How to conceptualize loving relationships so as to accommodate that just love is geared toward preserving and fostering individual autonomy? To develop an answer, this paper draws on the recent debate on the rational role of experience to motivate a view dubbed Murdochian presentationalism. Murdochian presentationalism takes seriously two presentationalist ideas: 1) individuals harboring different world views who respond to identical situations differently can be equally rational; 2) our views and concepts develop under the constant pressure of experience. It combines (...) these ideas with Murdoch’s tenet that coming to know others (and thus being able to do well by them) requires unselfish love, construed as just attention that involves a continuous refinement of our evaluative concepts and makes us better attuned to what is real. Complemented with a broadly Kantian notion of autonomy, the resulting view fits the bill. The paper ends on a sketch of what is dubbed the ideal lovers’ pledge and a comment on what metaphor the view arrived at suggests for thinking about loving relationships. (shrink)

In this paper a close look is taken at van Fraassen's use of the concept of truth. It is shown that the rather deflationist understanding of the term in his more recent publications differs considerably from the one referred to in his earlier writings, where the truth of a scientific theory is construed as its correspondence to the world. As will be argued, his more recent remarks call for a reevaluation of the difference between scientific realism and constructive empiricism and (...) force him - for the sake of consistency - to give up his realist commitments regarding the world and the observable. (shrink)

Experience, it is widely agreed, constrains our thinking and is also thoroughly theory-laden. But how can it constrain our thinking while depending on what it purports to constrain? To address this issue, I revisit and carefully analyze the account of observation provided by Norwood Russell Hanson, who introduced the term ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ in the first place. I show that Hanson’s account provides an original and coherent response to the initial question and argue that, if suitably developed, his account provides (...) a distinctive, powerful, and attractive alternative to relationalist and standard representationalist conceptions of experience. (shrink)

(English abstract further below.) -/- Wer denkt, Polyamorie erfordere ein geringeres Maß an Verpflichtung als Zweierbeziehungen, der liegt gründlich daneben. Wie aber gestaltet sich polyamoröse wechselseitige Verpflichtung idealerweise? In diesem Beitrag untersuche ich, ob sich ein bestimmtes, auf Iris Murdochs Konzeption von Liebe als gerechter Aufmerksamkeit beruhendes Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung in romantischen Partnerschaften fruchtbar auf polyamoröse Beziehungsgeflechte anwenden lässt. Ich beginne damit, Murdochs im deutschsprachigen Raum kaum rezipierte Liebeskonzeption ausführlich darzustellen und diese dabei von Simone Weils Position abzugrenzen, der Murdoch (...) wesentliche Elemente entnimmt. In einem zweiten Schritt skizziere ich das von Murdochs Position inspirierte Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung. In Auseinandersetzung mit Überlegungen, die John Enman-Beech und Julienne Obadia mit Blick auf die in polyamorösen Beziehungsgeflechten verbreitete Praxis angestellt haben, Beziehungsvereinbarungen einzugehen, werbe ich drittens für die skizzierte Idealkonzeption, indem ich zeige, dass sich mit ihr den von Enman-Beech und Obadia aufgeworfenen Herausforderungen, die sich im Zuge intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen stellen, in zwei Hinsichten mit Erfolg begegnen lässt. Erstens hebe ich hervor, dass eine am skizzierten Ideal orientierte Praxis bereits die Art von prozeduralen Normen implementiert, auf deren Bedeutung Enman-Beech zu Recht hinweist. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass das skizzierte Ideal nicht den Schwierigkeiten ausgesetzt ist, die sich nach Obadia mit denjenigen Elementen intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen verbinden, die sie als Vertragskomplex bezeichnet, und ein weniger pessimistisches Bild davon nahelegt, wie vermittelst solcher Beziehungsvereinbarungen konstituierte Individuen aufzufassen sind. -/- ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on a certain ideal conception of how lovers may commit to each other in polyamorous relationships. Drawing on an analysis of Iris Murdoch’s adaptation of Simone Weil’s ideas, I sketch what I have elsewhere called the ideal lovers’ pledge—a conception of a commitment between lovers that is spelled out in terms of Weil’s and Murdoch’s shared notion of love as just attention. I then argue that this conception is well-suited to meet certain challenges that arise in the context of thinking about relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships, challenges that have been brought out in recent work by John Enman-Beech and Julienne Obadia. First, I show that practices of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships that are oriented toward the ideal I propose will naturally implement the kind of procedural norms that Enman-Beech rightly highlights. Second, I argue that the ideal I propose does not generate the kinds of problems that according to Obadia arise due to a constellation of assumptions that she thinks underlie the practice of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships – a constellation she dubs the contract complex. The proposed ideal thus suggests an alternative under-standing of such agreements and implies a less pessimistic account of what kind of individuals are constituted by way of forging such agreements. (shrink)

