La référence au mythe de Kronos dans l’œuvre de Plotin occupe une place qui n’est pas facile à définir. Ce mythe est peu abordé dans le cadre des travaux sur la métaphysique plotinienne, bien que Kronos - l’Intellect dans ses rapports à l’Un et à l’Âme représente un des points particulièrement sensibles de la doctrine de Plotin. Ce motif est, en revanche, étudié en tant que l’exemple de l’exégèse d’un mythe : consternant, car il n’y a rien (...) de plus éloigné de la version hésiodique des théogonies. L’analyse des quatre fragments relatifs au mythe de Kronos, permet de constater la référence à Platon comme premier objectif de l’exégèse plotinienne. Plotin réalise un étrange « morcellement » du mythe, dont il sépare les personnages et les épisodes pour ensuite les intégrer dans l’architecture de ses discours. Cette attitude a pour résultat des interprétations très audacieuses et parfaitement insérées dans la noétique plotinienne et dans la culture philosophique de son époque. (shrink)

Ce livre aborde la philosophie de Plotin sous l'angle des rapports entre la pensée et le langage, analysant le concept d'intellect (Noûs) et les multiples formes du discours dans l'oeuvre pour montrer le lien inextricable entre la teneur métaphysique et la teneur pratique de ce Noûs plotinien.

This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as for Proclus, the muthos (...) appears as being a simple particular case of logos, and even that the logos itself is only a particular case of muthos. (shrink)

At the end of Treatise 38, Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object and its intellection is not the act of a substrate, as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, (...) that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle. (shrink)

Plotin considère parfois l’intellection comme une sorte de sensation, alors qu’il distingue par ailleurs fortement les deux activités. Le but de cet article est d’étudier cette description qui semble paradoxale dans la mesure où l’intellection est ramenée à un processus auquel elle est opposée en même temps. Nous devons tout d’abord mettre en lumière le lien entre la sensation et l’intellection. Il est ensuite nécessaire de montrer de quelle manière la sensation est considérée comme un modèle qui rend compte du (...) processus de la pensée intuitive. C’est la vue qui apparaît comme le sens permettant de décrire l’intellection de la façon la plus adéquate. Mais la sensation ne constitue pas seulement un modèle et les réalités intelligibles sont appelées «les choses sensibles de là-bas», «ces corps» ou encore «les choses visibles». Nous cherchons, en un mot, à comprendre la signification de ces expressions qui semblent contraires à la doctrine platonicienne. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une étude comparative entre Plotin, Spinoza et Shankara, la raison et son dépassement en constituent le thème central. En effet ces trois philosophes cherchent à dépasser l'intellect : le nous pour Plotin, la buddhi pour Shankara et la raison pour Spinoza et ce, dans des contextes très variés - hellénistique, hindouiste et rationaliste - pour en définitive, s'unir à l'Absolu. Des lors, n'y aurait-il pas un lien de parenté, sous-jacent, qui unirait ces trois auteurs dans leur quête (...) de Vérité? La démarche de cette confrontation se propose de découvrir si le thème du "dépassement de la raison" révèle, ou non, l'existence d'un authentique lien entre ces philosophies et permette ainsi de rapprocher, irrésistiblement, la philosophie occidentale de la philosophie indienne... (shrink)

Plotin discute à plusieurs reprises de la mémoire, de sa fonction et de son rôle dans la connaissance. Dans la longue section qui va de IV 3 [27], 25 à IV 4 [28], 5, il s’interroge sur « ce qui » se remémore, c’est-à-dire sur le sujet de la mémoire. L’examen de ces chapitres permet de recueillir quelques éléments caractéristiques de la théorie plotinienne de la connaissance. Plotin fait une rigoureuse distinction entre la mémoire et la simple conservation d’impressions sensibles (...) et associe la mémoire à une capacité spontanée de l’âme. L’âme, d’autre part, en tant que sujet de la mémoire, est pourtant toujours caractérisée par un type de pensée discursif et lié au temps. De ce type de connaissance, Plotin distingue la pensée la plus élevée, qui appartient à l’âme grâce à la partie d’elle-même qui n’est pas descendue de l’Intellect, lequel est étranger au temps et à la discursivité. L’étude du sujet de la mémoire fournit des éclaircissements sur la structure de l’âme chez Plotin, sur le rôle de l’imagination (phantasia), sur le caractère intrinsèquement dynamique de l’âme, capable de redéfinir sa propre nature en accord avec la faculté qui joue en elle le rôle de centre unificateur. Au sommet se trouve une condition cognitive dans laquelle l’âme saisit, même « ici-bas », avant sa séparation du corps, les Formes intelligibles, au moyen d’une connaissance appropriée et indépendante de toute forme de mémoire et de discursivité (cf. IV 4 [28], 4-5). Par conséquent, le rôle de la réminiscence dans l’épistémologie plotinienne est plutôt limité. (shrink)

