Nous présentons ici une introduction à la lecture des Deux sources de la morale et de la religion d'Henri Bergson, publié en 1932. Cet ouvrage est le moins fréquenté des livres de Bergson : on le ramène à quelques formules sur l'opposition du " clos " et de " l'ouvert ", et à un mysticisme un peu fumeux. Pourtant, Bergson a mis vingt-cinq ans à se documenter pour écrire ce livre qui constitue une synthèse philosophique des travaux de la sociologie, (...) de l'anthropologie et de la psychologie des religions de son temps. Surtout, on voit s'y articuler les trois dimensions qui travaillent toute la pensée métaphysique de Bergson : le vital, le mental et le social ; et on comprend mieux que l'affirmation du point de vue de la conscience individuelle ne nie en aucune façon son inscription dans la vie biologique et dans une société politique. L'existence de grands individus y est mise au service de l'action de toute l'humanité et de la vie elle-même. F. Keck propose une présentation générale de l'ouvrage à travers son contexte intellectuel et sa méthode dualiste. A. Bouaniche commente cinq textes extraits des Deux sources ou d'ouvrages qui l'éclairent. F. Worms présente une interprétation de ce livre à la lumière du rapport entre la vie et la morale chez Bergson et dans la philosophie contemporaine. (shrink)

resumo Trata-se aqui de mostrar como a filosofia de Bergson decorre da constatação da passagem do tempo enquanto fato primordial e originário; nessa medida, as suas obras podem ser consideradas como diferentes tentativas de esclarecer tal experiência da temporalidade que, filosoficamente considerada, consiste na intuição da duração. Para isso, examina-se a forma pela qual o tratamento dado a problemas filosóficos distintos e discutidos em cada um de suas obras efetiva-se como meditação sobre o fato primitivo e seu esclarecimento progressivo. Em (...) primeiro lugar, acompanhamos o percurso de dedução das principais características da duração, sucessão, conservação e ato, sublinhando algumas de suas conseqüências filosóficas. A seguir, examinamos a dimensão crítica da filosofia de Bergson pela análise do pensamento do instante, aquele que desfigura a experiência do tempo e origina a via equivocada da metafísica tradicional; nesse exame procuramos diferenciar tal pensamento da experiência da simultaneidade, que é constitutiva de nossa relação concreta com as coisas. palavras-chave duração, sucessão, simultaneidade, criação, experiência, instante. (shrink)

Trata-se aqui de mostrar como a filosofia de Bergson decorre da constatação da passagem do tempo enquanto fato primordial e originário; nessa medida, as suas obras podem ser consideradas como diferentes tentativas de esclarecer tal experiência da temporalidade que, filosoficamente considerada, consiste na intuição da duração. Para isso, examina-se a forma pela qual o tratamento dado a problemas filosóficos distintos e discutidos em cada um de suas obras efetiva-se como meditação sobre o fato primitivo e seu esclarecimento progressivo. Em primeiro (...) lugar, acompanhamos o percurso de dedução das principais características da duração, sucessão, conservação e ato, sublinhando algumas de suas conseqüências filosóficas. A seguir, examinamos a dimensão crítica da filosofia de Bergson pela análise do pensamento do instante, aquele que desfigura a experiência do tempo e origina a via equivocada da metafísica tradicional; nesse exame procuramos diferenciar tal pensamento da experiência da simultaneidade, que é constitutiva de nossa relação concreta com as coisas.Duração. Sucessão. Simultaneidade. Criação. Experiência. Instante. The bergsonian Conception of Time AbstractThe aim of this article is to show how Bergson´s philosophy derives from the understanding of the passing of time as an original and primordial fact. In this way, his works can be considered to be different attempts to explain this experience of temporality which, philosophically considered, consist of the intuition of duration. Thus, we examine the way in which the treatment given to distinct philosophical problems discussed in each of his works takes place as a meditation on the primitive fact and its progressive clarification. Firstly, we follow the course of deduction of the main characteristics of duration, succession, conservation and act, emphasizing some of his philosophical consequences. We then examine the critical dimension of Bergson´s philosophy through the analysis of the thought of the instant, which distorts the experience of time and gives rise to an equivocal way of traditional metaphysics; in this examination we shall seek to differentiate this idea from the experience of simultaneity that constitutes our concrete relationship with things.Duration. Succcession. Simultaneity. Creation. Experience. Instant. (shrink)