As we explore panentheism, what can we learn from Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita? Although widely acknowledged as a panentheist, in the contemporary debate on how to characterize panentheism, Rāmānuja barely features. But Rāmānuja's position is worth studying not just because it bears on taxonomical questions. Among its interesting features is a conception on which devotional love, bhakti, serves an epistemic function that is also of crucial soteriological relevance. This chapter addresses both these topics. First, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is used to cast doubt on (...) a characterization of panentheism recently proposed by Mikael Stenmark. Second, Rāmānuja's conception of bhakti is juxtaposed with two conceptions of love that serve an analogous dual function: Weil's conception of supernatural love and Murdoch's conception of love as just attention. Rāmānuja's position, it is argued, is distinct, partly due to his panentheist commitments, but it also shares a number of features with the other two. In closing, it is suggested that for further comparative work on these three, ample room remains. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that combining resources from philosophy and psychology can yield useful tools for philosophical counselling. More specifically, I argue for three theses: a) Iris Murdoch’s notion of just attention and Marshall Rosenberg’s method of non-violent communication are interestingly compatible; b) engaging in non-violent communication serves to support one’s endeavors to acquire the kind of clear vision Murdoch thinks doing well by others requires; and c) non-violent just communication would be beneficial to both counsellors and counselees and (...) thus a useful resource for philosophical counsellors. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been interested in love and its general role in morality. This volume focuses on and explores the complex relation between love and justice as it appears within loving relationships, between lovers and their wider social context, and the broader political realm. Special attention is paid to the ensuing challenge of understanding and respecting the lovers’ personal autonomy in all three contexts. Accordingly, the essays in this volume are divided into three thematic sections. Section I aims at shedding (...) further light on conceptual and practical issues concerning the compatibility or incompatibility of love and justice within relationships of love. For example, are loving relations inherently unjust? Might love require justice? Or do love and justice belong to distinct moral domains? The essays in Section II consider the relation between the lovers on the one hand and their broader societal environment on the other. Specifically, how exactly are love and impartiality related? Are they compatible or not? Is it unjust to favor one’s beloved? Finally, Section III looks at the political dimensions of love and justice. How, for instance, do various accounts of love inform how we are to relate to our fellow citizens? If love is taken to play an important role in fostering or hindering the development of personal autonomy, what are the political implications that need to be addressed, and how? In addressing these questions, this book engenders a better understanding both of conceptual and practical issues regarding the relation between love, justice, and autonomy as well as their broader societal and political implications. It will be of interest to advanced students and scholars working on the philosophy of love from ethical, political, and psychological angles. (shrink)

How are love and justice related? Iris Murdoch characterizes the former by drawing on the latter. Love, she maintains, is just attention, which in turn triggers acts of compassion. Arguably, for Murdoch, love is the most important moral activity. By engaging in love, she maintains, moral agents progress on their journey from appearances to reality. Through love, they overcome selfish leanings, acquire a clearer vision of the world and, importantly, other individuals, which in turn enables them to act increasingly well. (...) In this paper, I lay Murdoch’s account of love alongside of Aristotle’s notion of philia. Ultimately, I argue that both Murdochian love and Aristotelian philia are crucial for enabling moral progress. I proceed as follows: First, I introduce Murdoch’s view. I then propose a novel reading of an argument from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in order to explain what I shall call his necessity claim (NC): philia is necessary to a flourishing life. Along the way, I point out ways in which Murdoch’s and Aristotle’s accounts are mutually illuminating. (shrink)

Dieser Artikel enthält eine kritische Diskussion der von Peter Stemmer in seinem Buch "Normativität. Eine ontologische Untersuchung" vorgelegten Analyse von Normativität. Zentraler Kritikpunkt ist der Umstand, dass der für Stemmers Analyse zentrale Begriff des Wollens unanalysiert bleibt, sich dieses jedoch, so das hier vorgestellte Argument, entweder in einer Weise analysieren lassen wird, die, als Tendenz gedeutet, weniger zu leisten vermag als Stemmer für seine Analyse benötigt, oder, als intentionaler Zustand gedeutet, selbst bereits Normativität voraussetzt und somit für Stemmers reduktive Analyse (...) von Normativität nicht geeignet ist. Gegen Ende des Aufsatzes wird eine pragmatistische Fundierung von Normativität angedeutet und verschiedene Ressourcen aufgezeigt, deren sich Stemmer bedienen könnte, um seine Position gegen die vorgebrachten Einwände zu verteidigen. (shrink)