This note aims to show that the text attested by the Medieval sources for Plotinus, Ennead IV, 6 (41) 2, 22-24 can be retained, notwithstanding the doubts of several scholars who tried to amend it. Retaining the manuscript tradition enables us to read in the passage three different kinds of vision of the soul : (1) the soul’s ordinary vision of itself, characterized by duality and otherness ; (2) the soul’s vision of intellect and (3) its vision of itself, when (...) she is within the intelligible : both these visions are characterized by the unified duality of the subject and the object of vision. (shrink)

Les lectures plotinienne et proclusienne de Métaphysique Λ ne se résolvent pas dans ces résultats doctrinaux que sont la hiérarchisation de l’Intellect et de l’Un-Bien et l’harmonisation des causalités efficiente et finale. Pour les saisir tant dans leur différence que dans celle qui les oppose toutes deux aux lectures concordistes, il faut déplacer l’analyse du plan des doctrines à celui des concepts. Plus précisément, il faut demander comment Plotin et Proclus intègrent le concept qui, en Métaphysique Λ, condense la charge (...) polémique portée par Aristote contre Platon, à savoir le concept d’energeia. Ce dernier engage en effet une conception radicalement antiplatonicienne du principe premier, dont on montre qu’elle s’articule en quatre critiques fondamentales. On analyse dès lors les stratégies de lecture de Λ mises en oeuvre par Plotin et Proclus de façon à évaluer les angles de contreattaque qu’elles déterminent. Plutôt qu’à une harmonisation ou à une simple hiérarchisation, on a affaire, dans les deux cas quoique sous des modalités différentes, à une intégration dialectique qui en passe par la neutralisation de la charge polémique du concept d’energeia ainsi que par sa réélaboration, elle-même solidaire de modèles causaux distincts tant de celui de Platon que de celui d’Aristote. (shrink)

Les critiques que Plotin adresse à l’épistémologie stoïcienne visent à établir que les stoïciens ont tort de corporaliser l’âme, car cela leur interdit de concevoir correctement les perceptions sensibles et les intellections. On peut penser qu’il n’y a rien d’intéressant à attendre, philosophiquement, de cette polémique menée par un partisan de l’incorporéité de l’âme contre les matéria­listes de l’ἡγεμονικόν. Car l’opposition des principes respectifs est telle que l’ad­versaire peut ne pas s’estimer réfuté parce qu’il ne partage aucune des prémisses de (...) son objecteur. Il semble que Plotin a eu conscience de ce problème, et qu’il a cherché à formuler des objections contre le corporalisme stoïcien telles qu’elles ne le prennent pas pour cible immédiate tout en l’atteignant indirectement par leurs implications. Mon propos est d’examiner cette démarche sur deux cas exemplaires : la critique de l’explication stoïcienne de la sensation par une transmission ; et celle de l’analyse de la connaissance en termes de réception d’empreintes. (shrink)

Cet article soutient que Plotin a écrit l’ Ennéade VI 8 (39) pour mener ses élèves à voir que notre liberté est fondée sur l’Un, un but poursuivi par le biais d’une polémique avec le De fato et le De anima d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise. La première partie cherche à établir que le « discours téméraire » introduit au chapitre 7 est une interprétation de la position du De fato sur la liberté des dieux. Plotin lit la thèse de son adversaire en (...) transférant au niveau de l’Un une structure tripartite constituée par la nature, la raison et le hasard, une structure qu’Alexandre utilisait pour expliquer les événements des réalités en devenir. La seconde partie propose de voir le traité comme un procédé dialectique. Plotin commence son enquête par le niveau de l’âme et celui de l’Intellect. Il arrive ensuite au discours sur l’Un, où il essaie de franchir progressivement les limites du langage en analysant les positions alternatives du point de vue du discours, des mots et enfin de la pensée. Ce faisant, il insiste sur le renversement des thèses d’Alexandre : l’Un est simple et donc il n’est pas contraint par sa nature, il est libre grâce à une volonté incapable de choisir parmi les contraires et tournée métaphoriquement vers elle-même. (shrink)

Etudie les aspects, les moyens et les précédents de l'interprétation que fait Plotin (205-270) de l'idée platonicienne de participation. L'auteur met en avant l'importance de la notion d'imitation dans l'hypothèse d'un processus d'engendrement des existences à partir des trois réalités véritables (l'Un, l'Intellect et l'Ame).

