The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein cites the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Koehler almost as often as he cites William James in his posthumously published writings on the philosophy of psychology. Yet, few treatments of the Wittgenstein–Koehler relation in the philosophical literature could be called sustained discussions. Moreover, most of them treat Koehler as a mere whipping boy for Wittgenstein, one more opportunity to criticize the practice of psychologists. This article emphasizes how much the two thinkers agreed, and the extent to which (...) some of Wittgenstein’s work not only agreed with but also has a logical structure parallel to some of Koehler’s text. Both thinkers hold that the theoretician should strive to recognize and resist the impulse to step in and purify, distill, streamline, or exclude phenomena: common, everyday experience for Koehler and common, everyday uses of words for Wittgenstein. They both aim to counteract the tendency to discount and disparage what is ordinary and common. (shrink)

Mandelbaum adopted a middle course between physicalistic scientific realism and phenomenalistic "ordinary language" direct realism. He affirmed the relevance of scientific knowledge for epistemology, but did not attempt to reduce the content of perception to physical properties. Rather, he developed a critical direct realism, according to which we see bodies by means of having phenomenal experience. This phenomenal experience was not, however, to be equated with the sense-data of the usual representative realism. Rather, it was a perception of material objects (...) by means of their qualities. In this way, he agreed with the phenomenological position of the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Koehler, who rejected the view that sense-data by themselves could provide an epistemic basis for knowledge claims. Koehler's position, too, may be described as a critical realism. As would Mandelbaum, he sought to give proper due to the phenomenal while also affirming its basis in a physical world of objects and brain processes. In its insistence on the reality and scientific respectability of the phenomenal, the critical realism of Mandelbaum and Koehler is distinct from the contemporaneous physicalism of Place and Smart. (shrink)

The relevance of Wolfgang K hler's psychoneural isomorphism principle to contemporary cognitive neuroscience is explored. K hler's approach to the mind—body problem is interpreted as a response to the foundational crisis of psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Some aspects of his isomorphism doctrine are discussed, with a view to reaching an interpretation that is both historically accurate and pertinent to issues currently debated in the philosophy of psychology. The principle was meant to be empirically verifiable. Accordingly, (...) some similarities between K hler's approach and current neural network modeling are pointed out, and it is shown that some recent trends in the neurosciences are broadly compatible with K hler's views on cortical functioning. Isomorphism is interpreted as a form of neuroreductionism constrained by bridging laws relating mental phenomena to macrosocopic parameters of neural function. While isomorphism is probably valid for perceptual phenomena, its applicability to higher mental processes remains doubtful. (shrink)

"A Survey of Ranking Theory": The paper gives an up-to-date survey of ranking theory. It carefully explains the basics. It elaborates on the ranking theoretic explication of reasons and their balance. It explains the dynamics of belief statable in ranking terms and indicates how the ranks can thereby be measured. It suggests how the theory of Bayesian nets can be carried over to ranking theory. It indicates what it might mean to objectify ranks. It discusses the formal and the philosophical (...) aspects of the tight relation and the complementarity of ranks and probabilities. It closes with comparative remarks on predecessors and other philosophical proposals as well as formal models developed in AI. (shrink)

Concentrating upon applications that are most relevant to modern physics, this valuable book surveys variational principles and examines their relationship to dynamics and quantum theory. Stressing the history and theory of these mathematical concepts rather than the mechanics, the authors provide many insights into the development of quantum mechanics and present much hard-to-find material in a remarkably lucid, compact form. After summarizing the historical background from Pythagoras to Francis Bacon, Professors Yourgrau and Mandelstram cover Fermat's principle of least time, the (...) principle of least action of Maupertuis, development of this principle by Euler and Lagrange, and the equations of Lagrange and Hamilton. Equipped by this thorough preparation to treat variational principles in general, they proceed to derive Hamilton's principle, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and Hamilton's canonical equations. An investigation of electrodynamics in Hamiltonian form covers next, followed by a resume of variational principles in classical dynamics. The authors then launch into an analysis of their most significant topics: the relation between variational principles and wave mechanics, and the principles of Feynman and Schwinger in quantum mechanics. Two concluding chapters extend the discussion to hydrodynamics and natural philosophy. Professional physicists, mathematicians, and advanced students with a strong mathematical background will find this stimulating volume invaluable reading. Extremely popular in its hardcover edition, this volume will find even wider appreciation in its first fine inexpensive paperbound edition. (shrink)

Ranking theory delivers an account of iterated contraction; each ranking function induces a specific iterated contraction behavior. The paper shows how to reconstruct a ranking function from its iterated contraction behavior uniquely up to multiplicative constant and thus how to measure ranks on a ratio scale. Thereby, it also shows how to completely axiomatize that behavior. The complete set of laws of iterated contraction it specifies amend the laws hitherto discussed in the literature.

