Chance and Necessity : From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection

In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 101-132 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of the topic must show how it extends to natural necessity or deterministic laws or full determination in perfect parallel. The paper indicates at the end how this demand can be met.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,377

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The big bad bug: What are the humean's chances?John Bigelow, John Collins & Robert Pargetter - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462.


Added to PP

49 (#273,591)

6 months
1 (#866,649)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Causation: An alternative.Wolfgang Spohn - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):93-119.
Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.
What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Franz Huber - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):81-110.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references