The unlivable is the most extreme point of human suffering and injustice. But what is it exactly? How do we define the unlivable? And what can we do to prevent and repair it? These are the intriguing questions Judith Butler and Frédéric Worms discuss in a captivating dialogue situated at the crossroads of contemporary life and politics. Here, Judith Butler criticizes the norms that make life precarious and unlivable, while Frédéric Worms appeals to a "critical vitalism" as a (...) way of allowing the hardship of the unlivable to reveal what is vital for us. For both Butler and Worms, the difference between the livable and the unlivable forms the critical foundation for a contemporary practice of care. Care and support, in all their aspects, make human life livable, that is, "more than living." To understand it, we must draw on the concrete practices of humans who are confronted with the unlivable: the refugees of today and the witnesses and survivors of past violations and genocide. They teach us what is intolerable but also undeniable about the unlivable, and what we can do to resist it. Crafted with critical rigor, mutual respect, and lively humor, the compelling dialogue transcribed and translated in this book took place at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) on April 11, 2018, at a time when close to two thousand migrants were living in nearby makeshift camps in northern Paris. The Livable and the Unlivable showcases this 2018 dialogue in the context of Butler's and Worms's ongoing work and the evolution of their thought, as presented by Laure Barillas and Arto Charpentier in their equally engaging introduction. It concludes with a new afterword that addresses the crises unfolding in our world and the ways a philosophically rigorous account of life must confront them. While this book will be of keen interest to readers of philosophy and cultural criticism, and those interested in vitalism, new materialism, and critical theory, it is a far from merely academic text. In the conversation between Butler and Worms, we encounter questions we all grapple with in confronting the distress and precarity of our times, marked as it is by types of survival that are unlivable, from concentration camps to prisons to environmental toxicity, to forcible displacement, to the Covid pandemic. The Livable and the Unlivable at once considers longstanding philosophical questions around why and how we live, while working to retrieve a philosophy of life for today's Left. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de montrer comment la lecture de Kant par Bergson, loin de se ramener à un mot d’ordre sommaire, comporte une reprise partielle, une critique précise, un refus ultime enfin, qui conduisent au cœur d’une relation profonde entre deux philosophies irréductibles. La reprise partielle de la distinction entre intelligence et intuition, et même entre matière et forme de l’intuition, doit être comprise autrement que comme un hommage ironique. Elle seule permet de comprendre l’unité que Bergson (...) revendique contre Kant, d’abord entre matière et forme de l’intuition, dans le cas du temps, puis entre intelligence et intuition même, à partir de L’évolution créatrice. À son tour, cette unité permet aussi de comprendre pourquoi l’intelligence reste à l’écart de l’intuition pratique dans le dernier grand livre de Bergson. « Gagnée » par l’intuition, l’intelligence ou l’entendement le sont donc bien en un double sens : non seulement surmontés, mais envahis par elle, jusqu’à une limite qui révèle au cœur d’un problème commun, une singulière différence.The purpose of this paper is to show how Bergson’s reading of Kant, far from any expeditive fightword, implies at the same time some reappropriation, a precise critique, and a final objection that together lead to the heart of a profound relationship between two irreducible doctrines. The partial endorsing of Kant’s distinction between intelligence and intuition, and even between matter and form of intuition itself, must not be understood only as a ironical hommage. On the contrary, it helps understanding the unity Bergson advocates against Kant, first between the matter and form of intuition, in the case of time, then between intuition and intelligence itself, after Creative Evolution. In its own turn, that unity helps understanding why intelligence is put aside of practical intuition in Bergson’s last great book. Intelligence or understanding are thus « won » in a double way : not only as surpassed, but also as penetrated by intuition, up to a last limit, which reveals a peculiar difference, at the heart of a common problem. (shrink)

(2005). Between Critique And Metaphysics. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 39-57.

