We argue for three main claims. First, the sentence ‘A and B ought to φ and ψ’ can express what we a call a joint-ought claim: the claim that the plurality A and B ought to φ and ψ respectively. Second, the truth-value of this joint-ought claim can differ from the truth-value of the pair of claims ‘A ought to φ’ and ‘B ought to ψ.’ This is because what A and B jointly ought to do can diverge from what (...) they individually ought to do: it may be true that A and B jointly ought to φ and ψ respectively, yet false that A ought to φ and false that B ought to ψ; and vice-versa. Third, either of two prominent semantic analyses of ‘ought’ – Mark Schroeder’s relational semantics, and Angelika Kratzer’s modal semantics – can model joint-ought claims and this difference in truth-value. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the topic of evaluation of clinical ethics consultation. The concept of evaluation seems to contain an internal tension: On the one hand, evaluation is seen as distorting the conceptual and normative content of the case under scrutiny and, on the other, the evaluative act is the most important use of judgment and an inescapable part of everyday life. As such, we maintain that evaluation is essential.

Fetal ultrasonography has made women's and men's relationship to the fetus more equal. Drawing on information obtained from multiple conjoint interviews with 62 childbearing couples, I suggest that although women and men are both advantaged by fetal ultrasonography, expectant fathers' experience of the fetus is always enhanced, whereas pregnant women's experience may also be attenuated. For men, fetal ultrasonography is like a prosthetic device: an enabling mechanism that permits them access to a female world from which they have been excluded (...) because of their limited biological role in reproduction. For women, fetal ultrasonography is enabling, but it may also be a disabling mechanism that disrupts their privileged access to the fetus. (shrink)

This paper focuses on philosophical toy objects and neo-pataphysicist disciplines, everyday resistance by futility and play. Contemporary electromagnetic toys, smart objects and the Internet of Things will be compared to the seventeenth-century Wunderkammer objects. Historic naturalia, objects and actual toy gadgetry will all be unveiled as alternate W.A.S.T.E. (Pynchon 1964) communications devices, among Habsburg peers. A proof of evidence for the functions of futile toys as resistance objects is given through the presentation of electronic circuit board designs as new bachelor (...) machines, chindogus (useless objects), subcutaneous Radio Frequency Bijoux (RFID-implants) and game fashion, as introduced by the author. But what are the consequences of the use of futile toys on the streets of everyday life? Do they entail a sustainable nascent practice in arts? Who is allowed to play with the electromagnetic parallel worlds? Do electronic toys offer a parallel communications system in their futility? What is the actual role of electronic toys in an inverse trajectory backwards to their harbingers, which are philosophical toys, jeux bijoux (blingblings to play with), Wunderkammer-toys (for peers to establish links with Potlatch-like gifts to tighten social relations) and the Ludic Spielzeug (a toy which empowers the player to recognize the futile toy as tool of resistance and backtalk to given economic and discourse order)? (shrink)

In 1907 the taxidermist Aleksandr Feodorovich Kohts founded a so-called "Museum Darwinianum" in Moscow. This museum first of all hosted a growing collection of stuffed, modelled, and visualized species and secondly — from 1913 on — a laboratory for the exploration of the evolution of species ruled by Koht's wife and psychologist Nadeshda Nikolaevna Ladygina-Kohts. While he was mainly dealing with dead animals and models, his wife was comparing the behaviour of a young chimpanzee to the behaviour of her little (...) son. Ladygina-Koht's study was unique at the time and therefore acknowledged by colleagues worldwide. That she was using photomontages for her comparisons and how this has influenced her research has not yet been considered in historical accounts. The article will examine this medial practice in order to understand how these seemingly opposing approaches could have both been dedicated to Darwin's evolutionary theory. (shrink)

In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...) when those we love believe the worst about us. And it is one of the salient wrongs of racism and sexism. Yet it is puzzling to many philosophers how we could wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about them. This paper defends the idea that we can morally wrong one another by what we believe about them from two such puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether we have the right sort of control over our beliefs for them to be subject to moral evaluation. And the second concerns whether moral wrongs would come into conflict with the distinctively epistemic standards that govern belief. Our answer to both puzzles is that the distinctively epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. This account of moral encroachment explains how epistemic norms governing belief are sensitive to the moral requirements governing belief. (shrink)

Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...) straight, by advancing a version of the Humean theory of reasons which withstands this sophisticated array of objections. Schroeder defends a radical new view which, if correct, means that the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely misunderstood. Along the way, he raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action. (shrink)

