Pindar’s skolion for the Olympic victor Xenophon of Corinth has received considerable attention for its subject rather than its poetic quality. For it celebrates a dedication of prostitutes to Aphrodite which scholars have considered a subject inappropriate for a choral ode. So they detected traces of a tension between the poet and Xenophon within the text. In this article it is argued that, quite the reverse, Pindar is drawing a parallel between himself and the victor and his family. If we (...) reconsider the pragmatic aspects of the skolion, its relation to Olympian 13 and the context Athenaeus provides for the fragment, we are able to see that Pindar links sport, ritual and politics, thereby serving Xenophon’s ambitions as well as his own. By practising conspicuous consumption Xenophon aims at detaching himself from Corinth’s egalitarian aristocracy, and at the same time the poet promotes himself in the literary field as a poetic innovator and authority. So, both transgress expectations and boundaries. (shrink)

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” endorses Nicholas Gaskill's analysis of Rorty's limited legacy in the field of science and technology studies. It shows how, rather than engaging with scientific practice in a substantial way, Rorty relied heavily on the ideas of Thomas Kuhn. The article surveys the development of science studies since Kuhn's day, sketching an intellectual genealogy for Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, whose work addresses—much more directly than Rorty's—current concerns with the (...) climate crisis and environmental degradation. (shrink)

This article introduces a collection of studies of biological concepts crossing over to other disciplines and nonscholarly discourses. The introduction discusses the notion of nomadic concepts as introduced by Isabelle Stengers and explores its usability for conceptual history. Compared to traveling and interdisciplinary concepts, the idea of nomadism shifts the attention from concepts themselves toward the mobility of a concept and its effects. The metaphor of nomadism, as outlined in the introduction, helps also to question the relation between concepts' movement (...) and the production of boundaries. In this way conceptual history can profit from interaction with translation studies, where similar processes were recently discussed under the notion of cultural translation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe question concerning the relation between thinking and the university is the starting point of this paper. After a very brief outline of some reflections on this topic, the case of Campus in Camps, a Palestinian experimental university, is presented to shed light on this issue. Inspired by Isabelle Stengers’ ecology of practices, it is possible to discern four requirements on thinking in the work of Campus in Camps, namely storytelling, comparing, mapping, and using. It will be argued that the (...) particularity of thinking at the university, is that it is done via artifices that initiate processes of composition, problematization, and attention. In the concluding section, the paper proposes to understand the study practice of Campus in Camps as an adventure that activates a sense of the possible, and hence opens up futures that are different from the ones that present themselves as obvious or unavoidable. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead has never gone out of print, but for a time he was decidedly out of fashion in the English-speaking world. In a splendid work that serves as both introduction and erudite commentary, Isabelle Stengersâe"one of todayâe(tm)s leading philosophers of scienceâe"goes straight to the beating heart of Whiteheadâe(tm)s thought. The product of thirty yearsâe(tm) engagement with the mathematician-philosopherâe(tm)s entire canon, this volume establishes Whitehead as a daring thinker on par with Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Michel Foucault. Reading (...) the texts in broadly chronological order while highlighting major works, Stengers deftly unpacks Whiteheadâe(tm)s often complicated language, explaining the seismic shifts in his thinking and showing how he called into question all that philosophers had considered settled after Descartes and Kant. She demonstrates that the implications of Whiteheadâe(tm)s philosophical theories and specialized knowledge of the various sciences come yoked with his innovative, revisionist take on God. Whiteheadâe(tm)s God exists within a specific epistemological realm created by a radically complex and often highly mathematical language. âeoeTo think with Whitehead today,âe Stengers writes, âeoemeans to sign on in advance to an adventure that will leave none of the terms we normally use as they were.âe. (shrink)

Depuis qu'elles existent, les sciences dites exactes se prétendent différentes des autres savoirs. Comment comprendre cette prétention? Faut-il, à la manière des épistémologues anglo-saxons ou de Karl Popper, tenter d'identifier les critères qui la justifient? Peut-on, suivant le modèle nouveau des études sociales des sciences, y voir une simple croyance? Ce livre propose un dépassement fructueux de l'opposition, apparemment irréconciliable, entre ces deux approches des sciences. Et si la tension entre objectivité scientifique et croyance était justement constitutive des sciences, enjeu (...) des pratiques inventées et réinventées par les scientifiques? Réussir à parler des sciences avec humour, sans en faire un objet de vénération, ni de dénonciation, en restant au plus proche de la passion des scientifiques, tel est ici le pari d'Isabelle Stengers. Mais ce livre ne se limite pas à un discours sur les sciences. Il s'agit bien plutôt de prolonger l'histoire de leur invention. Comment comprendre les liens multiples entre la science et les pouvoirs qui la mobilisent aujourd'hui? Comment concevoir les rapports entre science, expertise et démocratie? La nouveauté de L'invention des sciences modernes est de faire de ces différents problèmes intellectuels, pratiques et politiques les enjeux du processus par où pourrait s'inventer et se renouveler l'identité même des sciences. (shrink)