On se propose d’étudier ici l’unité, la diversité et l’évolution de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty à travers ses deux principaux recueils d’essais, Signes publié en 1960, et Sens et non-sens, paru en 1948, dont l’un annonce l’ouvrage posthume sur Le visible et l’invisible (1964), et l’autre prolonge de l’intérieur la Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). On est ainsi conduit à comprendre comment le problème fondamental de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty autorise la diversité de son œuvre, entre philosophie, sciences humaines et (...) politique, sans espoir de synthèse ou de système, mais conjurant aussi toute dispersion et toute résignation. L’évolution même de cette pensée d’une étape à l’autre en confirme le double héritage, autour d’une intuition centrale et d’une variété irréductible d’expériences. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de comprendre, sur le cas privilégié de la philosophie « française » au tournant du siècle, comment l’on passe de l’histoire de la philosophie à sa caractérisation nationale, ce qui conduit aussi à deux perspectives complémentaires : comprendre comment cette caractérisation nationale de la philosophie peut se lier à la caractérisation philosophique de la nation, notamment dans la période dont la Première Guerre mondiale fut le terme, comprendre aussi quelle autre conception des lieux, problèmes (...) et moments de la philosophie est possible, qui articule ses dimensions individuelles, communes et historiques. On est ainsi conduit à la lecture de textes précis sur la philosophie française, notamment de Bergson, à un double retour sur le « moment 1900 » en philosophie, et à quelques perspectives plus générales sur l’histoire de la philosophie elle-même. (shrink)

Résumé — Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cœur de la pensée de Simone Weil réside moins dans une philosophie de la nécessité comme telle que dans une philosophie de la rencontre de la nécessité et de l’âme humaine, et de ses effets, du malheur à l’amour, en passant par la vérité. Présente d’emblée, cette pensée connaît cependant deux étapes, comme si l’accent passait de la nécessité à ses effets, étapes que l’on étudie à travers deux (...) textes précis commentés comme les classiques qu’ils devraient être dans la philosophie du XXe siècle en France. C’est aussi par là que Simone Weil rejoint les principaux de ses contemporains, parmi lesquels Camus et Cavaillès, et ainsi le cœur du moment de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en philosophie comme ailleurs.— This paper intends to show how the core of Simone Weil’s thought is to be found less in a philosophy of necessity as such, than in a philosophy of the encounter between necessity and human soul, and the effects of that encounter, from woe to love, and including truth. However constant, this thought evolves through a difference of accent, as if the stress went from necessity to its effect ; this difference is here studied through the reading of two major writings, which deserve to be considered as XXth Century philosophical classics. It is also through this central thought that Simone Weil meets with such major contemporary philosophical figures as Camus and Cavaillès, and thus with what should be called the moment of the Second World War, in philosophy as elsewhere. (shrink)

Qu’advient-il quand, à la pointe extrême du continent eurasien, la méditation de l’un des plus grands penseurs français franchit les océans pour être accueillie, critiquée sans concession aussi bien que reprise ? Faut-il s’attendre au récit d’un malentendu quand Henri Bergson se trouve relu par son contemporain Nishida Kitarô, né deux années après que son pays se soit ouvert à l’Occident ? Ce dernier va-t-il, depuis le Japon, risquer avec la pensée française ce que firent jadis les européens Leibniz et (...) Malebranche avec la chinoise, ou Schopenhauer avec l’indienne ? Y a-t-il là pure appropriation, et selon quelles spécificités notionnelles et méthodologiques ? Cette rencontre ne laisse-t-elle pas présager, au contraire, un échange véritable quoique encore fragile qui, s’il emprunte presque tout son vocabulaire et ses concepts à l’Europe, en tire un esprit subtil et nouveau ? Les trois études rassemblées dans cet ouvrage se proposent d’envisager ce débat, né il y a près d’un siècle de nous, et la contribution qu’il pourrait apporter à une réflexion sur l’idée de philosophie comparée. (shrink)

Propose une hypothèse originale sur les sources de la pensée de Bergson et sa portée profonde, sur le mouvement de son oeuvre et la méthode qui s'impose pour la lire, sur la place de sa philosophie dans l'histoire.