The employment of mythological language and imagery by an Epicurean poet - an adherent of a system not only materialist, but overtly hostile to myth and poetry - is highly paradoxical. This apparent contradiction has often been ascribed to a conflict in the poet between reason and intellect, or to a desire to enliven his philosophical material with mythological digressions. This book attempts to provide a more positive assessment of Lucretius' aims and methodology by considering the poet's attitude to myth, (...) and the role which it plays in the De Rerum Natura, against the background of earlier and contemporary views. The author suggests that Lucretius was not only aware of the tension between his two roles as philosopher and poet, but attempted to resolve it by developing his own, Epicurean poetic, together with a bold and innovative theory of the origins and meaning of myth. (shrink)

This article argues that Plotinus wrote Ennead VI 8 (39) to direct his students to see that our freedom is founded on the One, a goal pursued by means of a polemic against Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato and De anima. The first part aims to establish that the “rash discourse” introduced in chapter 7 is an interpretation of De fato’s position on the freedom of the gods. Plotinus reads his opponent’s thesis by transferring to the level of the One (...) a tripartite structure made up of nature, reason, and chance, a structure that Alexander used to explain events on the level of Becoming. The second part proposes to see the treatise as a dialectical process. Plotinus starts his inquiry at the levels of soul and Intellect. He later arrives at the discourse about the One, in which he tries to progressively overcome the limits of language by analyzing alternative positions from the viewpoint of discourse, words, and finally thought. In doing this, he insists on his reversal of Alexander’s theses: the One is simple and therefore not constrained by its nature; it is free thanks to a will incapable of choosing between the contraries and directed metaphorically toward itself. (shrink)

À la différence de la plupart des autres commentateurs, je soutiens que l’histoire de l’univers évoquée dans le mythe du Politique comprend trois périodes : le règne de Kronos décrit en 271c3-272d6, le monde laissé à lui-même évoqué en 272d6-273e4 et le règne de Zeus, le nôtre, décrit en 273e4-274d7. La période d’abandon ne peut correspondre à la nôtre, au cours de laquelle, suivant Platon, les dieux sont actifs et jouent un rôle important. Un passage du Timée et surtout (...) le dixième livre des Lois laissent en effet entendre qu’il s’agit là d’une « expérience de pensée », destinée à illustrer dans quel état serait le monde s’il était livré a lui-même. (shrink)

Numenius and Ammonius, by E. R. Dodds.--Plotin zwischen Platon und Stoa, von W. Theiler.--Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin, par P. Hadot.--Plotin et les gnostiques, par H. C. Puech.--Die Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus, von H. Dörrie.--Mito e poesia nelle Enneadi di Plotino, di V. Cilento.--Quelle oder Tradition? Von R. Harder.--"Bewusst" und "unbewusst" bei Plotin, von H. R. Schwyzer.--The background of the doctrine "That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect," by A. H. Armstrong.--Une comparaison chez Aristote, (...) Alexandre et Plotin, par P. Henry. (shrink)

The origin of matter is one of the last and greatest unsolved mysteries bedevilling modern attempts at understanding the philosophy of the "Enneads." There are two stages in the production of Intellect and of soul. The One or Intellect produces an undifferentiated other, which becomes Intellect or soul by itself turning towards and looking towards the prior principle, with no possibility of the One's "turning towards" or "seeing" itself. But where does matter come from? To arrive at his conception of (...) matter, Plotinus has radically altered the definitions of non-being given by Plato and Aristotle in their refutation of Parmenides. Matter, for Plotinus, is a non-being opposed, not to "the being of each thing", as in Plato's "Sophist," but to all "the beings properly so-called", i.e. to all the forms. It is then further identified with Aristotle's definition of non-being as privation, with the crucial difference that privation, for Plotinus, is made a permanent substratum of change. This re-formulation of ideas from the "Sophist" and the "Physics" proves unmistakably that it is matter which is generated when soul produces a "non-being" which is also a "total lack of definition". The production of matter by soul does not, however, follow the model of the production of Intellect from the One or of soul from Intellect. Since matter is lifeless, it cannot turn towards its source. Soul therefore has to be herself directly responsible both for the production of matter and for the covering of matter with form. Matter is therefore included among the products which stem ultimately from the One. But the origin and the nature of matter have to be understood as very different from the double process of emanation which lies at the origin of Intellect and of soul. (shrink)