In addition to discussing some philosophical accounts of common sense, this article considers several ways in which common sense can be altered or disturbed in psychopathology. Common sense can be defined as practical understanding, capacity to see and take things in their right light, sound judgment, or ordinary mental capacity. The philosopher Vico described it as the ability to distinguish the probable from the improbable. Goethe understood common sense as an "organ" that is formed in communication for the purpose of (...) communication. Common sense is rooted in the intersubjective constitution of the life-world. Obsessive-compulsive patients show relatively mild disturbances of common sense. Patients with major affective psychoses, in their premorbid personality structure, are overly attached to common sense. In schizophrenia, however, there seems to be a true abdication of common sense involving a loss of "natural self-evidence." Even in premorbid states, such persons often lose both the sense of tact and the ability to "take things in their right light." Although logic, and the ability to engage in theoretical discussion, may be preserved, there is a loss of interpretive skills and the "faculty of judgment"; this results in an inability to cope with everyday practical and social activity. There is also a characteristic sense of perplexity, a sense of amazement before that which would normally seem self-evident and a frequent tendency to reflect upon the conditions of possibility of existence that otherwise remain concealed. The author suggests that the fragility of common sense should not be seen as a mere deficiency state. Rather, it derives from a basic vulnerability inherent in the very structure of being human. (Abstract written by special issue editor: L.A.S.). (shrink)

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...) of this presence. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper deals with an apparent tension in Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical Investigations_: Wittgenstein holds an expressivist position with regard to avowals, but also claims that the _doxastic_ avowal “I believe that p” is a “hesitant assertion” of p. It is argued that the tension is apparent only and that Wittgenstein’s expressivism in fact justifies and explains his views on “I believe”: avowals typically are _explicit expressives_ and usually implicate the corresponding illocutionary acts. The hesitant assertion of (...) p is the result of an implicature of the explicit expressive “I believe that p”. The paper also addresses the ambiguity of avowals and the possibility of thereby undermining the Frege–Geach objection to psychological expressivism. (shrink)

Recently, Bengt Hansson presented a paper about dyadic deontic logic,2 criticizing some purely axiomatic systems of dyadic deontic logic and proposing three purely semantical systems of dyadic deontic logic which he confidently called dyadic standard systems of deontic logic (DSDL1–3). Here I shall discuss the third by far most interesting system DSDL3 which is operating with preference relations. First, I shall describe this semantical system (Sections 1.1–1.3). Then I shall give an axiomatic system (Section 1.4) which is proved to be (...) correct (Section 2) and complete (Section 3) with respect to Hansson's semantics. Finally, in face of these results Hansson's semantics will be discussed from a more intuitive standpoint. After emphasizing its intuitive attractiveness (Section 4.1) I will show that two objections often discussed in connection with preference relations do not apply to it (Section 4.2 and 4.3); more precisely, I will show that the connectedness condition for preference relations can be dropped and that, in a sense, it is not necessary to compare two possible worlds differing in infinitely many respects. (What exactly is meant by this, will become clear later on.) Yet there is a third objection to Hansson's semantics which points to a real intuitive inadequacy of DSDL3. A way of removing this inadequacy, which corresponds to Hansson's own intuitions as well as to familiar metaethical views, is suggested, but not technically realized (Section 4.4). In the last section (section 4.5) I shall briefly show that DSDL3 is decidable, as expected. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.

The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...) transparency is ill-motivated and then offer a non-epistemic interpretation of ascriptive transparency by reference to the theory of explicit expressive acts: “I think it will rain” requires attendance to the weather because the utterance expresses a belief about the weather, not about ourselves. This will allow us to avoid what is often called “the puzzle of transparent self-knowledge” while remaining faithful to Evans’ linguistic observations. (shrink)

Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be combined and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general framework. To this purpose, a distinction between a predictive and a conceptual type of analogical reasoning is introduced. I then take up (...) a common intuition according to which analogical inferences hold if the differences between source and target concern only irrelevant circumstances. I attempt to make this idea more precise by addressing possible objections and in particular by specifying a notion of causal irrelevance based on difference making in homogeneous contexts. (shrink)

