Computer simulations are widely used in current scientific practice, as a tool to obtain information about various phenomena. Scientists accordingly rely on the outputs of computer simulations to make statements about the empirical world. In that sense, simulations seem to enable scientists to acquire empirical knowledge. The aim of this paper is to assess whether computer simulations actually allow for the production of empirical knowledge, and how. It provides an epistemological analysis of present-day empirical science, to which the traditional epistemological (...) categories cannot apply in any simple way. Our strategy consists in acknowledging the complexity of scientific practice, and trying to assess its rationality. Hence, while we are careful not to abstract away from the details of scientific practice, our approach is not strictly descriptive: our goal is to state in what conditions empirical science can rely on computer simulations. In order to do so, we need to adopt a renewed epistemological framework, whose categories would enable us to give a finer-grained, and better-fitted analysis of the rationality of scientific practice. (shrink)

Models such as the simple pendulum, isolated populations, and perfectly rational agents, play a central role in theorising. It is now widely acknowledged that a study of scientific representation should focus on the role of such imaginary entities in scientists’ reasoning. However, the question is most of the time cast as follows: How can fictional or abstract entities represent the phenomena? In this paper, I show that this question is not well posed. First, I clarify the notion of representation, and (...) I emphasise the importance of what I call the “format” of a representation for the inferences agents can draw from it. Then, I show that the very same model can be presented under different formats, which do not enable scientists to perform the same inferences. Assuming that the main function of a representation is to allow one to draw predictions and explanations of the phenomena by reasoning with it, I conclude that imaginary models in abstracto are not used as representations: scientists always reason with formatted representations. Therefore, the problem of scientific representation does not lie in the relationship of imaginary entities with real systems. One should rather focus on the variety of the formats that are used in scientific practice. (shrink)

This paper explores ‘reasonable doubt’ as an enlightening notion to think of reasoning and decision-making generally, beyond the judicial domain. The paper starts from a decision-theoretic understanding of the notion, whereby it can be defined in terms of degrees of belief and a probabilistic confirmation threshold for action. It then highlights some of the limits of this notion, and proposes a richer analysis of epistemic states and reasoning through the lens of ‘reasonable doubt’, which in turn is likely to supplement (...) the DT framework. The strategy consists in fighting on two fronts: with DT, the paper claims that there is no absolute notion of ‘reasonable doubt’ but, pace DT, it shows that reasonable doubt cannot be accounted for only in terms of degrees of belief and probabilistic threshold. We argue that the lens of reasonable doubt sheds light on aspects of belief dynamics, as well as of the nature of epistemic attitudes, which are often obscured by belief-centred approaches. In particular, when it comes to acknowledging the necessary ignorance and irreducible uncertainty that we face in our everyday-life decisions, studying the various facets of doubt rather than focusing on what can be believed, enables one to do justice to the richness and diversity of the mental states in play. (shrink)

Linkage (or genetic) maps are graphs, which are intended to represent the linear ordering of genes on the chromosomes. They are constructed on the basis of statistical data concerning the transmission of genes. The invention of this technique in 1913 was driven by Morgan's group's adoption of a set of hypotheses concerning the physical mechanism of heredity. These hypotheses were themselves grounded in Morgan's defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes are the physical basis of genes. (...) In this paper, I analyze the 1919 debate between William Castle and Morgan's group, about the construction of genetic maps. The official issue of the debate concerns the arrangement of genes on chromosomes. However, the disputants tend to carry out the discussions about how one should model the data in order to draw predictions concerning the transmission of genes; the debate does not bear on the data themselves, nor does it focus on the hypotheses explaining these data. The main criteria that are appealed to by the protagonists are simplicity and predictive efficacy. However, I show that both parties' assessments of the simplicity and predictive efficacy of different ways of modeling the data themselves depend on background theoretical positions. I aim at clarifying how preference for a given model and theoretical commitments articulate. (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to challenge theory-biased approaches to scientific knowledge, by arguing for a study of theorizing, as a cognitive activity, rather than of theories, as abstract structures independent from the agents’ understanding of them. Such a study implies taking into account scientists’ reasoning processes, and their representational practices. Here, I analyze the representational practices of geneticists in the 1910s, as a means of shedding light on the content of classical genetics. Most philosophical accounts of classical genetics fail (...) to distinguish between the purely genetic, or Mendelian level, and the cytological one. I distinguish between them by characterizing them in terms of their respective associated representational practices. I then present how the two levels were articulated within Morgan’s theory of crossing-over, and I describe the representational technique of linkage mapping, which embodies the “merging” of the Mendelian and cytological levels. I propose an analysis of the mapping scheme, as a means of enlightening the conceptual articulation of Mendelian and cytological hypotheses within classical genetics. Finally, I present the respective views of three opponents to Morgan in the 1910s, who had a different understanding of the articulation of cytology and Mendelism, and entertained different views concerning the role and proper interpretation of maps. I propose to consider these diverging perspectives as instantiating what I call different “versions” of classical genetics. (shrink)

