17 found
Order:
  1.  84
    Ontology after Carnap.Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy and beyond. Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions is widely seen as a turning point in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2. A new argument for animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  3.  38
    Ontology after Carnap.Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (1):166-169.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  4.  57
    Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity.Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  5. (1 other version)Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), The Continuum encyclopedia of British philosophy. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum.
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  6. Animalism, dicephalus, and borderline cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  7. Death's Distinctive Harm.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.
    Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. Animalism and personal identity.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Mortal Harm and the Antemortem Experience of Death.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):640-42.
    In his recent book, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics (Routeledge 2012), James Stacey Taylor challenges two ideas whose provenance may be traced all the way back to Aristotle. The first of these is the thought that death (typically) harms the one who dies (mortal harm thesis). The second is the idea that one can be harmed (and wronged) by events that occur after one’s death (posthumous harm thesis). Taylor devotes two-thirds of the book to arguing against both theses and the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Material Constitution.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing. pp. 149-69.
    This paper reviews four leading strategies for addressing the problem of material constitution, along with some of the prominent objections faced by each approach. Sections include (1) "The Orthodox View: Coincident Objects," (2) "Dominant Kinds," (3) "Nihilism," (4) "Revising the Logic of Identity," and (5) "Future Research." Also included is an annotated bibliography.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Disjunctivism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), The Continuum encyclopedia of British philosophy. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum.
    A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. (1 other version)Editor's Introduction.Stephan Blatti - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-2.
    Editor's introduction to first issue of The Southern Journal of Philosophy under the imprint of Wiley-Blackwell (48.1).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  21
    Editor's note.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):iv-iv.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  66
    No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.
    ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Review: Raymond Martin and John Barresi: The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity. [REVIEW]Stephan Blatti - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):191-195.
    This is a review of Raymond Martin and John Barresi's The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Columbia University Press, 2006).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Review). [REVIEW]Stephan Blatti - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):191-95.
  17.  85
    Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (review). [REVIEW]Stephan Blatti - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 463-464.
    This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer 2007).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark