Continuing work initiated by Jónsson, Daigneault, Pigozzi and others; Maksimova proved that a normal modal logic (with a single unary modality) has the Craig interpolation property iff the corresponding class of algebras has the superamalgamation property (cf. [Mak 91], [Mak 79]). The aim of this paper is to extend the latter result to a large class of logics. We will prove that the characterization can be extended to all algebraizable logics containing Boolean fragment and having a certain kind of local (...) deduction property. We also extend this characterization of the interpolation property to arbitrary logics under the condition that their algebraic counterparts are discriminator varieties. We also extend Maksimova's result to normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many, not necessarily unary modalities, and to not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with modalities of ranks smaller than 2, too.The problem of extending the above characterization result to no n-normal non-unary modal logics remains open. (shrink)

A part of relativistic dynamics is axiomatized by simple and purely geometrical axioms formulated within first-order logic. A geometrical proof of the formula connecting relativistic and rest masses of bodies is presented, leading up to a geometric explanation of Einstein's famous E = mc² . The connection of our geometrical axioms and the usual axioms on the conservation of mass, momentum and four-momentum is also investigated.

A Dictionary of Pali, Part I, A-Kh. Margaret Cone. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2001. xxiv, 778 pp. £25.00. ISBN 0 86013 394 X.

This is the second part of the paper [Part I] which appeared in the previous issue of this journal.

Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695–705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase “conspiracy theory” has no negative effect upon people’s willingness to endorse a claim. We revisit Wood’s findings and its (re)uptake in the recent (...) literature. Is the label “conspiracy theory” a pejorative? If so, does it sway or affect people’s belief in specific claims of conspiracy (i.e. particular conspiracy theories), or is the effect one that concerns claims of conspiracy more generally (i.e. all conspiracy theories)? Through an examination of the conceptual and methodological scope of Wood’s work and the results of our similar quasi-experimental design, we argue that it is premature to suggest the label “conspiracy theory” has no impact on the believability of a claim, or that it has no rhetorical power. (shrink)

The second part of the interview with Dr.Sci.Proleiev, Doctor of Philosophy, devoted to the understanding of the phenomenon of "philosophy in the USSR" (first part: Proleyev, S., Zborovska, X., Mironenko, R., Kostenko, O., & Shulha, M. (2018). Philosophy as a School of Life at the Time of Totalitarianism. Part I. Thinking in the Space of Soviet Myths.

Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account (...) for the variety of dream experiences? What kinds of experiential and empirical approaches are required in order to probe into dreaming subjectivity? Investigating qualities of perception, sensation, and embodiment in dreams, as well as the relationship between the dream-world and waking-world requires a step away from a delusional or altered-state framework of dream formation and a step toward an enactive integrative approach. Method: In this article, we will focus on the “depth” of dream experiences, i.e., what is possible in the dream state. Our article is divided into two parts: a theoretical framework for approaching dreaming from an enactive cognition standpoint; and discussion of the role and strategies for experimentation on dreaming. Based on phenomenology and theories of enactivism, we will argue for the primacy of subjectivity and imagination in the formation of lived experience. Results: We propose that neurophenomenology of dreaming is a nascent discipline that requires rethinking the relative role of third-, first- and second-person methodologies, and that a paradigm shift is required in order to investigate dreaming as a phenomenon on a continuum of conscious phenomena as opposed to a break from or an alteration of consciousness. Implications: Dream science, as part of the larger enterprise of consciousness and subjectivity studies, can be included in the enactive framework. This implies that dream experiences are neither passively lived nor functionally disconnected from dreamers’ world and body. We propose the basis and some concrete strategies for an empirical enactive neurophenomenology of dreaming. We conclude that investigating dream experiences can illuminate qualities of subjective perception and relation to the world, and thus challenge the traditional subject-object juxtaposition. Constructivist content: This article argues for an interdisciplinary enactive cognitive science approach to dream studies. (shrink)

For several decades, renewed interest in the connection between perception and knowledge has sustained a robust debate over external world skepticism. Recently, however, a growing consensus claims the skeptical challenge has been substantially met, and that realism in some robust form has emerged a clear victor. I invite us to rethink this consensus in a two-part response. The first forges a temporary alliance with skepticism against prominent forms of contemporary realism. That these fail to rebuff ews bolsters Barry Stroud’s call (...) for a new paradigm of objectivity. In the second part I sketch such a paradigm based upon a transactional interpretation of John Dewey’s pragmatism, and indicate its resilience to skeptical attacks. (shrink)