Gergely and Csibra's theory, known as "natural pedagogy theory", is meant to explain how infants fast-learn generic knowledge from adults. In this paper, my goal is to assess the explanatory import of this theory in a particular case, namely the phenomena known as "A-not-B errors". I first propose a clarification of natural pedagogy theory's fundamental hypotheses. Then, I describe Topál et al.'s (Science, 321, 1831-1834, 2008) experiments, which consist in applying natural pedagogy theory's framework to the A-not-B errors. Finally, I (...) show that natural pedagogy theory, in its actual stage of development, does not suffice to choose between various interpretations of Topál et al.'s experimental results. (shrink)

It is quite widely acknowledged, in the field of cognitive science, that the format in which a set of data is displayed (lists, graphs, arrays, etc.) matters to the agents' performances in achieving various cognitive tasks, such as problem-solving or decision-making. This paper intends to show that formats also matter in the case of theoretical representations, namely general representations expressing hypotheses, and not only in the case of data displays. Indeed, scientists have limited cognitive abilities, and representations in different formats (...) have different inferential affordances for them. Moreover, this paper shows that, once agents and their limited cognitive abilities get into the picture, one has to take into account both the way content is formatted and the cognitive abilities and epistemic peculiarities of agents. This paves the way to a dynamic and pragmatic picture of theorizing, as a cognitive activity consisting in creating new inferential pathways between representations. (shrink)

Models are generally used by scientists to obtain predictions and to provide explanations about phenomena. Their predictive and explanatory power is generally thought of as depending on their representative power. It is still not clear, though, in virtue of which features models allow scientists to draw inferences about the system they stand for. In this paper, I focus on a special kind of models, namely imaginary models (I-models) such as the simple pendulum. The main question I address is: how do (...) scientists use I-models in representing target systems? First, I propose a clarification of the very notion of representation, by emphasizing the importance of what I call the format of a representation to the inferences cognitive agents can draw from it. Then, I analyze the various representational relationships that are in play in the use of I-models. I finally conclude that there is no special semantics to be applied to I-models, and that the study of the representational power of models in general should instead focus on the variety of the formats that are used in scientific practice. (shrink)

La notion de témoignage est au cœur d’une branche de la théorie de la connaissance, appelée « épistémologie du témoignage », qui s’interroge sur le bien-fondé des croyances acquises par le biais d’autrui – par opposition aux seules capacités sensorielles et intellectuelles de l’individu. Le témoignage est aussi un des modes de preuve les plus importants dans le cadre judiciaire, aussi bien au cours de l’enquête et de l’instruction que du procès, et a fait l’objet de nombreuses réflexions de la (...) part de juristes, en particulier dans les pays de common law. Par-delà les différences disciplinaires, les distinctions des juristes sont à même d’apporter un éclairage nouveau à la réflexion épistémologique, laquelle invite à reconsidérer certaines définitions juridiques. (shrink)

