I n my argument in this paper I shall assume rather than try to prove the proposition, surely not on the face of it an unreasonable one, that the question of what actions, dispositions and circumstances are such as to frustrate human beings, and what are such as to make them comparatively happy and fulfilled, has a great deal of bearing on the question of what actions and dispositions are good or bad. I shall also assume that the way in (...) which human persons or societies can achieve fulfilment, or fail to achieve it, is explicable largely on the basis of the way in which man as a species has evolved. Few people, except those strongly affected by philosophical fashion, will wish to deny the first of these propositions. What one might call the hard utilitarian thesis, that goodness is to be defined in terms of contribution to happiness or fulfilment, may involve the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, may be vulnerable to the arguments of Moore, Hare and others. But I shall not commit myself here to the hard utilitarian thesis, since I am not insisting that goodness may be defined in terms of contribution to human happiness or fulfilment, but only that the question of how far anything contributes to human happiness or fulfilment has a vital bearing on the question of whether and to what extent it is good. I do not think that many people really doubt the truth of this proposition, unless they confuse it with the hard utilitarian thesis. (shrink)

‘Dialectic’ or ‘dialectics’ has been defined as the ‘art of investigating the truth of opinions, testing of truth by discussion’. What can usefully be said about the art of investigating or testing the truth of religious opinions by discussion?

An English eccentric and an agitated dean -- Mr. McGregor's garden -- I banish you -- Vultures and ostriches -- Post mortem.

I would like in what follows to discuss the uses for civilization of Lonergan’s philosophical work, and then say something about the broader significance of the method which he propounded for theology.

TO BE A THEIST, THE AUTHOR ARGUES, IS TO CONSTRUE THE WORLD AS A WHOLE ON THE MODEL OF A RATIONAL AGENT’S ACTIVITIES. CHRISTIAN THEISM IS CHARACTERISED BY PARTICULAR CLAIMS AS TO MATTERS OF FACT: GOD IS (A) THAT WHICH IS SAID TO MAKE ALL THINGS, (B) THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, (C) THAT WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BRING ABOUT A STATE OF JUSTICE, (D) THAT WHICH BROUGHT IT ABOUT THAT JESUS LIVED, DIED AND ROSE FROM THE DEAD. MEYNELL CONTENDS THAT (...) THIS IS A LOGICALLY COHERENT IDEA AND SHOWS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEPENDENT CONCEPTS OF GRACE, EVIL, PRAYER, PROVIDENCE, MIRACLE AND THE AFTER-LIFE THAT THE CHRISTIAN FAITH HAS ESCHATOLOGICAL TRUTH-CONDITIONS. (BP). (shrink)

Putnam argues rightly that, if scientism were true, values and intentionality would be eliminable from a description of the world as it really is. But these are not eliminable, since science itself depends on them. But he wrongly believes that, if there were any viable form of metaphysics, it would have to be scientism. This article argues that, if one applies Putnam's insights and corrects his oversights, a metaphysics is possible, which, while it is based on the methods of science, (...) is not scientism, and can accommodate intentionality and value. (shrink)

The Nature of Aesthetic Value proposes that aesthetic goodness, the property in virtue of which works of art are valuable, is a matter of their capacity in appropriate circumstances to give satisfaction. It inquires into the nature of this satisfaction, arguing that it consists of the extension and clarification of consciousness. This provides a basis for treatment of the ancient problem of the relation between cultivation of the arts and the pursuit and maintenance of the true and the good. The (...) book summarizes critics' judgments and arguments on literature, the visual arts, and music, testing the author's theory about the nature of aesthetic opinion. (shrink)

Williams's views on the following topics are expounded and criticized: the disanalogy between ethics and science; foundations of ethics in psychology; the self-disposability of the conscious subject; the bearings on one another of ethics and religion; the bogey of obligation; and the relevance of Greek philosophy. It is maintained that ethical arguments have a closer analogy with those of science than Williams will admit, though it is conceded that some moral questions are probably in principle incapable of being settled due (...) to conflict of basic criteria, especially happiness and fairness. (shrink)

I want in what follows to suggest – it would take a great deal of space to argue the matter in detail – that each of the prevailing schools of philosophy, the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and the ‘Continental’, has its characteristic strengths and weaknesses; and that to make effective progress in the philosophy of religion, one needs the virtues of both.

Focusing on the Aristotelian framework, the author defends 'Soft Utilitarianism' as combining the principle of happiness with the principle of fairness, being careful to note that these two features of a proper ethical theory cannot be reduced one to the other in the decision making process.

How can Socrates maintain, as he appears to do, that both pleasure and virtue are the chief good? In the Gorgias, he declares that pleasure is not the good for human beings. Consistently with this, he argues in the Apology and Crito that this good is virtue. Yet in the Protagoras, he can claim after all that it is pleasure. How can these positions be other than mutually contradictory? A common strategy among interpreters is to take the Protagoras as making (...) concessions for the sake of argument, or merely experimenting with ideas. This cutting of the Gordian knot is repudiated by Professor Rudebusch. The answer he gives is that there are two possible accounts of pleasure; and the fact that Socrates argues against pleasure as conceived in one way, in the Gorgias, is perfectly compatible with his acceptance of it as envisaged in another, as illustrated by the Protagoras. If Socrates is commending the life of virtue as itself the most pleasurable, all inconsistency disappears. As Rudebusch says, this is not a matter of concern merely to scholars; if anyone were convinced by Socrates on the point, he or she might well be induced to make fundamental changes in his or her way of living. (shrink)