This article analyzes the transformation of Minerva from an intellectual towards a scholarly journal by making use of bibliometric methods. The aim is to provide some empirical insights that help to understand what properties of the journal changed in the course of this transformation process. Minerva was one of the first journals that reflected on science and its role in society and science policy in particular. Analyzing the development of the journal sheds light on the emergence of science (policy) studies (...) and on Minerva’s role as a forerunner in this field. In a first step, the methods will be described. The second section provides some empirical results of the publication output of Minerva and its relations to other journals in the field. The empirical findings are put into a broader perspective in the concluding third section. (shrink)

In the current scientific and political discourse surrounding the transformation of the scientific publication system, significant attention is focused on Diamond Open Access (OA). Diamond OA is characterized by no charges for readers or authors and relies on monetary allowances and voluntary work. This article explores the potential and challenges of Diamond OA journals, using Germany as a case study. Two key questions are addressed: first, the current role of such journals in the scientific publication system is determined through bibliometric (...) analysis across various disciplines. Second, an investigation is conducted to assess the sustainability of Diamond OA journals and identify associated structural problems or potential breaking points. This investigation includes an in-depth expert interview study involving 20 editors of Diamond OA journals. The empirical results are presented using a landscape map that considers two dimensions: 'monetized and gift-based completion of tasks' and 'journal team size.' The bibliometric analysis reveals a substantial number of Diamond OA journals in the social sciences and humanities, but limited adoption in other fields. The model proves effective for small to mid-sized journals, but not for larger ones. Additionally, it was found that 23 Diamond OA journals have recently discontinued their operations. The expert interviews demonstrate the diversity within the landscape and the usefulness of the two dimensions in understanding key differences. Journals in two of the four quadrants of the map exemplify sustainable conditions, while the other two quadrants raise concerns about long-term stability. These concerns include limited funding leading to a lack of division of labor and an excessive burden on highly committed members. Gift-like contributions, while appealing, also present challenges as potential donors not only decide whether to contribute but also how to contribute, potentially creating friction between the gift and the journal's requirements. Furthermore, journals in the lower right quadrant often rely on third-party funding, necessitating a transformation once the funding expires. Common pathways for sustaining operations include lobbying for funding at the journal's home institution or increasing reliance on gift-based completion of tasks. These findings underscore the need for the development of more sustainable funding models to ensure the success of Diamond OA journals. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

Este texto es la ponencia del autor en la Conferencia sobre la humanización de la economía mundial, y debate el tema de la globalización. Afirma que ella es producto del deseo de mejorar nuestra existencia, y de decisiones a favor de una mayor apertura. Dentro de esto reconoce que la disparidad entre los países más ricos y los más pobres es mayor que nunca y que la pobreza es el desafío más apremiante en la esfera moral. Desarrolla luego más en (...) profundidad la visión y acciones del FMI en el proceso y proclama que éste y la Iglesia Católica son instituciones globales con acervos particulares e influencias valiosas, y siempre que sea posible, deben colaborar para lograr una globalización más integral y para luchar contra la pobreza mundial. (shrink)

Shepard's internalization concept is defended against Hecht's criticisms. By ignoring both Shepard's evolutionary perspective and the fact that internalization does not preclude modularization, Hecht advances inconclusive evidence. Developmental research supports Shepard's conclusion that kinematic geometry may be more deeply internalized than physical dynamics. This research also suggests that the internalization concept should be broadened to include representations acquired during ontogeny. [Hecht; Shepard].

Seit dem byzantinischen Bilderstreit und dem Bildersturm der Reformation ist nicht mehr in solcher Intensität über Bilder nachgedacht worden wie in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Neben der Archäologie und der Kunstgeschichte haben sich zahlreiche weitere Fächer an Fragestellungen rund um das Bild geradezu festgebissen. Angesichts dessen geht einer der bedeutendsten Kunsthistoriker der Gegenwart der Frage nach, warum Begriff und Geltung sowie Macht und Ohnmacht von Bildern so hartnäckig verfolgte Themen unserer Tage geworden sind.

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)

This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...) illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

Horst Bredekamp’s subject is the astute deployment and perennial resonance of the startling image of the body politic that dominates the frontispiece to Leviathan: a treatise on the psychology of the individual and the dynamic of the multitude, published in 1651 by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Affirming the centrality of such a figural device for this pioneering theorist of the state, Bredekamp goes on to address the art-historical dimension of the mesmerising etched title-page. In his central chapters he (...) explores the extraordinary range of sources – from socio-cultural tradition to scientific advances – on which the author and his artist-collaborator may have drawn. In conclusion, he reveals Hobbes to be no less passionate than shrewd in his belief that the constraints and amenities of a tolerable life in common attest to the potency of the visual. As appendices, two essays and catalogues explore the portraits made of Hobbes as well as illustrations that appeared in his other works, thus systematically completing the exploration of the images connected with this exceptional philosopher. (shrink)

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...) archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. (shrink)

It is difficult to translate the title “Wissen und Glauben” into English, because there is a debate between Kant, Jacobi, Fichte and Hegel behind it. Through Fichtes “Wissenschaftslehre” knowledge has been accepted as the basic element of all scholarship, whereas faith belongs to religion.First of all we will show, that knowledge and faith have an independent root. Each can exist by itself whithout the other one. Secondly, we will show how they complement one another. In fact faith can be sufficient (...) for the individual without knowledge. But faith can only achieve its richness and its public effectiveness together with knowledge, the πλήρωμα of faith needs knowledge. Knowledge on the other hand can neither take its depth nor reach its totality without faith. Knowledge that wants to enlighten itself must rely on faith. Faith shows knowledge that it is neither fully founded on man nor can it be fully considered as an image of the universe. On the one hand faith is criticism of self-empowered knowledge, on the other hand it is the way to surpass knowledge and to complete it. (shrink)

1. Im Angesicht der Zeit.--2. Im Umkreis der Kunst.--3. Im Horizont des Absoluten.

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Wie kam die heidnische Antike durch das christliche Mittelalter? Diese Frage von Horst Fuhrmann zielt auf die asketische Seite des Christentums, die den Kirchenvater Hieronymus zu einer schweren Selbstanklage brachte: Er sei vom göttlichen Richter als "Ciceronianer", als Liebhaber der lasziven, eleganten Literatur verdammt worden. Die Auffassung der Hieronymus wurde das ganze Mittelalter über immer wieder aufgegriffen, ebenso wurden jedoch auch die antiken Texte und Götterfabeln getreu abgeschrieben - in einer Zeit rabiater Fälschungen von Kirchenrechtstexten und Heiligenlegenden. Der Dank (...) dabür gebührt wohl zuerst den Mönchen des Heiligen Benedikt: sie haben in großer Entsagung alle Überlieferung der Antike, deren sie habhaft werden konnten, über die Epocheschwelle des neunten Jahrhunderts auf uns gebracht - ohne sich im Glauben irre machen zu lassen. (shrink)