On appelle « biais de confirmation » la tendance supposée des humains à sélectionner les informations qui vont dans le sens de ce qu’ils croient (ou veulent croire) et à interpréter celles dont ils disposent en faveur de leurs hypothèses favorites. Cet article vise à porter un regard critique sur certains usages de cette notion, et plus généralement sur le recours aux « biais cognitifs » pour expliquer tout un ensemble de phénomènes sociaux interprétés comme les marques d’une forme d’irrationalité. (...) Remettant en question le caractère probant des résultats expérimentaux destinés à mettre en évidence une déviation qui nous conduirait systématiquement à des représentations inexactes, je suggère que l’approche bayésienne en psychologie du raisonnement permet de rendre compte de certains de ces résultats en faisant l’hypothèse que nos inférences se conforment à une telle norme. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the significance of Ernest Nagel's introduction of the notion of model in his reconstruction of scientific theories. Nagel's account is generally considered as a version of the "received view" of theories, whose main advocate is Carnap. However, I will show that Nagel's considerations on models imply a renunciation to the logical empiricists' project of the formalization of scientific theories. I will argue that Nagel implicitly acknowledges that, in order to study the content of theories, one (...) cannot abstract away from the agents' understanding of theories, and from the reasoning processes they perform when using them. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a study of the invention and development of the technique of genetic mapping in the 1920's. I show that what is usually taken as one and the same theory (Classical Genetics) is in fact the result of the articulation of various levels of explanations corresponding to two different disciplines, with different methods and representational practices -- namely Mendelian theory and cytology. The merging of these two disciplinary frameworks is embodied in the very rules underlying the (...) construction and interpretation of genetic maps. Moreover, the debates between the geneticists around how to display data within these maps reveal that they have different understanding of the articulation of these disciplines (and different theoretical commitments). (shrink)

Résumé — La question de l’éducation, telle qu’elle se pose dès les premiers écrits de Simone Weil, où elle est pensée comme un apprentissage de la nécessité par l’action, puis dans ses réflexions politiques sur l’éducation syndicale d’une part et celle d’un peuple tout entier de l’autre, pour enfin se retrouver dans la pensée mystique des dernières années, offre un angle intéressant pour aborder l’œuvre de la philosophe. Jamais thématisée comme telle par Simone Weil, la notion d’éducation est pourtant transversale (...) et permet de comprendre à la fois l’unité profonde et les apparentes contradictions de sa pensée. Dans cet article, nous dégageons un certain nombre de caractéristiques importantes de la notion d’éducation qui se retrouvent aux plans individuel, politique et finalement mystique. On verra peu à peu émerger l’importance de la notion de symbole qui nous permettra de proposer, à partir de la " philosophie de l’éducation " de Simone Weil, un " mode d’emploi " pour la lecture de son œuvre même.— The issue of education provides us with an interesting perspective to approach Simone Weil’s works : though she never takes education as such as an object of study, it is a ubiquitous notion which enables us to understand both the deep unity and the apparent contradictions of her thought. In her first works, education is thought of as concrete learning of the necessity by one’s own actions on the world. In her political reflections, Simone Weil is concerned with both the education of workers by the syndicate and the education of a whole country. Finally, the issue of education is central, as I will show, to her late mystical thought. In this paper, I emphasize some important features of " the notion of " education as it appears in the individual, political and mystical works of Simone Weil. The notion of symbol will turn out to be of central importance, and I will finally show that it provides us with some " reading instructions " of the very writings of Simone Weil from the perspective of her philosophy of education. (shrink)

I analyse the double function of models (representing the phenomena, and being a tool for calculating and predicting them) from a cognitive point of view. Taking the same approach as Ronald Giere, I nevertheless argue that he is to much committed to an abstract conception of theories and that one should give more attention to the particular formats in which models are expressed and grasped. By taking the example of Classical Mechanics, I show that a model, as an abstract entity, (...) doesn't represent anything if not presented in some particular format, be it linguistic, diagrammatic, or pictorial. This format is crucial to the relation between the two main functions of models. (shrink)

