Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
In a series of well known publications, Christine Korsgaard argues for the claim that an agent acts morally just in case s/he acts autonomously. Two of Korsgaard's signature arguments for the connection between morality and autonomy are the "argument from spontaneity" and the "regress argument." In this paper, I argue that neither the argument from spontaneity nor the regress argument is able to show that an agent would be acting wrongly even if s/he acts in a paradigmatically heteronomous fashion.
Keywords Kantian ethics  Korsgaard
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The Supreme Principle of Morality.Allen W. Wood - 2006 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 342--80.

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