L’Université, définie comme « institution gourmande », valorise la figure symbolique du chercheur entièrement investi dans son travail, supposant un rapport quasi exclusif de l’individu au métier. Cet investissement est d’autant plus réclamé que le chercheur est soumis à l’injonction de produire beaucoup et vite en même temps que de faire preuve d’une mobilité internationale dans un contexte de forte concurrence pour des postes définitifs proportionnellement rares. Étudiant les chargés de recherche recrutés sur des mandats à durée déterminée du Fonds (...) National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS) en Belgique, les auteurs montrent l’importance d’adopter une perspective relationnelle de la carrière scientifique qui prenne en considération son interférence avec la vie privée. Trois logiques spatio-temporelles sont dégagées : une logique d’intégration, une logique de conciliation et une logique du conflit. Ces logiques sont associées aux situations de vie des chercheurs (être célibataire, en couple, avoir ou non des enfants…) et posent la question du genre. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà été publié dans Sur le journalisme, About Journalism, Sobre jornalismo [En ligne, online], Vol. 9, n°1 - 2020, 15 juin - June 15 - 15 de juno. A partir d'une étude sémiotique et communicationnelle de l'exposition de l'Agence France-Presse sur les réseaux socionumériques, nous nous demanderons de quelle manière la photographie agencière a été en partie bouleversée et transformée par ces moyens de communication. Face à un nouveau rythme de - Sciences de l'information et de la (...) communication – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of the basis of time’s asymmetry. I hold the view that there is an objective temporal asymmetry in Leibniz’s philosophy of time. I closely examine various asymmetrical phenomena, which can be candidates as an explanation of time’s asymmetry: (1) causation; (2) the flow of time; (3) the modal difference between past and present; (4) counterfactual dependence; and, finally (5) the asymmetry of the world’s progress and its direction and (6) of the progress of rational creatures. (...) I conclude that time’s asymmetry involves an irreducibly pragmatic aspect: the asymmetry of agency itself on which all other asymmetrical phenomena rely. (shrink)

En s’intéressant aux rythmes et aux temporalités associés à l’utilisation des espaces de coworking, cet article a vocation à rendre compte de la manière dont les coworkers, en majorité indépendants et télétravailleurs salariés à distance, utilisent l’espace pour concilier vie personnelle et vie professionnelle, contraintes professionnelles et aspirations à un mode de vie. Nous montrons que la présence dans les espaces de coworking est fréquemment associée à des transitions et des bifurcations aussi bien professionnelles que résidentielles, mettant en évidence des (...) rationalités qui relèvent du projet de vie. Confrontées à de nouvelles contraintes temporelles et spatiales générées par le statut de télétravailleur ou d’indépendant, ces personnes trouvent dans le coworking une manière de borner spatialement le travail. En offrant un lieu dédié à l’activité professionnelle, en instaurant des rythmes collectifs et en libérant l’espace domestique du travail, les espaces de coworking peuvent alors servir d’outils de régulation des temporalités. Cependant, alors que la littérature sur le coworking a beaucoup insisté sur sa dimension flexible et agile, notre étude met en évidence la permanence de l’importance des cadres spatiaux et sociaux de l’activité dans l’articulation entre rythmes individuels et sociaux. (shrink)

L’article présente une réflexion sur la question du temps dans les processus de migration et mise au travail des travailleurs et travailleuses détachés dans l’agriculture intensive. Nous proposons d’analyser le rapport entre les temporalités imposées aux détachés pour répondre aux besoins productifs et leurs conduites temporelles. Il s’agit de comprendre comment les personnes détachées vivent ces temporalités, mais aussi comment elles se les réapproprient et/ou les contournent afin de les articuler aux espaces-temps de la reproduction sociale. Notre recherche s’appuie sur (...) une enquête qualitative menée auprès des ouvriers et ouvrières mis à disposition des exploitants par des agences d’intérim espagnoles dans trois départements du sud de la France. L’analyse, structurée autour des parcours migratoires, du système du détachement et des temps sociaux, nous permet de saisir les effets des politiques migratoires sur les parcours des saisonniers dans les temps longs ; de retracer des stratégies de dépassement des temporalités imposées, qui amènent à l’installation et à l’emploi direct ; d’identifier les tentatives de « faire communauté » à travers des initiatives commerciales et récréatives collectives développées dans les temps libres. (shrink)