This memorial to Latour is not an appraisal of his fifty-year research career but the report of a traveling companion with a story to share about the apparent lack of continuity, the sudden, unapologetic, unprincipled changes of position, with which he surprised or scandalized his colleagues and readers. In the first place, was he a sociologist, an anthropologist, a philosopher? Though he did not make lasting commitments of that kind, he did make deeper ones that did not change—above all, never (...) to explain anything in terms of something more general and, thus, never to accept the position of judge. To follow Latour's problematic changes—sometimes referred to as his “versatility”—demands that we follow the changes of the very terms of the problems that his basic commitment bound him to confront. From the 1980s, when his work dealt with technoscientific progress, to the years of his growing concern with political ecology, and finally to his recognition of the oncoming climate chaos, dizzying leaps were entailed by his resistance to the temptation of judging. Involved in, but never the cause of, various of his leaps, Stengers describes her friend as responding, perforce, to changing times, rather than as behaving like a theorist thinking mainly of his image, reputation, and career. (shrink)

The importance of the problem lies not so much in the constitutional texts, but in the constitutional practice. In the practical powers Leopold I acquired on the eve of his reign in 1831, foreign examples are quite visible. They are less visible in the process which led to the loss of these powers.The Constitution itself gave to the King two effective powers, which he could exercisepersonally; he could dismiss his ministers, and dissolve Parliament. In both respects, for more than a (...) century, the King actually took personal decisions. Lately he has no langer been able to do so and his former powers are now practically in the hands of the Prime Minister. The influence of the British model is here quite evident. (shrink)

En ce XXe siècle, où la physique s'est identifiée à la science révolutionnaire par excellence, l'œuvre passionnée d'Ilya Prigogine constitue une singulière anomalie. Anormale parce qu'elle prend le parti du monde des phénomènes physiques contre le pouvoir de la théorie, jugé abusif ; mais anormale aussi par sa longue obstination à une époque où la rapidité fait foi. Le combat avait commencé au début des années soixante, sur un mode mineur : Prigogine demandait à ses collègues de reconnaître qu' " (...) il y a certainement une signification physique profonde dans l'équation de Boltzman ". Thèse apparemment bien légitime : l'équation de Boltzmann permet de décrire avec succès le comportement de non-équilibre des gaz dilués. Mais thèse iconoclaste : car, depuis que la croissance de l'entropie a été renvoyée aux seules probabilités, le comportement de non-équilibre n'est plus sensé autoriser la moindre " signification profonde ". Raconter l'histoire de ce combat, comme le fait Isabelle Stengers dans ce livre, revient à interroger les lois fondamentales sous l'angle du lien entre théorie, valeur et obligation. En effet, sans ce lien, ni la position de Prigogine ni celle des physiciens contre qui il va chercher des arguments toujours plus puissants ne sont intelligibles. L'auteur montre que ce lien permet d' " inventer " des problèmes : Il y a Prigogine qui oppose ainsi des lois nouvelles, les " lois du chaos ", au déterminisme absolu des lois fondamentales de la physique. La physique est habitée par la passion de la loi, mais la manière dont cette passion est ici réinventée pourrait ouvrir de nouvelles voies, vitales pour une " écologie des pratiques ". Serait-il possible que le physicien ne se présente plus comme celui par qui s'opère la fascinante découverte des lois de la nature? Serait-il possible de célébrer avec lui l'extraordinaire aventure que constitue l'invention d'un objet capable de dicter la manière dont il doit être décrit? (shrink)