Nicht zuletzt der Krieg in der Ukraine zeigt die herausragende Bedeutung des Weltraumes für unsere Gesellschaft sowie die militärische Operationsführung im Allgemeinen. Bereits in 2019 wurde durch die NATO dieser Bedeutung Rechnung getragen, in dem der Weltraum als fünfte Dimension neben Luft, Land, See und Cyber anerkannt wurde. Die für den Weltraum notwendige Infrastruktur wird gemeinhin als kritisch betrachtet und fällt damit auch unter die Abschreckungssystematik der NATO. Der Beitrag diskutiert die Abschreckungspolitik der NATO im Kontext Weltraum entlang der zwei (...) vorherrschenden Paradigmen – deterrence by punishment und deterrence by denial. In der Folge wird diskutiert, inwieweit die Förderung einer tragfähigen Responsive Space-Mentalität und deren Umsetzung in anwendbare Strategien von wesentlicher Bedeutung für die Übertragung auf eine kollektive Abschreckungsstrategie der NATO sein wird. Reaktionsfähige Weltraumkapazitäten werden es allen Mitgliedstaaten ermöglichen, zu den kollektiven Verteidigungsanstrengungen des Bündnisses beizutragen und den Grundsatz der deterrence by denial zu stärken. (shrink)

We define classes Φnof formulae of first-order arithmetic with the following properties:(i) Everyφϵ Φnis classically equivalent to a Πn-formula (n≠ 1, Φ1:= Σ1).(ii)(iii)IΠnandiΦn(i.e., Heyting arithmetic with induction schema restricted to Φn-formulae) prove the same Π2-formulae.We further generalize a result by Visser and Wehmeier. namely that prenex induction within intuitionistic arithmetic is rather weak: After closing Φnboth under existential and universal quantification (we call these classes Θn) the corresponding theoriesiΘnstill prove the same Π2-formulae. In a second part we consideriΔ0plus collection-principles. We (...) show that both the provably recursive functions and the provably total functions ofare polynomially bounded. Furthermore we show that the contrapositive of the collection-schema gives rise to instances of the law of excluded middle and hence. (shrink)

This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of the topic must show how it extends to natural necessity or deterministic laws or full determination in perfect parallel. The paper indicates at the end how this demand (...) can be met. (shrink)

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa ; in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful for (...) developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness itself. (shrink)

Originally published as 'Das Problem des Prinzipienforschung und die aristotelische Physik' in Kant-Studien 52 (1960-1), pp. 206-19, the revised text of a lecture given on 28 October 1959 in Hamburg. It presents in summary form the main line of argument developed in the introduction and first two parts of Wieland's book, Die aristotelische Physik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1962).

This paper deals with Hans Reichenbach's common cause principle. It was propounded by him in, and has been developed and widely applied by Wesley Salmon, e.g. in and. Thus, it has become one of the focal points of the continuing discussion of causation. The paper addresses five questions. Section 1 asks: What does the principle say? And section 2 asks: What is its philosophical significance? The most important question, of course, is this: Is the principle true? To answer that question, (...) however, one must first consider how one might one argue about it at all. One can do so by way of examples, the subject of section 3, or more theoretically, which is the goal of section 4. Based on an explication of probabilistic causation proposed by me in,, and, section 4 shows that a variant of the principle is provable within a classical framework. The question naturally arises whether the proved variant is adequate, or too weak. This is pursued in section 5. My main conclusion will be that some version of Reichenbach's principle is provably true, and others may be. This may seem overly ambitious, but it is not. The paper does not make any progress on essential worries about the common cause principle arising in the quantum domain; it only establishes more rigorously what has been thought to be plausible at least within a classical framework. (shrink)

The paper proposes two principles of coherence (thus taking up work started in Spohn (1991) "A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons"). The latter indeed serves as a weak, but precise explication of the notion of coherence as it is used in the current epistemological discussion. After discussing their epistemological setting, the paper considers four ways of establishing these principles. They may be inferred neither from enumerative induction, nor from the nature of propositions as objects of belief, nor in (...) a Kantian way from self-consciousness. Rather, I propose a fairly rigorous way to infer them from an even more fundamental rationality principle of non-dogmatism and an elementary theory of perception. (shrink)

We examine the performance of some standard causal discovery algorithms, both constraint-based and score-based, from the perspective of how robust they are against failures of the Causal Faithfulness Assumption. For this purpose, we make only the so-called Triangle-Faithfulness assumption, which is a fairly weak consequence of the Faithfulness assumption, and otherwise allows unfaithful distributions. In particular, we allow violations of Adjacency-Faithfulness and Orientation-Faithfulness. We show that the PC algorithm, a representative constraint-based method, can be made more robust against unfaithfulness by (...) incorporating elements of the GES algorithm, a representative score-based method; similarly, the GES algorithm can be made less error-prone by incorporating elements of the conservative PC algorithm. As our simulations demonstrate, the increased robustness seems to matter even when faithfulness is not exactly violated, for with only finite sample, distributions that are not exactly unfaithful may be sufficiently close to being unfaithful to make trouble. (shrink)