Haeusermann et al. (Citation2023) draw three overall conclusions from their study on closed loop neuromodulation and self-perception in clinical treatment of refractory epilepsy. The first is that closed-loop neuromodulation devices did not substantially change epileptic patient’s personalities or self-perception postoperatively. The second is that some patients and caregivers attributed observed changes in personality and self-perception to the epilepsy itself and not to the DBS treatments. The third is that the devices provided participants with novel ways to make sense of their (...) illness. These findings further demonstrate a misalignment between some neuroethicists’ concerns about putative postoperative changes to personality, and the empirical evidence for such changes. Haeusermann et al. nonetheless concede that “neurotechnology directed at persisting rather than episodic clinical phenomena could have greater implications for personality or self-perception, either because they operate more continuously or are directed at clinical phenomena that are more stably integrated into patients’ self-concepts” (41). We acknowledge that the hypothesis that participants did not report changes because they were only episodically and not continually stimulated offers an interesting line for future investigation. Nonetheless, we would like to propose that potential postoperative personality changes might be correlated with the pathophysiology itself, rather than the stimulation effects of the technology. Generally, we advance the view that unintended effects solely induced by the technology cannot be excluded per se. Regardless, this comment aims to highlight that ethicists’ starting premise should be that patients suffering from diverse pathophysiology, or patients who are treated with stimulation in different brain regions and with differing parameters, would likely not react in the same way to treatment. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

This book is a unique introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints imposed upon us (...) by our attachments to others, Frederic Schick reveals that our thinking is often more subtle than standard theories of rationality allow. Only a theory that respects that subtlety can illumine what is otherwise puzzling. The book contains many examples drawn from history and literature dealing with subjects such as love, war, friendship, and crime. (shrink)

This is _the_ leading introduction 200to professional values and ethics in social work. Frederic G. Reamer provides social workers with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the most critical issues relating to professional values and ethics, including the nature of social work values, ethical dilemmas, and professional misconduct. Conceptually rich and attuned to the complexities of ethical decision making, _Social Work Values and Ethics_ is unique in striking the right balance between history, theory, and practical application. For the third (...) edition, Reamer has updated the content and strengthened the relevance of the case material. Also new to the third edition: o Discussion of the moral dialogue between practitioner and cliento Coverage of virtue ethicso Practical discussion of concepts underlying social work ethicso Expanded application of the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics to ethical dilemmas in the professiono A look at the historical evolution of ethical standards in social worko New vignettes, illustrating difficult ethical decisionso More guidance on informed consent and termination of serviceso Discussion questions at the end of each chaptero A section on how to conduct a social work ethics audit. (shrink)

One important concern regarding implantable Brain Computer Interfaces is the fear that the intervention will negatively change a patient’s sense of identity or agency. In particular, there is concern that the user will be psychologically worse-off following treatment despite postoperative functional improvements. Clinical observations from similar implantable brain technologies, such as deep brain stimulation, show a small but significant proportion of patients report feelings of strangeness or difficulty adjusting to a new concept of themselves characterized by a maladaptive je ne (...) sais quoi despite clear motor improvement. Despite the growing number of cases in the DBS literature, there is currently no accepted or standardized tool in neuroethics specifically designed to capture the phenomenological postoperative experience of patients implanted with DBS or BCI devices. Given potential risks of postoperative maladaptation, it is important for the field of neuroethics to develop a qualitative instrument that can serve as a shared method for capturing postoperative variations in patient experience of identity and agency. The goal of this article is to introduce an instrument we have developed for this purpose and call for further neuroethical efforts to assess the phenomenology of implantable brain device use. (shrink)

Brief, accessible, and affordable, these pocket-sized volumes offer the essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition-from Plato to Wittgenstein.

Introduction -- 1e Intermed consid -- Marx -- Simmel -- Weber -- Lukács -- 2e intermed consid -- Horkheimer -- Adorno -- 3e intermed consid -- Habermas I -- Habermas II -- Habermas III -- Conclusion -- Postscript -- Bibliography.

