The contributors to this volume argue that we can, and they offer a new way: the "participatory turn," which proposes that individuals and communities have an ...

This essay adds a theological voice to the current debate over the legacy of Gilles Deleuze. It discusses Peter Hallward's charge that Deleuze is best read as a mystical, theophanic philosopher who values creativity to the detriment of real creatures. It argues that while Hallward is right to discern a flight from bodies, relations, and politics in Deleuze, this is due not to Deleuze's contemplative mysticism, but rather to his strident rejection of any transcendence. The essay then draws upon Thomas (...) Merton in order to argue that only a fully contemplative engagement with transcendence allows us to save the sort of radical becoming that Deleuze sought but couldn't achieve. (shrink)

Exploring the meeting of mystical and philosophical theology, Partakers of the Divine shows that Christian philosophical and contemplative practices arose together and that throughout much of Christian history, philosophy, theology and contemplation remained internal to one another. In this compelling volume, Jacob Holsinger Sherman demonstrates that the relation of philosophy, theology and contemplation to one another provides theologians and philosophers of religion today with a way forward beyond many of the stalemates that have beset discussions about faith and (...) reason, the role of religion in contemporary culture, and the challenges of modernity and postmodernity"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAs a postscript to this special issue, the author offers a set of concluding thoughts about the prospect of a new ritual turn within philosophy and theology and the relationship of this contemporary development to the previous ‘ritual turn’ of the early twentieth century. Where early twentieth-century scholars tended to treat ritual as repetitive symbolic behavior, and thus as something that needed to be decoded in order to be understood, the author suggests that a contemporary ritual turn involves not only (...) thinking about ritual as symbolic, but also thinking about it as a kind of creative, formative, and performative practice. To think ritual in this manner means not only to think about ritual but also, as it were, to think with ritual. (shrink)

The Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confdent, at least in some situations, by fnding justifable reasons to think their opponents (...) are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifable only because they lack information about their opponents. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Sarah McGrath (2008; 2011) argues that, when it comes to our controversial moral views, we have no reason to think we are less likely to be in error than those who disagree with us. I refer to this position as the Moral Peer View (MPV). Under pressure from Nathan King (2011a; 2011b), McGrath admits that the Moral Peer View need not always have been true, though she maintains it is true now. Although King seems to think there should be current (...) counterexamples to the Moral Peer View, he holds back from actually proposing any. I argue that those of us who favor marriage equality and gender equality are currently in a position to reject the Moral Peer View with regard to these issues, and I propose conditions under which people can reasonably take their moral beliefs to be epistemically advantaged. King and McGrath agree that opponents of slavery like William Wilberforce could reasonably believe they enjoyed an epistemic advantage over proponents of slavery, and I suggest that proponents of marriage equality and gender equality might make similar claims. I propose that we can make additional claims to epistemic advantages if we believe that (1) almost everyone that considers the matter admits they are advantages, (2) those who disagree with use would admit they are advantages, and (3) we can give a plausible explanation as to why those that we think are epistemically disadvantaged have not noticed that they are disadvantaged. Finally, I argue that it reasonable to think our controversial beliefs are justified if we can find reasons to think our opponents are mistaken, and do not see similar reasons to think ourselves mistaken. This is a better policy than supposing we are just as prone to make mistakes as our opponents, as the latter is both less defensible in theory, and more likely to stifle intellectual progress. (shrink)

Ever since Max Weber started an argument about the role of Protestantism in jump-starting northern Europe's economic development, scholars have clashed over the influence of religion and culture on a society's economic prospects. Today, many wonder whether the "explosion" of Protestantism in Latin America will effect a similar wave of growth and democratization. In this book, Sherman compiles the results of her field study and national survey of 1000 rural Guatemalan households. She offers persuasive evidence that, in Guatemala and (...) throughout the region, religious world-views significantly influence economic life. Sherman explains how the change in attitude and behavior that accompanies conversion from animism to a Biblically orthodox world-view has improved the domestic welfare and economic status of many families. Further, she asserts that this new attitude, sympathetic to democratic-capitalism, has created a "moral cultural soil" in which freedom, personal empowerment, an enhanced status for women, and a desire to get ahead can be nurtured. (shrink)

