John R. Silber; XI—Human Action and the Language of Volitions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 199–220, https://.

Lewis white beck's "a commentary on kant's critique of practical reason" overlooks the fact that some of the ideas most important to kant's ethics are not presented in the second "critique". It also lacks a necessary emphasis on the notion of the highest good, The unifying theme of the work as a whole. The author traces the role of this concept throughout the second "critique" and shows how kant developed the content of the idea of the highest good in the (...) combined notions of perfection as the moral good and happiness as the natural good. (staff). (shrink)

A systematic examination of Kant's ethics that recognizes the central importance of the good in relation to duty as forming a unified whole, in accordance with Kant's intent.

Predicting the future is a difficult and uncertain activity in which one is far more likely to be wrong than right. To predict the contribution of philosophy to education in the next century is an especially dubious enterprise because we cannot even predict the direction philosophy itself will take in the future. If, however, we follow the precedent of Immanuel Kant—who did not ask “Is knowledge possible?” but rather “What must we presuppose to account for the possibility of knowledge?”-- we (...) can then hope for an answer. We must ask, “What must the contribution of philosophy to future education be if philosophy and future education are to benefit humankind?” This question, I believe, can be answered. (shrink)

THE heterogeneity of the good--its division into the moral good, as virtue, and the natural good, as happiness--is central to Kant's philosophy. In order to clarify and sustain this division, Kant was compelled to specify the valuational characteristics of each kind of good and their relation to one another. But in trying to analyze the good in its heterogeneity Kant faced a terminological difficulty. He could no longer speak simply of "the good" without speaking ambiguously. To avoid this ambiguity Kant (...) decided to refer to the moral good by the term "das Gute," and to the natural good by the term "das Wohl," to moral evil by the term "das Böse," and to natural evil by the term "das Übel." This attempt at linguistic reform was not successful, however, for at least two reasons. First, Kant did not carry his reform of the language far enough. And second, Kant seriously underestimated and quickly fell victim to the power of common usage. The force of linguistic habit, both personal and social, and the wisdom inherent in common usage opposed the adoption of his terminology. (shrink)

SummaryOn Kant's view, the moral individual cannot be “programmed” by sociological or educational techniques. To brainwash is to destroy freedom while to educate is to develop the capacity for freedom. Plato's proposal to invent mythic roots as incentives to moral conduct is not acceptable, since it involves not merely the propagation of falsehoods, but its success requires also a totalitarian state that destroys freedom. Not being concerned with mere legality, but with encouraging true morality, he has renounced forcing moral goodness.Marx, (...) Lenin, Stalin and Mao all proposed educational programs that put down the mythic roots of their secular religions. They project and indoctrinate into people's mind a new vision of society and man. The diabolical religion of National Socialism was inculcated by terror and totalitarianism.Kant's ethics has it mythic roots, too, which lie in Christian pietism. But his fully developed theory proscribes the use of any mythic religion not based on morality. (shrink)

MORAL THEORY is by no means unique in its dependence upon judgment for its application. Judgment is a creative faculty that stands as the active link between any theory and its application, whether it be a theory of science, morality, or aesthetics.

The twentieth century may be considered the ultimate expression of Western ideals and philosophy: “civilized” man’s attempt to dominate “uncivilized” peoples and nature. The twenty-first century soberingly proclaims the shortsightedness and ultimate unsustainability of this philosophy. This paper shows the limitations of the modern Western worldview, and the practical applicability of ideas to be found in Asian philosophies.

Modern philosophy—perhaps better described as post-Enlightenment philosophy—began to emerge in the later half of the nineteenth century and continued to gain strength in its opposition to the Enlightenment’s insistence on the central role of reason and rational discourse in philosophy. The recent attacks on reason in the name of this or that ideology or “ism” do not strengthen but rather weaken the foundations of equality for women and minorities established through the use of reason. Philosophers—male and female of all races—may (...) take justifiable pride in having been by rational argument, agents of liberation for women and minorities. This achievement should not be jeopardized by the rejection of rational argument and evidence in the name of any currently fashionable movement. (shrink)