This paper provides an introduction to the relevant debates revolving the three topics the connections between which are the being discussed in this volume--justice, autonomy, and love--outlining various conceptions and related questions. It also contains an overview of the contributions to the three sections of the volume: I) Justice Within Relationships of Love, II) Loving Partiality and Moral Impartiality, and III) The Political Dimension of Love and Justice.

This paper provides a brief overview of Iris Murdoch's central notion of love as just attention, introduces the reader to a few contemporary debates around her account, and shows that for Murdoch, love is not opposed to morality, but at its heart.

If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically variable. If so, the following seems possible: our false and irrational background beliefs can modify our experience such that in it, things look distorted, or that it conforms with and appears to confirm the false and irrational beliefs that helped bring it about in the first place. If experience is doxastically variable, it seems, its epistemic function can be undermined. However, in this dissertation, I argue that (...) we can devise accounts of (visual) experience that meet two requirements: they are fully compatible with all kinds of doxastic variation and on them, even doxastically variable experience serves to rationally constrain our beliefs. I begin with a novel interpretation of Hanson’s account of theory-laden observation—a valiant, yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt to meet both these requirements. Next, I analyze and reject various contemporary relationalist accounts of experience and the most sophisticated recent representationalist attempt to accommodate phenomena of doxastic variation: Siegel’s (Rich) Content View. Then, based on the lessons learned and drawing on Hanson’s and Gupta’s work, I show what shape a successful account may take. Ultimately, I argue for the following theses: 1) Neither of the two dominant accounts of experience—relationalism and standard representationalism—currently succeeds in satisfactorily meeting both requirements. 2) To arrive at accounts that do meet them, we should drop both the restrictive relationalist conception of experience as a relation to mind-independent items and the standard representationalist conception of experience as justifying beliefs. 3) We make progress by adopting both the general conception of experience as making rational transitions to beliefs, judgments, and actions and a (slightly) modified version of Gupta’s presentationalist account of experiential phenomenology. Finally, 4) the possibility of devising successful accounts is independent of a major issue dividing relationalists and representationalists: whether experience has content. In the final chapters, I address various follow-up questions concerning the nature of views, conceptual capacities, conceptual content, and linkages between a subject’s experience and her responses. In concluding, I show that the account of experience I recommend is widely applicable in philosophy and beyond. (shrink)

This is a short response piece to “The Knowledge View of Perception. Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances for Perceptual Knowledge” - a paper given by Andrea Kern at the PEER conference 2021 in Pittsburgh. In it, I criticize Kern's argument against what she calls the Two-Capacity View (TCV). TCV is the view that generally, perception is a capacity that enables subjects to gain perceptual knowledge and that this capacity involves two sub-capacities: one for perception and one for judgment. In this piece, (...) I provide reasons to doubt the second step of her three-step argument, show a way in which defenders of TCV can resist its third step, along with Kern's notion of what we should take paradigmatic exercises of reason to be. (shrink)

This paper deals with Swinburne’s project of developing a theodicy. We criticise this project from both an external and an internal perspective. Regarding the first strategy, the target of our critique is Swinburne’s construal of God’s attributes—especially omniscience—and the related issue of incorrigible foreknowledge. We argue that Swinburne has to clarify and improve his position to deal with the fideist or the atheist. Regarding the second strategy, we focus on Swinburne’s notion of God’s right. In this context, the parent-child-analogy strikes (...) us as particularly problematic. Hence, we argue that Swinburne should either rethink it or drop it altogether. (shrink)

This article contains a brief critique of von Kutschera's conception of God, especially of the conceptual tension between divine transcendence and divine personhood, and of his response to the problem of evil.