This article explores the defining tendencies of urban expansion taking place in mega-cities of the Global South, as exemplified by recent trends in Metropolitan Manila and elsewhere. What I call the process of ‘uber-urbanization’ entails the construction of city emulants as platforms for the value-productive movements of globopolitical urban life, a fractal enterprise whose animating program involves the mediatization of human capacities in technologized forms of servitude. Such meditatized human capacities can be understood as comprising a kind of vital infrastructure (...) exemplified in long-standing experimental, risk-taking, shifting, multi-tasking modes of living developed out of urban conditions in the Global South. I discuss the liquidity of such modes of living on the part of surplus populations and its temporal dynamics as the newly discovered resource undergirding the expansion of city everywhere. (shrink)

As a senior physicist colleague and our friend, Robert N. Boyd, wrote in a journal (JCFA, Vol. 1,. 2, 2022), Our universe is but one page in a large book [4]. For example, things and Beings can travel between Universes, intentionally or unintentionally. In this short remark, we revisit and offer short remark to Neil’s ideas and trying to connect them with geometrization of musical chords as presented by D. Tymoczko and others, then to Escher staircase and then to Jacob’s (...) ladder which seems to point to possibility to interpret Jacob’s vision as described in the ancient book of Genesis as inter dimensional or heavenly staircase, e.g. an inter dimensional bridge between heaven and earth (see also classic book: Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach). Jacob’s vision of angels going down to earth from that staircase has been depicted for instance in William Blake art etc. In our communication with others via physics literature and discussions etc, we came to several conclusions as follows: Firstly, possibility of quantum wormhole effect to mirror particle universe, which sometimes it is termed non-orientable wormhole. While such mirror particles effect have been more than 50 years predicted with the so-called parity violation (cf. Lee & Yang, 1950s), and that is called symmetry breaking. Secondly, a series of extended experiments on laser irradiated cold water may suggest possible transition from a phase of water to be at least partially fourth phase of water, which may be composed of crystalline water (see e.g. Gerald Pollack, and also Harold Aspden on liquid crystalline). If we can imagine laser cooling effect can be done in protracted time, then we can achieve a physical representation of Aspden’s liquid crystalline. Therefore, in subsequent article (Part II) we outlined simple model of such an effect of tunneling via quantum liquid crystalline Universe, which may likely be modeled with iced-water. It is interesting to remark here that certain experiments by Stockholm University scientists have shown that X-ray triggered water can exhibit properties just like liquid crystal (cf. PRL, 2020). That is why we consider it possible that there can be quantum phase transition where liquid water (comprised of iced cubes and water) can exhibit effects such as tunneling in quantum liquid crystalline Universe. Last but not least, we admit that what we outlined here is just an initial phase; and if you wish, perhaps we can call such experiments as “wormhole-at-lab” experiments (abbreviated: WHALE). (shrink)

For a set x, let ${\cal S}\left$ be the set of all permutations of x. We prove in ZF several results concerning this notion, among which are the following: For all sets x such that ${\cal S}\left$ is Dedekind infinite, $\left| {{{\cal S}_{{\rm{fin}}}}\left} \right| < \left| {{\cal S}\left} \right|$ and there are no finite-to-one functions from ${\cal S}\left$ into ${{\cal S}_{{\rm{fin}}}}\left$, where ${{\cal S}_{{\rm{fin}}}}\left$ denotes the set of all permutations of x which move only finitely many elements. For all sets (...) x such that ${\cal S}\left$ is Dedekind infinite, $\left| {{\rm{seq}}\left} \right| < \left| {{\cal S}\left} \right|$ and there are no finite-to-one functions from ${\cal S}\left$ into seq, where seq denotes the set of all finite sequences of elements of x. For all infinite sets x such that there exists a permutation of x without fixed points, there are no finite-to-one functions from ${\cal S}\left$ into x. For all sets x, $|{[x]^2}| < \left| {{\cal S}\left} \right|$. (shrink)