When the original Dutch version of this book was presented in 1971 to the University of Leiden as a thesis for the Doctorate in philosophy, I was prevented by the academic mores of that university from expressing my sincere thanks to three members of the Philosophical Faculty for their support of and interest in my pursuits. I take the liberty of doing so now, two and a half years later. First and foremost I want to thank Professor G. Nuchelmans warmly (...) for his expert guidance of my research. A number of my most im portant sources were brought to my attention by him. During the whole process of composing this book his criticism and encouragement were carried out in a truly academic spirit. He thereby provided working conditions that are a sine qua non for every author who is attempting to approach controversial matters in a scientific manner, conditions which, however, were not easily available at that time. In a later phase I also came into contact with Professors L. M. de Rijk and J. B. Ubbink, with both of whom I had highly stimulating discussions and exchanges of ideas. The present edition contains some entirely new sections, viz. 1-9, IV-29, V-9, V-20, VII-14 (iii), (iv), VII-17 (i), VIII-22, IX-17, IX-19, X-9 and XI-8. Section X-9 was inspired by a remark made by Professor A. (shrink)

Reasons First explores the hypothesis that reasons have a basic explanatory role in ethics and epistemology. While widely accepted concerning moral worth, Schroeder argues that this idea also illuminates some long-standing puzzles to do with knowledge.

Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.

The contributions in the first part Re-modelling logic of this volume take account of formal logic in the theory of rational argumentation.

According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition (...) would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative sense of 'ought', on which it relates agents to actions. In contrast, logically and linguistically sophisticated philosophers have typically rejected this naive view. According to them, there is no argument-place for an agent in any relation expressed by 'ought', nor is there any argument-place for an action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing that there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory. (shrink)

Este artigo visa demonstrar como se vem instaurando a formação do cidadão através do Orçamento Participativo, na cidade de Porto Alegre, após 1990.

According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. _Noncognitivism in Ethics_ is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with (...) a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder introduces and assesses three principal kinds of noncognitivist theory: the speech-act theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, the expressivist theories of Blackburn and Gibbard, and hybrid theories. He pays particular attention both to the philosophical problems about what moral facts could be about or how they could matter which noncognitivism seeks to solve, and to the deep problems that it faces, including the task of explaining both the nature of moral thought and the complexity of moral attitudes, and the ‘Frege-Geach’ problem. Schroeder makes even the most difficult material accessible by offering crucial background along the way. Also included are exercises at the end of each chapter, chapter summaries, and a glossary of technical terms - making _Noncognitivism in Ethics_ essential reading for all students of ethics and metaethics. (shrink)

Wie muss ein ethischer Beratungsdienst strukturiert sein, damit er in moralischen Konfliktsituationen im klinischen Alltag angefragt wird und die Ratsuchenden ergebnisorientiert unterstützen kann? Nach welchen Kriterien lassen sich die Beratungsgespräche auswerten und bewerten? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen werden theoretisch fundierte Konzepte ethischer Fallbesprechung aus Nimwegen, Leuven und Basel herangezogen; dies geschieht vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrungen mit der über zehnjährigen Entwicklung der ethischen Arbeit im Ev. Krankenhaus Bielefeld (EvKB). Als Resultat stellen wir einen strukturierten, multidisziplinären Ansatz vor, mit dem in (...) den Beratungsgesprächen die ethischen Dimensionen unterschiedlicher Vorstellungen herausgearbeitet und möglichst einvernehmlichen Lösungen zugeführt werden. Am Beispiel des EvKB lässt sich zeigen, dass der ethische Beratungsdienst auch in Zeiten knapper Ressourcen implementiert und praktiziert werden kann und eine Gesprächskultur schafft, die zu neuen Zielvariablen führt; hier spielen der Perspektivenwechsel und die Prozessgerechtigkeit eine zentrale Rolle und liefern zugleich Ansatzpunkte für unsere eigene Evaluationsstrategie. Zum aktuellen Stand der Evaluation klinischer Ethikberatung wird die internationale Literatur kritisch gewürdigt. Erste konzeptionelle Ansätze und Ergebnisse einer eigenen Evaluationsstrategie werden vorgestellt. Durch die Offenlegung hoffen wir, die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Themen zu intensivieren. (shrink)

The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. -/- (...) The Fundamentals of Reasons offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of reasons. Focusing on the twin roles of reasons in explanation and deliberation, the book not only emphasizes what has made reasons central across philosophy but it also explores why philosophers have such incompatible pictures about what reasons are and how they work. Working from the inside out, Howard and Schroeder identify contentious assumptions about not only the internal structure of reasons but also their relationship to other important concepts, and then show how these contentious assumptions shape the many downstream applications of reasons in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and beyond. -/- This mildly opinionated exploration of key questions about the significance and nature of reasons helps the reader to navigate this important part of the philosophical landscape and to get clearer about why reasons seem important and what their import, ultimately, is. (shrink)