During the last few decades, models have become the centre of attention in both cognitive science and philosophy of science. In cognitive science, the claim that humans reason with mental models, rather than mentally manipulate linguistic symbols, is the majority view. Similarly, philosophers of science almost unanimously acknowledge that models have to be taken as a central unit of analysis. Moreover, some philosophers of science and cognitive scientists have suggested that the cognitive hypothesis of mental models is a promising way (...) of accounting for the use of models in science. However, once the importance of models in cognition as well as in science has been acknowledged, much more needs to be said about how models enable agents to make predictions, and to understand the world. In this paper, our goal (as a cognitive scientist, working on causal reasoning, and a philosopher of science, working on models and representations) is twofold. We would like to further develop the notion of mental models, and to explore the parallels between mental models as a concept in cognitive science, and models in science. While acknowledging that the parallel move towards models in cognitive science and in philosophy of science is in the right direction, we think that: i. the notion of mental models needs to be clarified in order to serve as a useful tool, ii. the relation between the hypothesis of mental models and the use of models in science is still to be clarified. First, we will briefly recall a few points about the mental model hypothesis, on the one hand, and the model-centred view of science, on the other hand. Then, we will present our parallel criticisms, and put forward our own proposals. (shrink)

Methodology and the Philosophy Division of Logic.

In this paper, I construe scientific understanding not only as understanding the phenomena by means of some theoretical material (theory, law or model), but more fundamentally as understanding the theoretical material itself that is supposed to explain the phenomena. De Regt and Dieks (2005) emphasise the contextual aspects of the intelligibility of theories, showing that it depends on their "virtues", on the historical standards of intelligibility, and on the particular "skills" of their users. My paper aims at continuing this proposal, (...) first by giving a more precise definition of one's understanding of a theory and then by emphasising the importance, for this issue, of the particular formats in which a theory is expressed and hence grasped by its users. To defend this, I take the example of the versions of classical mechanics (variational versus vectorial) and the various formats of representation of its main principles and models. What does "understanding a theory" mean? At first sight, we could say that it amounts to having a clear view of the logical relations between its core principles and theorems. This kind of understanding, though global, is quite abstract: one can understand the logical structure of a theory without being able to connect it to the phenomena. Moreover, this definition depends on how one 115 construes the structure of theories: it will vary according to whether one defines theories as logical sets of statements with interpretative rules (following the "syntactic conception" of theories) or as families of models ("semantic conception"). I thus suggest that there is another sense of "understanding a theory" that itself has two aspects. To understand a theory, one has to understand both what the theory says or means and how it works; in other words, one has to grasp the phenomena by means of its conceptual apparatus (representational aspect) and to be able to manipulate it and make it fit the phenomena (computational aspect). I claim that these are essentially contextual and practical matters, and that the particular format in which the theoretical content is displayed is crucial to them. Following Humphreys' proposal (2004), I claim that one never accesses to a theory as a whole. Be it a set of statements or a class of models, in practice, it is always displayed in some particular equations, statements, images, graphs, diagrams. Humphreys' proposal of the notion of "template" to complement the classical "units of analysis" of science, like theories and models, may be a good candidate to study the relationship between the representational and computational aspects of understanding: a template is a "concrete piece of syntax" (most of the time an equation, but I suggest that Humphreys' claim could be extended to other formats) that has both a representational and computational function. With the example of classical mechanics, I show how these two functions are interrelated and, as Humphreys suggests, sometimes in tension with each other. Adressing these issues by focusing on the particular formats that are dealt with in practice may enlight this problematic relationship. (shrink)

