Reassessing the foundations of Korsgaard’s approach to ethics

Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia:online (2017)
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In a series of well known publications, Christine Korsgaard argues for the claim that an agent acts morally just in case s/he acts autonomously. Two of Korsgaard's signature arguments for the connection between morality and autonomy are the "argument from spontaneity" and the "regress argument." In this paper, I argue that neither the argument from spontaneity nor the regress argument is able to show that an agent would be acting wrongly even if s/he acts in a paradigmatically heteronomous fashion.



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Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

Citations of this work

Korsgaard's Expanded Regress Argument.Samuel Kahn - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):40-65.

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