Philosophy is one of the most intimidating and difficult of disciplines, as any of its students can attest. This book is an important entry in a distinctive new series from Routledge: The Great Philosophers . Breaking down obstacles to understanding the ideas of history's greatest thinkers, these brief, accessible, and affordable volumes offer essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition from Plato to Wittgenstein. In just 64 pages, each author, a specialist on his subject, places the philosopher (...) and his ideas into historical perspective. Each volume explains, in simple terms, the basic concepts, enriching the narrative through the effective use of biographical detail. And instead of attempting to explain the philosopher's entire intellectual history, which can be daunting, this series takes one central theme in each philosopher's work, using it to unfold the philosopher's thoughts. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky adhered to an evolutionary metaphysics of reincarnation according to which the world is constituted of immortal souls or monads, which he calls ‘substantival agents.’ These substantival agents can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher or of a lower level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a substantival agent can evolve (...) by being gradually reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. In ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic evolutionary doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis and he attempts to reconstitute this doctrine. The present article is intended as an historical introduction to the translation of Lossky’s ‘Leibniz’s Doctrine of Reincarnation as Metamorphosis.’. (shrink)

We argue that a fashionable interpretation of the theory of natural selection as a claim exclusively about populations is mistaken. The interpretation rests on adopting an analysis of fitness as a probabilistic propensity which cannot be substantiated, draws parallels with thermodynamics which are without foundations, and fails to do justice to the fundamental distinction between drift and selection. This distinction requires a notion of fitness as a pairwise comparison between individuals taken two at a time, and so vitiates the interpretation (...) of the theory as one about populations exclusively. (shrink)

What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is (...) argued that because they are modes of thinking, emotions generate cognitive activities that relate to the making of evaluative and deontic judgements, the utterance of speech acts, the mastering of normative concepts and the building of arguments. Furthermore, each type of emotion generates its own constitutive judgements and structures normative thinking according to its own logic. The main thesis is that emotions provide sociological explanations for social agents’ thinking and speech, for emotions are precisely what motivate and, especially, structure normative reasoning and language. Being observable in language, emotions allow us to explain a) how social subjects reason and argue through norms and values, and b) how social subjects through their speech acts can contribute to the (un-)making of the social world. (shrink)

Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, rationality, (...) and normativity? This question is the departure point of this article. Various philosophers have analyzed the relationships between rationality and emotion, those between emotion and normativity, and those between emotion and intentional action. Nonetheless, their theses are scattered and do not offer an integrative view on how rationality, normativity and emotions work from the standpoint of intentional explanation. By using de Sousa’s distinction between the epistemic and the strategic modes of rationality as a theoretical framework, this article proposes therefore to remedy this deficit by unifying these philosophical insights with the goal of elaborating a theory of intentional explanation which brings together rationality, normativity and emotions. (shrink)

This book is a guide to working with social science concepts. Concepts are the prisms through which we see the social world. They are foundational to the social science enterprise, and the quality of investigations hinges in part on how well researchers make use of them. Most social science concepts are drawn from ordinary language used in everyday ways; however, many social scientists "reconfigure" ordinary words to meet their research needs. They tinker with the meanings of words to fit their (...) theoretical aims and make them precise, useful tools of measurement and comparison. This book examines social science concepts through an interpretivist lens with the aim of providing concrete conceptual guidance for future research. Specifically, this book seeks to: 1) identify characteristic dangers that attend the making and use of reconfigured concepts; 2) lay out ways in which a select number of interpretivist approaches have been used to mitigate these dangers; 3) introduce practical tools that rework these interpretivist approaches into explicit and useable research methods; 4) show concretely how these elucidation tools can be gainfully used by social scientists working both within and outside of the interpretivist tradition. It will be an essential guide for social science research. (shrink)

The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has become an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we critically assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than 1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes. While we observed an increase in the number of publications in theoretical neuroethics (...) that mention putative DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative assumptions probablyin lieuof robust evidence. As such, this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite the low number of first-hand primary studies and large number of marginal and single case reports, potential postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients remain a critical ethical concern. We recommend further empirical research in order to enhance theoretical neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for the development of better instruments capable of capturing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS. (shrink)