vanity than he himself is free of them. We sense the religious point of view of Wittgenstein in his utter seriousness (so often compared to Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard) as well as in his conviction that there is a good lying beyond the world which puts every human being, and above all himself, under an obligation to place it ahead of self. When he said that he could not help seeing every problem this way, he meant that he could not help seeing it as having an importance that went beyond facts and theories and circumstances and even beyond the world itself. And the demonstration that this was indeed his point of view he knew would inevitably be, as indeed it was, in every line he wrote. H. L. FINCH Hunter College,CUNY Johnny Washington. A Journey into the Philosophyof Alain Locke. Contributions in AfroAmerican and African Studies. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Pp. viii + ~2o. Cloth, $59.95. Alain Locke (1886-1954), a secondary figure in American pragmatism, wrote on problems of value in cultural analysis; he is noted for his vigorous relativism. As this century's most distinguished African American philosopher--a Rhodes Scholar educated at Harvard and Oxford--Locke played twin roles, mentoring artists of the Harlem Renaissance and chairing the philosophy department at Howard University. Josiah Royce's influence on his thought is evident, as is that of social scientists W. E. B. Du Bois and Franz Boas. In Locke's most recognized works, such as "Values 704 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 and Imperatives" (1935) and "The New Negro" (19~5), as well as his lesser-read "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" (1942), he warrants note for two key contributors to the history of ideas. First, he analyzes "race" and "culture" relativistically, showing how nineteenth-century discussions (say, on "racial uplift") may continue without problematic ontological baggage. Second, by appealing to functionalism, he defends the relative equivalence of elements which characterize cultures. He thus undergirds arguments in social philosophy about the sufficiency of values and norms in social practices. Four decades after his death there exist only two book-length studies of Locke's philosophy, both authored byJohnny Washington. Washington deserves a great deal of credit for his part in initiating a fast-growing critical--and distinctively philosophical-literature on Locke. Indeed, no serious student of Locke's philosophy can proceed without contending with Washington's work. While this study merits praise for its thoroughness and care in treating unpublished essays by Locke, it suffers somewhat from its style of exposition. Washington's "narrate-and... (shrink)

This article engages with Michel Foucault’s idea of confession as the central Christian strategy of subjection or subjectivation and the link he proposes between confession and obedience. The article also wishes to show how confession can become counter-conduct. I apply Foucault’s conceptions to early modern Lutheran confessionalism, elucidating how the confessional apparatus of the orthodox Lutheranism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sweden strived to mold obedient subjects who are able to conduct themselves. I also examine the transformation and overthrow of (...) these subjectivation techniques in Radical Pietism, analyzing a dissident confession of faith by the Radical Pietist Peter Schaefer, who exemplifies perfect subjection, constituting himself as a perfectly obedient subject, and yet a failure of subjectivation in the sense of submission, insofar as for him, obedience becomes a strategy of empowerment. (shrink)

The history of the concept of “religion” in Western tradition has intrigued scholars for years. This important collection of eighteen essays brings further light to the ongoing debate. Three of the invited participants, W.C. Smith, M. Despland and E. Feil, has each previously written impressive books treating this subject; the last two acknowledged the impact and continuing influence of Smith’s work, The Meaning and End of Religion. An introduction and a recapitulation of Smith’s contribution as a scholar set (...) the stage for a retrospective look at the published literature. Contributors then examine the transformation of words (the classical religio to the modern religion), particularities of religion in nineteenth-century France, Troeltsch’s concept of religion, the study of religion from an Asian point of view and the categorization of “World Religions.” The concluding essays elaborate contemporary anthropological, cross-disciplinary, semiological, deconstructive and psychoanalytical methodological approaches to the concept and study of “religion.” Exploring critically different aspects of the concept and study of religion, these provocative essays typically reflect the methodological pluralism currently existing in the field of Religious Studies. Of interest to scholars and students alike, this collection also contains a complete bibliography of W.C. Smith’s publications. (shrink)

El presente estudio propone una lectura de la novela de José Saramago O Evangelo segundo Jesus Cristo a la luz de aquellos textos antiguos judíos y cristianos de temática bíblica que han sido excluidos de los correspondientes cánones sagrados de los judíos, protestantes y católicos. El análisis de la obra del escritor portugués revela un alto nivel de lo que se podría denominar intertextualidad inversa. Para reconstruir la vida de Jesús, Saramago se apropia de episodios, personajes y símbolos tanto de (...) la Biblia como de esos apócrifos antiguos y los transforma de tal manera que adquieren un significado opuesto al que poseen en sus respectivas fuentes textuales. De esta forma, Saramago lleva a cabo una exégesis personal particularmente osada que tergiversa o desmonta ciertos presupuestos que se consideran parte esencial de la tradición bíblica. Para lograr su propósito, el novelista pone en práctica una serie de técnicas literarias y hermenéuticas afines a las que se usaban en los textos apócrifos de la Antigüedad. Al igual que en un midrás hebreo, Saramago vuelve a contar una historia sagrada desde una perspectiva distinta, en este caso la de los débiles y desposeídos. Igualmente, su deseo de rellenar los huecos que quedaron sin explicación en los Evangelios canónicos hace eco de la técnica judía del derás. A través de un análisis detallado de los personajes principales y de algunos símbolos recurrentes que aparecen en la novela se descubre una glorificación de lo pequeño y de los marginados como focos de resistencia contra las fuerzas poderosas que desean dominarlos y silenciarlos. En el centro de esta lucha se encuentra un Jesús profundamente humano que busca inútilmente la respuesta a algunas de las interrogantes fundamentales que siguen atormentando a la humanidad: ¿Por qué entraron al mundo el mal y el dolor? ¿Por qué castiga Dios a los seres humanos? ¿Por qué tiene que sufrir el hombre la angustia de la culpa? (shrink)

How do we deal with difference personally, interpersonally, nationally? Can we weave a cohesive social fabric in a religiously plural society without suppressing differences? This collection of significant essays suggests that to truly honour differences in matters of faith and religion we must publicly exercise and celebrate them. The secular/sacred, public/private divisions long considered sacred in the West need to be dismantled if Canada (or any nation state) is to develop a genuine mosaic that embraces fundamental differences instead of (...) a melting pot that marginalizes. An ethics of difference starts with a recognition of difference, not as deviance or deficit that threatens but as otherness to connect with, cherish, and celebrate. The book begins with the suggestion that our inability to come to terms with social plurality is not fundamentally the fault of religious differences, and that a public/private split inadequately deals with matters of basic difference. It then explores how encouraging people to live out their respective faiths may open new possibilities for respectful, honourable, and just negotiations of contemporary dilemmas arising out of the multicultural fabric of Canadian life. Towards an Ethics of Community introduces readers to some of the most challenging and divisive dilemmas we face in this increasingly pluralistic, postmodern world — issues such as family and domestic violence, Aboriginal rights, homosexuality and public policy, and female genital mutilation. This is a book truly global in scope and significance. (shrink)