In The Border between Seeing and Thinking, Ned Block argues that the distinction between perception and cognition should be grounded in representational format. I object that cognition is multifaceted, and includes representations with the same format as some perceptual representations. We can save Block’s view by interpreting it as concerning the border between one elite species of cognition—namely, propositional thought—and everything below it, including perception. But that leaves the border between perception and cognition in general unexplained. To fill this gap, (...) I recommend my stimulus-dependence account of the border and reply to objections Block raises against it. This brings into relief a category of mind that is crucial to understanding human infants and nonhuman animals—namely, nonpropositional cognition, which sits between perception and propositional thought. (shrink)

While Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics does not provide a guide for action in the form of rules for a decision process as deontological or consequentialistethical theories purport to do, he does present a description of the virtuous agent and the virtues that this agent exercises in his choices of action. In this paper Iargue that Aristotle’s mature virtuous agent characteristically exercises the virtue of wisdom (sophia) as well as the practical virtues of character and intelligence in his choices of (...) action and that students of virtue (those sincerely interested in becoming virtuous by acting as the virtuous agent does) can derive certain action-guiding rules from a description of these three virtues and how they are exercised by the mature virtuous agent in any given choice of action. (shrink)

Although Adorno criticizes the existential tradition, it is frequently argued that he and Heidegger share a number of theoretical interests. Adorno does come into direct contact with existential thought at certain points, but it is Kierkegaard, not Heidegger, who more closely approaches his concerns. I begin by reviewing Adorno's Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. I then argue that, unlike Hegel, who is also criticized by Adorno on various grounds, Kierkegaard has had an influence on Adorno that has been underappreciated. While (...) Adorno criticizes Kierkegaard for breaking off the subject-object dialectic, they converge in their attacks on identity-thinking, the retention of a negative utopian standpoint of critique, and a deliberately provocative style of writing, all of which are marshaled in defense of the individual, who is besieged by modern society. Unlike Kierkegaard, however, and despite the generally accepted view, I conclude by arguing that because Adorno does not break off the subject-object dialectic, he has the necessary theoretical resources to deal with the theory-practice problem. Key Words: Adorno • communication • dialectic • individual • Kierkegaard • subject-object • subjectivity • theory-practice. (shrink)

The essential guide to understanding what literary theory is and why it matters.

Understanding Literary Theory is the essential guide for every reader looking to understand what literary theory is and why it matters. This concise and accessible text introduces today's foremost schools of literary theory, offering historical background and outlining the important ideas of each. The theories are then applied to a variety of classic short stories, demonstrating how the different theoretical approaches can yield diverse interpretations of the same literary works. This volume separates itself from similar texts by providing clear and (...) accurate explanations of theory's most challenging concepts. It examines all of the major schools of criticism, including ecocriticism, ethnic studies, feminism, formalism, Marxism, narratology, new historicism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, queer theory, reader response, and structuralism. Each chapter begins with a straightforward summary that outlines the focus of the theoretical approach, its notable practitioners, its advantages and disadvantages, and a concise definition. The chapters then delve into each theory by explaining the key concepts and the ideas that led to them. This book is indispensable for anyone intimidated by words like deconstruction, differance, heteroglossia or hyperreality. Understanding Literary Theory shows readers the interpretative possibilities that literary theory can provide. It is the ideal introduction for those who want to get the most out of the literature they read. (shrink)

