Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 2, Page 131-145, June 2022.

This article examines recent scholarly work on boredom by drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s account of modernity, irony, and mass skepticism. In The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin noted that, beginning in the 1840s, Western societies had been gripped by an “epidemic of boredom.” He was referring to a peculiarly modern form of mass boredom, associated with the “atrophy of experience” in a mechanized and urbanized social life—a boredom Elizabeth S. Goodstein has characterized as the “democratization of skepticism.” Although Bakhtin says little (...) about “boredom” directly, he probes the sociocultural conditions that give rise to it. Bakhtin, for example, celebrates the liberatory and egalitarian promise of modern vernacular speech, which displays a healthy suspicion of “monotonic” qualities of elite genres, and which springs not from the pulpit or the palace, but from the street, the marketplace and the public square. Bakhtin is concerned about the nihilistic implications of this disenchantment of the world and the threats it poses—indifference, reification and alienation—to the “participative” mode of social life he favours. (shrink)

As interest in the work of Bakhtin grows there is an increasing demand for a well organized, readable text which explains his main ideas and relates them to current social and cultural theory. This book is designed to supply this demand. Elegantly written with the needs of the student coming to Bakhtin for the first time in mind, it provides the essential guide to this important and neglected thinker.

The relationship of Marxist thought to the phenomena of everyday life and utopia, both separately and in terms of their intersection, is a complex and often ambiguous one. In this article, I seek to trace some of the theoretical filiations of a critical Marxist approach to their convergence (as stemming mainly from a Central European tradition), in order to tease out some of the more significant ambivalences and semantic shifts involved in its theorization. This lineage originates in the work of (...) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then stretches to Georg Lukács and the so-called ‘Gnostic Marxism’ of Walter Benjamin (as mediated by the important figure of Georg Simmel), and culminating most recently in the work of Agnes Heller. Such a Marxist theory is inseparable from a political project that seeks to unveil and critique what it takes to be the debased, routinized and ideological qualities of daily existence under the auspices of modern capitalist society, but also attempts to locate certain emancipatory tendencies within this selfsame terrain, an orientation that can be summed up in the phrase ‘everyday utopianism’. Although there are occasional lapses into dualistic modes of thinking in the work of these writers, the key insight they present to us is the need to overcome the pervasive dichotomy between the everyday/immanent and the utopian/transcendental, of a sort that has bedevilled the work of many other theorists and intellectual traditions. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a burgeoning interest in the study of everyday life within the social sciences and humanities. In Critiques of Everyday Life Michael Gardiner proposes that there exists a counter-tradition within everyday life theorizing.

Boredom Studies is an increasingly rich and vital area of contemporary research that examines the experience of boredom as an importan - even quintessential - condition of modern life. This anthology of newly commissioned essays focuses on the historical and theoretical potential of this modern condition, connecting boredom studies with parallel discourses such as affect theory and highlighting possible avenues of future research. Spanning sociology, history, art, philosophy and cultural studies, the book considers boredom as a mass response to the (...) atrophy of experience characteristic of a highly mechanised and urbanised social life. (shrink)

Although Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's literary essay In'ei raisan (In praise of shadows) (1933) now sometimes receives serious attention, it is still often dismissed as nostalgic—missing the significance of Tanizaki's ontology of the shadow for our information-saturated era, with its conformist tendencies to block out all negativity. This essay relocates In'ei raisan within two historical contexts: first, the Kyoto School, including Kyoto's negotiation with Martin Heidegger, and a wider attempt to overhaul the empiricist, property-driven hardwiring of progress derived from the British empire; (...) second, the recently burgeoning field of 'critical transparency studies', for which the promise of perfectly clear representation risks a bureaucratic authoritarianism absorbing all agency. To a remarkable degree, the diagnosis by twenty-first century critical transparency studies of a narcissistic, technocratic addiction to positivity is already there in Tanizaki's shadows. These shadows deserve reconsideration for their potential to derail our condition of 'stuckness' in a progress defined by an empiricist instrumentalization of the world. (shrink)