Cet article se propose d’interroger les modalités de gestion des quartiers d’habitat social sous l’angle des temporalités. Deux types de rapport au temps sont plus particulièrement décrits afin d’analyser leur (dés)articulation et leur mode de (dé)synchronisation. Il s’agit de montrer les dissonances à l’œuvre entre le temps physique de la relation au locataire et le temps différé qu’introduisent les outils de gestion à distance. En effet, les dispositifs de prise en charge de la relation au locataire participent à différer le (...) traitement des demandes en créant deux temporalités disjointes, celle de la relation immédiate au locataire et celle d’une mesure décalée dans le temps. Cette spécificité crée pour les salariés d’agence des conflits temporels liés à ces modalités de gestion mais également des temporalités spécifiques issues de l’implication dans le territoire. (shrink)

Dominique Royoux est Directeur du service Prospective et Coopérations territoriales et de l'agence des temps de grand Poitiers, président de l'association Tempo territorial. Propos recueillis par Sabrina Costanzo. On trouvera le sommaire de l'ensemble du dossier paru dans la revue Territoires ici. Les politiques temporelles se développent en France depuis une dizaine d'années : où en sont-elles aujourd'hui? Nous manquons de recul pour procéder à une véritable évaluation des politiques - Urbanisme – Nouvel article.

At the turn of the 1980s, Félix Guattari became interested in the Free Radio movement . He then became directly associated between 1986 and 1991 with the Minitel service entitled “3615 ALTER”, initiated by the a collective including C31, an association of critical IT specialists currently editing the journal Terminal. Contrary to the traditional Left, Félix Guattari was less interested in a critique of the content of the media and of their political instrumentalization than in their form and mode of (...) social organization. The proliferation of machine-arrangements was expected to make possible new technological articulations likely to generate innovative assemblings. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue Réseaux, 2007/1, N° 140, p. 29-65. Personne ne le conteste, et ceci est devenu un lieu commun, nos modes de vie connaissent des mutations importantes et sont amenés à en connaître d'autres encore plus importantes. Depuis la fin des « trente glorieuses » une succession de transformations se cumulent pour aboutir à ce que l'on peut considérer comme le début d'une véritable mutation anthropologique. Les explications proposées pour comprendre un tel mouvement ne (...) manquent (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...) alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency. Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research. In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act. (shrink)

Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...) then is involved with questions of moral psychology whose answers admit a kind of richness in the life of human beings from which the philosophy of mind may ordinarily prescind. Philosophy of mind, insofar as it treats the phenomenon of agency as one facet of the phenomenon of mentality, has been more concerned with how there can be ‘mental causation’ than with any details of a story of human motivation or of the place of evaluative commitments within such a story. (shrink)

L’exil des migrants de retour en Géorgie post-soviétique, en se doublant d’une rupture historique brutale et douloureuse avec le « temps d’avant », révèle la perception d’une autre forme d’exil, social et temporel. Cet exil temporel organise une perception du temps originale constituée de diverses ruptures qui sont mises en narration par les discours des migrants à travers la mobilisation de différents procédés narratifs destinés à restituer des parcours individuels heurtés au sein d’un temps socialement partageable. Ainsi, ces narrations laissent (...) apparaître la mise en scène du motif inaugural de la chute ainsi que le lien entre migration et peur de la fragmentation nationale. Elles révèlent également des polarités sociales que nous comprenons comme des perceptions temporelles différenciées. La dialectique rupture-continuité diffère donc selon la position sociale des enquêtés. Selon qu’on ait pu clore ou non les « années difficiles » post-soviétiques, elles sont considérées comme une transition achevée ou bien comme une crise perpétuelle en décalage avec la temporalité politique rapide du réformateur Mikhaïl Saakashvili.Ainsi, en se conjuguant aux rythmes précaires des mobilités, l’appréhension temporelle des migrants dont il est ici question se saisit au croisement de perspectives historiques et de celles des trajectoires migratoires et biographiques. (shrink)

Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical rationality can help to advance metaethical debates. These debates include the role of rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency. I discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the insights contained therein can illuminate the (...) complex structure of practical rationality, inform our standards for an adequate theory of practical reason, and frame our thinking about the significance of rational capacities in moral theory and social practice. (shrink)

The concept of agency is of crucial importance in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and it is often used as an intuitive and rather uncontroversial term, in contrast to more abstract and theoretically heavy-weighted terms like “intentionality”, “rationality” or “mind”. However, most of the available definitions of agency are either too loose or unspecific to allow for a progressive scientific program. They implicitly and unproblematically assume the features that characterize agents, thus obscuring the full potential and challenge of modeling agency. (...) We identify three conditions that a system must meet in order to be considered as a genuine agent: a) a system must define its own individuality, b) it must be the active source of activity in its environment (interactionalasymmetry) and c) it must regulate this activity in relation to certain norms (normativity). We find that even minimal forms of proto-celular systems can already provide a paradigmatic example of genuine agency. By abstracting away some specific details of minimal models of living agency we define the kind of organization that is capable to meet the required conditions for agency (which is not restricted to living organisms). On this basis, we define agency as an autonomous organization that adaptively regulates its coupling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself as a consequence. We find that spatiality and temporality are the two fundamental domains in which agency spans at different scales. We conclude by giving an outlook to the road that lies ahead in the pursuit to understand, model and synthesis agents. (shrink)

Schiller says that “it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom.” Here I attempt to defend a claim in the same spirit as Schiller’s but by different means. My thesis is that a person’s autonomous agency depends on their adopting an aesthetic identity. To act, we need to don contingent features of agency, things that structure our practical thought and explain what we do in very general terms but are neither universal nor necessary features of agency (...) as such. Without these things, the question of what to do for any individual would be underdetermined. The problem is that adopting such a contingent form of agency amounts to a restriction on what we can do, and so it is a prima facie threat to our autonomy. I will argue that one way, and indeed the only way, of meeting this challenge lies in aesthetic experience. Granting our capacity for aesthetic pleasure the authority to determine the particularities of our agency is compatible with autonomy because doing so means identifying with one’s capacity for pleasure in free and creative activity. Doing this allows us to be both particular sorts of agents and creatures regulated by the universalizing demands of reason. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...) between doing and allowing, and the distinction in law between act and omission. (shrink)

Some philosophers posit a connection between normativity and agency. This connection allows us to infer propositions about what we ought to do or what reason we have to do from the conditions of action. This chapter considers arguments for this connection. In particular, the chapter argues that not only do the conditions of generic agency have important normative implications for us, but so too do the conditions of narrower, more contingent, and more local kinds of agency. Finally, objections to this (...) thesis are summarized and rejected, in part because they presuppose our having far more control over what our deliberations require in the way of agency than we actually do. -/- . (shrink)

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with (...) recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency. (shrink)

À travers une enquête qualitative par entretiens menée auprès des sportifs de haut niveau de l’INSEP, nous nous intéressons à leur rythme de vie qui articule des temps nombreux et variés : temps sportif, temps scolaire ou universitaire, temps professionnel, temps de récupération, temps de loisir privé et social, etc. Dans ce contexte il apparaît que leur temps objectif et leur temps subjectif ne coïncident pas toujours. Nous identifions à la fois une capacité générale de ces sportifs à gérer une (...) organisation temporelle particulièrement chargée, mais aussi de profondes variations d’un profil de sportif à l’autre, d’où l’idée d’une construction sociale du temps subjectif. Après avoir présenté l’organisation objective des temps à l’INSEP, nous analysons le poids de plusieurs facteurs sportifs et extra-sportifs pour expliquer cette disjonction et comprendre quels éléments ont tendance à favoriser un meilleur vécu d’un emploi du temps objectivement chargé. Cela nous conduit à ouvrir la discussion sur la conception des différentes temporalités de la préparation des sportifs qui demeure floue, entre temps de travail et temps de loisir. Cette préparation s’inscrit elle-même dans un contexte institutionnel spécifique : la construction du rythme de vie de ces sportifs est alors la recherche d’un compromis entre temps collectif et temps individuel. (shrink)

