Agency, ownership, and the standard theory

In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-31 (2010)

Abstract

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of "disappearing agency". My main aim is to show that there is no problem of disappearing agency, and we will see that my response to the first challenge will be conducive to this end. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we "own" the agency that springs from our mental states and events "by default".

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,202 (#5,037)

6 months
20 (#43,973)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles

The Metaphysics of Agency.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
Agent-Causation and Agential Control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633 - 659.
The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory.Joseph Heath - 2009 - Business Ethics Quarterly 19 (4):497-528.
Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency.Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.