One of the key concepts in autonomist Marxism is the ‘general intellect’. As capitalism develops, labour and its products become increasingly ‘immaterial’, inasmuch as the physical side of production is taken over by automated systems. The result is that all aspects of the collective worker's affective, desiring and cognitive capabilities are now brought to bear on production itself. This problematises capitalistic notions of proprietary control, because it raises the possibility that the mass ‘cognitive worker’, and the inherently co-operative principles it (...) embodies, can detach itself from neoliberal mechanisms of subsumption and valorisation and lay the foundation for a new communalistic ethos. What is intriguing is that several autonomists evoke the work of Mikhail Bakhtin vis-à-vis the ‘general intellect’. Bakhtin did maintain that dialogism is an irreducibly collective phenomenon, and that we all contribute to the continuous making and remaking of language. We do not ‘own’ the words we use; as such, meaning is necessarily plural and heterogeneous, the product of the interaction of many texts and voices that can only be pragmatically and contingently unified. The present article seeks to explore the connection between Bakhtin and autonomism, focusing on the insight that communication is always ‘more than myself’, and hence integral to the ‘social brain’ that is a shared legacy, our ‘commonwealth’. It also raises the possibility of a more ‘troublesome’ Bakhtin than is generally countenanced by the liberal academy, and a concomitantly ‘dangerous’ dialogism that haunts a digitalised and networked world marked in equal measure by tremendous emancipatory promise and catastrophic threat. (shrink)

The global financial crisis beginning in 2008 has encouraged the revitalization of a wide spectrum of leftist theorizing, but arguably the most audacious is that of ‘accelerationism’. Left-accelerationism sees the intensification of certain tendencies in late capitalist society as a way to escape its gravitational orbit and ‘repurpose’ the very material infrastructure of capitalism itself, to universally emancipatory ends. The central task here is to engage accelerationism with a thinker of the post-Autonomist tradition, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi. Contrary to Williams and (...) Srnicek, co-authors of the #Accelerate manifesto, Bifo asserts that acceleration per se only augments the power and dynamism of capital, and posits instead a ‘post-politics’ of ironic detachment, aesthetic cultivation, and ‘therapy’. Contrasting Bifo and accelerationism clarifies each of their assumptions and core arguments, and points the way to a more nuanced perspective on these issues, in a contemporaneous moment marked in equal measure by inestimable threat and liberatory promise. (shrink)

The French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre developed an account of modernity that combined rigorous critique, a rejection of nostalgia, left pessimism or transcendental appeals, and the search for utopian potentialities in the hidden recesses of the everyday. This article will focus on a topic that is arguably central to his ‘critique of everyday life’ but has been entirely overlooked in the literature thus far: that of boredom. Although often dismissed as trivial, boredom can be understood as a touchstone through (...) which we can grasp much wider anxieties, socio-cultural changes and subjective crises that are intrinsic to our experience of modernity. Curiously, although Lefebvre was very interested in boredom, he did not analyse it systematically, and he used terms like ‘boring’ or ‘boredom’ in loose, elliptical and seemingly contradictory ways. Such a lack of clarity reveals his ambivalence about this phenomenon, but also highlights a subtle pattern of differentiation he makes between particular modalities of boredom that can be highly illuminating. Through a careful reading of the full range of Lefebvre’s writings, we can begin to understand how he discriminates between different experiences and expressions of boredom, some of which are unambiguously negative, whereas others are judged more positively. With respect to the latter, as he says in Introduction to Modernity, under certain conditions boredom can be full of desires, frustrations and possibilities. Through such an investigation, we start to glimpse latent connections between boredom and utopian propensities that caught the attention not only of Lefebvre but also such thinkers as Ernst Bloch, Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

Although several writers have noted significant complementary features in the respective projects of Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) and the French social thinker Henri Lefebvre (1901–91), to date there has not been a systematic comparison of them. This article seeks to redress this oversight, by exploring some of the more intriguing of these conceptual dovetailings: first, their relationship to the intellectual and cultural legacy of Romanticism; and second, their respective assessments of irony (including Romantic irony), and, more (...) specifically, of the ironic register as a potential vehicle for socio-cultural criticism. Although the positions Bakhtin and Lefebvre stake out vis-à-vis these issues reveal many similarities – such as extensive use of Socrates in the writings of each – there are also significant differences, not least because Lefebvre’s understanding of Romanticism is more fully developed than Bakhtin’s. Accordingly, the central argument advanced here is that Bakhtin’s fairly disparaging account of Romanticism, together with his scattered and often contradictory remarks on irony, can be subjected to re-envisioning and potential enrichment by reference to Lefebvre’s more considered thoughts, especially the latter’s notions of ‘Revolutionary romanticism’ and ‘Marxist irony’. (shrink)