Games occupy a unique and valuable place in our lives. Game designers do not simply create worlds; they design temporary selves. Game designers set what our motivations are in the game and what our abilities will be. Thus: games are the art form of agency. By working in the artistic medium of agency, games can offer a distinctive aesthetic value. They support aesthetic experiences of deciding and doing. -/- And the fact that we play games shows something remarkable about us. (...) Our agency is more fluid than we might have thought. In playing a game, we take on temporary ends; we submerge ourselves temporarily in an alternate agency. Games turn out to be a vessel for communicating different modes of agency, for writing them down and storing them. Games create an archive of agencies. And playing games is how we familiarize ourselves with different modes of agency, which helps us develop our capacity to fluidly change our own style of agency. (shrink)

Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's reasons. Meta-internalism explains (...) this phenomenon by postulating higher-order dispositions, consitutive of (rational) agency itself, which causally interact with the agent's normative beliefs to produce corresponding motivations to action. I show that meta-internalism comes to grief over cases of akrasia, insofar as it leaves no room for the capacity for rational guidance when agents voluntarily act at variance with their judgments about what they have reason to do. Volitionalism, I contend, improves on both internalism and meta-internalism. Its distinctive feature is the postulation of a kind of motivation that is directly subject to the agent's control, and independent of the dispositions and desires to which the agent is passively subject. (shrink)

In both popular and scholarly discussions, sexual consent is gaining traction as the central moral consideration in how people should treat one another in sexual encounters. However, while the concept of consent has been indispensable to oppose many forms of sexual violence, consent-based sexual ethics struggle to account for the phenomenological complexity of sexual intimacy and the social and structural pressures that often surround sexual communication and behavior. Feminist structural critique and social research on the prevalence of violation even within (...) consensual sex suggest that consent is insufficient to ground responsibility; a more fundamental orientation toward the value of sexual agency provides a better foundation for sexual ethics. Using feminist critical theory, phenomenology, and black feminist thought, this dissertation develops a socially situated and relational notion of sexual agency and diagnoses how such agency is neglected in prevailing discussions of consent in moral philosophy and legal theory. I argue that the ethical question of responsibility to another in a sexual encounter—apart from juridical considerations—should be reframed around the value of each person’s socially situated practices of agency. Preceding and extending beyond the obligation to gain valid consent for an action, responsibility demands adapting one’s intentions and behaviors in response to the wider range of another’s communicative expressions of agency. However, communicative expressions can be ambiguous or overdetermined by social context and cultural norms; they often offer only provisional traces of agency. To address this inherent uncertainty in intimacy, I propose drawing on insights from Emmanuel Levinas about the dynamic, open-ended nature of relationality, responsibility, and communication. Responsibility toward another does not depend on securing certainty about their “yes” or “no,” but requires responding continuously under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, adapting behaviors and intentions to make room for another’s agency despite its opacity. (shrink)

A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study, this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section concerns (...) free will and moral responsibility, including theories of moral responsibility and the challenge to an alternative possibilities condition posed by Frankurt-type scenarios. Distinguished by its balance and consistently high quality, the volume presents papers selected for their significance, innovation, and clarity of expression. Contributors include Harry Frankfurt, Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Elizabeth Anscombe, John Martin Fischer, Michael Bratman, Roderick Chisholm, Robert Kane, Peter Strawson, and Susan Wolf. The anthology serves as an up-to-date resource for scholars as well as a useful text for courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, or metaphysics. In addition, paired with Free Will: A Philosophical Study, it would form an excellent upper-level undergraduate or graduate-level course in free will, responsibility, motivation, or action theory. (shrink)

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere (...) happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of "disappearing agency". My main aim is to show that there is no problem of disappearing agency, and we will see that my response to the first challenge will be conducive to this end. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we "own" the agency that springs from our mental states and events "by default". (shrink)

Constitutivists believe that we can derive universally and unconditionally authoritative norms from the conditions of agency. Thus if c is a condition of agency, then you ought to live in conformity with c no matter what your particular ends, projects, or station. Much has been said about the validity of the inference, but that’s not my topic here. I want to assume it is valid and talk about what I take to be the highest ambition of constitutivism: the prospect of (...) grounding moral requirements in the conditions of agency. If this can be done, then we can show that everyone is bound by the demands of morality, and we can do so without the customary entanglements—queer normative entities, an implausibly powerful moral sense, or divine lawgivers. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the structure of our temporally extended agency. We do not have the power to act directly at a distance, so any of our temporally extended projects must be sustained over its temporal unfolding by momentary actions. We need both the capacity to organize these momentary steps in light of a synoptic overview of the extended activity as a whole and to sustain our motivation to continue to pursue the extended activity. Hence, the distinctive mode in which we (...) act over time is that of ’planning agency,’ which requires a form of temporal identification that goes beyond mere psychological continuity. I then discuss the differences in internal structure between merely continuous and integrated activities, and between telic and atelic ones. I provide a taxonomy of the different kinds of temporal goods and values and how these structures might bear on the risk of crisis of meaning in our temporal existence. I then touch briefly on the issue of how our mortality might make a difference to the structure of what we find valuable and how it relates to the temporal features of our agency. In the closing section, I discuss the effects of the moving temporal location of the agent (with her local executive powers) relative to her extended pursuits, including the asymmetries generated by the distinction between past and future stages of the activity and the moving horizon of what the agent can anticipate and (indirectly) control. (shrink)

The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and (...) a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical. (shrink)

This chapter explains the mechanism of proxy agency whereby a group (or individual) acts through another authorized to represent it.

Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...) Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de donner une interprétation dialogique de la logique temporelle standard. Dans ce cadre, nous utiliserons les langages hybrides dont Patrick Blackburn s’est servi pour caractériser la logique modale comme logique dialogique.

L’objectif de cet article est de donner une interprétation dialogique de la logique temporelle standard. Dans ce cadre, nous utiliserons les langages hybrides dont Patrick Blackburn s’est servi pour caractériser la logique modale comme logique dialogique.

Malgré l’ubiquité de la question des temporalités avant, pendant, et même après la guerre, très peu d’études ont systématisé la façon dont les visions temporelles structurent la décision d’un recours à la force armée et à la praxis de la guerre. Dans les grandes théories de la guerre, le temps est le plus souvent appréhendé de manière objectiviste, au singulier, supposant l’univocité universel..

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

The discussion of collective agency involves the reduction problem of the concept of a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long restricted orthodox theories and made them face the tension between an irreducible concept of a collective and ontological reductionism. Heterodox theories as functionalism and interpretationism reinterpret the concept of agency and accept it as realized on the level of a collective. In order to adequately explain social phenomena that have relations as their essence, in this paper we propose a (...) relational, holistic account of collective agency and argue that functionalism and interpretationism can be integrated into such an account. (shrink)

We have argued elsewhere that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this chapter we explore the importance of mental time travel - our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future - to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative disorders, (...) forms of amnesia, or other frontal lobe damage, our capacity for mental time travel is impaired, resulting in commensurate losses to agency autonomy, and a forensic condition essential for holding persons responsible: in legal terms, the capacity for mens rea. (shrink)

The central problem of social theory is 'structure and agency'. How do the objective features of society influence human agents? Determinism is not the answer, nor is conditioning as currently conceptualised. It accentuates the way structure and culture shape the social context in which individuals operate, but it neglects our personal capacity to define what we care about most and to establish a modus vivendi expressive of our concerns. Through inner dialogue, 'the internal conversation', individuals reflect upon their social situation (...) in the light of current concerns and projects. On the basis of a series of unique, in-depth interviews, Archer identifies three distinctive forms of internal conversation. These govern agents' responses to social conditioning, their individual patterns of social mobility and whether or not they contribute to social stability or change. Thus the internal conversation is seen as being the missing link between society and the individual, structure and agency. (shrink)

