On dit depuis longtemps que l'image visuelle est un langage. Mais ne s'agit-il là que d'un slogan? Ce langage a-t-il des mots? A-t-il une syntaxe? S'écrit-il? Se subdivise-t-il en langues? Permet-il ce jeu sur les formes et le sens qu'on appelle rhétorique? C'est ce qu'on ne savait guère jusqu'ici.

La présente contribution s’insère dans un travail de plus grande envergure, visant à mettre en lumière les fondements naturels d’une théorie du sens. Dans une telle théorie, on distingue un double mouvement d’anasémiose et de catasémiose. C’est durant le premier que divers mécanismes produisent le sens, sur la base des interactions entre les êtres vivants et les stimulations provenant du monde. Nous nous focaliserons sur le second mouvement, au cours de laquelle le sens permet — voire produit — l’action sur (...) le monde. Or il se fait que l’action sur le monde par les signes, vecteurs du sens, est le domaine d’étude de la pragmatique. Dans notre article, nous confronterons les conceptions classiques de la pragmatique et celles qui découlent de notre approche physicaliste de la catasémiose. (shrink)

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton’s translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever (...) before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

A work of art can be defined as a section of space that has been assigned a particular status. It is not our intention to define this status—philosophical aesthetics has been addressing this issue for centuries. Rather, we aim to pinpoint the mechanisms in virtue of which this section of space is isolated and bestowed with the status in question. Such a move requires the action of a certain instance—hence the emphasis we put on the interactive character of the process. (...) We shall pay particular attention to the type of sign called ‘index,’ which plays a pivotal role in this affair. (shrink)

Plant succession is a phenomenon ascribed to vegetation dynamics at the scale of the plant community. The study of plant succession implies the analysis of the species involved and their relationships. Depending on the research done, the characteristics of trees have been studied according to either static, dimensional or partial approaches. We have revised the principal theories of succession, the methods of describing structure and development of tree and relationship established between tree species' attributes and their successional status. During studies (...) of succession, we propose that the profile of plant species be completed by including the organizational attributes of their structure as well as their development dynamics. We suggest an approach to the architecture that gives a general overview of the mode of development, revealing, among other things, that a limited number of architectural models may be found in nature. We hypothesize that community dynamics, in succession, may to a certain degree arise from the dynamic nature of plant development. This line of reasoning is in accordance with the current school of thought on process structuralism. (shrink)

Certain poets tell stories, other only appreciate the palpable aspects of signs . The latter frequently use puns, thus stressing formal analogies between words .This tends to make us accept that formal analogy results in sense analogy. The logical structure of this reasoning is explained and shown erroneous, for contrarily to science metaphors and puns in poetry are equations or models which do not operate.But these proceedings are in use and it is inadequate to claim that they are but deceits (...) or illusions. In fact poetry is strictly imaginary, its universe is one of pure representation and it recuses any checking by reality or experience‐which is of basic importance in any scientific proceeding. In the last end, this characteristic appears as the only real difference between poets and scientists, both of whom work by application of analogic models. (shrink)

1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Traditionally, empathy is conceived of as a cognitive function that governs how people think during social interactions, and is considered as largely impervious to change. However, developments in psychology and neuroscience show that empathy is grounded in neural substrates of emotionally communicative behaviour and so is learned through imitation and other forms of cultural learning. This also means that abnormal patterns of empathic function can develop through adverse life experiences, or that empathy may fail to develop in young people with (...) neurodevelopmental disorders. Nevertheless, by focussing on empathy as a quality of social interaction and affective expression in the here and now, and by appreciating that it is as a special form of sensorimotor skill, pathways to training and fostering better development of empathy can be identified. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)