In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Aristoteles’ Wahrnehmungstheorie herrscht ein Dissens darüber, welche Relevanz dem Kapitel De Anima II 5 beizumessen ist. Während Burnyeat davon ausgeht, daß in diesem Kapitel eine für die Wahrnehmung spezifische und gegenüber physischen Vorgängen vollkommen andere Art von Veränderung eingeführt wird, sehen die Literalisten in diesem Kapitel lediglich eine Erweiterung des Bewegungsmodells der Physik, das für seelische wie nicht-seelische Tätigkeiten gleichermaßen gilt. Ich zeige, daß beide Interpretationsstrategien der Aussage und Relevanz von De an. II 5 nicht (...) gerechtwerden. Meine Interpretation konzentriert sich auf die Klärung zweier Punkte, die für den Status von De an. II 5 entscheidend sind: das Verhältnis von De an. II 5 zur Bewegungslehre von Phys. III 1-3 und die Funktion von De an. II 5 innerhalb der Argumentation des zweiten Buchs von De Anima. Die Klärung beider Punkte beantwortet die Frage, was der Sinn der umstrittenen Termini alloiôsis tis und sôteria ist und auf welche Klasse von Vermögen sie sich beziehen. (shrink)

Aristoteles betont an vielen Stellen in seinem Werk die zentrale Bedeutung der Wahrnehmung fur den Wissenserwerb. Wie sind diese programmatischen Aussagen interpretatorisch einzulosen? Bildet die Wahrnehmung fur Aristoteles das Fundament, auf das unser ganzes Wissen begrundend zuruckgefuhrt werden kann? Oder hat sie bloss die Funktion, den Intellekt mit elementaren Informationen zu versorgen? Die Studie arbeitet prazise heraus, welche Rolle die Wahrnehmung in Aristoteles' Theorie des Wissenserwerbs spielt. Es zeigt sich, dass Aristoteles eine Position vertritt, die als eine systematisch interessante Alternative (...) in die gegenwartige Debatte um die Begrundung empirischen Wissens eingebracht werden kann.". (shrink)

Aristoteles' Ethik gipfelt bekanntlich in der Lehre, dass das vollkommene Glück in der betrachtenden oder kontemplativen Lebensform (bios theoretikos) besteht. In diesem kognitiven Vollzug zeigt sich der Mensch als mit der an Seligkeit herausragenden Tätigkeit Gottes am nächsten verwandt. Auch wenn der Begriff der Kontemplation (theoria) sowohl für Aristoteles' Glückskonzeption als auch für seine Gotteslehre eine zentrale Rolle spielt, so ist es alles andere als klar, was genau mit diesem Begriff gemeint ist: Worin genau besteht dieser kognitive Vollzug und was (...) ist sein Gegenstand? Steht diese Tätigkeit überhaupt noch in einem Zusammenhang mit der Natur des Menschen? Vollziehen Gott und Mensch dieselbe Art von theoria nur in einem unterschiedlichen zeitlichen Ausmass oder ist der Unterschied tiefgreifender? Die vorliegende Abhandlung unterzieht diesen für Aristoteles' Ethik und philosophische Theologie zentralen Begriff einer grundlegenden Analyse."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Der Transhumanismus versteht sich als kulturelle Bewegung und als interdisziplinärer Forschungsansatz mit dem Ziel der umfassenden Verbesserung des Menschen, d.h. seiner kognitiven, emotionalen und moralischen Fähigkeiten, mit technischen Mitteln. Der Transhumanismus stellt lebensweltlich grundlegende Grenzziehungen in Frage, z.B. der Grenze zwischen Natur und Technik, Mensch und Tier, Mensch und Maschine, Personen und Sachen, Wachsen und Eingreifen, Therapie und enhancement. Primäres Ziel dieses Bandes ist eine Kritik des Transhumanismus. Die Beiträge diskutieren seine impliziten Metaphysik, Anthropologie und Ethik: Ist das vom Transhumanismus (...) anvisierte Ziel metaphysisch möglich und auch technisch realisierbar? Ist die von ihm geforderte umfassende Technisierung der menschlichen Natur moralisch legitim und sozialethisch vertretbar? Ist die Selbstverbesserung des Menschen durch Überwindung seiner conditio humana überhaupt rational wünschenswert? Von der kritischen Durchleuchtung transhumanistischer Positionen soll eine aufklärerische Wirkung auf eine technikbegeisterte intellektuelle Öffentlichkeit ausgehen. (shrink)

