Der Transhumanismus versteht sich als kulturelle Bewegung und als interdisziplinärer Forschungsansatz mit dem Ziel der umfassenden Verbesserung des Menschen, d.h. seiner kognitiven, emotionalen und moralischen Fähigkeiten, mit technischen Mitteln. Der Transhumanismus stellt lebensweltlich grundlegende Grenzziehungen in Frage, z.B. der Grenze zwischen Natur und Technik, Mensch und Tier, Mensch und Maschine, Personen und Sachen, Wachsen und Eingreifen, Therapie und enhancement. Primäres Ziel dieses Bandes ist eine Kritik des Transhumanismus. Die Beiträge diskutieren seine impliziten Metaphysik, Anthropologie und Ethik: Ist das vom Transhumanismus (...) anvisierte Ziel metaphysisch möglich und auch technisch realisierbar? Ist die von ihm geforderte umfassende Technisierung der menschlichen Natur moralisch legitim und sozialethisch vertretbar? Ist die Selbstverbesserung des Menschen durch Überwindung seiner conditio humana überhaupt rational wünschenswert? Von der kritischen Durchleuchtung transhumanistischer Positionen soll eine aufklärerische Wirkung auf eine technikbegeisterte intellektuelle Öffentlichkeit ausgehen. (shrink)

I shall distinguish between two periods of analytic ontology, one semi-idealistic, the other post-idealistic. The former fostered the very idea of a conceptual scheme within which questions of ontology could be formulated and answered in the first place; the latter rejected this idea in favour of the view that ontological inquiry neither presupposes a framework, nor provides the framework for science or everyday speech. Since then, ontology is what it always have been, the systematic study of the most fundamental categories (...) of being, not of thought. Unfortunately, such a category theory becomes aporetic in its search for a solution of the problem of the “temporary intrinsic”. Experience cannot tell us, whether entities persist by “perduring” or by “enduring.” One can take an alternative route and seek to broaden the conceptual basis of ontology by focussing on “Being” in contrast to entities, or being. The controversy on perdurantism and endurantism emerges as a dispute over two conflicting ways of being in time, not of Being itself. (shrink)

I shall distinguish between two periods of analytic ontology, one semi-idealistic, the other post-idealistic. The former fostered the very idea of a conceptual scheme within which questions of ontology could be formulated and answered in the first place; the latter rejected this idea in favour of the view that ontological inquiry neither presupposes a framework, nor provides the framework for science or everyday speech. Since then, ontology is what it always have been, the systematic study of the most fundamental categories (...) of being, not of thought. Unfortunately, such a category theory becomes aporetic in its search for a solution of the problem of the “temporary intrinsic”. Experience cannot tell us, whether entities persist by “perduring” or by “enduring.” One can take an alternative route and seek to broaden the conceptual basis of ontology by focussing on “Being” in contrast to entities, or being. The controversy on perdurantism and endurantism emerges as a dispute over two conflicting ways of being in time, not of Being itself. (shrink)

The conviction that philosophical problems are "problems of language" (Rorty) which may be solved, or dissolved, either by reforming language or by understanding more about the language we actually speak, forms the common ground of otherwise conflicting camps within 20th century analytic philosophy. The refusal of ordinary language philosophers to construct ideal languages stems from the prejudice that ordinary English satisfies all requirements for being an ideal language. If traditional philosophers would use words as ordinary speakers of English do they (...) would not be able to formulate questions, and theses, they are apt to do. They are "misusing language" and "transgressing the bounds of sense" (Hacker). However, ordinary language philosophers like Austin have no theory of the origin of the "metaphysical", that means, the "human restlessness in the ordinary" (Cavell) and the drive to speak outside language-games. Wittgenstein can be said to have such a theory. The vision of language he sketches out in the Investigations reveals that skepticism is a permanent threat of communication and thought. A direct (flat) repudiation of traditional themes and modes of thinking is, properly speaking, beyond the reach of linguistic procedures, as Wittgenstein would understand them. /// A convicção de que os problemas filosoficos são "problemas de linguagem" (Rorty) passiveis de serem solucionados, ou dissolvidos, seja mediante a reforma da linguagem ou mediante uma melhor compreensão da linguagem que na realidade falamos, constitui a plataforma comum a vários compos, de outra forma em competição uns com os outros, dentro da corrente analítica defilosofia no século XX. A recusa por parte dos filósofos da linguagem ordinária em construir uma linguagem ideal deriva do preconceito segundo o qual a linguagem comum satisfaz todos os requisitos de uma linguagem ideal. Se os filósofos tradicionais usassem as palavras como os falantes ordinários da língua inglesa (ou outra) fazem não seriam capazes deformular questões, e teses, ted como se sentem capazes de fazer. Eles estão simplesmente a abusar da linguagem e a "transgredir as fronteiras do sentido" (Hacker). Apesardisso, osfilosofos da linguagem ordindria, tais como Austin, naopossuem uma teoria acerca da origem do "metafísico", ou seja, da "inquietude humana no ordinário" (Cavell) e do impulso a falar fora dosjogos linguisticos. O artigo defende que uma tal teoria se encontra precisamente em Wittgenstein. A sua visão da linguagem nas Investigações revela que o cepticismo constitui uma ameaca permanente a comunicação e ao pensamento. Assim sendo, uma repudiação directa dos temas e dos modos de pensar tradicionais é algo que está para aélm do alcance dos procedimentos linguisticos, tal como Wittgenstein os entende. (shrink)