In my Oriens article on Avicenna's empiricism, I present what Avicenna calls the principles of syllogism, which are the different types of propositions that form the irreducible and axiomatic starting points of syllogisms and definitions. As Avicenna states both explicitly and implicitly in numerous passages that I cite, these are all based on experience. Two of these are the primary propositions and those with built-in syllogisms, literally, "premises of fiṭra syllogisms," fiṭra being the natural operation of the intellect—thus, "premises whose (...) syllogisms are constructed by the natural operation of the intellect." In his "Note" on my article... (shrink)

This paper defends Plotinus’ reading ofSophist248e-249d as an expression of the togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being. Throughout the dialogues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness of knower and known, expressing this through the myth of recollection and through metaphors of grasping, eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible paradigm is in the thought that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as extrinsic “objects” but as the contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading (...) ofSophist248e-249d shows that the “motion” attributed to intelligible being is not temporal change but the activity of intellectual apprehension. Aristotle’s doctrines of knowledge as identity of intellect and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as thinking itself, are therefore in continuity with Plato, and Plotinus’ doctrine of intellect and being is continuous with both Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

Résumé La théologie de Numénius, qui définit le premier dieu comme un principe totalement simple, solitaire et transcendant, a joué un grand rôle dans la construction de l’hénologie plotinienne. Or, si cette dernière est en partie héritière des réflexions médioplatoniciennes, elle marque également un véritable tournant dans l’histoire du platonisme. Tandis que le premier principe de Numénius exprime l’unité parfaite de l’être et de l’intellect, l’Un de Plotin est « au-delà de l’être » de manière absolue. Cette différence a des (...) conséquences décisives, tant sur la manière de concevoir le rapport du premier au second principe, que sur l’interprétation de la relation de l’Intellect divin à son objet. Cet article se propose d’analyser, à travers une étude de la conception du premier principe chez Plotin et Numénius, l’apport métaphysique que représente l’existence d’un principe au-delà de l’être. (shrink)

Did Freud present a scientific hypothesis about the unconscious, as he always maintained and as many of his disciples keep repeating? This question has long prompted debates concerning the legitimacy and usefulness of psychoanalysis, and it is of utmost importance to Lacanian analysts, whose main project has been to stress Freud's scientific grounding. Here Jacques Bouveresse, a noted authority on Ludwig Wittgenstein, contributes to the debate by turning to this Austrian-born philosopher and contemporary of Freud for a candid assessment of (...) the early issues surrounding psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein, who himself had delivered a devastating critique of traditional philosophy, sympathetically pondered Freud's claim to have produced a scientific theory in proposing a new model of the human psyche. What Wittgenstein recognized--and what Bouveresse so eloquently stresses for today's reader--is that psychoanalysis does not aim to produce a change limited to the intellect but rather seeks to provoke an authentic change of human attitudes. The beauty behind the theory of the unconscious for Wittgenstein is that it breaks away from scientific, causal explanations to offer new forms of thinking and speaking, or rather, a new mythology. Offering a critical view of all the texts in which Wittgenstein mentions Freud, Bouveresse immerses us in the intellectual climate of Vienna in the early part of the twentieth century. Although we come to see why Wittgenstein did not view psychoanalysis as a science proper, we are nonetheless made to feel the philosopher's sense of wonder and respect for the cultural task Freud took on as he found new ways meaningfully to discuss human concerns. Intertwined in this story of Wittgenstein's grappling with the theory of the unconscious is the story of how he came to question the authority of science and of philosophy itself. While aiming primarily at the clarification of Wittgenstein's opinion of Freud, Bouveresse's book can be read as a challenge to the French psychoanalytic school of Lacan and as a provocative commentary on cultural authority. (shrink)