Modern theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Still, the general topic remained a genuinely philosophical one. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview. Section 2 explains the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality can be given; the questions turn out to be quite unevenly addressed in the literature. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of (...) rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to confirm that it was Hamann's translation of Hume's "Treatise" (I.4.7) which triggered Kant's critical turn in 1768/69. If this is indeed so, then Kant's inaugural dissertation must be reassessed, in particular the doctrine, to be found there, that we have cognitive access to the intelligible world. This doctrine is part of a strategy for tackling the problem highlighted by Hume; that there may be conflicting principles at work in the human mind, i.e., an (...) antinomy. The dissertation's strategy failed and so raised the question of how categories can refer to objects. (shrink)

Die Generationsgenossen Max Scheler und Ernst Cassirer haben vermutlich nie persönlichen Kontakt gehabt. Gleichwohl gibt es in ihren Texten beachtliche Verweise aufeinander, die eine thematische und methodische Vergleichbarkeit von Problemstellungen zeigen. Statt der Untersuchung von persönlichen wechselseitigen Beeinflussungen empfiehlt sich deshalb eine strukturelle philosophische Komparatistik. Scheler und Cassirer teilen die Würdigung des Ausdrucksphänomens als Wirklichkeitsparadigma. Von daher gelangen sie beide zu einer Konzeption von Kultur und Anthropologie (als Inbegriff von Wissensformen), in welcher der Befund der Krise eine konstitutive Rolle spielt. (...) Am Thema der Metaphysik scheinen die beiden Autoren sich von einander zu trennen. Doch auch bei dem gegenüber Schelers Metaphysik höchst kritischen Cassirer lassen sich gleichwohl – gerade in der kulturanthropologischen Grundposition – metaphysische und religiöse Positionen ausmachen. (shrink)

I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess certain content-characteristics, but simply and irreducibly thatIexperience them – i.e. that they are, at the time of their occurrence, experientially presentto me–, whatever their contents may be. So the central question regarding personal identity is: What is this “I”to whomthe experiences are present, and what is the nature of its (...) identity across changing experiences? Following Zahavi, I suggest that the subject is not to be conceived as a merely postulated trans-experiential entity but has its very being in experiential presence itself. Yet the question is how to conceive of this presence. When we understand it as a property or quality of the experiences (as Zahavi seems to do), the problem is that every experience that has ever been experienced possesses this property, and so it cannot account for what it means that some experiences are experiencedby meand not some other subject. In contrast, I suggest (following Klawonn’s “I-dimension” theory) understanding experiential presence not as a property of the experiences but as a dimension which is able to comprise many experiences and to abide as identical through their change – an idea that can also be found in some formulations of Zahavi’s, but which he does not distinguish with the necessary clarity from the quality account. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether managerial rhetoric in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K filings can help gauge the level of managerial opportunism in a firm. We find that the use of trust-related words is connected to inefficient investment decisions and poor operating performance. Furthermore, firms making more frequent use of trust-related words are subject to less monitoring by institutional investors or analysts. Their accounting also relies more heavily on discretionary accruals. These results are consistent with the notion that (...) managerial rhetoric to advertise trustworthiness points towards agency problems plaguing the firm. (shrink)

The paper is based on ranking theory, a theory of degrees of disbelief (and hence belief). On this basis, it explains enumerative induction, the confirmation of a law by its positive instances, which may indeed take various schemes. It gives a ranking theoretic explication of a possible law or a nomological hypothesis. It proves, then, that such schemes of enumerative induction uniquely correspond to mixtures of such nomological hypotheses. Thus, it shows that de Finetti's probabilistic representation theorems may be transformed (...) into an account of confirmation of possible laws and that enumerative induction is equivalent to such an account. The paper concludes with some remarks about the apriority of lawfulness or the uniformity of nature. (shrink)

The central claim of the paper is, roughly, that the fact that it looks to somebody as if p is a defeasibly a priori reason for assuming that p (and vice versa), for any person, even for the perceiver himself. As a preparation, it outlines a doxastic conception suitable to explicate this claim and explains how to analyse dispositions within this conception. Since an observable p has the disposition to look as if p, this analysis generalizes to the central claim (...) which is then argued to be at the bottom of coherentism. Thus, the defense of the claim supports coherentism as opposed to foundationalism and at the same time provides an answer to skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