The pollution of time -- A tribute to Martin Luther King, Jr. -- The humanities, the crucible of higher education -- The tremble factor -- The thicket of law and the marsh of conscience -- Generations on generations -- The myth of overqualification -- Democracy: its counterfeits and its promise -- By the rivers of Babylon -- The next parish over -- The university and the defense of freedom -- Stretching the envelope -- Seeking the North Star -- Parents' convocation (...) -- Multiculturalism true and false -- Obedience to the unenforceable -- The need for honesty in confronting history -- Character education East and West -- Such stuff as dreams are made on -- Drinking the sun of Corinth -- Procedure or dogma: the core of liberalism -- Roadblocks to education reform -- Education and spiritual formation -- Ethics and corporate responsibility -- Life is a series of surprises -- Science vs. scientism -- The choices are ours. (shrink)

In three volumes, a distinguished group of scholars from a variety of disciplines in the natural and social sciences, the humanities and the arts contribute essays in honor of Robert S. Cohen, on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The range of the essays, as well as their originality, and their critical and historical depth, pay tribute to the extraordinary scope of Professor Cohen's intellectual interests, as a scientist-philosopher and a humanist, and also to his engagement in the world of (...) social and political practice. Science, Mind and Art, Volume III of Essays in honor of Robert S. Cohen focuses on issues in contemporary epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind as well as on the relations of science and human values in ethical and religious thought. It also has important new work in contemporary metaphysics, as well as in the history of philosophy, and on questions of multiculturalism in science education. Contributors include Paul Feyerabend, Adolf Grünbaum, Joseph Margolis, Joëlle Proust, Erazim Kohak, Elie Wiesel, Miriam Bienenstock, and John Silber, among others. (shrink)

In the 1960s Lewis White Beck criticized Kant’s highest good as a moral concept. In 1963 John Silber responded. Thus, the “Beck-Silber controversy.” This paper explores such controversy in the Spanish literature. It begins identifying four criticisms: the problems of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and irrelevance. It then identifies a new problem rescued from the Spanish literature: dualism. After categorizing, following Matthew Caswell, the Spanish defenses into revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists, this paper assesses these defenses. The paper also (...) translates sections of such literature into English and leaves us closer to a complete defense of the highest good by salvaging what it can of the Spanish literature’s unique points. (shrink)

Fifteen essays by as many contributors with a summative introduction by Edie. The contributors are Dreyfus, Adamczewski, Earle, Compton, J. E. Smith, J. M. Anderson, Natanson, Silber, Crosson, Molina, G. E. Myers, Tillman, W. J. Richardson, Langan, and Findlay. All of the essays were presented in one form or another at one of the last three meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Some of them have been considerably reworked and expanded, the most important of which is (...) John Silber's fifty-seven page paper, "Being and Doing." Silber subjects the contemporary analytical version of voluntary responsibility, as found paradigmaticaliy in H. L. A. Hart's work, to a severe critique, arguing that a notion of status responsibility which involves following intentions and motives back to their pre-thematic roots in attitudes and a whole style of life, or way of being, is more consonant with human experience and nature than the antiseptic notion of responsibility developed by Hart. Even Hampshire takes his lumps at Silber's hands. Other excellent papers include Findlay's "Essential Probabilities," which can be read as a plea for a material logic, and Richardson's "Kant and the Late Heidegger," which uses Heidegger's reflection on the Kantian problematic to examine the issue of the continuity between the early and the later Heidegger. Not all of the essays approach the standards of these three, but for a collection of papers that have only the meeting of the same society in common, this is better than most.—E. A. R. (shrink)

“Is the Kantian Universalization Demand a Suficient Procedure forthe Establishment of Moral-Ethical Contents? Some Considerations Regardinga Negative Answer to this Question”. In this article we analyze the thesis thatclaims the suficiency of the Kantian universalization procedure expressed inthe categorical imperative of the general law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals) to determine the content of morality, with the aim of holding that thisthesis contradicts Kant’s inal conception of Ethics as it is expounded in Metaphysicsof Morals, insofar as it is structured upon (...) the normative priority of the“end of humanity”. The effective adoption of this end –or practical principle– isa necessary condition for the ascription of morality and for the determination ofthe “content” of the “moral law”. In order to achieve this aim, we analyze two ofthe most inluential interpretations that are at the base of the aforementionedthesis, v.gr., John R. Silber’s, in “Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, andHenry E. Allison’s in “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...) example is normative practical reasoning of the form 'I ought to φ, so I'll φ', where 'I ought to φ' expresses a normative belief and 'I'll φ' an intention. This has at least some characteristics of reasoning, but there are also grounds for doubting that it is genuine reasoning. One objection is that it seems inappropriate to derive an intention to φ from a belief that you ought to φ, rather than a belief that you ought to intend to φ. Another is that you may not be able to go through this putative process of reasoning, and this inability might disqualify it from being reasoning. A third objection is that it violates the Humean doctrine that reason alone cannot motivate any action of the will. This paper investigates these objections. (shrink)

Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.