Poe’s influence on the Symbolists has been traced on many occasions, though not in detail. The classical study in English is Eliot’s “From Poe to Valéry,” a Library of Congress lecture delivered three years after Valéry’s death.2 Eliot defines Poe as irresponsible and immature—irresponsible in style, immature in vision. He had, Eliot comments, “the intellect of a highly gifted young person before puberty”; “all of his ideas seem to be entertained rather than believed” . How, then, we ask, did he (...) hoax the sophisticated French? Although Eliot raises the issue of their relative ignorance of English, he prudently does not make much of it: after all, we know that Baudelaire spent seventeen years on the tales, Mallarmé still longer on the poems—thirty years for the definitive text; while Valéry, to whom Baudelaire and Mallarmé left little to translate, managed a version of the Marginalia. Each might have said, as Mallarmé did in 1885, that he had learned English for one sole reason: “to read Poe better.”3 In the matter of linguistic competence, then, Eliot is content to remark that the French poets “were not disturbed by weaknesses of which we are very much aware” . He underlines, however, that Poe showed different facets of himself to each of his readers who adopted him in various ways: Baudelaire focused on the Poète maudit, Mallarmé on the prosodist, and Valéry on the theoretician in whom he discovered “a method and an occupation—that of observing himself write” . So Poe had a diverse effect, which Eliot accepts more readily in respect of Baudelaire and Mallarmé than he does of Valéry. To explain this last case which intrigues him especially, he introduces a paradox: “with Poe and Valéry, extremes meet,” he writes, “the immature mind playing with ideas because it had not developed to the point of convictions, and the very adult mind playing with ideas because it was too skeptical to hold convictions” .Thus Eliot damns Poe with faint praise. The distance between cause and effect, master and disciples is so vast that it can only be thought the product of monstrous error. And yet “from Poet to Valéry” and the complementary studies in English or French of the past thirty-five years neglect some deeper factors that drew the Symbolists. Misreadings there were no doubt since such are in the nature of things, but these authors were sensitive to currents that others overlooked. They attempted to go to first principles, not only because Poe was “ce poète incomparable, ce philosophe non refute” 4 and, therefore, worthy of scrutiny, but because they held him to be vital to their future thought. In a period of great social and aesthetic change they found a figure of radical independence—classicist, visionary, logician supreme—whom they explained by convergent tropes of daemonic power. In this regard the newly published correspondence of Mallarmé and the massive Valéry notebooks have added to our knowledge. I would like, then, to consider the nature of Poe’s action, this submerged dialogue in time and successive rewriting by which—“à l’égal de nos maître les plus chers ou vénérés,” as Mallarmé put it5—he entered the mainstream of French poetry. 2. The lecture was later published in Hudson Review 2 : 335; all further references to this work, abbreviated “FPV,” will be included in the text.3. Mallarmé, “Autobiographie,” Oeuvres completes, p. 662.4. Baudelaire, “Le Poème du hachisch,” Oeuvres complètes, 1:427.5. Mallarmé, “Scolies,” Oeuvres completes, p. 223. James Lawler, Edward arson Waller Distinguished Service Professor of French at the University of Chicago, has written extensively on nineteenth- and twentieth-century French poetry. Among his books are Lecture de Valéry, The Language of French Symbolism, The Poet as Analyst, and René Char: The Myth and the Poem. He is currently completing a study of Buadelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal. (shrink)

Plato was the first author to use the term mûthos (myth) in our modern sense.1 He described the role of myth in Athens, in order to contrast it with an argumentative philosophical discourse aimed at the truth. Even so, he had recourse to this unverifiable story not only in a practical role, in order to persuade the citizen to obey moral norms and political laws, but also in a theoretical context, evoking premises from which philosophical discourse could develop, and picturing (...) realities such as the soul, that could not be grasped by either the senses or the intellect. With the disappearance of the city-state and the constitution of Kingdoms and Empires, the social and political aspects of myth tended to disappear in the Mediterranean world, allowing the soul to take “centre-stage.” While theogony, cosmogony, and anthropogony persisted, they did so only to provide a framework for a vast drama—that of the salvation of the human soul—as described in the Chaldaean Oracles and the treatises of the Sethian Gnostics. (shrink)

Chapter 20 of Plotinus’ treatise VI, 2 [43] has received particular attention because it seems to deal with the Intellect. However, the connection of this chapter with chapter 19 is problematic insofar as the latter deals with the ways in which species are generated by the first genera. Our aim will be to show that chapter 20 can only be understood in the light of the notion of genus. More precisely, Plotinus’ aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the priority (...) of the genus over its species by means of the theory of double activity. In order to demonstrate this point, the notion of Intellect is introduced by Plotinus as a model (παράδειγμα) to conceive this priority. We will study successively these two chapters to justify this point, insisting on the link between them as well as on the reinterpretation of some key Aristotelian concepts. This study also shows that the use of the comparison with science allows Plotinus to justify the primacy of the intelligible totalities that are the Soul and the Intellect as well as the generation of their respective parts, the particular souls and the particular intellects. (shrink)