La vie a-t-elle émergé de la matière? Et dans ce cas, comprendre le vivant signifie-t-il le réduire à un ensemble particulier d'interactions physico-chimiques? Et comprendre l'expérience psychique, est-ce la réduire à l'activité de populations neuronales enchevêtrées? Le premier visage proposé par la question de l'émergence de la vie est celui de l'affrontement entre les conquérants de la réduction et les défenseurs de la différence qualitative entre le tout et ses parties. Visage polémique, affichant l'arrogance et les prétentions qui dominent l'écologie (...) des pratiques scientifiques. Avec le thème de l'auto-organisation, l'émergence propose aujourd'hui d'autres visages, plus avenants, car ils annoncent un intérêt nouveau, orienté vers l'exploitation des propriétés en vérité très singulières que l'apparition et l'évolution des vivants pourraient avoir requis de la matière. Une approche pacifique de la question de l'émergence est-elle désormais possible? Ou s'agit-il là d'une opération de pacification, menée à l'encontre de belligérants naïfs par des tiers qui en savent plus? Les différents visages de l'émergence expriment les différents types de liens qui existent ou pourraient s'inventer entre pratiques scientifiques, entre constructeurs de modèles et praticiens de terrain. Mais les protagonistes de la question de l'émergence, qu'ils entendent la réduire, à la manière des sociobiologistes, ou en célébrer la complexité innovante, ne peuvent s'empêcher de rêver, de spéculer sur la possibilité d'une approche enfin scientifique qui permettrait de nous comprendre nous-mêmes et de comprendre les enjeux de nos histoires. Isabelle Stengers prend ici le risque d'accepter que cette composante spéculative est irrépressible. Mais l'enjeu est alors de reconnaître les situations où la spéculation change de nature, parce que les pratiques scientifiques s'y adressent à ces questions posées par d'autres, et qu'elles obligent à une rencontre avec d'autres pratiques humaines, modernes et non-modernes. (shrink)

Let us begin by making a rather obvious remark: the meaning of the question of ‘what we do not know’ varies according to whether or not the word “yet” is explicitly or implicitly included. It comes as no surprise that it should be in physics, the science in which, ever since Galileo and Newton, the quest for knowledge has been so amply and unexpectedly rewarded, that we find the most dramatic examples of both possibilities: one in which theory points to (...) knowledge not yet acquired, knowledge which is still to be conquered, but which, once attained, should constitute its final triumph; and one in which “we do not know” may be taken as the conclusion of established knowledge. We do not (yet) know how to unify the four fundamental forces of interaction in a single theory, and yet that eventuality is already being called the theory of everything (TOE). Since interaction is the principle on which physics now bases all its explanations, and since physical explanations are in principle valid for everything that exists, the unification of the forces of interaction must therefore be the science of the principles of everything that exists. On the other hand, we do not know at what moment a particular radioactive nucleus will disintegrate. In this case, our knowledge of physics makes it impossible to use the word “yet”: radioactive disintegration is described in terms of a “lifetime,” which means that each nucleus within a given population has, at any one moment, the same probability of disintegrating, and that this probability is not a function of any variable which we can identify and manipulate. In this case, our knowledge asserts that we cannot know now and will not be able to know for as long as our present knowledge remains valid. (shrink)

Presents a comprehensive history of multiverse theory, reviewing the discoveries that shaped astrophysicists' current consensus view while showing that the multiverse is able to be explained entirely in naturalistic terms.

Representing the thinking of philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, coaches, and sports writers, these essays bring together a wide range of approaches to ...

This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutical theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorisation of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutical practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s (...) critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body; particularly, his analyses demonstrate that norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable in time and thus do not directly depend on generic physiological structures. In practice, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties and, similarly, patients’ reflective insights into their own motor deficiencies do not necessarily produce meaningful motor improvements. Physiotherapeutical procedures can be understood neither as mechanical manipulations of patients’ machine-like bodies by experts nor as a process of such manipulation by way of instructing patients’ explicit conscious awareness. Rather, physiotherapeutical practice and theory can benefit from the philosophical interpretation of motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Consequently, motor performances addressed in physiotherapy are interpreted as relational features of a living organism coupled with its environment, and motor disorders are approached as failures to optimally manage the motor requirements of a given situation owing to a relative loss of the capacity to structure one’s relation with their environment through motor action. Building on this, we argue that the process of physiotherapy is most effective when understood as a bodily interaction to guide patients towards discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through bodily postures and movements. (shrink)