Aristoteles behandelt die Wahrnehmung im Rahmen seiner umfassenden Wissenschaft vom Lebendigen; die Schrift De anima stellt hierfür den begrifflichen Ausgangspunkt und Rahmen bereit, indem die Seele als das basale explanatorische Prinzip des Seienden, insofern es lebendig ist, anhand ihrer verschiedenen Vermögen definiert wird. Von allen seelischen Vermögen erfährt dabei die Wahrnehmung die ausführlichste Behandlung. Das ist der zentralen Bedeutung dieses Vermögens geschuldet, durch dessen Besitz sich die Tiere von den Pflanzen unterscheiden.

Unter dem Eindruck einer "Renaissance des Religiösen" einerseits und der zunehmenden Politisierung von Religionen andererseits rückt die Verhältnisbestimmung von Politik und Religion im staatlichen wie im internationalen Kontext verstärkt in den Fokus des politischen und gesellschaftlichen Interesses. In den letzten Jahren trägt auch die politische Philosophie dieser Situation vermehrt Rechnung, was sich in einer steigenden Zahl von Veröffentlichungen zu diesem Thema niederschlägt. Dabei kann sie auf eine reiche Tradition philosophischer Modelle zum Neben-, Mit- oder Gegeneinander von Politik und Religion zurückblicken. (...) Was in dieser Diskussion bisher jedoch fehlt, ist eine differenzierte Darstellung der für die Verhältnisbestimmung von Philosophie, Politik und Religion klassischen Modelle, angefangen von der griechischen Antike bis in die Liberalismus-Kommunitarismus-Debatte des ausgehenden letzten Jahrhunderts. Diese Lücke schließt der vorliegende Band: In 15 Beiträgen namhafter Experten werden klassische Modelle der Verhältnisbestimmung von Philosophie, Politik und Religion, beginnend mit Platon bis hin zu Charles Taylor, eingehend behandelt. (shrink)

The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger rests on the assumption that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. Some of the other assumptions are also discussed, and the limitations of the no-alternatives argument are explored.

Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it (...) does not re- place it or aim at replacing it. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is (...) adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience. (shrink)

Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...) entry explores some of the arguments for and objections to this controversial account of our nature and persistence. (shrink)

This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)

What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...) have been instrumental in shaping it. Some of their contributions defend animalism, others criticize it, still others explore its more general implications. The book also contains a substantial introduction by the editors explaining what animalism is, identifying leading issues that merit attention, and highlighting many of the issues that the contributors have raised. (shrink)

In the opinion of most philosophers, the capacity to entertain I-thoughts is grounded on a basic capacity to self-consciousness. It is because a creature has a concept of herself that she is able to say “I”. The aim of that book is to reverse the order of dependence and to show that the capacity to form I-thoughts is the primitive aptitude that transforms an impersonal consciousness into a Self.

Conditionals pervade every aspect of our thinking, from the mundane and everyday such as ‘if you eat too much cheese, you will have nightmares’ to the most fundamental concerns as in ‘if global warming isn’t halted, sea levels will rise dramatically’. Many decades of research have focussed on the semantics of conditionals and how people reason from conditionals in everyday life. Here it has been rather overlooked how we come to such conditionals in the first place. In many cases, they (...) are learned through testimony: someone warns us about the ill-effects of cheese. Any full account of the conditional must consequently incorporate such learning. Here, we provide a new formal account of belief change in response to a testimonial conditional. (shrink)