La philosophie de Plotin se situe a la croisee de deux metaphysiques. La premiere culmine avec l'affirmation de l'identite entre l'etre et la pensee: en introduisant les Formes intelligibles dans l'Intellect divin, elle conjugue platonisme et aristotelisme. La seconde inaugure un courant qui marquera durablement l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale, a travers notamment la tradition de la theologie negative. L'ontologie grecque est ainsi menee a son achevement en meme temps qu'elle est debordee par la position d'un au-dela de l'etre, l'Un, (...) et ebranlee par l'impensable extinction de l'etre que represente la matiere. La pensee se trouve aux prises avec deux figures du non-etre, qu'il s'agisse de ce non-etre par defaut qu'est la matiere, ou du non-etre par sureminence propre au premier Principe. Ce livre a donc pour objet de montrer qu'il ne s'agit chez Plotin ni d'une forme superieure d'onto-theologie, ni de la sortie de la metaphysique a laquelle aspire tout un courant de la reflexion contemporaine, mais bien d'une nouvelle et autre metaphysique, qui reussit a entrelacer infini et totalite. C'est ce noeud et cette tension entre deux metaphysiques, dont chacune engage une figure differente de l'alterite, que font apparaitre des analyses patientes et eclairantes des textes des Enneades. Cet ouvrage presente donc a la fois une reinterpretation de l'oeuvre de Plotin et une reflexion profonde sur des problemes qui, de Hegel a Heidegger et de Schelling a Levinas et Derrida, continuent encore et toujours a inquieter la pensee. (shrink)

Did Freud present a scientific hypothesis about the unconscious, as he always maintained and as many of his disciples keep repeating? This question has long prompted debates concerning the legitimacy and usefulness of psychoanalysis, and it is of utmost importance to Lacanian analysts, whose main project has been to stress Freud's scientific grounding. Here Jacques Bouveresse, a noted authority on Ludwig Wittgenstein, contributes to the debate by turning to this Austrian-born philosopher and contemporary of Freud for a candid assessment of (...) the early issues surrounding psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein, who himself had delivered a devastating critique of traditional philosophy, sympathetically pondered Freud's claim to have produced a scientific theory in proposing a new model of the human psyche. What Wittgenstein recognized--and what Bouveresse so eloquently stresses for today's reader--is that psychoanalysis does not aim to produce a change limited to the intellect but rather seeks to provoke an authentic change of human attitudes. The beauty behind the theory of the unconscious for Wittgenstein is that it breaks away from scientific, causal explanations to offer new forms of thinking and speaking, or rather, a new mythology. Offering a critical view of all the texts in which Wittgenstein mentions Freud, Bouveresse immerses us in the intellectual climate of Vienna in the early part of the twentieth century. Although we come to see why Wittgenstein did not view psychoanalysis as a science proper, we are nonetheless made to feel the philosopher's sense of wonder and respect for the cultural task Freud took on as he found new ways meaningfully to discuss human concerns. Intertwined in this story of Wittgenstein's grappling with the theory of the unconscious is the story of how he came to question the authority of science and of philosophy itself. While aiming primarily at the clarification of Wittgenstein's opinion of Freud, Bouveresse's book can be read as a challenge to the French psychoanalytic school of Lacan and as a provocative commentary on cultural authority. (shrink)

The status of beauty in Plotinus' metaphysics is unclear: is it a Form in Intellect, the Intelligible Principle itself, or the One? Basing themselves on a number of well-known passages in the "Enneads," and assuming that Plotinus' Forms are similar in function and status to Plato's, many scholars hold that Plotinus theorized beauty as a determinate entity in Intellect. Such assumptions, it is here argued, lead to difficulties over self-predication, the interpretation of Plotinus's rich and varied aesthetic terminology and, most (...) of all, the puzzling dearth of references, in the whole of the "Enneads," to a Form of Beauty. A detailed reading of VI.7.32 and 33 reveals that, in these two crucial passages at least, Plotinus adopts an aesthetic approach to the One and that, far from confining Beauty to Intellect, he equates the One, the Good and the Beautiful. This reading is here supported not only by an analysis of the text but also by a consideration of the semantic differences between μορφή and ε[unrepresentable symbol]δος, the inter-relatedness, in Plotinus' philosophy, of the concepts of love and value, and the exclusion of beauty from the πρ[unrepresentable symbol]τα γένη. In turn, the exegesis of VI.7.32 and 33 raises the issue of the significance for aesthetics understood in the narrow sense of the word, of Plotinus's ontology of beauty. It is here claimed that in so far as sensible beauty, both artistic and natural, can be nothing else than an effect of the shaping action of the Forms and a reflection of their radiance, singular or global, it should not be held that Plotinus had an aesthetics in the modern sense of this term. (shrink)

Plus que tout autre philosophe antique, Plotin semble mettre ses interprètes au défi de décrypter le fond de sa pensée. En effet, elle a l’air d’un système, mais le lecteur des Ennéades ne se voit pas livrer les structures conceptuelles principales qui doivent en assurer la cohérence. Emilsson s’est proposé le décryptage de certaines structures qui ont la fonction de principe conceptuel soit tout à fait général soit spécifique pour un champ thématique déterminé. Après avoir proposé une étude...

