This paper examines Taylor’s moral realism in the light of his criticisms of ‘our subjectivist civilization’. I argue that his work is valuable in its stress on the link between identity and moral judgement and its picture of human beings as ‘strong evaluators’, but I dispute that these considerations lead to moral realism if this is taken to include a claim to truth. Specifically, I argue that Taylor’s ‘Best Account’ principle may generate radical inconsistency and his depiction of practical reason (...) does not lead to any hope of convergence. His own theism serves to illustrate these difficulties. (shrink)

At the heart of MacIntyre's critique of modernity is the problem of moral truth. He argues that the 'Enlightenment project' of justifying morality has failed due to the breakdown of a concep tual scheme inherited from Aristotle, in which the idea of an essen tial human nature or function played a crucial part. Where modernity trades on moral fictions such as 'utility' and 'natural rights', Aris totle's scheme allows moral judgements to be matters of fact. Mac Intyre's denigration of modernity (...) draws attention to his own positive account of moral justification, which I examine from a position of scepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that, while there is much of value in his work - his critique of modern moral philosophy is remarkably cogent and helps clarify what is at stake in discussion of modernity - his account of the good life seems to be circular and his notion of rational progress is unpersuasive. Key Words: Aristotle • ethics • MacIntyre • modernity • truth. (shrink)

Gary Kitchen; Discussion: Habermas's Moral Cognitivism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 317–324, https://doi.org.

Gary Kitchen; Discussion: Habermas's Moral Cognitivism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 317–324, https://doi.org.