In this chapter, I propose a minimal construal of philosophical health that contains two core elements: variegated coherence and intentional directedness at a trans-subjective good. Combining elements from the works of Iris Murdoch and Marshall Rosenberg, I sketch a practice I dub non-violent just communication and argue that it promotes philosophical health as per the minimal construal and that we can derive from it a principle of philosophical health to complement the list of five principles of philosophical health that have (...) been proposed by Luis de Miranda. I then show that the practice of non-violent just communication promotes what Miranda Fricker has characterized as hermeneutic virtue and testimonial sensibility and, finally, suggest that my minimal notion of philosophical health is a useful tool to contrast various conceptions of philosophical counselling. (shrink)

Diese Einleitung liefert eine Skizze der Genese des Bandes, eine Einführung in die im Sammelband diskutierten Themenkomplexe und Fragestellungen sowie Zusammenfassungen aller in ihm enthaltenen Beiträge.

The observable/unobservable distinction, realistically construed, is a feature which lies at the very heart of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. The aim of this paper is to approach it by taking a close look at van Fraassen’s concept of observation. We will argue that if van Fraassen’s most recent writings about “literate experience”, especially his remarks on the status of observation reports and his general a-metaphysical stance, are taken into account, his realistic interpretation of the observable/unobservable distinction paves the road for (...) inconsistency. In particular, we will show that a dilemma emerges to the effect that van Fraassen is forced to accept skeptical consequences blatantly at odds with constructive empiricism and its restatement of the aim of science. We will finally suggest that the only way out for van Fraassen involves giving up his realistic construal of observability and thus taking sides with constructivism. (shrink)

Was ist und wie funktioniert praktische Normativität? Können Soll-Sätze aus Ist-Sätzen abgeleitet werden? Gibt es so etwas wie objektive Werte und moralische Tatsachen? Oder beziehen sich normative Aussagen in Wirklichkeit auf mentale Vorgänge in den Subjekten? Welchen Geltungsanspruch haben normative Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen und moralische Überzeugungen im Besonderen? Welche Rolle spielen Wünsche, Emotionen und die (reine) praktische Vernunft? Erkennen wir moralische Regeln und Eigenschaften intuitiv? Beruht alle Moral nur auf Übereinkunft? Diese und weitere Fragen und Probleme sind heute Gegenstand einer (...) umfangreichen, interdisziplinär geführten Normativitäts-Debatte. Auf systematischer Ebene diskutieren Internalisten und Externalisten über das Wesen praktischer Gründe, Realisten und Antirealisten über den ontologischen Status praktischer Normen sowie Kognitivisten und Non-Kognitivisten über die Wahrheitsfähigkeit normativer Aussagen und die Art und Weise, wie das praktisch Gesollte erkannt werden kann. Geführt werden diese Debatten unter Rückgriff auf Positionen, die je nach Selbstverständnis der Teilnehmer aristotelisch, humeanisch, kantisch, utilitaristisch oder pragmatistisch sind. Dieser Band möchte dazu beitragen, Vertreter der unterschiedlichsten Konzeptionen praktischer Normativität in einen konstruktiven Dialog miteinander zu bringen. (shrink)

What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject (...) that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence evident that o is F. Seeing that o is F is thus a way of its being evident that o is F and is therefore a way of knowing that o is F. (shrink)

Richard Rorty is well known as a propagandist of pragmatism and of a "post-philosophical" culture in which many traditional philosophical debates are dismissed as outrightly fruitless. The paper is mainly concerned with Rorty's dismissal of the realism-antirealism debate. The shift from argument to propaganda which is typical of much of Rorty's reasoning is critically investigated from different perspectives. In particular, it is argued that Rorty cannot convincingly establish a pragmatist position beyond realism and antirealism, and that pragmatism seems to be (...) inadequate with respect to scientific practice. Finally, the fruitfulness of the realism-antirealism debate is defended. (shrink)

In American Nietzsche, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen delves deeply into Nietzsche's philosophy, and America’s reception of it, to tell the story of his curious appeal.

The author gives a critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The centre of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the Grammarions with special (...) reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech. (shrink)