Comparative Political Theory and Cross-Cultural Philosophy explores new forms of philosophizing in the age of globalization by challenging the conventional border between the East and the West, as well as the traditional boundaries among different academic disciplines. This rich investigation demonstrates the importance of cross-cultural thinking in our reading of philosophical texts and explores how cross-cultural thinking transforms our understanding of the traditional philosophical paradigm.

Function-first approaches illuminate phenomena by investigating their functional roles. I first describe virtues of this approach. By foregrounding normal instances of knowledge, for example, function-first theorising offers a much-needed corrective to epistemology's counterexample-driven momentum towards increasingly byzantine, marginal cases. And epistemic practices are shaped by human limitations, needs, vices, and power relations. These non-ideal, naturalistic forces of embodied sociality form the roots of function-first theorising, which creates a fecund foundation for social epistemology. Secondly, I consider an objection to function-first theorising. (...) The objection holds that function-first approaches lack adjudicatory power. That is, function-first proposals are overly compatible with diverse claims about knowledge, which encourages “just so” speculation. In response to this concern, I advocate methodological pluralism in epistemological theorising. All methods have limitations; researchers must be mindful of those limits and fruitfully combine multiple methods. I illustrate with Hannon's function-first based arguments for “epistemic pragmatism”, which denies that the meaning of “knows” is determined by truth conditions. Finally, I argue that function-first theorising motivates staunch anti-skepticism about knowledge. Practical forces cannot chisel a sharp threshold for how much evidence is required for knowledge. But thinking this supports radical skepticism about knowledge conflates fuzzy thresholds and high ones. (shrink)

Two questions are central to the ethics of geoengineering. The justificatory question asks ‘Under what future conditions might geoengineering become justified?’, where the conditions to be considered include, for example, the threat to be confronted, the background circumstances, the governance mechanisms, individual protections, compensation provisions, and so on. The contextual question asks ‘What is the ethical context of the push toward geoengineering, and what are its implications?’ Unfortunately, early discussions of geoengineering often marginalize both questions because they tend to focus (...) on arguments from emergency that illegitimately brush them aside. One sign of this is that some emergency arguments are ethically short-sighted, and morally schizophrenic. In this paper, I illustrate this problem by appeal to two abstract examples. Although both are extreme and idealized, even the imperfect analogies provide reasons for concern about our current predicament. Ethically serious discussion of geoengineering should confront such worries, rather than hide behind overly simplistic appeals to moral emergency. As Michael Stocker puts it in his seminal discussion of moral schizophrenia, “to refuse to do so bespeaks a malady of the spirit.” . (shrink)

Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.

This essay replies to Michael Morreau and Erik J. Olsson’s ‘Learning from Ranters: The Effect of Information Resistance on the Epistemic Quality of Social Network Deliberation’. Morreau and Olsson use simulations to suggest that false ranters—agents who do not update their beliefs and only ever assert false claims—do not diminish the epistemic value of deliberation for other agents and can even be epistemically valuable. They argue conclude that “Our study suggests that including [false] ranters has little or no negative (...) effect on the epistemic value of social deliberation. Including them can even be epistemically beneficial. -/- I present concerns about their model and I enumerate some epistemic values that their discussion omits. I first raise two interrelated worries: (i.) The model is too simple; real-life irresponsible assertors do not speak uniformly falsely, for example. And tracking testifiers’ reliability demands cognitive resources. (ii.) In reality, we do not treat a person’s assertions that p as evidence that not p, especially not for all their assertions. I argue that these simplifications threat Morreau and Olsson conclusion. -/- I then enumerate epistemic values and disvalues that Morreau and Olsson do not discuss, but which bear on the value of false assertions and false ranters in their simulation and in real life. Candidate disvalues include: False beliefs of ranters; cognitive costs of discerning and recalling testifiers’ reliability; distrust; epistemic polarisatin; a prevalence of false assertion can impugn all testimony, including that of reliable testifiers. And candidate values include: a prevalence of true beliefs and assertions; attention being directed towards the right things; well-functioning trust relationships; believing people’s assertions; healthy discussion; epistemic respect; learning together. -/- . (shrink)