The status of beauty in Plotinus' metaphysics is unclear: is it a Form in Intellect, the Intelligible Principle itself, or the One? Basing themselves on a number of well-known passages in the "Enneads," and assuming that Plotinus' Forms are similar in function and status to Plato's, many scholars hold that Plotinus theorized beauty as a determinate entity in Intellect. Such assumptions, it is here argued, lead to difficulties over self-predication, the interpretation of Plotinus's rich and varied aesthetic terminology and, most (...) of all, the puzzling dearth of references, in the whole of the "Enneads," to a Form of Beauty. A detailed reading of VI.7.32 and 33 reveals that, in these two crucial passages at least, Plotinus adopts an aesthetic approach to the One and that, far from confining Beauty to Intellect, he equates the One, the Good and the Beautiful. This reading is here supported not only by an analysis of the text but also by a consideration of the semantic differences between μορφή and ε[unrepresentable symbol]δος, the inter-relatedness, in Plotinus' philosophy, of the concepts of love and value, and the exclusion of beauty from the πρ[unrepresentable symbol]τα γένη. In turn, the exegesis of VI.7.32 and 33 raises the issue of the significance for aesthetics understood in the narrow sense of the word, of Plotinus's ontology of beauty. It is here claimed that in so far as sensible beauty, both artistic and natural, can be nothing else than an effect of the shaping action of the Forms and a reflection of their radiance, singular or global, it should not be held that Plotinus had an aesthetics in the modern sense of this term. (shrink)

Trying to reconstruct the specific definition of the noetic act from some excerpts of the fifth and seventh Treatises (Enneads, V, 9 and 4), one manages to circumscribe the operations by which Plotinus establishes in the context the unity between the intellect, the act of thinking, some form of «prime intelligibility» and the other, multiple, intelligibilities. Plotinus is striving to avoid several pitfalls in order not to endanger the unity of the noetic hypostasis and consequently to imperil the only possible (...) way of thinking the One. At least four ways of bypassing possible impediments detectable in the context mentioned can be summarised : (i) averting the idea that the noetic act can be identified to the form and can thus be defined as «the thinking of forms» ; (ii) establishing that the precession of being as an «object of thought» is an a posteriori act of thought, and not the actual and necessary preeminence of the being on the noetic act ; (iii) debunking any temptation of considering thought as a mediation between the first and the second hypostasis ; and finally (iv) avoiding a definition of the noetic act through a sine qua non recourse to power, by establishing a specific statutary order of the noûs according to which the act and the power determine, or not, the possibility of intellection. An analysis of the texts will bring us to reconsider the so‑called theory of the two complementary acts and its Aristotelian origins, and also to recall the debates around Plotinus’ «idealism», demonstrating the appositeness and the specificities of that conception. (shrink)

Is there an energeia of the Good according to Plotinus? The aim of this paper is to shed light on the tension between two conflicting perspectives concerning the Good in the philosophy of Plotinus. According to the first perspective, Plotinus claims that the the first principle completely transcends the energeia, which is strictly limited to the Intellect. According to the second, he ascribes a kind of immanent energeia to the One. I will examine the two series of texts in which (...) these two perspectives are present and advance two hypotheses to explain the divergence between these two viewpoints.Firstly, the meaning of the term energeia is not unequivocal, depending on whether it is strictly limited to the intelligible realm or ascribed to the One. Secondly, the competition between two models of causality in the Enneads can explain why Plotinus has two divergent views on the relation between the Good and the energeia. According to the first model, the Good ≪doesn’t have in itself what it gives≫. In line with this principle, Plotinus claims that the Good stands epekeina energeias. The second model of causality is inherited from the peripatetic school. According to it, the cause already contains eminently in itself that which it gives. This model of causality helps explain the ascription of energeia to the Good and the so‑called ≪double‑energeia theory≫. (shrink)