" Le normal a pris la relève de l'ancestral ". C'est en ces termes que Michel Foucault salua l'avènement d'une nouvelle ère, celle des disciplines - moment où les sujets cessent de s'identifier par leurs généalogies et leurs positions dans un système d'alliances, par des mécanismes historico-rituels, mais sont plutôt voués à l'interminable hantise de la norme, à ne plus se connaître et se reconnaître que par le détour de l'altérité de l'anormal : voués à ne ressaisir leur identité et (...) à n'être auprès d'eux-mêmes qu'au plus proche du spectre inquiétant de ce tout autre qu'ils repoussent au plus loin. Alors, l'enfance de l'homme n'est plus la mémoire de son innocence perdue, mais la forme première de son insoumission ; le primitif n'est plus celui qui, depuis l'autre rive d'un quelconque voyage, lui fait signe vers le mirage de sa bonté native, mais celui qui indique, sous les espèces de la plus honteuse barbarie, le danger qu'il représente pour sa propre race ; et la folie n'est plus le masque grotesque ou sublime d'un au-delà de la raison, mais le miroir tendu de sa propre faiblesse. Car, si le temps est venu où " l'homme calculable " a remplacé " l'homme mémorable ", il n'en reste pas moins que le travail de la norme ne consiste pas, comme on le croit trop souvent, à produire un effet d'uniformisation sociale, mais fait bien plutôt jouer un complexe système de codage différentiel des conduites, à l'intérieur duquel nous sommes pris et advenons comme sujets. Pour autant qu'il engage notre mode d'être de sujets modernes, il nous appartient donc d'explorer ce code étrange et familier : c'est la tâche que se fixe l'auteur, à partir de l'un des concepts-clé de l'œuvre de Foucault. (shrink)

This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other (...) hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). (shrink)

The Problem of Old Evidence has troubled Bayesians ever since Clark Glymour first presented it in 1980. Several solutions have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks and none of them is considered to be the definite solution. In this article, I propose a new solution which combines several old ideas with a new one. It circumvents the crucial omniscience problem in an elegant way and leads to a considerable confirmation of the hypothesis in question.

Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by addressing Cartwright's views on (...) the practice of model building in science and the question of how models represent the world before moving on to a detailed discussion of methodologically and metaphysically challenging problems. Finally, the book addresses Cartwright's original attempts to clarify profound questions concerning the metaphysics of science. With contributions from leading scholars, such as Ronald N. Giere and Paul Teller, this unique volume will be extremely useful to philosophers of science the world over. (shrink)

Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...) life would’ve afforded had she continued living. This deprivation view of death’s harm (DV) derives some of its credibility from the general deprivation theory of which it is an instance: mortal harm is subject to the same kind of analysis plausibly given of other non-mortal harms. Furthermore, note that the weak formulation of HT—asserting only that death can inflict harm, not that it always or necessarily does—accommodates the intuition that instances of rational suicide and justifiable euthanasia present cases in which death fails to harm. DV is equipped to explain how in these cases the harms involved in continued existence outweigh the goods of which death deprives the subject. I agree that suicide can be rational and that euthanasia can be justifiable. Likewise I accept both HT and DV as far as they go. But they do not go far enough. Specifically, I argue here that death harms even those who die as a result of rational suicide or justifiable euthanasia; that death’s harm is neither undifferentiated nor wholly contingent, but multifaceted and partly necessary; that the necessary part of death’s harm is distinctive, inflicting a peculiar restriction on the autonomy of one who dies; and, regarding the timing and subject issues, that this restriction harm is inflicted on the antemortem subject prior to her death. (shrink)

A conjunction of two hypotheses may provide a better explanation than either one of them individually, even if each already provides a good explanation on its own. An appropriate measure of explanatory power should reflect this, but none of the measures discussed in the literature do so because they only consider how much an explanatory hypothesis reduces our surprise at the evidence – which is problematic. This chapter introduces and defends a class of coherentist measures of explanatory power, and shows (...) that one particular such measure that combines different intuitions underlying the epistemological notion of coherence overcomes the aforementioned problems of surprise reduction measures. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)