If you were looking for a philosopher likely to appeal to Americans, Friedrich Nietzsche would be far from your first choice. After all, in his blazing career, Nietzsche took aim at nearly all the foundations of modern American life: Christian morality, the Enlightenment faith in reason, and the idea of human equality. Despite that, for more than a century Nietzsche has been a hugely popular—and surprisingly influential—figure in American thought and culture. In _American Nietzsche_, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen delves deeply into (...) Nietzsche's philosophy, and America’s reception of it, to tell the story of his curious appeal. Beginning her account with Ralph Waldo Emerson, whom the seventeen-year-old Nietzsche read fervently, she shows how Nietzsche’s ideas first burst on American shores at the turn of the twentieth century, and how they continued alternately to invigorate and to shock Americans for the century to come. She also delineates the broader intellectual and cultural contexts within which a wide array of commentators—academic and armchair philosophers, theologians and atheists, romantic poets and hard-nosed empiricists, and political ideologues and apostates from the Left and the Right—drew insight and inspiration from Nietzsche’s claims for the death of God, his challenge to universal truth, and his insistence on the interpretive nature of all human thought and beliefs. At the same time, she explores how his image as an iconoclastic immoralist was put to work in American popular culture, making Nietzsche an unlikely posthumous celebrity capable of inspiring both teenagers and scholars alike. A penetrating examination of a powerful but little-explored undercurrent of twentieth-century American thought and culture, _American Nietzsche_ dramatically recasts our understanding of American intellectual life—and puts Nietzsche squarely at its heart. (shrink)

Theories of meaning according to various schools of Indic philosophy.

This chapter argues that sex and love are quite different from each other. Specifically, it argues that sexual desire is different kind of entity from romantic love, especially when the latter is understood as the settled abiding commitment between long-term partners. It also explores the normative connections (moral permissibility, obligation, and supererogation) between non-romantic forms of love—friendship, familial, and agapic love—and sexual desire, as this is an under-researched area. Furthermore, the essay argues that sexual desire’s goals clash with the goals (...) of many forms of love because the goal of sexual desire is self-interested whereas those of love are not. (shrink)

Interwar Japan saw the rise of a generation of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and educators who were uneasy about modern life. One expression of this malaise was the introduction of calligraphy in the 1941 and 1943 school curricula. Calligraphy injected aesthetics into writing education. Yet it also compromised the speed and efficiency of writing, which lay at the core of Japan's system of modern education. The solution was to teach writing twice, once as an art in the `art section' and once as (...) a functional skill in the `language section'. As an art, writing was a means to cultivate the spirit, discipline the body, escape from the calculated logic of linear time and produce an aesthetic epiphany. As a functional tool, it was a skill for keeping pace with the demands of the modern world by communicating meaning quickly and efficiently. Bureaucrats and educators from 1941 were thus simultaneously engaged in the task of overcoming modernity on the one hand and of instilling proficiency in modern life on the other. This duality of the word as a functional code for transmitting meaning and the word as an aesthetic form both echoed and shaped the double nature of Japan's modernity. (shrink)

Interwar Japan saw the rise of a generation of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and educators who were uneasy about modern life. One expression of this malaise was the introduction of calligraphy in the 1941 and 1943 school curricula. Calligraphy injected aesthetics into writing education. Yet it also compromised the speed and efficiency of writing, which lay at the core of Japan's system of modern education. The solution was to teach writing twice, once as an art in the `art section' and once as (...) a functional skill in the `language section'. As an art, writing was a means to cultivate the spirit, discipline the body, escape from the calculated logic of linear time and produce an aesthetic epiphany. As a functional tool, it was a skill for keeping pace with the demands of the modern world by communicating meaning quickly and efficiently. Bureaucrats and educators from 1941 were thus simultaneously engaged in the task of overcoming modernity on the one hand and of instilling proficiency in modern life on the other. This duality of the word as a functional code for transmitting meaning and the word as an aesthetic form both echoed and shaped the double nature of Japan's modernity. (shrink)

We construct a novel proof of Cantor's theorem in set theory.

Walter Kaufmann's monumental study of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, Nietzsche:Philosopher,Psychologist,Antichrist (1950) dramatically transformed Nietzsche interpretations in the postwar United States and rendered Kaufmann himself a dominant figure in transatlantic Nietzsche studies from 1950 until his death in 1980. While the longevity of Kaufmann's hegemony over postwar American Nietzsche interpretations in particular is remarkable, even more so is the fact that he revitalized the career of such a radical thinker in the conservative intellectual climate of the 1950s. Philosophers and historians typically credit (...) Kaufmann with rescuing Nietzsche from the Nazis, but argue that he did so by denaturing Nietzsche's philosophy of power and narrowly transforming him into an existentialist. By contrast, this essay argues that Kaufmann took a much more dramatic step by extending the scope of Nietzsche's philosophy, demonstrating how his ideas resonated with but also transcended the dominant philosophies of the day. Kaufmann presented Nietzsche as a philosopher uniquely poised to bridge the increasing mid-century rift between continental and analytic philosophies, as well as between the increasingly distinct moral worlds of academic philosophers and general readers. At a time when philosophical discourses within the university and beyond were pulling apart, Kaufmann put Nietzsche to work to bring them back together. By emphasizing Nietzsche's harmony with the range of scholarly and popular philosophical concerns of mid-century, he also established, for the first time in the United States, Nietzsche's role as a canonical thinker in the Western tradition. (shrink)