The Dialectica-style functional interpretation of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity ( $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ) given in [1] uses a choice functional (which is not a definable set function of ( $hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ). By means of a Diller-Nahm-style interpretation (cf. [4]) it is possible to eliminate the choice functional and give an interpretation by set functionals primitive recursive in $x\mapsto\omega$ . This yields the following characterization: The class of $\Sigma$ -definable set functions of $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ coincides with (...) the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in $x\mapsto \omega$. (shrink)

In the present paper we give a functional interpretation of Aczel's constructive set theories CZF − and CZF in systems T ∈ and T ∈ + of constructive set functionals of finite types. This interpretation is obtained by a translation × , a refinement of the ∧ -translation introduced by Diller and Nahm 49–66) which again is an extension of Gödel's Dialectica translation. The interpretation theorem gives characterizations of the definable set functions of CZF − and CZF in terms of (...) constructive set functionals. In a second part we introduce constructive set theories in all finite types. We expand the interpretation to these theories and give a characterization of the translation × . We further show that the simplest non-trivial axiom of extensionality is not interpretable by functionals of T ∈ and T ∈ + . We obtain this result by adapting Howard's notion of hereditarily majorizable functionals to set functionals. Subject of the last section is the translation ∨ that is defined in Burr for an interpretation of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity. (shrink)

The paper argues that the standard decision theoretic account of strategies and their rationality or optimality is much too narrow, that strategies should rather condition future action to future decision situations (a point of view already developed in my Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie, sect. 4.4), that practical deliberation must therefore essentially rely on a relation of superiority and inferiority between possible future decision situations, that all this allows to substantially broaden the theory of practical rationality, that a long list of points (...) attended to in the literature can be subsumed under the broadened perspective (including a novel view on the iterated prisoner's dilemma and on iterated Newcomb's problem, which, however, is revised in Spohn (2003) "Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation"), and that the task to complete and systematize this list indeed forms a fruitful research programme. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is a characterization of the $\Sigma_1$ -definable set functions of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity and a uniform version of axiom of choice: $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ . This class of functions is shown to coincide with the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in a given choice functional and $x\mapsto\omega$ . This goal is achieved by a Gödel Dialectica-style functional interpretation of $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ and a computability proof for the involved functionals.

In his new book, Rossi emphasizes the prominent role of enlightened religion in the political project of establishing perpetual peace. My paper discusses Rossi’s stance on the question as to whether Kant, in his later years, moved to an immanentist conception of the highest good. Kant’s own position in this regard can arguably be better described as comprehensive, according to which an immanent and a transcendent conception of the highest good are upheld as realizable side by side. Rossi’s account looks (...) perfectly consistent with such a view. One of the reasons for such a comprehensive reading is that “immanent” and “secular” do not coincide in Kant in the first place. Seen in this comprehensive way, and while a version of the highest good ought to be realized immanently, we cannot be certain that this will indeed happen. If it does indeed happen, the immortality postulate, which Kant never abandoned, renders it rational to believe that the immanent version of the highest good is merely a step towards its transcendent realization. Affinities of Rossi’s approach to the suggestion that Kant subscribes to a political theology based on what has been called “Molinism minimally defined” will also be explored. (shrink)

This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the “dependent” overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of (...) data must be seen as two illustrations of the same representational contents. The researchers’preference for using verbal data to assess the independent variable and the tendency to introduce a causal relationship between representation and behaviour is shown to result from misplacing folk-beliefs. Folk-beliefs about intentional causality, it is shown, pertain to the same level as other beliefs about the world on the part of the subjects. Hence they are part of the folk-representation itself and must be treated as such; their use in scientific accounts of the belief-action relationship is not implied by data on rational belief systems. It is suggested to conceptualize social representations as integral units of beliefs and action which may be used to explain causally subsequent contingent social events. The function of folk-beliefs in intentional causality for the self-concept of rational people and for social accountability is discussed. (shrink)

The mental system of an individual usually generates a reality-model that includes a self-model and a world-model as fundamental components. Exceptional experiences (ExE) can be classified as subjectively experienced anomalies in the self-model or the world-model or in the relation of both. Empirical studies show significant correlations between specific patterns of ExE and socially and clinically relevant variables. In order to examine the ontological status of anomalous phenomena a psychophysical approach is presented in which the principle of complementarity is of (...) fundamental importance. Applying a generalized quantum theory to psychosocial and psychophysical systems, complementary aspects such as autonomy versus reliability or novelty versus confirmation are identified as possible local and global variables. The findings indicate that entanglement correlations could play a role in the occurrence of ExE and that specific psychological interventions can dissolve them. (shrink)