Cet article propose une réflexion sur les activités de recherche à partir de laboratoires industriels et académiques et d’organisations « intermédiaires » (laboratoires communs ; spin offs etc.). Les observations faites ponctuellement depuis une vingtaine d’années dans des laboratoires de chimie et de biologie montrent qu’elles sont l’objet d’une compétition accrue au niveau mondial entre différentes institutions et entre individus. La première hypothèse de l’article est que cette concurrence exacerbée entre entreprises, entre laboratoires académiques, entre scientifiques conduit à des stratégies (...) ayant pour objectifs une diminution des temps réservés par les prescripteurs (« les temps officiels ») pour chaque acte de recherche et à une rationalisation du travail scientifique dans le but d’accélérer la mise sur les marchés de produits, qu’ils soient académiques ou industriels, et ainsi d’en diminuer les coûts. Pour rendre compte de cette évolution, l’organisation des temps de travail en « opérations de recherche » est comparée à celle qui semble devenir prédominante aujourd’hui, la « logique-projet ». La seconde hypothèse est que ces nouvelles normes contraignantes influencent « la disponibilité temporelle » des travailleurs de la recherche et obligent de ce fait à s’interroger sur la place des chercheurs dans le salariat. (shrink)

Many ethicists writing about automated systems attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed (...) makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human–robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...) by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution. (shrink)

Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.

The paper distinguishes versions of the 'Agency theory of causation' and defends some of them against the charge of circularity.

This paper examines Fichte's proof of evil in §16 of the System of Ethics. According to the majority of commentators, Fichte was mistaken to consider his proof Kantian in spirit (Piché 1999; Kosch 2006, 2011; Dews 2008; and Breazeale 2014). For rather than locate our propensity to evil in an act of free choice, Fichte locates it in a natural force of inertia. However, the distance between Kant and Fichte begins to close if we read his concept of inertia, not (...) as a material force, but as a tendency to resist the work of agency and autonomy. There are, I argue, both textual and conceptual reasons in support of a figurative interpretation. In the course of presenting these reasons, I also uncover an important insight guiding Fichte's analysis of evil in the System of Ethics: namely, his claim that we can never fully step back from ourselves in reflection. In the concluding sections of the paper, I argue that Fichte's insight may solve a particular skeptical threat facing recent Kantian accounts of normativity. (shrink)

I examine skeptical arguments about the constitutive nature of agency, with special attention to those of Elijah Millgram. I suggest that these arguments lead us not to the conclusion that agency has no such nature, but that it is an essentially contested kind in the same way that art is. I argue that this undermines traditional forms of constitutivism in metaethics but opens the door to a different way of pursuing the same program. Finally, I take issue with Millgram’s solution (...) to the problem of “logical aliens” and suggest an alternative based my analogy with art. (shrink)

Applying evidence from recently available public information on Enron, I defined Enron’s culture as one rooted in agency theory by asserting that Enron’s members were predominantly agency-reasoning individuals. I then identified conditions present at Enron’s collapse: a strong agency culture with collectively non-compliant norms, a munificent rare-failure environment, and new hires with little business ethics training. Turning to four possible antidotes (selection, objectivist integrity, integrity capacity, and stewardship reasoning) to an agency culture under these conditions, I argued that the currently (...) available ethics literature would have made little difference toward averting Enron’s collapse if any of the recommendations from the relevant ethics literature had been implemented. I conclude by identifying new directions for business ethics literature in order to make it more implementable under the conditions identified at Enron. Essentially, we need a way to clearly determine (1) the difference between connivance and commitment, (2) what is meant by balance with regard to the multiple dimensions of ethics and legal theories, and (3) the proper balance between agency and stewardship reasoning. (shrink)