In book X of the Republic, Plato famously reports “a quarrel between poetry and philosophy.” The present essay examines this quarrel in book X, along with other relevant parts of the Republic, by understanding “philosophy” and “poetry” as rival ways of life and rival ways of discourse. The essay first explains why, in Plato’s view, poetic discourse weakens one’s power to reason and is at odds with philosophic discourse. Then it shows how poetic discourse is bound up with a way (...) of life that champions the value of freedom. Such a life forms a contrast with the philosophic life, which is marked more by stability and unity than by freedom. The quarrel, however, is not a simple antagonism. The essay hence concludes by discussing why, despite the opposition between the two, philosophy cannot do without poetry. (shrink)

The Reichenbach-Grunbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light of the conventionality thesis. (...) The slow-transport method of synchrony is then examined in the light of these results and is shown not to provide an adequate method of uniquely determining the one-way speed of light. Finally, the general ε -Lorentz transformations for events along the x-axis are derived from three principles: the round-trip light principle, the principle of equal passage times, and the linearity principle. These principles are shown to be independent of one-way velocity assumptions, and thus may form the basis of a Special Theory of Relativity without distant simultaneity assumptions. (shrink)

In book X of the Republic, Plato famously reports “a quarrel between poetry and philosophy.” The present essay examines this quarrel in book X, along with other relevant parts of the Republic, by understanding “philosophy” and “poetry” as rival ways of life and rival ways of discourse. The essay first explains why, in Plato’s view, poetic discourse weakens one’s power to reason and is at odds with philosophic discourse. Then it shows how poetic discourse is bound up with a way (...) of life that champions the value of freedom. Such a life forms a contrast with the philosophic life, which is marked more by stability and unity than by freedom. The quarrel, however, is not a simple antagonism. The essay hence concludes by discussing why, despite the opposition between the two, philosophy cannot do without poetry. (shrink)

In hume's dialogues, Part x, Philo presents the trilemma attributed to epicurus: "is God willing but unable to prevent evil? able but unwilling? both willing and able? whence, Then is evil?" some critics say philo is trying to disprove god's existence. Some say he is not. I say he grants God exists as the first cause in order to show natural religion is impossible. For natural religion must establish god's benevolence, But it cannot combat "moderate scepticism" to establish any moral (...) attribute of god. It would have to show first that men are for the most part happy--A proposition no one can prove both because it is contrary to everyone's feeling and experience and because it is impossible to compute all the pains and pleasures of all men. Philo's argument stands independently of the more frequently discussed four causes argument of part xi. (shrink)

This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure, ‘I don’t want X, I want/just want Y’. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and television documentary data, I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure following a co-interactant’s formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses decrease the likelihood of (...) challenge in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns speakers routinely deal with the last item first. The value of ‘I want Y’ is to formulate an alternative sense of agency which undermines the preceding turn and shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. The article contributes to work in discursive psychology as I show how speakers may formulate their ‘wants’ in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Apostolic Letter of Our Most Holy Father PAUL VI, by Divine Providence, POPE to Our Venerable Brethren, Cardinal John Carmel Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster, and Gordon Joseph Gray, Archbishop of Saint Andrews and Edinburgh and to the other Archbishops and Bishops of England, Wales and Scotland. On the Occasion of the Second Scholastic Congress held at Oxford and Edinburgh on the Seventh Centenary of the Birth of John Duns (...) Scotus. Venerable Brethren, Greetings and Apostolic Blessing: A devoted mother of valiant men, Great Britain is distinguished by a quality no less estimable than the honour and the feats of her glorious children, for she knows how to cherish fondly the memory of her glorious sons and, when tradition demands that recurrences be celebrated solemnly, she knows how to sing their praises as though striving to repay them a debt of honour. These were the thoughts that sprang to our mind, and gave no slight satisfaction as we dwelt upon them, when we first learned the details of the Second International Scholastic Congress which is being prepared in your countries in memory of the Venerable John Duns Scotus on the seven hundredth anniversary of his birth. This Congress will be held at Oxford and Edinburgh under your patronage, Venerable Brethren, with lively interest and careful organization. One can already foresee that it will produce excellent results and will be of considerable importance, in view both of the arguments that will be discussed and of the distinguished persons who will take part in the sessions. Universities of England and Scotland and, from abroad, the universities of Paris and Cologne where he lectured, and many others, will send official representatives; apart from Catholics, there will be outstanding members of the Anglican Communion, of the Church of Scotland, of other Christian Communities of Great Britain, and well known exponents of sacred learning from every part of the world. As We voice our wishes for a successful Congress and abundant fruits to follow from it, we express frankly our satisfaction at the particular character of this Congress and certain features with which it is intended to distinguish it. Its principal and definite purpose is to shed 6 POPE PAUL VI. a brilliant light on the person of John Duns Scotus, on his philosophical and theological doctrine, and his moral and ascetic principles. Avoiding the reefs of discussion and controversy which so often stood in the way in times gone by, the critico-historical method has been adopted in accordance with modern preferences, a method which, employed by learned men in discovering which are the genuine works of the Subtle Doctor and what are really and truly his teachings, has yielded excellent results. For this reason combined efforts are being made to produce the broad outline of a panorama, namely a unified vision of the whole family of the Scholastic doctors, in which it will be possible to measure and understand the variety, the richness, and the fecundity of the philosophical and theological doctrine which flourished in the Middle Ages. There is no doubt that in this panorama Saint Thomas Aquinas with his "Summa theologica" rises like a lofty peak dominating the mountains in the vicinity, that is, the whole world of sacred learning developed during his time. The synthesis created bythe Angelic Doctor in describing the relationship between Faith and Reason, between Faith seeking understanding (as your own Saint Anselm of Canterbury had already expressed it1) and understanding seeking Faith, achieved such universal agreement that he is recognised as leader in the ranks of the Scholastics and is rightly celebrated by the name of Doctor Communis. Side by side with him, however, other prominent Scholastic teachers and doctors stand out, like stars illuminating the Catholic learning of the period. In the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, in which Our Predecessor of happy memory, Pope Leo XIII, pleads for the revival of Scholasticism under the leadership of Saint Thomas Aquinas in opposition to modern errors, after the statement that "Saint Thomas towers above all others",2 other Scholastic doctors are enumerated and a prominent place is reserved for Saint Bonaventure, whom Saint Pius X afterwards called "the second leader of Scholasticism",3 and it is universally recognised... (shrink)