Drawing on a variety of discourses, from religion, philosophy, and political thought, to cultural criticism, social theory, and the arts,The Ideas That Made America: A Brief History shows how ideas have been major forces in American history, driving movements such as transcendentalism, Social Darwinism, conservatism, and postmodernism.

This essay starts by discussing the definitions, and their attendant difficulties, of "casual sex," "promiscuity," and "objectification" (including whether objectification is only about treatment or can be about mere regard), and then continues to discuss the morality of casual sex and promiscuity, especially as to whether they are objectifying. Assuming a pessimist view of sexual desire and activity, the paper argues that it is nearly impossible to defend these sexual practices against the accusation of objectification, because even though casual sex (...) and promiscuity do not necessarily objectify, they likely almost always do. The essay concludes by arguing that the wrongness of objectification in these two kinds of sexual practices might not be serious, so they might be overall morally permissible. (This is a revised version from that in the 7th edition of The Philosophy of Sex.). (shrink)

Dignity is a central value in care for aged adults, and it must be protected and respected. With demographic changes leading to an aging population, health ministries are increasingly investing in digitalization. However, using unfamiliar digital technology can be challenging and thus impact aged adults' dignity and well‐being. The INNOVATEDIGNITY project aims to research new, dignified ways of engaging with aged adults to shape digital developments in care delivery. This qualitative study aimed to explore how innovative digitally‐led healthcare have influenced (...) aged adults' well‐being and dignity through three studies conducted as part of the INNOVATEDIGNITY project: a scoping review, an empirical study and a policy analysis. The three documents were analysed to uncover meanings relevant to the research problem revealing four main themes: the advantages of new technologies in facilitating aged adults' well‐being, the rupture of dignity due to bewilderment in the digital world, aged adults' dignity is affected by their worries about human face of care being replaced by technology and preserving aged adults' dignity in digitally‐led healthcare. Digitalization in healthcare impacts aged adults' well‐being as providing new opportunities for care, but preserving aged adults' dignity when working with unfamiliar digital innovations is challenging. Aged adults need to be informed about the use of technology in their care and supported to develop the necessary digital skills to better adapt to digitally‐led healthcare. The circumstances, conditions and needs of individuals should remain central when implementing new technologies in healthcare settings in a dignified way. (shrink)

Emotion as patheception. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874494.

A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear (...) dynamics and ecological psychology. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of commentary on fetal pain has looked at the maturation of cortical pathways to decide a lower age limit for fetal pain. This approach assumes pain can be felt directly from neural activation and ignores psychological development. Here we propose that neural activation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for phenomenological experience, including pain. Isolated neural activation is just one physical fact amongst an infinity of physical facts that requires order or structure to be isolated (...) and experienced. A new theoretical approach is necessary to understand essential phenomenological experience. We conjecture that infant caregiver interaction provides the necessary order or structure so that the infant can isolate fundamental sense experiences delivered by neural activity. Cortical structures provide the necessary neural basis for qualia but qualia are revealed as phenomenological only as the infant becomes a subjective self. (shrink)

There are two ways in which Ghazali contributes to the discussion of whether God exists: by arguing for the existence of God, and by arguing against certain views which, in his opinion, stand in the way of truly believing that God exists. In this paper I examine Ghazali’s argument from creation and his refutation or the philosophers’ second proof for the eternity or the world. My purpose will be to argue that: firstly, Ghazali’s argument and his refutation are based on (...) incompatible views of time, and cannot, therefore, both be maintained. Secondly, Ghazali fails to establish the one interesting premiss which he employs in his argument from creation. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles can be justified as a concrete application of Ockham’s Razor, the maxim which enjoins us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. First, a statement of the Principle is presented, according to which the Principle, while interesting enough, is not logically necessary. It is then argued that the assumption of the falsity of the Principle prescribes an epistemological situation where it seems to be impossible to find grounds (...) for thinking that the Principle is indeed false. Hence it is to be accepted as an epistemological necessity of sorts, one that recommended by the desire not to multiply entities beyond need. (shrink)