In this paper, I construe scientific understanding not only as understanding the phenomena by means of some theoretical material (theory, law or model), but more fundamentally as understanding the theoretical material itself that is supposed to explain the phenomena. De Regt and Dieks (2005) emphasise the contextual aspects of the intelligibility of theories, showing that it depends on their ―virtues‖, on the historical standards of intelligibility, and on the particular ―skills‖of their users. My paper aims at continuing this proposal, first (...) by giving a more precise definition of one's understanding of a theory and then by emphasising the importance, for this issue, of the particular formats in which a theory is expressed and hence grasped by its users. To defend this, I take the example of the versions of classical mechanics and the various formats of representation of its main principles and models. What does ―understanding a theory‖ mean? At first sight, we could say that it amounts to having a clear view of the logical relations between its core principles and theorems. This kind of understanding, though global, is quite abstract: one can understand the logical structure of a theory without being able to connect it to the phenomena. Moreover, this definition depends on how one construes the structure of theories: it will vary according to whether one defines theories as logical sets of statements with interpretative rules (following the ―syntactic conception‖ of theories) or as families of models (―semantic conception‖). I thus suggest that there is another sense of ―understanding a theory‖ that itself has two aspects. To understand a theory, one has to understand both what the theory says or means and how it works; in other words, one has to understand it as representing the phenomena (representational aspect) and to be able to manipulate it and make it fit the phenomena (computational aspect). I claim that these are essentially contextual and practical matters, and that the particular format in which the theoretical content is displayed is crucial to them. Following Humphreys' proposal (2004), I claim that one never accesses to a theory as a whole. Be it a set of statements or a class of models, in practice, it is always displayed in some particular equations, statements, images, graphs, diagrams. Humphreys' proposal of the notion of ―template‖ to complement the classical ―units of analysis‖ of science, like theories and models, may be a good candidate to study the relationship between the representational and computational aspects of understanding: a template is a ―concrete piece of syntax‖ (most of the time an equation, but I suggest that Humphreys' claim could be extended to other formats) that has both a representational and computational function. With the example of classical mechanics, I show how these two functions are interrelated and, as Humphreys suggests, are sometimes in tension with each other. Adressing these issues by focusing on the particular formats that are dealt with in practice may enlight this problematic relationship. (shrink)

Symposium " Visual Cognition in the History of Science ", (bourse du CNFHPS, Académie des sciences).

The book edited by Roman Frigg and Matthew C. Hunter is a great example of interdisciplinary collaborative work, bringing together contributions by scholars of science and of art, around the topic of representation. The collection consists of eleven essays, seven of which were presented in early form at a conference organized by the two editors at the London School of Economics and the Courtauld Institute of Art in June 2006; the other four have been added subsequently. The result is a (...) high-standard, remarkably edited book. (shrink)

Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)

Marked sharply by its time and place (Paris in the 1970s), this early theological text by Jean-Luc Marion nevertheless maintains a strikingly deep resonance with his most recent, groundbreaking, and ever more widely discussed phenomenology. And while Marion will want to insist on a clear distinction between the theological and phenomenological projects, to read each in light of the other can prove illuminating for both the theological and the philosophical reader - and perhaps above all for the reader (...) who wants to read in both directions at once, the reader concerned with those points of interplay and undecidability where theology and philosophy inform, provoke, and challenge one another in endlessly complex ways." "In both his theological and his phenomenological projects Marion's central effort to free the absolute or unconditional (be it theology's God or phenomenology's phenomenon) from the various limits and preconditions of human thought and language will imply a thoroughgoing critique of all metaphysics, and above all of the modern metaphysics centered on the active, spontaneous subject who occupies modern philosophy from Descartes through Hegel and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Cet article vise à comprendre la théorie stoïcienne de la deixis afin d’expliquer l’importance accordée par les stoïciens aux pronoms démonstratifs et aux énoncés qu’ils composent, c’est-à-dire les propositions dites définitives. Nous montrons que ces propositions sont privilégiées pour des raisons à la fois ontologiques et épistémologiques en raison des propriétés sémantiques de leur sujet. Elles sont privilégiées d’un point de vue ontologique parce que la deixis grâce à laquelle leur sujet fait référence au réel crée une relation privilégiée à (...) la matière, la catégorie ontologique stoïcienne fondamentale. De plus, ces sujets requièrent que leur référent existe et soit présent et saisissable. Ces énoncés sont d’autre part privilégiés d’un point de vue épistémologique parce qu’ils sont fondamentaux dans l’acquisition de la connaissance. Nous suggérons enfin que tous les énoncés apparemment définis ne le sont pas en effet, et considérons quand et sous quelles conditions une référence déictique est réussie. (shrink)

This pioneering book demonstrates the crucial importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics to his philosophy as a whole. Marion traces the development of Wittgenstein's thinking in the context of the mathematical and philosophical work of the times, to make coherent sense of ideas that have too often been misunderstood because they have been presented in a disjointed and incomplete way. In particular, he illuminates the work of the neglected 'transitional period' between the Tractatus and the Investigations.