I defend Kant’s moral psychology against John R. Silber’s argument that Kant cannot account for the radical evil of Hitler. Silber’s argument cannot be maintained, I argue, if Kant’s account of theological and moral fanaticism, and the personality of the moral fanatic, are taken into account. I contend that Kant’s writings support an analogy between the fanatical pursuit of religious and moral ideals and Hitler’s fanatical pursuit of an ideal of racial purity. I conclude that Kant’s account (...) of moral fanaticism is adequate to account for the actions and moral psychology of Hitler. (shrink)

This is a classic volume in the "library of Living Philosophers" and includes a collection of essays on Dewey's work by his contemporaries at the time of the volume's publication. It also includes a biographical essay on Dewey and his replies to the assembled essays.

Introduction -- Prologue -- Book one -- Book two -- Book three -- Book four.

In “Causality and Determination,” Anscombe rejects the two received opinions on the nature of causality in the modern philosophical tradition. She rejects the Humean conception of universal generalization based on the constant conjunction in experience of cause and effect, and she also rejects the notion that causality entails a necessary connection between cause and effect. As an alternative, she suggests that the core notion of causality is one of the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. Her consideration of causality (...) ranges generally over all types of causality, but I believe that the most significant implication of her position is in application to the causality of human action. In this paper, I will articulate what I take to be that position. (shrink)

In his Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that (...) the brand of realism that Kornblith’s solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. (shrink)

Moral Absolutes sets forth a vigorous but careful critique of much recent work in moral theology. It is illustrated with examples from the most controversial aspects of Christian moral doctrine, and a frank account is given of the roots of the upheaval in Roman Catholic moral theology in and after the 1960s.

Philosophers have recently revived the study of the ancient Greek topics of virtue and the virtues—justice, honesty, temperance, friendship, courage, and so on as qualities of mind and character belonging to individual people. But one issue at the center of Greek moral theory seems to have dropped out of consideration. This is the question of the unity of virtue, the unity of the virtues. Must anyone who has one of these qualities have others of them as well, indeed all of (...) them—all the ones that really do deserve to be counted as virtues? Even further, is there really no set of distinct and separate virtuous qualities at all, but at bottom only a single one—so that the person who has this single condition of “virtue” is entitled also to the further descriptions “honest” and “well-controlled” and “just” and “friendly” and “courageous” and “fostering” and “supportive,” and so on, as distinguishable aspects or immediate effects of his unitary “virtue”? (shrink)

This a response to D. Z. Phillips's stringent critique of theodicies, including that suggested by myself. I offer counters to his array of arguments, and point to what I see as a fundamental flaw in his philosophy of religion. He appealed to religious language as used by ordinary religious persons. But his account of the meaning of this language was not that of the ordinary religious believer. He thus claimed, by implication, to know better than they did what they really (...) meant. I conclude that he was a non-realist concerning both religious language and the reality of God. (shrink)

What are the purposes of education and what is the relationship between educational research and policy? Using the twin lenses of Visible Learning and educational philosophy these are among the many fascinating topics discussed in extended conversations between John Hattie and Steen Nepper Larsen. This wide-ranging, and informative book offers fundamental propositions about the nature of Education. It maps out in fascinating detail a coming together of Hattie's empirical data and world-famous Visible Learning paradigm with the rich heritage of (...) educational philosophy. As well as exploring the inevitable questions of the purpose of education and the development of students in a learning society. Part clash of cultures, part meeting of minds, always fascinating and illuminating, this intriguing book will inspire teachers, students and parents at all levels of the educational system - from kindergarten through school to university. Conversations include: What is the purpose of education? Does educational data speak for itself? What is the role of the teacher? Is learning a visible phenomenon? Is it important to teach and learn specific subjects? What is the role of Neuroscience research? What is the relationship between educational research and educational politics? What is the role of the state in education? (shrink)