<b>Objectives:</b> To gather empirical data on how gender and educational level influence bioethical reasoning among medical students by analyzing their use of care versus justice arguments for reconciling a bioethical dilemma. <b>Setting:</b> University Departments of Medical Ethics, Social and Communication Psychology in Germany. Participants: First and fifth year medical students. Design and method: Multidisciplinary, empirical, 2-segment study of ethics in action: In intrapersonal Segment 1, the students were presented with a bioethical dilemma and then administered a 13-item questionnaire to survey (...) their individual preferences for care versus justice arguments in resolving the conflict. The survey questioned 6 justice, 6 care-related items and 1 socially critical item. Data were analysed by gender and year of medical school. In interpersonal Segment 2, the bioethical dilemma from Segment 1 was discussed in gender-mixed and gender-homogeneous groups. Coded transcripts were evaluated to identify prevalences in care versus justice reasoning. <b>Results:</b> Data on 462 medical students were evaluable (n=338 in Segment 1, n=168 in Segment 2, n=44 overlap). Gender and level of education had no effect on moral reasoning in intrapersonal Segment 1, but significantly affected reasoning in interpersonal Segment 2, where women significantly tended to use more care-orientated arguments. Justice arguments predominated the group discussions. <b>Conclusion:</b> Interpersonal contexts affect moral reasoning in medical students, probably by amplifying the socialisation relating to gender and educational level. Care orientation is associated with the female gender. Professional socialisation tends to reduce the diversity and richness of moral reasoning towards a more justice-weighted orientation. Medical ethics should teach both justice and care reasoning modes in order to broaden physicians' ability to reconcile bioethical dilemmas. (shrink)

Moral error theory is the doctrine that our first-order moral commitments are pervaded by systematic error. It has been objected that this makes the error theory itself a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards of competing first-order moral theories :87–139, 1996) and Kramer. Kramer: “the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. It is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning” [2009, 1]). (...) This paper shows that error theorists can resist this charge if they adopt a particular understanding of the presuppositions of moral discourse. (shrink)

According to the thesis of the guise of the normative, all desires are associated with normative appearances or judgments. But guise of the normative theories differ sharply over the content of the normative representation, with the two main versions being the guise of reasons and the guise of the good. Chapter 6 defends the comparative thesis that the guise of reasons thesis is more promising than the guise of the good. The central idea is that observations from the theory of (...) content determination can be used in order to constrain possible theories of the representational contents associated with desire. The authors argue that the initially most promising versions of the guise of the good fail to meet these constraints, and then explain the steep challenge confronting any who wish to craft a new guise of the good theory which meets the constraints while also preserving the initial motivations for adopting any guise of the normative theory at all. But a simple version of the guise of reasons not only avoids the troubles besetting the guise of the good but proceeds immediately from a deep diagnosis of the source of its difficulties. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent (...) with the account of knowledge and successfully deals with fake barns. (shrink)

Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that (...) generate the voluntary activities making up ordinary deliberation. These nondeliberative, nonvoluntary processes by means of which we are able to deliberate for reasons are the fundamental processes by means of which we can think or do anything for a reason: once it has been seen that they must exist, it can be recognized that they are ubiquitous. As a result, the usefulness of deliberation to rational belief and action is intermittent, contingent, and modest. Deliberation is a tremendously valuable tool for increasing human capacities to think and act for good reasons in challenging contexts, but in the end it is merely a tool, wielded by people through the same nondeliberative, nonvoluntary capacities to think and act for reasons that they are enhancing the effectiveness of by deliberating. (shrink)

What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...) Will and the Concept of a Person,” the interdisciplinary nature of the question has been emphasized by various authors. Going beyond the boundaries of the traditional free will debate, they have attempted to describe the requirements for agent accountability by appeal to theories of personality, rational agency, and ethical choice. The approach has been a breath of fresh air in the often-stagnant free will debate, bringing new considerations to bear and provoking new lines of argument, and it is an approach that we will adopt in this paper. In the following pages, we hope to show that an under-noticed phenomenon of moral psychology, inverse akrasia, exemplified by Huckleberry Finn, has something to contribute to the understanding of agency and accountability. After presenting the phenomenon in section I, we will move in section II to a quick survey of a family of Frankfurt-inspired views and a critique of them based on the phenomenon in sections III and IV. A new theory will be offered in section V, and potential objections addressed in the final section of the paper. (shrink)

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...) for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny. (shrink)

Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of philosophers’ other (...) commitments. For example, Fitting Attitudes accounts play a central role both in T.M. Scanlon’s [1998] case against teleology, and in Michael Smith [2003], [unpublished] and Doug Portmore’s [2007] cases for it. And of course they have a long and distinguished history. (shrink)