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Felix Bräuer
Universität Mannheim
  1. Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (3):395–416.
    Relying on aesthetic testimony seems problematic. For instance, it seems problematic for me to simply believe or assert that The Velvet Underground's debut album The Velvet Underground and Nico (1964) is amazing solely because you have told me so, even though I know you to be an honest and competent music critic. But why? After all, there do not seem to be similar reservations regarding testimony from many other domains. In this paper, I will argue that relying on aesthetic testimony (...)
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  2. Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2259–2276.
    Many philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and (...)
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  3. The transparency of expressivism.Wolfgang Freitag & Felix Bräuer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-15.
    The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...)
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  4. The transparency of expressivism.Wolfgang Freitag & Felix Bräuer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-15.
    The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...)
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  5. The transparency of expressivism.Wolfgang Freitag & Felix Bräuer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-15.
    The paper argues that Gareth Evans’ argument for transparent self-knowledge is based on a conflation of doxastic transparency with ascriptive transparency. Doxastic transparency means that belief about one’s own doxastic state, e.g., the belief that one thinks that it will rain, can be warranted by ordinary empirical observation, e.g., of the weather. In contrast, ascriptive transparency says that self-ascriptions of belief, e.g., “I believe it will rain”, can be warranted by such observation. We first show that the thesis of doxastic (...)
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  6. Statistics as Figleaves.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):433-443.
    Recently, Jennifer Saul (“Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, 2017; “Racist and Sexist Figleaves”, 2021) has explored the use of what she calls “figleaves” in the discourse on race and gender. Following Saul, a figleaf is an utterance that, for some portion of the audience, blocks the conclusion that some other utterance, R, or the person who uttered R is racist or sexist. Such racial and gender figleaves are pernicious, says Saul, because, (...)
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  7. Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice.Felix Bräuer - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (2):399–419.
    People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kindsof speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties (...)
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  8. Epistemic Internalism and the Challenge from Testimony.Felix Bräuer - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 1 (13):82-98.
    In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism and anti-reductionism are compatible (...)
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  9. Looking beyond reductionism and anti-reductionism.Felix Bräuer - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):230-248.
    Under which conditions are we epistemically justied to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justication reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively, someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following this line of thought, (...)
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    Die Worte der Anderen.Felix Bräuer - 2021 - Paderborn, Deutschland: Mentis.
    Unter welchen Bedingungen sind wir geneigt, der Aussage eines Mitmenschen zu glauben? In den meisten Fällen sind wir gerechtfertigt, der Aussage eines Mitmenschen zu glauben, sofern wir keinen konkreten Anlass haben, an seiner Verlässlichkeit zu zweifeln. Dies gilt jedoch nicht, wenn sehr hohe praktische Risiken mit einer Fehlinformation einhergehen. In einem solchen Fall benötigen wir stets erfahrungsbasierte Gründe, die für die besondere Kompetenz der fraglichen Person auf dem relevanten Gebiet sprechen. Das gilt unabhängig davon, ob wir konkreten Anlass dazu haben, (...)
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  11.  32
    Testimonien, epistemische Gemeinschaften und praktische Risiken.Felix Bräuer - 2017 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 65 (5).
    Under what conditions are we justified in believing what people tell us? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist. Either our justification reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, some philosophers have argued that we need to look beyond this dichotomy. Following this line of thought, this paper examines and criticizes a recent proposal by John Greco. According to Greco, testimony has two functions: (1) passing on (...)
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