The problems of racism and racially motivated violence in predominantly African American communities in the United States are complex, multifactorial, and historically rooted. While these problems are also deeply morally troubling, bioethicists have not contributed substantially to addressing them. Concern for justice has been one of the core commitments of bioethics. For this and other reasons, bioethicists should contribute to addressing these problems. We consider how bioethicists can offer meaningful contributions to the public discourse, research, teaching, training, policy development, and (...) academic scholarship in response to the alarming and persistent patterns of racism and implicit biases associated with it. To make any useful contribution, bioethicists will require preparation and should expect to play a significant role through collaborative action with others. (shrink)

This book examines the outlook for Latin American entrepreneurs in the new global environment. Using case studies from across the region, the book highlights liberalization measures nations are adopting to facilitate small and medium size enterprise (SME) creation and growth, and existing barriers that are threatening SME sector gains.

Jean-Luc Marion advances a controversial argument for a God free of all categories of Being. Taking a characteristically postmodern stance, Marion challenges a fundamental premise of both metaphysics and neo-Thomist theology: that God, before all else, must be. Rather, he locates a "God without Being" in the realm of agape, of Christian charity or love. This volume, the first translation into English of the work of this leading Catholic philosopher, offers a contemporary perspective on the nature of God. (...) "An immensely thoughtful book. . . . It promises a rich harvest. Marion's highly original treatment of the idol and the icon, the Eucharist, boredom and vanity, conversion and prayer takes theological and philosophical discussions to a new level."--Norman Wirzba, Christian Century. (shrink)

What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...) which offer different methods of avoiding idiosyncrasy: the high epistemic standards proposal and the democratic values proposal. (shrink)

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to inertial (...) frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

In seven essays that draw from metaphysics, phenomenology, literature, Christological theology, and Biblical exegesis,Marion sketches several prolegomena to a future fuller thinking and saying of love’s paradoxical reasons, exploring evil, freedom, bedazzlement, and the loving gaze; crisis, absence, and knowing.

Events in the US in 2020 have laid bare the reality that racism and its effects continue to take a heavy toll on the lives of Black Americans. The three articles in this issue of AJOB each provide...

While humanists have pondered the subject of love to the point of obsessiveness, philosophers have steadfastly ignored it. One might wonder whether the discipline of philosophy even recognizes love. The word philosophy means “love of wisdom,” but the absence of love from philosophical discourse is curiously glaring. So where did the love go? In The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion asks this fundamental question of philosophy, while reviving inquiry into the concept of love itself. Marion begins his profound and (...) personal book with a critique of Descartes’ equation of the ego’s ability to doubt with the certainty that one exists—“I think, therefore I am”—arguing that this is worse than vain. We encounter being, he says, when we first experience love: I am loved, therefore I am; and this love is the reason I care whether I exist or not. This philosophical base allows Marion to probe several manifestations of love and its variations, including carnal excitement, self-hate, lying and perversion, fidelity, the generation of children, and the love of God. Throughout, Marion stresses that all erotic phenomena, including sentimentality, pornography, and even boasts about one’s sexual conquests, stem not from the ego as popularly understood but instead from love. A thoroughly enlightening and captivating philosophical investigation of a strangely neglected subject, The Erotic Phenomenon is certain to initiate feverish new dialogue about the philosophical meanings of that most desirable and mysterious of all concepts—love. (shrink)

John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

Despite a revived interest in explaining the evolution of anisogamy in recent years (i.e. different—micro and macrogametes), there remain more questions than answers. The topic is important because it is thought to be the foundation of the theory of gender differences and relations. Twelve of these questions are briefly reviewed here—(1) the distinction between sex and sexual types; (2) the distinction between mating types and anisogamy; (3) the possible role of ecological as well as social evolution in proto-gender differences and (...) relations; (4) the life history strategies involved; (5) whether the relevant social relationships are based on conflict or cooperation; (6) the origin and properties of meiosis; (7) the conformity of theories with sex allocation theory; (8) the relevance of multiple levels of selection; (9) appropriate modelling strategies; (10) the relationship between the kind of gametes produced and secondary sexual characteristics; (11) the relevance to humans; and (12) how realistic the search for a single explanation is. It is concluded that polarized sexuality may be a form of trade. (shrink)