Everyday Utopias explores a topic that is vital but is too often overlooked by utopian scholars. It is best read in tandem with its 2013 predecessor, Weak Messianism: Essays in Everyday Utopianism, by Michael Gardiner. In a nutshell, Cooper, like Gardiner, argues that although utopian visions may be born in the brains of utopian thinkers, progress toward utopia is what counts, and it must be rooted in present patterns and possibilities. Lest my qualms with the book’s execution (...) overwhelm its value for readers, let me emphasize my enthusiastic support of its basic purpose and its promotion of the growing field of practical utopianism, using a strikingly diverse array of cases to stake... (shrink)

Realism has traditionally been a philosophical doctrine embodying an ontological element asserting the existence of various types of entities and a meta-theoretic element asserting that the existence of those entities is independent of our knowledge of their existence. Anti-realism, on the other hand, denies that the existence of objects is independent of our knowledge. ;Recently, attempts have been made to reinterpret the basic realist/anti-realist dispute in semantic terms. Basically, realism would be the view that the truth of sentences are independent (...) of our knowledge of their truth-values. Anti-realism, on the other hand, would hold that truth is not so independent of our knowledge. ;Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam have presented two of the most famous extended semantic criticisms of metaphysical realism. Dummett argues that realism is committed to an unacceptable theory of meaning. Putnam argues that realism rests upon incoherent assumptions regarding truth and reference. ;Unlike many commentators, I accept basic Dummettian constraints. I argue, however, that his conclusions do not follow. Not only can the semantic realist conform to his constraints, a realist construal of truth is in fact ineliminable in such an account. Thus, I turn Dummett's framework against its own conclusions. ;Regarding Putnam, I proceed by rejecting his premises. I show that the arguments he constructs do not support the claim of incoherence levelled at metaphysical realism. Often, indeed, his arguments, if carefully understood, actually support realism. ;I thus conclude that the two most famous and formidable attempts to reject metaphysical realism on the basis of semantic considerations fail. As such, there is no reason to abandon realism traditionally understood. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 674-678, September 2021.

In this article, I reply to comments on my book by Georgi Gardiner and Joshua DiPaolo. I will first reply to Gardiner's comments, focusing primarily on her doubts about the adjudicative power of function-first epistemology. I will then reply to DiPaolo, who argues that I have misidentified that primary function of the concept of knowledge.

This article reports a study comparing the effects of a single dose of alcohol with a matched placebo drink on recognition memory with and without conscious recollection. A double-blind, cross-over design was used with healthy volunteers who were all social drinkers. Processing depth at study was manipulated using generate versus read instructions. Conscious recollection at test was assessed using the remember-know-guess paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). Alcohol significantly reduced conscious recollection (remember responses) but had no effect on recognition in (...) the absence of conscious recollection (know responses). False alarms rates were low and unaffected by alcohol. Previous findings that generation effects are found only for remember responses were closely replicated. A further dissociation of the generation effect occurred between treatments in that deeper processing at study facilitated recognition on placebo but not on alcohol. That both alcohol and depth of processing produce dissociative effects on recollective experience provides further evidence that remembering and knowing reflect distinct memory systems. (shrink)

The first half of Mark Quentin Gardiner’s recent book, Semantic Challenges to Realism: Dummett and Putnam, is a sustained, systematic, and, for the most part, novel attempt to demolish the case against semantic realism instigated by Michael Dummett. In this article I reply on the anti-realist’s be-half. I aim to demonstrate that none of Gardiner’s main anti-Dummettian arguments are successful, and moreover that his errors are, in the main, consequences of serious misconstruals of vital aspects of the (...) semantic realist and anti-realist positions. (shrink)

Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism (...) is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)