ExcerptIn his insightful book Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Michael Ignatieff observes that “[t]he challenge of Islam has been there from the beginning.”1 Ignatieff is not alone among Western observers. And in this context, I would like to begin by stating up front that I am neither an opponent of human rights per se nor among those tradition-bound Muslims—though that I am–who abstain from either endorsing the construct or rejecting it outright, presumably as an exercise of sorts in “passive (...) resistance.” Similarly, I do not believe, as another scholar characterizes the position of revealed religion, that “human rights are a secular usurpation of the rights of God.”2 In fact, as I will show, for well over half a millennium, Muslims have theorized on what could only be considered a concept of human rights, while simultaneously recognizing the “rights of God.” Nor do I believe, contrary to popular perception, that the purportedly “secular” roots of human rights necessarily place them outside the reach of Islam, unless, of course, one assumes, as I do not, that the dominant understanding of “secular” in the West is the only meaning the term can legitimately carry. These are among the reasons why, for me, the idea of summarily rejecting human rights seems so unnecessary if not misguided. (shrink)

A background assumption in much contemporary political philosophy is that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, taking priority over other values such as beneficence. This assumption is typically treated as a methodological starting point, rather than as following from any particular moral or political theory. In this paper, I challenge this assumption. To frame my discussion, I argue, first, that justice doesn’t in principle override beneficence, and second, that justice doesn’t typically outweigh beneficence, since, in institutional contexts, the (...) stakes of beneficence are often extremely high. While there are various ways one might resist this argument, none challenge the core methodological point that political philosophy should abandon its preoccupation with justice and begin to pay considerably more attention to social beneficence—that is, to beneficence understood as a virtue of social institutions. Along the way, I also highlight areas where focusing on social beneficence would lead political philosophers in new and fruitful directions, and where normative ethicists focused on personal beneficence might scale up their thinking to the institutional case. GPI Working Paper No. 11-2022. (shrink)

Medical nihilism is the view that we should have little confidence in the effectiveness of medical interventions. Jacob Stegenga argues persuasively that this is how we should see modern medicine, and suggests that medical research must be modified, clinical practice should be less aggressive, and regulatory standards should be enhanced.

Metasemantics comprises new work on the philosophical foundations of linguistic semantics, by a diverse group of established and emerging experts in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the theory of content. The science of semantics aspires to systematically specify the meanings of linguistic expressions in context. The paradigmatic metasemantic question is accordingly: what more basic or fundamental features of the world metaphysically determine these semantic facts? Efforts to answer this question inevitably raise others, including: where are the boundaries of semantics?; (...) what is the essence of the meaning relation?; which framework should we use for semantic theorizing?; and what are the intrinsic natures of semantic values? Metasemantic inquiry has long been recognized as a central part of the philosophy of language, but recent developments in metaphysics and semantics itself now allow us to approach these classic questions with an unprecedented degree of precision. The essays collected here provide promising new perspectives on old problems, pose questions that suggest novel research projects, and taken together, greatly sharpen our understanding of linguistic representation. (shrink)

Abu Hamid al Ghazali, one of the most famous intellectuals in the history of Islam, developed a definition of Unbelief (kufr) to serve as the basis for determining who, in theological terms, should be considered a Muslim and who should not. Jackson's annotated translation is preceded by an introduction that reconstructs the historical and theoretical context of the Faysal and discusses its relevance for contemporary thought and practice.

This article presents some overlooked evidence on the reception of John Locke’s writings at Christ Church, Oxford. It is intended to supplement a new article in the History of Universities on the surprisingly positive response to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) at that bastion of late seventeenth-century high churchmanship. This evidence sheds new light on: the reception of Epicureanism at that college in the 1650s; Locke’s personal connections at Christ Church; book-holdings of Locke’s writings at the early eighteenth-century college; (...) some unnoticed uses of Locke’s writings by members of Christ Church; the European and North American reception of one Christ Church Lockean; and, the changing trajectory of the later eighteenth-century reception of Locke at that college. (shrink)

Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...) The payoff is not only a specific proposal for marking the perception–cognition boundary, but also a deeper understanding of the natures of hallucination and demonstrative thought. (shrink)