Wittgenstein on “I believe”

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):54-69 (2018)
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Abstract

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper deals with an apparent tension in Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical Investigations_: Wittgenstein holds an expressivist position with regard to avowals, but also claims that the _doxastic_ avowal “I believe that p” is a “hesitant assertion” of p. It is argued that the tension is apparent only and that Wittgenstein’s expressivism in fact justifies and explains his views on “I believe”: avowals typically are _explicit expressives_ and usually implicate the corresponding illocutionary acts. The hesitant assertion of p is the result of an implicature of the explicit expressive “I believe that p”. The paper also addresses the ambiguity of avowals and the possibility of thereby undermining the Frege–Geach objection to psychological expressivism.

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References found in this work

Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Meaning and speech acts.R. M. Hare - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (1):3-24.
Moore's paradox and consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.
Die Entwicklung der Autorität der Ersten Person.Johannes L. Brandl - 2014 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (5).

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