Anyone interested in Greek philosophy or in contemporary theories of hierarchy will profit from reading this book. It is a model of correct methodology since O’Meara carefully studies the relevant Greek texts in a chronological order, which he constantly illumines through references to secondary literature. As a result, it offers helpful insights into Plotinus, as these examples indicate. Although the Greek word for "hierarchy" does not itself occur in the history of thought prior to Pseudo-Dionysius, the conception of hierarchic structures (...) is found clearly in Plotinus’ view of existents related to one another as higher/lower, prior/posterior, causally independent/dependent, and so on. His presentation of those structures varies, though. At times he utilizes the Platonic contrast between the sensible and intelligible realms, which, however, are linked through participation. On other occasions he speaks of the One, the Intellect and the Soul. The second of these is occasionally linked with intelligibility, being, and number. The third with reference to the visible universe is described as Nature and Logos. But the hierarchical ordering which remains constant from beginning to end of the Enneads is that of the three hypostases: the One, Intellect, and Soul. These Plotinus often presents from different perspectives and with varying emphases, with the result that one realizes his hierarchical arrangements are not an a priori source of his philosophizing but emerge from it. (shrink)

In this ambitious book, acclaimed writer Marilynne Robinson applies her astute intellect to some of the most vexing topics in the history of human thought—science, religion, and consciousness. Crafted with the same care and insight as her award-winning novels, _Absence of Mind_ challenges postmodern atheists who crusade against religion under the banner of science. In Robinson’s view, scientific reasoning does not denote a sense of logical infallibility, as thinkers like Richard Dawkins might suggest. Instead, in its purest form, science represents (...) a search for answers. It engages the problem of knowledge, an aspect of the mystery of consciousness, rather than providing a simple and final model of reality. By defending the importance of individual reflection, Robinson celebrates the power and variety of human consciousness in the tradition of William James. She explores the nature of subjectivity and considers the culture in which Sigmund Freud was situated and its influence on his model of self and civilization. Through keen interpretations of language, emotion, science, and poetry,_ Absence of Mind_ restores human consciousness to its central place in the religion-science debate. (shrink)

L'article compare le motif de la contemplation de sa propre image dans une surface réfléchissante chez Plotin avec des motifs semblables que l'on trouvenon seulement dans les récits mythologiques, mais aussi dans les doctrines cosmologiques des systèmes philosophiques, gnostiques surtout, qui sont à la fois proches de Plotin et concurrent, à l'égard de la philosophie plotinienne. En même temps, en analysant deux métaphores mythologiques, dont une se sert du motif de la réflexion dans le miroir (le mythe orphique du (...) démembrement de Dionysos) et l'autre de la réflexion dans l'eau (le mythe de Narcisse), l'article souligne les différences qui séparent la doctrine plotinienne de la descente de l'âme et celle de la chute de l'âme. (shrink)

L'article compare le motif de la contemplation de sa propre image dans une surface réfléchissante chez Plotin avec des motifs semblables que l'on trouvenon seulement dans les récits mythologiques, mais aussi dans les doctrines cosmologiques des systèmes philosophiques, gnostiques surtout, qui sont à la fois proches de Plotin et concurrent, à l'égard de la philosophie plotinienne. En même temps, en analysant deux métaphores mythologiques, dont une se sert du motif de la réflexion dans le miroir (le mythe orphique du (...) démembrement de Dionysos) et l'autre de la réflexion dans l'eau (le mythe de Narcisse), l'article souligne les différences qui séparent la doctrine plotinienne de la descente de l'âme et celle de la chute de l'âme. (shrink)

This article examines the visual archive of the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. Better known as the Bandung Conference or simply Bandung, this diplomatic meeting hosted 29 delegations from countries in Africa and Asia to address questions of sovereignty and development facing the emergent postcolonial world. A number of well-known leaders attended, including Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Zhou Enlai of China, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Sukarno of the host country, Indonesia. Given its importance, the meeting was (...) documented extensively by photojournalists. The argument of this article is that the visual archive that resulted has contributed to the enduring symbolism and mythology of Bandung as a moment of Third World solidarity. More specifically, the street photography style of many images - with leaders walking down the streets of Bandung surrounded by adoring crowds - depicted an informality and intimacy that conveyed an accessible, anti-hierarchical view of the leaders who were present. These qualities of conviviality and optimism can also be seen in images of conference dinners, airport arrivals, delegate speeches, and working groups. Drawing upon the critical work of scholars of southern Africa and Southeast Asia, this article summarily positions the concept of the 'decolonising camera' to describe both the act of documenting political decolonisation as well as the ways in which visual archives produced during decolonisation can contribute to new iconographies of the political, which are both factual and mythic at once. (shrink)