Part/whole is said in many ways: the leg is part of the table, the subset is part of the set, rectangularity is part of squareness, and so on. Do the various flavors of part/whole have anything in common? They may be partial orders, but so are lots of non-mereological relations. I propose an “upward difference transmission” principle: x is part of y if and only if x cannot change in specified respects while y stays the same in those respects.

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

Abstract. There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand, are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand, are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. This (...) article considers one facet of this debate: evaluating the relevance of the fact that the remedies available for breach of contract can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. This wide variation in remedies for breach of a (contractual) promise is one central difference between promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law. The article asserts that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, universal theory of Contract Law. (shrink)

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which (...) challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life? (shrink)

It is widely agreed that Hume’s description of human inductive reasoning is inadequate. But many philosophers think that this inadequacy in no way affects the force of Hume’s argument for the unjustifiability of inductive reasoning. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension, given that Hume was not merely pointing out that induction is fallible. I then explore a recent diagnosis of where Hume’s sceptical argument goes wrong, due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that Hume committed a (...) quantifier-shift fallacy, i.e. inferred a statement of ∃∀ form from one of V∀∃ form. The implications of this diagnosis for the traditional problem of induction are briefly examined. The author suggests that, were his philosophy received, we must alter from the foundation the greatest part of the sciences. Hume 1740. (shrink)

I will here sharply oppose all the phases of the story Schaffer & Knobe tell. In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer & Knobe’s supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.

Act Utilitarianisms divide into Total and Average versions. Total versions seem to imply Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”. Average versions are proposed in part to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but these are subject to “Mere Addition” arguments as detailed by Hudson in “The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People”. Thus, various intermediate versions of utilitarianism, such as the one investigated by Hurka in “Value and Population Size”, take on interest. But Hudson argues that such compromise theories are subject to the mere addition (...) arguments, and are therefore no improvement over Average Utilitarianism. I disagree: some such compromise solutions escape Hudson’s Mere Addition arguments. (shrink)

Modern Standard German does not have distinct forms for nominatives and accusatives in the feminine gender. This is not only unique within Germanic languages, but also quite remarkable from a typological and functional viewpoint, under the plausible assumption that feminine NPs do not differ in animacy from masculine NPs. I will discuss the loss of the N/A distinction for feminines in detail and speculate about possible reasons – among others, that the referents of feminines are not typically animate, that the (...) syncretism was modelled after a similar syncretism in the plural, and that a sexist bias of the speech community in which the syncretism originated influenced a core part of the grammar of their language. (shrink)