Pourquoi les sciences modernes n'avancent-elles que sur le mode guerrier - guerre du scientifique contre ses concurrents, guerre du savant contre le " charlatan ", guerre du " nouveau " contre l' " ancien "? Pourquoi ces sciences sont-elles présentes parmi nous sous le jour le plus faux : triomphe d'un savoir enfin objectif, neutre et désintéressé, produit par une démarche méthodique, humble et sereine? Et pourquoi, lorsque les scientifiques osent dire leurs rêves et leurs ambitions, est-ce si souvent la (...) spéculation arrogante, le mépris et la polémique qui trouvent à s'exprimer? Les savoirs modernes sont aujourd'hui habités par une obsession de la différenciation. Et cette obsession de la différence à rappeler, de l'opposition à maintenir, entre objectivité scientifique et savoirs subjectifs, les voue à exister sur le mode de la guerre généralisée, guerre défensive ou offensive de chacun contre les autres, guerre de tous contre ce qu'ils s'accordent à disqualifier en tant que simple opinion. Est-il possible de civiliser les savoirs modernes, d'inventer entre eux et avec nous un régime de coexistence pacifique? Est-ce possible, sans leur demander de renoncer aux rêves et aux passions qui les font exister, sans exiger qu'ils se soumettent, au nom de cette paix à établir, à un quelconque tribunal distribuant les droits et les devoirs de chacun? C'est pour construire une réponse à cette question qu'Isabelle Stengers tente ici une démarche tout à la fois de diagnostic et de pronostic. Car il s'agit tout aussi bien de comprendre les valeurs que font exister les sciences, que de risquer un pari sur un avenir possible où ces valeurs seraient activement dissociées du pouvoir de disqualifier. Le projet d'une mise en culture des sciences n'a rien à voir, alors, avec un quelconque supplément d'âme, ou une meilleure diffusion des connaissances scientifiques. Pour Isabelle Stengers, il passe par la construction de ce qu'exigerait une véritable écologie des pratiques, modernes et non modernes. (shrink)

Au début de ce siècle, les atomes ont enfin conquis droit de cité à l'intérieur de la physique. Leur foule désordonnée, les évènements multiples dont ils sont les acteurs, renvoient aux apparences les lois classiques de la physique. Le monde s'est peuplé et le peuple des atomes semble rebelle à la loi. Et pourtant, quelques années plus tard, ce peuple rebelle est devenu silencieux. La loi règne à nouveau, et elle descend en ligne directe de la plus étonnante des créations (...) de la physique mathématique, la mécanique quantique. Moment de triomphe ou moment de désarroi? Car tout se passe comme si, soudain, les physiciens avaient perdu l'accès à ce qu'ils appelaient réalité, comme si tout savoir portant sur cette réalité devait être reconnu comme irrémédiablement factice. La loi règne, certes, mais dans le silence, une coupure infranchissable venant, semble-t-il séparer le langage que nous devons utiliser pour décrire la réalité et la vérité indicible de cette réalité. Le réel est voilé. La tragédie de la mécanique quantique a fait l'objet de mille et une controverses qui semblent témoigner que la physique, ici, est confrontée à des questions proprement philosophiques : la réalité est-elle connaissable? Voire, " existe-t-elle-en soi "? Mais une autre hypothèse peut être proposée, qui permettrait de transformer en comédie non dénuée d'humour l'ironie tragique d'un rêve dont l'accomplissement final entraîne la destruction. Car les questions d'apparence philosophique et le renoncement ascétique auxquels la mécanique quantique semble appeler les physiciens traduisent peut être d'abord et avant tout les moyens que ceux-ci ont utilisés pour faire faire le monde événementiel et tumultueux dont ils avaient gagné l'accès, pour transmuter en harmonie mathématique le bruit des atomes. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...) of the brain-injured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann’s syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider’s sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations, I argue that “higher-order” cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider’s intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann’s syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process. (shrink)

Marx’s vision of unalienated production is often thought to be subject to decisive objections. This article argues that these objections rely on a misinterpretation of Marx’s position. It provides a new interpretation of Marx’s vision of unalienated production. Unlike another well-known account, it suggests that unalienated production involves realizing oneself through providing others with the goods and services they need for their self-realization. It argues that this view is appealing and that it offers a more successful response to objections than (...) previous interpretations. In doing so, it hopes to put Marx’s concern with alienation and nonalienation back on the table. (shrink)

Conceiving of nuclear energy as a social experiment gives rise to the question of what to do when the experiment is no longer responsible or desirable. To be able to appropriately respond to such a situation, the nuclear energy technology in question should be reversible, i.e. it must be possible to stop its further development and implementation in society, and it must be possible to undo its undesirable consequences. This paper explores these two conditions by applying them to geological disposal (...) of high-level radioactive waste. Despite the fact that considerations of reversibility and retrievability have received increased attention in GD, the analysis in this paper concludes that GD cannot be considered reversible. Firstly, it would be difficult to stop its further development and implementation, since its historical development has led to a point where GD is significantly locked-in. Secondly, the strategy it employs for undoing undesirable consequences is less-than-ideal: it relies on containment of severely radiotoxic waste rather than attempting to eliminate this waste or its radioactivity. And while it may currently be technologically impossible to turn high-level waste into benign substances, GD’s containment strategy makes it difficult to eliminate this waste’s radioactivity when the possibility would arise. In all, GD should be critically reconsidered if the inclusion of reversibility considerations in radioactive waste management has indeed become as important as is sometimes claimed. (shrink)

This paper addresses theoretical challenges, still relevant today, that arose in the first decades of the twentieth century related to the concept of the organism. During this period, new insights into the plasticity and robustness of organisms as well as their complex interactions fueled calls, especially in the UK and in the German-speaking world, for grounding biological theory on the concept of the organism. This new organism-centered biology understood organisms as the most important explanatory and methodological unit in biological investigations. (...) At least three theoretical strands can be distinguished in this movement: Organicism, dialectical materialism, and holistic biology. This paper shows that a major challenge of OCB was to describe the individual organism as a causally autonomous and discrete unit with consistent boundaries and, at the same time, as inextricably interwoven with its environment. In other words, OCB had to conciliate individualistic with anti-individualistic perspectives. This challenge was addressed by developing a concept of life that included functionalist and metabolic elements, as well as biochemical and physical ones. It allowed for specifying organisms as life forms that actively delimit themselves from the environment. Finally, this paper shows that the recent return to the concept of the organism, especially in the so-called “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” is challenged by similar anti-individualistic tendencies. However, in contrast to its early-twentieth-century forerunner, today’s organism-centered approaches have not yet offered a solution to this problem. (shrink)

Le prix Nobel de chimie montre comment ses résultats les plus récents en physique théorique lui permettent de résoudre les problèmes qui rendent invraisemblables, malgré leur succès retentissant, tant la physique classique que la mécanique quantique : le paradoxe du temps et le paradoxe quantique. ©Electre 2021.

Terugblik van de bekende psychiater op zijn ontwikkeling als sannyasin.

This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does (...) not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former. (shrink)

In recent years, biologists and philosophers of science have argued that evolutionary theory should incorporate more seriously the idea of ‘reciprocal causation.’ This notion refers to feedback loops whereby organisms change their experiences of the environment or alter the physical properties of their surroundings. In these loops, in particular niche constructing activities are central, since they may alter selection pressures acting on organisms, and thus affect their evolutionary trajectories. This paper discusses long-standing problems that emerge when studying such reciprocal causal (...) processes between organisms and environments. By comparing past approaches to reciprocal causation from the early twentieth century with contemporary ones in niche construction theory, we identify two central reoccurring problems: All of these approaches have not been able to provide a conceptual framework that allows maintaining meaningful boundaries between organisms and environments, instead of merging the two, and integrating experiential and physical kinds of reciprocal causation. By building on case studies of niche construction research, we provide a model that is able to solve these two problems. It allows distinguishing between mutually interacting organisms and environments in complex scenarios, as well as integrating various forms of experiential and physical niche construction. (shrink)

La science classique s'est trouvée associée à un désenchantement du monde. C'est la leçon que Jacques Monod entendait tirer des progrès de la biologie : "L'ancienne alliance est rompue. L'homme sait enfin qu'il est seul dans l'immensité indifférente de l'Univers d'où il a émergé par hasard." Notre science n'est plus ce savoir classique, nous pouvons déchiffrer le récit d'une "nouvelle alliance". Loin de l'exclure du monde qu'elle décrit, la science retrouve comme un problème l'appartenance de l'homme à ce monde. Les (...) théories scientifiques ne peuvent plus supposer la possibilité d'un savoir omniscient : nous lisons, jusque dans leurs principes, les traces d'une activité d'exploration au sein d'une nature en évolution. (shrink)

Insight problem solving is thought to underpin creative thought as it incorporates both divergent (generating multiple ideas and solutions) and convergent (arriving at the optimal solution) thinking approaches. The current literature on schizotypy and creativity is mixed and requires clarification. An alternate approach was employed by designing an exploratory web-based study using only correlates of schizotypal traits (paranoia, dissociation, cognitive failures, fantasy proneness, and unusual sleep experiences) and examining which (if any) predicted optimal performance on an insight problem-solving task. One (...) hundred and twenty-one participants were recruited online from the general population and completed the number reduction task. The discovery of the hidden rule (HR) was used as a measure of insight. Multivariate logistic regression analyses highlighted persecutory ideation to best predict the discovery of the HR (OR = 1.05; 95% CI 1.01–1.10, p = 0.017), with a one-point increase in persecutory ideas corresponding to the participant being 5% more likely to discover the HR. This result suggests that persecutory ideation, above other schizotypy correlates, may be involved in insight problem solving. (shrink)